Thursday, November 13, 2008

Tests For A New President--West Africa

The big noise from the Continent of Collapsing States of late has focused on the East of Africa. The Jolly Pirates of Somalia, and their landlocked kinsmen, the woman killers of the Shabab, have gotten more than a little MSM coverage. Recently, the recrudescence of active war between the Looting, Pillaging, Raping and Killing National Force of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Tutsi "Freedom Fighters"of General Nkunda have occasioned much spilling of ink, wringing of UN and EU hands, and generation of photogenic refugee streams on the ground.

Meanwhile, on the other side of Africa, trajectories of both long standing and relatively recent origin are pointing to the emergence of another set of interlocking problems. For a single reason which will shortly become apparent, the United States will not be able to sit back, twiddle its thumbs, and hope somebody does something so that we don't have to.

At the center of the vortex sits Nigeria, flush with some 37 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and over five trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Nigeria also has a population of more than a 146 million who enjoy(?) a life expectancy of only forty-five or so years, a low per capita income, massive maldistribution of wealth, and sectarian violence pitting the majority Muslims (fifty percent of the folks) against the slightly less numerous Christians.

The sectarian killing comes on top of the long festering tribal hatreds. (For those of you who have reached a "certain age" think back to Biafra. It was all the rage forty or so years ago.) Endemic violence has joined with endemic disease and a precarious balance on the knife edge between enough to eat and starvation. In short, all four horsemen of the apocalypse are riding high and hard.

The schwerpunkt of the coming crisis in Nigeria is the delta of the Niger river. That delta is home to much of the Nigerian oil industry, particularly the tanker loading terminals. Thus, it is the primary point of departure of the oil, which provides 20 percent of the country's GDP, 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, and roughly 80 percent of the government's budget.

The delta is also home turf for MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. This insurgent group gives armed expression to very legitimate, completely organic political, economic, and social grievances. MEND has shown itself to be competent, well armed, and possessed of a keen eye for the media spectacular. The seizure of off-shore platforms, loading facilities and associated supply boats replete with kidnappings and "non-negotiable" demands.

The impact of MEND has been to significantly slow and even stop the shipment of oil from the Niger delta. It has also served to discourage further foreign investment or even the repair of aging facilities. It follows that MEND has hurt the already less than well emplaced government, which is struggling so far without great success to overcome the long wretched years of grossly corrupt and utterly incompetent military rule which ended not quite a decade ago.

"So what?" You ask.

The so what is this. The US is the largest export partner of Nigeria. We receive over fifty percent of Nigeria's exports. And, buddy, we ain't buying that much cocoa and rubber. We are buying that much oil. While the exports have fallen from their previous average level of 2.1 million barrels per day, the Nigerians still provide nearly a fifth of US oil imports.

The current downward trend of oil prices will hurt Nigeria. Without an increase in production, the country will not have the foreign exchange necessary to support its massive requirement for imported food. Heck, the Nigerian government might even have to postpone its ambitions to enter the space race in order to feed the people. To say nothing of meeting other basic needs such as infrastructure improvements.

As if the flaky situation in Nigeria were not sufficient to rate a high place in the contingency plans of the incoming US administration, the affairs of two other neighboring countries must be factored in.

The worse off of the two is Chad. You might remember Chad from a couple of decades ago when it fought a semi-comic, semi-tragic war with Libya. Back then, Chad, which is about three times the size of California, was best known as a place with nothing but miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles.

Enter oil. Chad has oil. Not a lot compared with Nigeria, but a still respectable 1.5 to 2 billion barrels. A consortium headed by ExxonMobil has sunk nearly four gigabucks into developing the oilfields in the south. These went on line in 2003.

Since the completion of a 650 mile pipeline to the Limboh terminal in Cameroon, approximately 225,000 barrels per day have been exported. This amount can be increased perhaps enough to make up some of the shortfall from Nigeria. The US is the destination for some 85 percent of the flow.

The government of Chad is controlled by a minority group. In addition, it is a government which, shall we say, lacks transparency. It is also a government which is excessively economical with the truth.

A prime example of this economy of truthfulness is found in the record of Chad's president, Idress Deby. President Deby swore to the World Bank and IMF that his government would institute a "share the wealth" program. Some of the oil revenues were to go to assorted social programs benefiting the people of southern Chad.

Instead the money went to security needs such as new weapons for the army. When first called to account for this, Deby responded by demanding a new agreement with the World Bank leaving out the pesky requirement to spend the money on trivia such as the people of Chad who have a low median income, a short life expectancy, an absence of medical care and educational facilities, and a surplus of frustration.

The then president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, agreed so that Deby would not carry out his threat to close the taps feeding the pipeline. The justification offered by Deby and accepted by Wolfowitz among others was the spreading conflict in Darfur and the threat of armed attack from Sudan

Deby proved himself another champion of democracy when he engineered the removal of limits upon his term in office. He has also proven himself a master of counterinsurgency by seeing the renewal of guerrilla attacks last year and a near overrunning of the capital earlier this year.

The guerrillas have popular support and have been shaking hands with al-Qaeda, which group has become increasingly active in both North Africa and the Sahel. Given that over half of Chad's ten million people are Muslim, this development has potential ramifications of importance.

Security at the oil fields is light. The pipeline cannot be secured against attack. As events in Sudan have shown in recent weeks, kidnapping of foreign technicians is a very viable option for even quite small groups of anti-government orientation.

Despite Deby's threat to close the Big Valve on the pipeline which caused Wolfie to quake in his upmarket boots, any hiccup in the flow of oil (and dollars) would cause seismic shaking in the Chadian government. A shaky Chad could become a collapsing Chad quickly.

Picture a failed state perched between Libya and Sudan, Niger and the Central African Republic. Ain't a pretty picture, is it?

The third country in the mix is Cameroon. While Cameroon itself has been quite stable by African standards, it is vulnerable to spill over from either or both Nigeria and Chad. Cameroon has made a few, hesitant, even microscopic steps in the general direction of democracy but remains under an authoritarian regime headed by Paul Biya. Biya has been running the show for twenty-six years now and shows no sign of being eager to retire.

Cameroon has a decent agricultural base and a modest oil patch. These have provided much of the reason for the country's stability. But, there are some very real problems there. Unemployment is running at or above thirty percent. Altogether forty-eight percent of the population lives below the local poverty line. Wealth is quite unevenly distributed with the top decile disposing of over thirty percent and the lowest decile less than three.

With the transfer of the Bakassi peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon, the possibility of developing more oil reserves exists. This possibility is of lesser importance than the development of the oil terminal at the end of the Chad pipeline. Overall, much of the recent appearance of stability in Cameroon has been dependent upon the high price for coffee, cocoa and oil. The government's share of the revenue stream has underwritten social and economic development programs catering to the aspirations and needs of selected portions of the population.

With prices headed down for some time to come, the Cameroon government will find it difficult to either placate disaffected portions of the public or provide for security forces. President Biya has expressed concern (alarm would be more accurate) over recent "pirate" raids on Cameroonian targets both afloat and on shore. Cameroon along with Nigeria has asked the UN for the establishment of an anti-piracy patrol in the Niger delta and adjacent international waters.

All three countries are inherently less than stable. All, Nigeria in particular, have past histories of internal conflict. All three have significant social and economic problems which could be capitalised upon easily by anti-government movements. Two of the three have majority Muslim populations which have experienced significant penetration by Islamist ideology.

The mix of factors now including a decline in world market prices for basic commodities is one of real explosive potential. Golly, what a great time to be the brand new, quite inexperienced POTUS.

Better start thinking about problems like the one outlined here, POTUS to be, before they become above the fold stories in the WaPo and NYT.

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