Talk About Bad Timing!

In the Great Game of Nations complexity is the rule. This being the ground truth, the main rule of the matter it ill behooves a country to make the game even more complex. However, this is what the Obama administration has managed to do in its so far bootless effort to constrain Iranian nuclear ambitions.

To be quite fair events outside the control of the administration have also served to render the Iranian nuclear question even more complex and resistant to solution. The specific event here is the killing of Hamas heavyweight Mahmoud al-Mabhou in Dubai.

The specific complication for which the Obama administration must take full responsibility is the sale of defensive weapon systems to Taiwan at almost the very moment that Secretary of State Clinton was making threats against Beijing in Paris. The administration acknowledged the obvious in advance: That the Chinese would go exoatmospheric over the sale.

Still, the sale and the threat of "diplomatic isolation" went on in apparent tandem. It is bizarre enough to utter dark predictions of evil consequences which would ensue upon the Trolls of Beijing continuing their opposition to another round of UN sanctions given that China is soon to be the second largest economy on the planet and holds oodles and oodles of Uncle Sam's IOUs with more on route. It is beyond the merely bizarre to assert such threats when the US needs the understanding cooperation of Beijing on many levels far more than the Chinese need Washington.

China may not veto any new round of Security Council sanctions, but it is not likely to abide by them. The same may be said of the Russians--and other countries. Even if Russia is on board with another sanction effort, it is less than probable that it would move to enforce them. Also questionable is the continued will and resolve of either Germany or France to take the economic hit of actually curtailing the thriving trade which businesses in both nations have carried on with the Iranians.

The cover for major sanction busting is already in place. It is provided by the internal opposition to the mullahocracy. An easy argument to the effect that any particular sanction requirement might hurt the Iranian people but not the government or Revolutionary Guard Corps exists.

Even if not true, even if the sanctions are narrowly directed against the Revolutionary Guard and other governmental entities, it may be said with a more-or-less straight face that the ultimate effect of any particular sanction (such as one hitting the gasoline deficiencies in the country) can be seen as weakening the opposition by hurting the person in the street. Thus, sanctions no matter how worded will be porous to the extreme.

The US has pinned too many hopes on the sanctions. So far none have worked. None are likely to given the resistance of the Trolls of Beijing and the ability of others to excuse sanction violations. As a result there exist two almost equally unpleasant alternatives: Accept Iran as a nuclear capable power and pray for sanity in Tehran or use the "military option."

In the interim the administration has to accept the probability that Iran will strike at Israel using proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. That the administration is doing just this is seen in the recent comment by former Marine general and current National Security Advisor, James Jones, that such are both probable and near term.

The near term just became shorter with the killing of the Hamas commander in Dubai. No matter who precisely suffocated (or electrocuted following torture) the guy, Hamas has already (surprise here) pointed the finger at Mossad. While it is equally probable that al-Mabhouh was killed by individuals in no way connected with either Mossad or Israel, the "Zionist entity" will be held responsible not only by Hamas but Tehran.

The Iranians are the largest supporter of Hamas as they are Hezbollah. Unlike Hezbollah which is subject to a fair amount of Syrian influence if not control, Hamas is answerable only to Tehran. The consequence is simply that if the interests of both are served, the resulting unity will assure Hamas takes its best shot at Israel (including Israel's external interests.)

The consequence of the new Dubai complication does reinforce the message of SecState Clinton to Beijing: That Iran is key to (in)stability in the region and this will redound to either the advantage or disadvantage of China.

The only bright ray of hope in the current set of reinforcing complexities is to be found in the inherent Chinese distaste for instability. More than most Western governments and societies turbulence of a social and political sort is anathema to the Chinese. If their Mideast/Persian Gulf regional experts are on the ball, the possibilities for burgeoning instability resident not only in the Iranian bomb dream but in the Iranian use of proxies against Israel and others will be properly highlighted for their bosses' attention and action.

Of course, the promptings of regional experts will be drowned out at least in the near future by the sense of outrage resounding around the Forbidden City in the wake of the US selling gigabucks of hardware to a recipient considered by the Trolls to be a province in rebellion. The rights and wrongs of this position are manifold but the consequences are not. China is not likely to heed either the threats of Secretary Clinton or the advice of their in-house experts.

So what?

So, the Obama administration can set yet one more deadline for Tehran's compliance. Or not. The end is the same. Iran will continue to pursue the bomb. The Israelis will have a very difficult decision to make. Hamas will seek to kill more.

Like some Frenchman once wrote, "The more things change, the more they stay the same."