The successful detonation of the bomb concealed on his person by the physician turned suicide bomber also represents a dramatic failure by CIA in following the basic rules of tradecraft. There is nothing mysterious about tradecraft. It is a combination of slightly paranoiac commonsense and good criminal procedure.
First and foremost tradecraft depends upon never trusting anyone--other than one's closest associates--completely. Or, to use the translated Russian proverb so beloved by Ronald Reagan, "Trust--but verify." In working a human source--which is what al-Balawi was supposed to be--it is an imperative that the source have face time only with his controller. Sure, there can be very occasional exceptions to that basic requirement, but the idea of allowing a double agent--which is what al-Balawi was--in close proximity with several officers including the COB is a major lapse.
No matter what hopes might have been placed on al-Balawi's capacity to play pointer to senior al-Qaeda personnel, no matter what assurances might have been provided by the General Intelligence Department in Jordan as to al-Balawi's new allegiances, he should have been handled only by his controller with other interested people viewing discretely. If it was absolutely essential, a second person, even the COB, might have entered the room with al-Balawi.
There is no doubt but most if not all double agents are prickly characters in need of constant reassurances, unending absolution, and careful psychological manipulation. Often the demands of a double are outrageous. Whenever possible they should be complied with. But, never, repeat never, at the risk of compromising security or the integrity of the totality of the operation.
If there was no way around allowing al-Balawi to not only meet in person but be in close physical proximity to a number of officers, then there should have been an appropriate trade-off. Imagine this dialogue:
Al-Balawi, "I must see them all. My information is too important."
Case officer controller, "Sure thing, but I have to pat you down first. Nothing personal, but I gotta follow regulations or my ass is grass. I'm sure you understand."
But this elementary precaution--a technique which was common in previous combat zones--was not followed. Presumably this lapse was due to the Agency's "lust for knowing" and the concomitant deep desire to finally put paid to some of the most obnoxious and able of al-Qaeda's senior personnel.
It is easy to understand how lust could overpower the necessary caution of tradecraft when one considers that the Chief of Base had spent eight years as a full time chaser of Islamist jihadists. There is no doubt but she wanted desperately to nail one or more al-Qaeda heavyweights to the barn door.
Another factor which might have contributed to the temporary (but quite fatal) lapse of reason is the nature of the relationship between CIA and Jordan's GID. It has existed for years. Since long, long before al-Qaeda came into existence, since before the Six Day War, the Agency has had a fine working relationship with GID. The relation has survived any number of political strains as well as the death of King Hussein. Undoubtedly there was a great desire not to give any offense to a close ally, particularly given the ability and critical utility of the GID to US intelligence services.
Yet the Jordanians had only had possession of al-Balawi for a little less than a year. Considering the depth of al-Balawi's public commitment to Islamism, to jihad, as well as the fact that he loathed, hated, detested Israel to a degree which bordered on monomania, nine or ten months is a remarkably short time to accomplish a 180 degree reversal in a man's values and motives.
Al-Balawi and his al-Qaeda controllers were able to deceive Jordan's intelligence personnel completely. This is to the credit of the enemy. That the Agency took GID assurances at face value is a discredit to the American spooks.
"Trust--but verify!"
Presumably the Agency did some verification. It is self-evident that whatever independent measures might have been employed by Langley, they were not enough. Admittedly, how much is enough is a very subjective judgement call based upon a large number of contextual and personal considerations. The still small voice embodied in tradecraft always whispers, "Err on the side of caution."
In this case the Agency's people in the field did not. They died as a result.
Death in the world of the spooks is a reality. There is a wall filled with commemorative plaques in Langley which attests to that ground truth. Just like any military service, an intelligence organization sucks it up and presses on after taking losses. As is the case in the military it is essential that the dead be memorialized not simply with plaques, medals, or speeches but by an accurate understanding of what went wrong so that proper action can be taken to prevent future losses.
In this case the lessons learned are simple. The first is one must always follow the most cautious application of tradecraft. The second is: "Trust--but verify!"
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