Way To Go, Center!

Looks like the Kremlin forgot to push its "reset" button. Not that Vladimir Putin or Dimitri Medvevdev can be held personally responsible. These guys have been too busy since coming to power five years ago to review the file covering espionage operations started back in the days when Bill Clinton was making amorous with White House interns.

The ten Russians arrested in the US along with an eleventh reportedly picked up in Cyprus were popped as the FBI finally wrapped up an investigation which started even as the Republicans in the House of Representatives were protecting American morality by impeaching the president. The timing of the Feebs' move is open to question.

Not even the most pessimistic assessment of the long and winding road of Russian plotting gives any hint that the Moscow Moles were anywhere near any key to any executive lavatory. The snippets of documents filed by the Department of Justice (at least as quoted in the several media accounts) make for fun reading by devotees of the spy versus spy genre but show no real evidence of any honest-to-gosh, bottled in bond, US government secrets.

On the US side the nearly twenty year caper complete with codes and cyphers, false identities, dead drops and brush passes to say nothing of wiretaps, surveillance teams, black bag jobs, and all the other features of a trade craft based spy yarn is portrayed as a major success against a crafty, dedicated, and omnipresent adversary. A reminder, according to at least one old time Soviet secret agent, of the worse days of Cold War excess.

The Russian response has been restrained--at least by Kremlin standards of the past. The Lads in the (New) Kremlin allow as how the people arrested may have been Russian nationals but will not go so far as to concede that their purposes in traveling under false names may have been nefarious in the slightest. Vladimir (The Good Czar) Putin did go a bit ballistic, averring that the "US police had gone out of control" in comments to visiting Bill Clinton.

Vlad Of The Bare Chest did seem more concerned over the timing of the Department of Justice action and its possible aftershocks than he did the slight problem of Russians being caught in rather flagrant disregard of normal protocol. At first the Russian Foreign Ministry took much the same line, noting that the episode should be viewed in the context of the improving relations between Russia and the US.

However, the Foreign Ministry did harden its position a few hours later. The new, improved narrative took the view that the arrests must be seen as an attempt by unnamed but certainly sinister forces to erode the new harmony between the Men in the Kremlin and the Guy in the Oval. There were dark ruminations about similar incidents in the past which always, in the Foreign Ministry's eyes, took place during times of improving relations. The parallel was obvious; by the timing of the arrests and the relative lack of harm done the US, someone in the US government was doing his evil best to toss a spanner in the works.

The timing was a bit odd, considering that only a few days earlier, President Obama had been making ever-so-nice with Dimitri Medvedev. Both men had toasted the successful pushing of assorted "reset" buttons. The Nice Young Man Of The People From Chicago took his counterpart out to a nearby and apparently renowned throughout the world hamburger joint for a quick bite of an appropriately populist food. Smiles all around.

The Russians have been playing the espionage game against the US without pause during and after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Despite changes in name, alterations in the form of government, reduction in geographic extent, erosion of military, economic, and diplomatic power, the game went on. Changes in Russia of a more positive nature since the emergence of Putin and his protegee, Medvedev, would or have served to change the nature and character of the game.

The Russians have a long history of using espionage as a preferred tool of state. Quite often, regardless of the nature or the regime, czar, commissar, or president, the Russians have used espionage to their advantage. The directors of FBI, CIA, and the Office of National Intelligence have all stated on the public record that Russian espionage had continued year after year at or above the level achieved during the Cold War. No one familiar with the spy-versus-spy scene has found a need to dissent from this appreciation.

It has been fashionable for some years within the ever-so-progressive circles of the American hoi olligoi to poo-poo the assessments offered by the US intelligence community regarding the unchanging nature of the Russian love of espionage or its targeting of the US as the "main enemy" as so much Cold War alarmist rhetoric spewed in support of ever greater budgets. It never crossed the closed minds of the "progressives" that maybe, just maybe, the professionals in the wild and wacky world of espionage might possibly know what they were talking about.

The arrests and their high profile juxtaposition with the heady, dare one write, "giddy," meeting of Obama with Medvedev may serve as a healthy corrective for all those in government as well as outside that the Russians play a very hardball game in pursuing national interest. The mere fact that the Russian clandestine service was willing to invest quite a few years in establishing the bona fides of their agents, quite a few patient years of moving their pawns into potential positions of access to critical information found in venues outside of the official agencies, shows a deep commitment to the art and craft of espionage. The fact that the controllers back at Center were content to wait more years before having any real chance of a payoff underscores both the commitment to and high appreciation for the results of spying.

Regardless of what any member of the American elite might wish, Russia is not and will never be an American "friend." This is true not because the Russian government is necessarily and automatically hostile to the US. Rather it is the result of the realistic and realpolitck nature of the Russian pursuit of national interest. The Russians understand that friendship exists only between people, individuals. It does not exist, cannot exist, between states.

It was an English Foreign Secretary who once observed that states have neither lasting friends nor lasting enemies, only lasting interests. The Russians are in tandem with this concept.

Look at it this way. Just because the Russians spy on us doesn't mean they don't like us. Heck, it's only business, nothing personal.

Fat Chance!

In yet one more of his accustomed exercises in tough sounding but utterly meaningless rhetoric, President Obama punctuated his appearance at the G-8 meeting by telling reporters, "There have to be consequences for such irresponsible behavior on the international stage." The practitioners of "irresponsible behavior" to whom the always eloquent if not reality connected POTUS was referring are the North Koreans. More specifically the North Korean government.

The sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, was scarcely "irresponsible behavior." That term applies rather more fittingly to running one's pickup off a cliff while holding a half empty bottle of Jack Black in one hand. Or, being a church organist who moonlights as the piano player in the local bordello.

The sinking by torpedo of a warship falls properly in the category of calculated deliberate act. A calculated, deliberate act of war. To call it anything else is mendacious at best, purely stupid at worse.

(It might help the president clarify his thinking were he to try a little thought experiment. If one of our Navy's billion dollar guided missile cruisers were to end up underwater following an encounter with, say, a torpedo fired by an Iranian submarine, would the Man in the Oval consider it merely "irresponsible behavior?" And, if he were to do so, would his interpretation be accepted by Congress? We the People?)

The Hermit Kingdom of the North made a decision at the highest levels of government. The decision to sink the South Korean naval vessel carried some slight degree of risk, but the regime calculated (quite possibly with the advice and counsel of the Trolls of Beijing) that the benefits accruing to the act far outweighed the potential adverse consequences.

There is that word again! "Consequences." The Obama administration as well as the president personally seem to be much enamored of the word, "consequences." It comes up with nauseating regularity in remarks by the president, by the SecState, by others whenever a government--usually Iran--does something of which we disapprove or fails to do something which meets our approbation.

It's a beautiful word, sort of menacing, in a polite and vague way. It carries a delicate whiff of threat, at least implied threat. It almost seems like an ultimatum, an understated one to be sure, but it has do-this-or-else! connotation which is the heart and soul of the classic ultimatum.

The overuse of the word, "consequences" by the current administration has robbed it of all the unpleasant force it may have possessed once. Experience over the past eighteen months demonstrates that the president and his "team" use the word instead of taking real action. It is not an ultimatum, but rather a substitute for one. Through the combination of overuse and subsequent inaction, "consequences" has come to imply that the irresponsibly behaving state has one more free pass.

Pyongyang, that is to say, Dear Leader, his number three son (and probable successor) and the rest of the top echelon, know perfectly well that no one is going to take any action of substance to inflict "consequences" for the "irresponsible behavior." There is absolutely nothing which can be done, no conceivable "consequence" which can be inflicted on the Hermit Kingdom.

No rational actor, certainly not the South Korean government, would consider even for a nanosecond going to war in response to the killing of forty-six sailors and the loss of an aging small surface combatant. Beyond this, anyone and everyone who is slightly oriented in time and place realizes that no sanction regime over and above all those currently in force will have any noticeable impact on Pyongyang. For reasons which are good and sufficient in their estimate, the Trolls of Beijing will make sure of that.

The realities which govern global politics assure that the Obama statement as well as the words in the official communique issued over the signatures of the G-8 leaders exercise precisely the same impact on Pyongyang as have the now traditional G-8 riots on international policy. Ironically but accurately the rioters have the same effect on high state policy as the presidents and prime ministers of the eight largest economies on Earth wield over the Hermit Kingdom. Zero equals zero.

One has to wonder why the Great Statesmen of the Big Eight bother. They, even President Obama, must know that all the thundering denunciations, all the demands for meaningful responses by the "international community," all the invocations of "consequences," are so much vapid bloviation.

Do they blather the fine sounding nothings because at least they can agree on the softer version of tough talk? Do these heads of the largest, most wealthy, most advanced, most powerful states posture with such monolithic determination over something none can influence because they cannot agree on a way to handle real problems, real rocks and shoals upon which any or all of their ships can founder?

North Korea, Iran, and even Karzai's Afghanistan will do their own thing, in their own way, regardless of the heaving and hectoring of the POTUS or even all of the Eight Really Huge Economies. The three referenced states will continue to pursue their own national interests each in its own way for its own reasons utterly immune to the "consequences." The Eight Biggies know this, for each will do the same--chase after its own subjectively defined national and strategic interest--again without regard to the importuning or promised "consequences."

Mr Obama found this truth to his personal embarrassment with the solid rejection of his plea to borrow and spend more in the American way. Whether Mr Obama's view that deficits are less of a concern than the need for further government spending in support of the "fragile" global recovery is correct is less important to the US in its foreign relations than the simple fact that his position was ignored by the others.

The Other Seven fired a very large warning shot very, very close across the bows of America. The warning is clear. US influence on the policies and behavior of other states, in this case states which are peers of the US by definition, is waning, waning rapidly. The other leaders assembled in Canada have told the US that it is not the "go-to" power it was as recently as two years ago.

Instead of trotting out old, tired, meaningless terms like "irresponsible behavior" or making dire mutters of "consequences," Mr Obama and his Team would be better off--and so would We the People, if he and they meditated upon the implications of being rejected or ignored in his policy stance by our economic peers. They would be well-advised to consider just what the future might bring as more and more countries conclude that they can go after their own national interests without the slightest regard to the views of the US.

This advice is doomed to be fruitless. Not simply because the exalted of Team Obama would never read the Geek's blog, but for a reason far more substantial. Mr Obama and, in all probability, many of those on his "team" have full bore cases of anosognosia. This means that not only does the president not know something critical, but that he does not even know that he does not know it. He is not only ignorant of ground truths governing the game of international politics--he does not even know that he is ignorant of them.

A hopeless case.

A Modest Proposal For Hamas--And Mr Obama

On 20 June 2010 President Obama played the game of Let's Pretend again. This time the Nice Young Man From Chicago decided to pretend that Hamas is a real, honest-to-gosh, all get out, for real, bottle in bond, triple X super-refined, sure enough government.

That's right, bucko, the POTUS has determined from and for reasons explicable only to himself that Hamas is no longer a terrorist entity which shot its way into power in the Gaza Strip whereupon it launched a rocket rain of terror on portions of Israel while entrenching and enriching itself by the open exploitation of those people unfortunate enough to find themselves at the wrong ends of Hamas controlled guns. Having decided that the current situation in Gaza is completely "unsustainable" the president opined, "it demands fundamental change."

The change envisioned by President Obama's "Announcement on Gaza," is not one which sees the overthrow of the Koran-waving, gun-toting, rocket-firing Mighty Warriors of Islam but its transformation via American declaratory policy into a legitimate government. Demonstrating that this "Announcement" was no mere exercise in patented Obama World Vision rhetoric, the Man in the Oval has put four hundred million of our (well, to err on the side of accuracy, borrowed or made-by-the-Feds-computers) dollars into the hands of Hamas and, to show proper balance, the Palestinian Authority.

The effect of the "Announcement" and the largess with other peoples' money serves to put the Palestinian Authority on an equal footing with Hamas. The logic of this defies rational explication considering that the PA at least makes some pretense of acting like a real, responsible government reluctant to fire rockets into Israel and, at least on occasion, showing some semblance of both democracy and a rule of law. The PA, in sharp distinction from Hamas, has even almost, sort-of, provisionally, allowed that Israel has a right to exist within secure borders.

Hamas has offered not even the slightest hint that it is prepared to (a) make peace with the PA, (b) submit its future to an open, transparent vote by the citizens of Gaza, (c) abandon its commitment to drive Israel into the sea, (d) drop its alliance with Iran, (e) stop its strident anti-Americanism, (f) observe even minimal human rights for its citizens, particularly women, (g) halt its antisemitic indoctrination of children, (h) cease all armed attacks on Israel by any person or group resident in the Gaza Strip and (i) commence an open, transparent, and effective program of economic development such as to benefit all residents of Gaza.

Considering that extensive but incomplete list of features, what is the goal of equating Hamas with the PA? What is the goal of the "Announcement?"

Mr Obama apparently believes that he can transform Hamas from its current nasty reality into a mature, responsible, legitimate government with the issuing of an "Announcement" and the provision of money. Of course, this hallucination is on a par with such previous triumphs of self-delusion as his belief that speaking nice, friendly, soft words to the mullahs of Iran would result in an instant abandonment of the quest for the Mahdi Bomb, a total rejection of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups, and the immediate ending of internal repression.

Perhaps Mr Obama would have done better had he thought in a manner less grand. Consider one less sweeping approach. A less grand move, to be sure, but one which would simultaneously test Hamas' will and ability to act the part of a genuine government and improve the lives and economic futures of the residents of Gaza. It would also directly address an ongoing point of friction between the folks of Gaza on the one hand and the PA on the other.

Electrical power is a point of ongoing distress for the people of Gaza. The operation of the one power plant in Gaza is also a subject of intense friction between Hamas and the PA. After the generating station shut down yesterday, Hamas immediately accused PA of causing the outage in order to "punish the people of Gaza." The PA replied that Hamas was seeking to "incite" the residents of the Strip against the PA.

Consider the following: Gaza receives a jilly-poo ergs per square meter from the sun. The number of cloudy days per year approaches zero. Solar panels, even the newer thin film sort, are no longer expensive to fabricate, although the process does include some very real environmental risks. The associated equipment, controllers, inverters, batteries, and so on are also relatively inexpensive to make and operate. The technology is reasonably mature, well understood, and not hard to master.

Solar based systems can be centralized which allows for the use not only of photovoltaic arrays but also solar heated steam turbines. Or the solar generation can be point-of-use based in the most decentralized way. This means the energy can be produced by either some central bureaucracy or by individuals. In short, this dual capacity obviates the he-who-controls-energy-controls-life tendency of Hamas.

On the human factors side of life, surely Hamas numbers among the creative engineering minds usually employed in designing and making rockets, IEDs, and explosives generally some men who can turn to the challenge of designing and fabricating point-of-use solar systems. Certainly, the large number of unemployed people can provide a labor force capable of making and installing solar systems.

All that is needed is (a) political will and (b) money. Mr Obama has made it obvious that money is available. In fact, the Europeans have been standing in line as well, all eager to toss money in the general direction of Hamas without any safeguards as to its usage beyond those of the pious hope variety. Only the political will on the part of Hamas has been lacking.

The will has been lacking because there has been no percentage for Hamas in doing so. Hamas gets money, lots of money, from various and sundry donors ranging from humanitarian NGOs to well-intentioned governments to governments whose intentions are not so benign. Hamas has been in the position of getting the wherewithal to do its terrorist thing and being freed of any responsibility to assure the citizens have more than the barest of bare essentials.

If Mr Obama entertained a serious desire to see Hamas change its nature from killer to governor, from bomb wielder to economic developer, he would have done something akin to linking American aid to a measurable, observable project such as the development, manufacture, and installation of low cost, point-of-use solar generation. This approach would have put a doable task before Hamas, a put-up or shut-up test as well.

If Hamas accepted the money, the conditions, and passed the it's-a-government-after-all test, the result would have been (a) green jobs, (b) ample electrical energy for residential, commercial, and limited industrial or agricultural use, (c) functional legitimacy with the citizens of Gaza and (d) a solid economic accomplishment of pervasive effect which would mean Hamas finally had something to risk if more rockets were fired with more IAF or IDF responses.

The "Sun Power For Gaza" concept is far from being the only option in the think-small-think-effectively category. It is an illustration of what should--and might--be employed if Mr Obama would only bring his ideas and ego down to mere human size. Grandiose pronouncements are fine, wonderful even--if substance and results are not considered.

Smaller ideas, lesser goals, do not sound nearly so magnificent. They do, however, have an advantage over their greater cousins. They lead somewhere. They accomplish something. The ancient Chinese put it succinctly and accurately, "The journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step."

And, Mr Obama might be reminded, no journey can be completed with a single step.

Now, Hezbollah Joins The Narcos--Why Not?

Sue Myrick (R. NC-9) is a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It may be recalled that she garnered more than a little notoriety when she wrote the forward for the book Muslim Mafia last year. This book accused the Council On American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) of being a subversive entity. (It is interesting in this regard that CAIR during ensuing litigation did not charge the book's authors or publisher with libel or defamation but rather with having acquired certain documents by illegal methods.)

Alarmed by the book's allegations that CAIR had planted espionage agents within committees charged with national security duties, Ms Myrick, joined by other Republican Members of Congress, demanded the Sergeant At Arms investigate to determine whether or not interns appointed with CAIR backing had served in this sinister role. Later she, again with other Republicans, requested the Internal Revenue Service investigate as to whether CAIR had violated its tax-exempt status by lobbying efforts.

It is without surprise that CAIR and other pro-Islam groups including the Islamic Society of North America and the Muslim American Society as well as Democratic Party heavyweights, most notably, John Conyers and Mike Honda, pushed back--hard. Weakening the push back efforts was the undeniable linkage of CAIR with officially identified Muslim terrorist groups as an unindicted co-conspirator in the controversial Holy Land Foundation trial.

Ms Myrick has written another letter recently. This time the recipient was Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano. The subject: Investigate the possible linkage of Hezbollah and Mexican narcotrafficking cartels.

The letter is a fine example of unspecified "former intelligence officers," and "well trained officials," and "some authorities." Ms Myrick's missive rests additionally on some well known and unpleasant realities deep south of the border such as the cooperation between Iranian capo Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan supremo Chavez, the long established presence of Hezbollah operatives in the drug smuggling region of the Tri-border between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, the skill shown by Hezbollah in digging tunnels, and, as a bit of a stretch, the similarity of terrain between that of the southwest US-Mexican border and the border between Israel and Lebanon.

In Ms Myrick's estimate, the probable current or near-term partnership between Hezbollah and the assorted smuggling cartels operating on the US-Mexico border constitutes a definite national security threat. As such, the matter deserves, at the least, the establishment of a task force which "could explore all these issues."

It is the wishy-washy nature of the Myrick request which undermines her argument that the US may soon be experiencing "Israel like car bombings of Mexican/USA border personnel or National Guard units in the border regions." Get a grip, Congresswoman Myrick!

Either the US does face a growing threat from a partnership between Hezbollah (or Hamas or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the cartels or it does not. If the potential for such exists to the degree you appear to believe, then action beyond the formation of a "taskforce (which) could explore all these issues," is necessary.

The use of the resources, personnel, and knowledge of the smuggling cartels would be of great utility to an entity such as Hezbollah or an adverse state like Iran. However, the potential utility of such an alliance would be eroded significantly if employed for petty efforts such as "Israel-like car bombings." The killing or wounding of a few Border Patrol agents or National Guardsmen would be a frittering away of a capacity with much greater potential.

The current dynamics of global politics makes the use of the smuggling cartels an attractive option. Of course, this option would not be either cheap or risk free, so it seems reasonable that any partnership would have as its goal operations far more damaging to the US than the sound of VBIEDs in the desert air.

Ms Myrick would be well advised to reform her letter, its arguments, and the sketchy evidence supporting her contentions to an appropriate level. Not to be unduly alarmist, but taking into account the strong probability that Iran will have the capacity to take two Hiroshima sized bombs off the shelf within eighteen to twenty-four months, a legitimate level of threat is that of a WMD attack using either nuclear or biological munitions.

The capabilities of the smuggling cartels, their human resources, their collective knowledge are up to the task of introducing agents and equipment into the US. This capability should be understood not as simply dumping the martyrdom seekers and munitions across the Great Fence of the Southwest but delivering them well into the interior of the US.

The complex, well-organized, and highly redundant delivery system developed and constantly improved upon by the cartels provides a ready capacity for delivering a devastating attack on the US at any time. All that is necessary is the formation of a partnership between one or more cartels and either Iran or one of its proxies.

This takes time. The cartels are run by men who are even tougher of mind than the mullahs and their stooges. It will take more than a slight amount of effort to persuade the cartel chiefs that what is in the deal more than offsets the risks of American response. It will take careful playing off of one cartel with the others as well as meticulous manipulation of relevant and receptive Mexican police, military, and government officials.

None of this is made easier by the arrogant xenophobia which has been well noted by those foreigners--even other Muslims--who have had dealings with Iran or Iranian proxies. Nor does the assistance of Hugo Chavez ease the path to partnership.

Chavez enjoys no particularly high standing in the estimate of the cartels. He has even lower standing with members of the Mexican elite both in and out of government. Any Chavez involvement will be obvious since that is the only way Hugo, The Mouth Of The South, knows how to operate. The evident participation of Hugo will make any deal with Mexican officials all the more difficult given the nationalism which is always present in their makeup along with greed.

The culture gap between Islamist jihadi and Latin American narcotrafficker is wide and deep. It will not be bridged quickly and easily--if at all. This ground truth is far more relevant in considering the potential of an emerging threat on the border than is the presence of a few jail tattoos in Farsi.

Ms Myrick is correct in being concerned. The growth of an alliance between Iran or its proxies and the elaborate smuggling networks of LatAm is a real threat in the longer term. But, the right way to go about countering this potential is not in the writing of politically expedient letters.

The right way is that of careful monitoring of developments and their disruption whenever possible. And the options for disruption are manifold given the nature of the relationship between Islamists and traffickers. Not to simplify the matter, time is on the side of the US in this area of threat assessment and abatement.

In short, Ms Myrick should put her word processor on stand-by. Unless the intelligence community has become significantly more incompetent in recent months (not impossible but highly unlikely), the Iranian-smuggling connection is already on the radar screens. As a rule of thumb, if we hear nothing about it, the matter is being handled properly and effectively.

Killing The "Special Relationship"

When President Obama took office his vague and ever so progressive view of foreign relations included the specious notion that all US relations with all other countries were predicated upon a shared set of international "rights and relations." This hyper-egalitarian position was not only adopted contrary to the dictates of history and reality but shoved aside all considerations of "special relationships" typified by that binding the US and UK for the last century.

The US has always defined its conduct of foreign relations with an eye on its specific relation with the Great Britain. For the first century or so of our existence, we tended to define ourselves, our existence, by firm opposition to all things British. On more than a few occasions following the War of 1812 we came to the brink of war with the British, most recently during the Cleveland administration over the matter of "Olney's Eighteen Inch Gun" memo.

Since then, and, in particular, since 1917, the US has viewed its relationship with the UK as first among equals. FDR bent the law beyond recognition to give all aid short of war to the battered and beleaguered British following 1 September 1939. Americans fought and died in an undeclared naval war against Nazi Germany in order that supplies, including warlike stores, could get through the submarine blockade of the home islands. This was not legal. Arguably, it violated even the Constitution. But, it was the right thing to do. It was also a testament to the "special relationship" which tied the US to the UK.

Various presidents in various ways have acted to fray the web constituting the special relationship. So also have assorted British prime ministers. The ties of shared history, shared values, shared world views, shared needs and aspirations as to what constitutes a world order in which either and, therefore, both could flourish have assured the special relationship continued despite transient difficulties.

Before Mr Obama no American president eschewed the very notion of the special relationship between ourselves and Great Britain. Before Mr Obama brought his unique personal mixture of progressivism run amok, world class naivete regarding world affairs, and personal history, perhaps including myths regarding British mistreatment of a paternal grandfather during the Mau-Mau Emergency, the thought of jettisoning the special relationship was unthinkable.

While Mr Obama has also tossed out the similar, but not equal in either basis or consequence, special relationship between the US and Israel, he seems to have harbored a particular desire to destroy for once and all any vestige of the US-UK unique linkage. The motivations for this apparent drive belong in the realm of psychodynamics. The implications for both countries exist in the real world.

It is not necessary to rehearse the dreary record of the gratuitous insults heaped on the British starting with the removal of the bust of Winston Churchill from the Oval Office and continuing to the present day. Nor is it sufficient to excuse the record on the basis of Mr Obama's frustration and anger over the BP Gulf of Mexico oil blowout. (The recent exercises in rhetorical overkill are simply add-ons to the earlier, and far less excusable bad behavior on the part of the president.)

The American president and the new British prime minister have talked on the phone more than a few times, but the G-8 and G-20 meetings provide the first chance for the two men to breathe each other's air. The meeting will not be easy or necessarily productive given the two men's differences in political stance, economic policy, and world view.

The differences, taken in the context of both the administration's and Congress' harangues about and against BP and the intentional diminution of the "special relationship," are almost guaranteed to assure that the (in)famous "reset" button will not be pushed by the Obama finger. This implies that if any chance exists for the special relationship to survive the perils of the Obama touch, it depends upon the patience, forbearance, and far-sighted statesmanship of David Cameron.

Even though Mr Cameron has demonstrated in the opening days of his ministry a measure of deliberate calm, rationality, and openness marking him as a refreshing personality in the British political scene, the deck at home is stacked against any attempt to revivify--or even sustain in a minimal way--the "special relationship. In this context it should be recalled that the British parliament concluded in a report a few months ago that the "special relationship" may have run its days.

The House of Commons panel making that dreary assessment may have been prompted by an understated version of the you-can't-fire-me-I-quit dynamic. The panel may actually have been of the view that if the Obama administration was scuppering the generations of enmeshed history, perhaps it would be better to do the job first. That motivation is both quite understandable and forgivable. Far more understandable and forgivable than the Obama efforts at relationship murder.

Over the years, particularly on this side of the Atlantic, there has existed a feeling to the effect that the "special relationship" is far more critical to the British than to the Americans. There are quite obvious and equally superficial reasons for this conceit.

It would be quite easy to demonstrate the falsity of the view, however. All that would be necessary is for David Cameron to push up the date of British withdrawal from Helmand province to, say, 1 October 2010. The flap this move would produce throughout Beltway Land is delightful to imagine. Pulling ten thousand excellent troops out of the still quite hotly contested province would spell the end to any hope of pulling even the slightest semblance of "not-losing" from the yawning maw of defeat.

Even the vague hint of a British total withdrawal by 2015 has raised whispers of "defeat" in and around the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom. Ratcheting the hint to the level of even "semi-commitment" would raise the decibel level of panic from incipient to immediate.

There is another way to get the message through the preternaturally calm and detached presidential brain housing group. That would be a serious talking to by an adult member of the administration (if there is any.) The substance of the lecture would be, if the US, if a single American president, can unilaterally abrogate a diplomatic and political relationship which has been extended for generations and sealed by the blood of both Yanks and Brits, then what country can trust a relation with the US?

Credibility, the worth and strength of America's word, is what is at stake in the current situation. American credibility has been the reason thousands of Americans died in Southeast Asia. During the long, long war in Vietnam, several presidents of both parties dedicated the lives of Americans to the alter of credibility.

If past presidents have been so worried about the worth of American commitments that they have been willing to spend American blood in truckload lots, then, what is that Mr Obama does not understand? Why does he believe that his single handed jettisoning of the US-UK special relationship has no effect on the perceptions of other countries, other governments?

No matter what sort of public window dressing is put on the meeting between Obama and Cameron, the reality of the "special relationship" being an endangered species will remain. Unless and until Mr Obama can reverse his course on the nature and character of our relation with the UK, doubts will both linger and grow.

These doubts will continue, a cancerous bloom in waiting, not only in London but in the capitals of other countries which have considered themselves to enjoy a relationship, if not "special" then at least close with the US. If these countries cannot be convinced that the Obama Team is dedicated to the maintenance of the "special relationship," they will not be comfortable with any commitment made to them by the current administration--or the continuation of previous commitments by Obama and company.

The historical record as well as current dynamics in global politics demonstrates that not all relationships are created equal. There is no uniformity of relationship defined by international "rights and responsibilities." Rather all foreign relations are bi-lateral at root. At the same time, because they are each and all bi-lateral, the change in one long-standing relation has consequences, intended or not, on all others.

Once again, Mr Obama, reality has shown conclusively just how wrong your ideologically driven views are. And, how destructive they can be.

It's Reset Button Time In Afghanistan

President Obama assured all that cared to hear and heed that the change in commanders did not mean a change in strategy in Afghanistan. He went on to animadvert that all hands (including his) were in agreement on goals, strategy and, presumably, operational approaches although "tactics" would be open to change.

Fer sure, Mr President. You might not know it, but that isn't the way things work. Not in the real world of actual soldiers, real insurgents, and if-they-hit-you-you-die bullets. Whether you know it or not, whether you intended it or not, you have hit the reset button in your war in Afghanistan.

To get a grip on this ground truth requires starting with a very basic observation about the nature of successful counterinsurgency in general and what this means for Afghanistan. A primary reality of counterinsurgency is that one cannot kill one's way to victory. Killing people and breaking things plays a role in counterinsurgency, but a very limited one.

The focus of competition between the insurgent and his opponent is is the collective mind of the uncommitted majority of the affected population. Each side seeks to mobilize the support of the uncommitted majority to its side while denying the opponent the opportunity to do the same.

Simultaneously and at a more fundamental level each side--insurgent and counterinsurgent--is seeking to progressively reduce the political will of his opponent while maintaining that of his side. This dual track war means that the side which can maintain its political will while reducing that of his enemy as well as attracting a greater deal of active support from the uncommitted majority than the opponent will succeed.

This twin, interlocking dynamic is seen to have been at work in every insurgency throughout history, particularly the history of the past two or three hundred years. It is at work in Afghanistan today.

Killing people and breaking things plays a role in accomplishing the tasks of undercutting the enemy's political will as well as mobilizing the uncommitted majority at the expense of the adversary. This does not imply that the traditional characteristics of war--killing people and breaking things--is unimportant. Rather, it means that the traditional aspects of war are very important.

The strategic and operational level concepts as well as the tactical approaches which implement the first two on a daily basis must properly define who to kill, how to kill, and when to kill in a way which maximizes the effectiveness of killing in both the undercutting of the enemy's political will and the attracting of the greater percentage of the uncommitted majority. The unique requirements of counterinsurgency call into question the traditional US military algorithm of firepower kills and killing brings victory.

General Stanley McChrystal's understanding of insurgency and the twin, interlocking dynamics which serve to define success or failure prompted him to place the highest value on using US, Afghan, and other allied forces to protect civilians even at the cost of making combat operations more difficult to undertake and complete. His view of the dynamics of successful counterinsurgency also pointed him in the direction of accepting higher friendly casualties if doing such would assure safety for the uncommitted majority.

This understanding is not one easily accepted by conventionally oriented soldiers as well as the civilians who must take the political heat for casualties. The conventional American soldier has been raised in a school which places the highest priority on protecting our troops. The next highest priority is that of killing the maximal number of hostile forces in a minimum amount of time.

The slogan of the conventional soldier, a slogan which is perfectly suited for peer-to-peer wars, is "find, fix, and destroy." That is, use superior technologies of reconnaissance and surveillance to locate the enemy force. Then, employ high volumes of indirect and air delivered fire to fix him in place, to deny him the chance to move. Finally, by superior mobility put enough friendly troops in place to destroy any enemy which survived the fix-in-place stage.

The use of the firepower heavy approach to war proved most counterproductive in Afghanistan (and scarcely less so in Iraq.) General McChrystal came to his job already aware of the limitations of conventional doctrine. Even if he hadn't, the all too obvious rebirth of Taliban as well as the profound hostility felt to "foreign" forces by the uncommitted majority of Afghans would have made it so.

McChrystal replaced the "shoot, move, communicate" so as to "find, fix, and destroy" approach to the war with one which correctly changed the emphasis to protecting the uncommitted civilian population, offering inducements to the soft-core supporters of Taliban, and placing ever increasing direct pressure on the hard core insurgents with the intent of mobilizing support from the uncommitted majority and undercutting the political will of the Talib to continue fighting.

In practice this approach meant the US willingly put aside most of its advantages in indirect and air delivered firepower, put its troops at greater risk of being wounded or killed, and, of necessity, slowed the tempo of combat. Each and everyone of these features violated long standing practices of the US Army (and, to a much lesser extent, the Marine Corps.)

It is not at all surprising that this approach, dubbed "courageous restraint," did not sit well with the more conventionally minded officers and senior NCOs who comprise the majority of the US forces in Afghanistan. It is not surprising either that General David Petraeus has promised to "review" the policy of courageous restraint.

This review will undoubtedly be greeted by hosannas on the part of the conventionally minded men in Afghanistan. It will also be met with sighs of relief by the grunts at the sharp point as no one who occupies that necessary and very uncomfortable place is happy with the notion of placing his one and only skin at risk in order to protect the host civilian population. Then, of course, the legion of hairy-chested politicians, pundits, and TV watching super-strategists who have the bravery of being out of range will cheer a more robust way of fighting the war.

In Afghanistan, the locals have shown their opinion of "courageous restraint" in very real and really beneficial ways. As the incidents of civilian deaths and injuries collateral to US, ISAF, and Afghan National Forces operations have decreased, the flow of actionable intelligence from locals has increased. This has resulted in a steady and steadily accelerating shift in initiative from the insurgents to the counterinsurgents.

Taliban has reacted to the palpable shift in battlefield initiative by resorting to terror tactics which smack of desperation. Taliban has increased its use of indiscriminate IEDs which results in civilian casualties. Taliban has employed assassination of low ranking pro-government tribal leaders and officials. It has even hung an eight year old boy as a spy for the British Army. The net effect of these methods has been the demobilization of Taliban support and its remobilization to the "foreigners" and even the Kabul government.

In short, the courageous restraint concept has resulted in Taliban killing its way to defeat.

Even the thought of change in the McChrystal concept should perturb anyone interested in an ultimate American success in Afghanistan. The fact that General Petraeus would even consider reviewing an approach which is so clearly working is alarming. As a political general, David Petraeus may be more concerned about the mutterings in the ranks about the additional burden placed upon American warriors by the McChrystal understanding of the requirements of successful counterinsurgency. If this is the case, he is worried about the wrong matter.

The fact that General Petraeus was in command in Iraq during the time that the elements placed into play by others took effect gives no reason to believe that he is perceptive enough to see the nature of the great differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, the differences which make Afghanistan the far more difficult venue. Nor should one take undue comfort from General Petreaus having been in overall charge of the process of fabricating the new field manual on counterinsurgency. There is a world of difference between writing an abstract doctrine of theoretically universal application and fighting one, specific war in one, specific human terrain.

The take away is simple to state; hard to practice. General McChrystal developed a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the nature and character of the war in Afghanistan. He developed a strategic and operational concept for waging that one, specific war which showed success from the moment it came out of the box.

Unfortunately, it appears that General Petraeus is all too willing to compromise the success from the moment he accepted the new assignment. Even more unfortunate is the reality that President Obama did not know (or pretended not to know) that a change in command automatically means a change in strategy.

Iran And The Ghost Of Democracy

It has been a year since the government officials counting the vote in Iran reelected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a second term as the country's president. This exercise in creative accounting not only proved famed political philosopher Joseph Stalin correct when he pontificated that the people casting ballots elected no one, that was done by the folks counting ballots, but also initiated a period of protest and repression which was longer than expected but not bloodier.

Amnesty International has released a comprehensive report on the repression portion of the protest-repression dyad. It makes for searing reading. It also constitutes a severe indictment of the Iranian regime and its bully boys. In addition, in the Amnesty International methodical documentation of the human consequences of the Iranian exercise in regime maintenance exists a charge of moral cowardice directed against the US and other Western governments.

The Obama administration generally and the president specifically have maintained a discrete distance from the dance of protest and suppression. This detached approach has been justified on a number of grounds. A firm stance in support of the pro-democracy factions would be counterproductive in that it would bolster the regime's claims that the opponents of Ahmadinejad and the mullahs were foreign puppets. Any measures taken against the Iranian regime would hurt the people we intended to assist. The US had to stay on message, had to focus on stopping the Iranian nuclear program regardless of any other consideration no matter how worthy.

All of these reasons (leaving aside any consideration of the lack of internal consistency) are superficially plausible. All make sense of a sort.

But the real deal exists on a more fundamental level. Any effective support of the pro-democracy elements of Iranian society (which, it must be noted includes members of the clerical ruling class) would automatically violate the imperatives of cultural relativism. This is not an inconsiderable fact given that Mr Obama and many of his "team" are strong adherents of the notion that no one cultural, social, political, or economic system is preferable to another. The president and others of his inner circle really believe that all political, social, economic, and cultural systems are ethically equivalent, and any value judgement which holds one to be "better" than another is the product of insensitivity, chauvinism, or xenophobia.

To take on the mullahs and their frontmen would demand that the US, as a matter of policy, declare that secular, pluralistic democracy is ethically superior to clerical rule, subverted elections, and the wholesale violation of human rights by the government of Iran. Any open, effective support for the dissidents in Iran would require that the US, as a matter of policy, hold that states and institutions produced by the European Enlightenment are inherently superior, hold a moral high ground in comparison to states and institutions produced by the Prophet and his successors.

That sort of thing has been, is, and will remain a definite no-no to people such as Mr Obama for whom cultural relativism is a species of revealed Truth. The only correct course of action open to a person who is a True Believer in the dictates of cultural relativism is expressing a sort of vague distaste for the violence associated with repression surrounded by a preternatural detachment which refuses all value judgments as unacceptable "privileging" of a specific outside political position.

So people die in Iran. So people scream in the torture cellars of Evan prison. So, even the graves of those murdered by the Thugs of the Koran are desecrated. Memories besmirched. Lives destroyed. Bodies mutilated.

Through it all the US, the current administration turns the other way, eyes carefully averted as if we were some thwacking great maiden aunt suddenly confronting a vulgar drunk on the steps of the church. Averting our collective vision not for any real world concern, any realpolitik goal, but simply due to the dictates of an intellectual fad of the moment.

A similar dynamic from the same root is at work in the refusal of Team Obama to name properly the enemy we confront daily not only in distant places but here at home. It is cultural relativism which denies us the right to name the threat which confronts us, the gangsters who menace us.

To call the enemy political Islam is to explicitly exalt other monotheistic religions over Islam. To call the people who try to kill us in Afghanistan or in Times Square, Muslims, is to contravene the requirements of cultural relativism as to do so holds Muslims as occupying an ethical niche inferior to those people who do not follow the strictures of Islam.

There is only one cause for the spineless American posture regarding the Iranian election. It is the same cause as underlies the gutless and brainless refusal to call the threat facing us and the rest of the West by its real name.

The cause is not, as is often alleged, "political correctness." That is simply one more convenient excuse for avoiding the truth.

The truth is simply that at the head of this nation there is a president afflicted by a very dangerous, even fatal mental virus. Other Americans of high rank or office have the same affliction. So do many in the elites of the media and academia. The president and all the others who think as he does have caught the same mind destroying disease.

The name of the disease is cultural relativism.

Unless and until the US government can get out from under the dead hand of cultural relativism the US will continue to fail to protect not only its own core interests but also the ambitions and goals of others who would be as we are--citizens of a republic who are still more free than not. In turn this means the US has surrendered its ancient and quite honorable calling to be the "city on a hill," a shining beacon of hope for all humankind.

Obama's Gotta Wonder--Is Anybody Listening?

For a long time now whenever an American president has spoken, the world has listened. The global (and domestic) audience might not have liked what they heard, but ears were attentive, brains were engaged. As recently as last year the American president was both heard and heeded on matters both great and small. If nothing else people were ready and willing to hope that the new voice meant substantial and positive change in affairs ranging from health care at home to a globe ranging recession and the very nasty little war in a very faraway place.

In recent months, weeks, even days, the situation has reversed course with an abruptness which startles the observer. Bluntly put, a new dynamic exists, a new dynamic which bloomed with stunning rapidity, a new dynamic in which no one really cares what the American president might say--other than to dismiss the words as not having been worthy of hearing.

There are two excellent indicators of this new dynamic. One comes from the domestic front in the familiar form of a poll. The other comes from the nations comprising the G-20 nations, in the quite unfamiliar form of flat rejection.

The most recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll conducted between 17 and 21 June shows that Mr Obama and his progressive agenda have been rejected by very significant pluralities of We The People. The numbers, particularly the sixty-two percent who believe "the country is headed down the wrong path," are those one would expect from, say, a Rasmussen, or even a Republican Party sponsored "push poll" not one from the WSJ/NBC News folks.

There are, of course, many inputs to this new domestic perspective. These include the nature and extent of the Great Transformational Agenda so beloved by the Progressive Caucus and the Man in the Oval but which violates the American propensity for modest changes achieved slowly. There are other, equally or more important factors involved. The administration's response to the BP oil blowout is one. The failure of the economic stimulus packages is another. Even the evident erosion of American influence around the world plays a role.

There is no little probability that the president's action of yesterday--firing McChrystal and replacing him with a man who is a highly regarded political general but no warfighter--will add more suspicion and distrust to the mix in the weeks to come, particularly if General Petraeus alters the McChrystal strategy and operational plans. The net effect of appeasement, getting tough with Israel, bowing to a Saudi king, appearing far less than resolute when faced by an act of war by North Korea, kicking the British in the crotch, encouraging the Russians to behave more and more like the Soviets of bygone days, has been to lessen America in the eyes of the world and the American president in the esteem of We the People.

The more head snapping demonstration of the new dynamic comes from the G-20, more specifically the European members of the assemblage of the largest economies. You recall that Mr Obama sent a letter to the heads of government of all G-20 states which, in essence, begged one and all not to become deficit hawks but rather to continue along with the US on the path of stimulus spending.

Apparently, the political advisers who line the walls of the Oval like vultures around the slaughter house came to realize that the Social Democrat propelled states of Europe had reversed course with the blinding rapidity more characteristic of a school of tropical fish than a cluster of European parliamentarians. In a femtosecond or less, the several European states had gone from their traditional stance of cradle-to-grave benefits provided by other people's money to a posture of austerity severe enough to bring a smile to the face of Messrs Calvin and Knox.

At the same time, the US continued to cruise along fueled by money which is not our own in pursuit of the Great Transformational Agenda. The Sages of Politics feared that this lonely position might impose a political cost on the Democratic Party and the incumbent president. So, the begging letter emerged.

It was written. It was signed. It was delivered. It was ignored. With greater or lesser degrees of courtesy, the American president's plea for unity was blown off. Blown off by one and all. The Eurocrats had come to the conclusion that there were times when the US should be quite unilateral.

The irony in this is as tasty as a triple chocolate cake. The American president in common with many of the American hoi oligoi sees Western Europe with its economic and political philosophy of democratic socialism, its post-modernist languor, its cultural relativism, to be the most seductive of Edens, the most attractive of Paradises, the capstone of ten and more cycles of centuries of human "progress."

"If only we could be more like them," came the lovelorn sigh of thousands of Americans, members in good standing of the self-appointed elites of politics, media, and academe.

Just as the new American president seemed to be leading his people successfully out of the wasteland of America-past and into the Promised Land of Europe-West, a not-so-funny thing happed over in the Continent of Dreams. The place morphed overnight it seemed from the Repository of All Things Great to a a remake of the Old USA.

Benefits beyond count, vacations which never ended, being held harmless against all perils foreign and domestic, became suddenly, shockingly, totally yesterday. In a flash, the good life, the "third life," la dolce vita, was cast aside, to be replaced with the pain and suffering, the sackcloth and ashes of austerity.

Say it ain't so, Joe! Say it ain't so, Barack! Nancy! Somebody! Anybody?

But, it is so. And, the US is alone. Swimming upstream. Headed by a leader to whom no one will listen. Urged on by a voice unheard in the world and increasingly unheeded or unbelieved by those of us who are members of We the People but not card carrying adherents of the domestic elite.

Once, not that many months ago, a conveniently unnamed aid to the Man in the Oval (in)famously remarked, "We were elected to preside over the graceful decline of the United States." Now it appears that We the People unwittingly elected a man destined to preside over, not the decline, but the defeat of the US.

We elected the man for a number of reasons. Some of us practiced identity politics--placing the subgroup of ethnic, racial, religious, economic, or ideological affiliation above the primary loyalty to the US. Some of us voted from a basis of frustration and alienation, terminally fried off by the hypocrisy and duplicity of the Bush/Cheney years. Still others of us were taken in by the false flag campaign of Mr Obama. (Of course that latter is no excuse as all political campaigns are to some extent of the false flag sort and experience should have made us too hip to have been taken in by the "hope and change" slogans coming from the TelePrompter propelled mouth over the palpably empty suit.)

In any event We the People still have some faint chance of forestalling our looming defeat in the world. If nothing else we can take a clue from the Europeans. That's right, boyo, the Europeans.

The European hoi polloi have shouted "enough is enough!" The common men and women of West Europe have had it up to their dandruff with cultural relativism, multi-culturalism, the surrendering of painfully won defining institutions and values to the new barbarians, the hordes of arrivals from the primitive regions of the Islamic world.

We can do no less. And, no more. Tolerance, forbearance, and diversity are valuable values, but none mean we must abandon the unique features and attributes which have served so well for so long to make us a self-conscious entity.

Now European politicians are demanding of their people (and in the case of the new British government, themselves) that individuals no longer ask, "what's in it for me?" but rather ask, "how will this benefit us all?" European politicians are seeking to force a powerful and painful change upon their societies and polities, a change from indulgence to sacrifice, a shift from give-it-to-me-now! to delay-for-a-better-future. They are asking the nearly impossible--to surrender an overly pleasurable today for the prospect of an OK tomorrow.

We can do no less. Since so few of our political figures are willing or able to emulate their European counterparts, We the People must demand that they do so. This is to ask of ourselves something even more strenuous, more arduous than the European politicians have asked of their publics.

Yeah, that's where it is at--demand that our politicians demand of us both austerity and the accompanying sacrifice of our version of la dolce vita.

It may be an impossible task for us to undertake. However, the alternative, the defeat of the US, makes the task not only important but central--if we are to have a tomorrow.

Firing A General Won't Make The World Better

The MSM as well as some of the new media have been looking for the bright side in the firing of General McChrystal. Reading these assorted attempts at top spinning a major disaster of the self-inflicted sort leads one to alternate tears with laughter.

There simply is no bright side to Mr Obama's exhibition of toughness, his resolute protection of civilian supremacy against the nonexistent threat of General McChrystal's negative assessments of the collection of time servers, people suffering under a delusion of adequacy, and lofty thinking lamebrains.

Tossing McChrystal off the troika to the wolves just as the time sensitive Afghanistan war is reaching the critical moment makes as much sense as inviting Osama bin Laden to help himself to the contents of the large nuclear warehouse not far from downtown Albuquerque. Not even the dual hatting of the politically acceptable and Iraq experienced General Petraeus alters the facts on the ground.

The removal of McChrystal will not boost morale and confidence among the US, allied, or Afghan National Forces. The removal will, however, give a boost to the morale and confidence in victory within the forces of the enemy.

Beyond the AfPak area of operations, the Obama decision will have consequences which equal or exceed those within the theater. Mr Obama's move will, for example, engender good cheer in Tehran.

So far, Mr Obama's dealings with Iran have been a record of continued complete failure. It is perfectly OK, considering this, to ask just how canning McChrystal makes matters worse. To do this, we have to get down to the basics.

The most basic fact of late is this. The Iranians have announced that their efforts at enriching uranium to twenty percent have resulted in producing seventeen kilograms of the stuff. This implies that their current rate of production is at least five kilos per month. A quick extrapolation shows that Tehran will have enough twenty percent feedstock to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium for two Hiroshima sized devices by the time of the midterm elections.

Another, equally basic fact is this. The sanctions including the fourth round of UN Security Council impositions as well as the additional measures taken by the European Union and those wending their way through Congress (against the opposition of the Man In The Oval) will not, can not, have a desired, positive effect on the quest for the "Mahdi Bomb."

The failure of both diplomatic engagement and sanctions implies that the US now has only two options regarding Iran. The first is the oft mentioned (in hushed tones) military option. The second might be called the Dr Strangelove approach. Remember the film's sub-title? That's right, "How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb."

This translates to some version of containment. Now containment worked when directed at the Soviet Union. It worked because both the US and the USSR shared a common value: There is no profit in committing national suicide.

To assume the Iranians have the same calculus of rationality is dubious at best. The Shia form of Islam as practiced in Iran is notably eschatological in orientation. The leading clerics as well as the country's president share an end-of-time world view which celebrates the necessity of a final war for the coming of the Mahdi. Given this consideration, it is not at all prudent to base policy on the efficacy of containment even a containment backed by relatively effective ABM systems and the threat of American nuclear retaliation.

The Iranians have been justifiably worried about the US employment of the "military option." The removal of General McChrystal from command on the eve of an operation which even Iranian observers believe would be successful shows Tehran that the US is most likely to blink first when standing eyeball to eyeball on the precipice of war.

The Iranians came to know General McChrystal quite well during the general's duty in Iraq, during the time when his special forces units cut great swaths through the ranks of the Iranian trained, Iranian supplied, sometimes Iranian commanded Shia insurgents. The mullahs and their Revolutionary Guard Corps bully boys also took McChrystal's measure during his abbreviated tenure in Afghanistan.

Frankly, General McChrystal assumed the same role in the mind's of Tehran's military leaders that George Patton did in the estimate of the German high command--the bogyman from hell. The removal of McChrystal proves to the mullahs and their men that Barack Obama has not been and never will be serious about any use of the "military option." Tehran has concluded with a certainty never felt by Mao that the US is "a paper tiger."

Not to put too fine a point on the matter, no president who is serious about the possibility of waging war in support of policy would remove a genuine, successful fighter of wars. Not even the replacement of McChrystal by Petraeus changes the algorithm as General Petraeus, no matter how beribboned, is not the warfighter that McChrystal is.

Beyond Iran lurks a legion of Islamist or Islamist leaning governments. The evident withdrawal of American support for Israel has encouraged the Islamist states to become more so. It has also forced other governments to lean ever closer to the more extreme stance of political Islam.

The muscle flexing of the adherents of political Islam has become more evident with every day which has passed since the IDF stopping of the "humanitarian flotilla." The fifty-seven member OIC has taken the point in both the UN Human Rights Council, and, most recently, in the Security Council. Our "allies," Turkey and Pakistan, have been carrying the OIC freight. Now these two stalwarts of political Islam have been joined by Malaysia in calling for an emergency UN session on the question of the IDF boarding of the flotilla.

The intent of Malaysia and its fellow members of the OIC is the launching of yet one more diplomatic assault on Israel. President Obama's previous efforts at "outreach" to the Muslim countries coupled with his transparent appeasement of the "frontline" Arab states provided the basis for this move. However, his firing of McChrystal has served to turbo-up the political courage of the OIC bloc.

Once again, the firing of a competent warfighter shows the hostiles of political Islam that the US has no "big stick" to support its softly spoken diplomatic words. The ground truth which has eluded Mr Obama and his "team" is simply that all diplomacy, hard or soft, spoken or acted, must finally rest upon the credible capacity and will to use force. Putting a successful warfighter out to pasture on the verge of a critical campaign because of a few poorly chosen (if accurate) words incautiously spoken near the ears of a "progressive" journalist shows the US is not currently willing to countenance the use of war as an instrument of international politics.

Mr Obama has shown he can be decisive. He has shown a willingness to seek revenge for attacks on members of his "team." It is to the misfortune of the US, to that of the civilized countries of the world, that he chose to demonstrate how tough and decisive he can be in a way which gives direct and real aid and comfort to the enemy.

Obama Steps On His Dick With Golf Shoes

To nobody's great surprise but to the total dismay of any American who cares whether the US fails in Afghanistan or not, the Very Thin Skinned and Shallow Minded man who currently occupies the Oval fired (or, technically speaking, "accepted the resignation of") General Stanley McChrystal today. The president is scheduled to do the impossible--explain and justify his decision later today, as soon as the TelePrompter can be loaded with the appropriate platitudes.

Mr Obama has dual hatted General Petraeus to serve as commander in Afghanistan in addition to his current job as CINCENTCOM. (Well, it does simplify the chain of command as Petraeus is now his own boss.) General Petraeus did an adequate job as commander in Iraq and, is well thought of by Republicans. Most importantly from the perspective of the Oval Office Inmates, General Petraeus has spent most of his career in billets requiring a nuanced interaction with journalists and politicians.

General McChrystal, as is shown by the ill-advised remarks so eagerly seized upon and quoted by the writer of the Rolling Stone piece, is by background, training, experience, and orientation a warfighter, a special operator. Men of this variety as the Geek can attest from much personal experience, are given to blunt honesty, eschewing the finely nuanced speech so beloved by politicians, journalists, and academics. In short, General McChrystal calls it as he sees it to the best of knowledge and belief.

Blunt honesty and the integrity which sustains and permits honesty constitute an anathema to politicians and others who must make deals regardless of actual cost. One may be certain that General Petraeus will never rock any administration boat, insult any civilian lamebrain, or perturb the sleep of even the unjust.

Whether General Petraeus can win the military portion of the war in Afghanistan is a more open question. While there are never any certainties in war--other than men will die--the informed, impartial observer would have been reasonably sure of backing a winner with McChrystal and his radically different approach to the war in Afghanistan. That degree of confidence can no longer be said to exist, if for no other reason than the impact of the McChrystal sacking on the morale of American forces and on the willingness of the Karzai regime to put a high degree of trust and confidence in the will and ability of the Americans to win.

Another very real impact of the Obama decision to rid himself of the troubling general resides with the enemy. There is no doubt but the Taliban and others of its ilk will be encouraged in their will to resist by the removal of the only senior American commander to have bested the black hats in both the military and political arenas of war.

Where the McChrystal strategy and operational doctrine focused in large measure on disrupting the organizational integrity of the insurgents, the Obama action has been to disrupt, perhaps fatally, the American organization. Where McChrystal had taken great pains to demoralize the senior echelons of Taliban et al, the Obama action has done the same to the good guys--to us and our allies including the Afghan National Forces.

In the forthcoming rationalization there is a high likelihood that Mr Obama will echo the words of all too many writers of editorials and others of the pundit class. He will aver, or at the least, imply, that General McChrystal was both insulting and insubordinate in his words and the words of his staff.

This justification is, at best, a crock of caca.

The characterizations offered of Joe Biden, and Messrs Eikenberry and Holebrook to say nothing of the other "wimps" in and around the White House may have been ill-chosen but they were accurate in the extreme. With the exception of SecDef Gates and SecState Clinton (exceptions that were made explicitly by General McChrystal and his staff), the members of "Team Obama" have demonstrated repeatedly that they were incapable of understanding and appreciating the realities on the ground in Afghanistan. If not evil counselors, these worthies have shown themselves as inept counselors. They merit the disapprobation heaped upon them by the general and members of his staff.

The truth, particularly when presented in a very blunt way, may be both inconvenient and painful, but that does not make it any less of the truth. The president had put on the combat boot of the general's words and loudly announced by his action that the boot both fits and pinches.

As for the insinuation that the general was being in any way insubordinate or rejecting of civilian supremacy, that accusation is utterly specious. It has utterly no validity. If one wants to witness insubordination in action he need only revisit the Affair of General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur.

Dugout Doug directly and repeatedly violated explicit orders given him by the president of the United States, Harry Truman. For that, General MacArthur well deserved being fired as he was by President Truman.

Nothing said by General McChrystal is in the same universe with what MacArthur did. General McChrystal violated no orders. Nor would he. A man of the background and experience of McChrystal would obey any lawful order he was given. Or, if obedience would violate his greater oath to the Constitution or his responsibility to and for the lives of the men under his command, then General McChrystal would do the honorable thing--he would resign his commission.

The Geek has heard men say far worse words concerning their superiors both uniformed and in mufti than anything attributed to General McChrystal or his staff. Heck, the Geek has said far worse during the stress of a war ill-fought and the sight of men dying without useful outcome. But, the Geek and others like him were fortunate that they were of low rank--and that they had no rat of a journalist pretending collegiality while in their midst.

It is a personal misfortune for General McChrystal and a national tragedy for all Americans that the general was not similarly situated and thus able to speak openly, honestly, and candidly about people of high station who by their actions betray the trust which had been placed in them.

The Downside Of A Professional Military

Forty years ago, as the traumatic debacle of the Vietnam War was reaching its penultimate stage, two waves ripped and later roared through the American public and the government. The first of these was of lesser importance--the replacement of the complex and easily abused system of classification and deferments which had made the Selective Service System a model of abuse with the far more fair in appearance lottery. The second, the wave which broke to great applause as the last American troops were leaving Vietnam, was the replacement of the conscript army by an "all volunteer force."

The senior echelons of the American military were all in favor of doing away with the draft. The prevailing view was--and is--that large, relatively low skilled forces were obsolete. Rather, the changes in military technology required and allowed smaller forces of much better trained, longer service troops.

The politicians in D.C. were also enamored with the notion of an "all volunteer" armed force. The denizens inside the Beltway had learned during the long years of Vietnam that the political will of the American public was inversely proportional to the number of "boys next door" who came home in fiberglass boxes. A similar equation was seen to have existed regarding opposition to the war: The draft, and only the draft, bred opposition by both potential draftees and their families to the war which required conscription.

As long as the country was at peace, or, worst case, fought only very short and low casualty wars, the "all volunteer" force in practice seemed to provide all the advantages predicted in principle. The Army and Marine Corps became organizations of people who wanted to be there. The changes in all forms of military technology assured that these (relatively speaking) manpower light forces had combat power aplenty. Lean, mean, and equipped very well to move, shoot, and communicate, the ground combat forces of the US were proportionately far more potent than their much larger predecessors had been only a couple of decades earlier.

At the time of discussion and implementation, there were a few voices opposed to the return to the old American concept of a vocational armed force, particularly a vocational ground army. This negative view focused primarily upon the probable consequence of an army which was increasingly divorced from the society which gave it birth and whose political institutions told it whom to fight, how to fight, and where to fight.

Among the critics of the "all volunteer" idea were those who argued that such a "mercenary" force would make it easier for presidents to send the troops and for congresses to support their dispatch. Analogies were constantly drawn between the "all volunteer" force and the old frontier army or the colonial forces of the US in the Philippines or Great Britain throughout the world. Critics of this school argued that the US would be in search of enemies, preferably small but possessed of critical resources. This position has some merit as events of the past twenty or so years have shown.

A far more trenchant criticism was offered by analysts who foresaw protracted interventionary wars. Given the small size of any affordable American ground combat force (a term which includes both the Army and Marine Corps) and the nature of interventionary operations, particularly those of a predominantly counterinsurgent character, the same units, the same men, the same officers would be cycled through the area of operations repeatedly.

As a result these individuals, particularly senior NCOs and officers who might see four or more tours of duty at ever higher rank, would begin to feel quite proprietary about "their" war, would have an increasing sense of what might be called entitlement regarding the war and how best to fight and win it. Coupled with the automatic separation of members of the ground combat force from the civilian society, these interlocking notions of "ownership" and "entitlement" would lead inexorably to increasingly tense relations between the military command structure, particularly the one in theater, and the larger civilian leadership echelon.

The tendencies of isolation, ownership, and entitlement would, if anything, be intensified within the special operations communities. At the same time, it would be the special operators who possessed the mindset, the experience, the operational imagination best suited for interventionary operations generally and counterinsurgency more specifically. The nature of the wars of the future (seen from the perspective of the 1980s) dictated that the Big Army of tanks, artillery, fast sweeping maneuvers would be irrelevant to the realities of what we now term "asymmetrical warfare."

The men needed in the future (again from the perspective of the Reagan days) would be those of the special operations forces, the most isolated, most indoctrinated, most committed members of the vocational army. As a result, there would be greater and greater friction between the professionals of the "Small Army" forces and both the diplomats and political leaders.

All of what was predicted by the second group of critics thirty years ago has come true during the long years of the Afghan and Iraqi wars. The "Big Army" professionals, the treadheads, the big gun guys, the men who reigned supreme during the short, sharp, and inconclusive days of Desert Storm were not the right people to run the war Afghanistan.

In a real sense the current flap of the McChrystal Comments is the necessary product of the "all volunteer" force as well as the necessary reliance upon the hard and idealistic minds formed almost automatically in the special operations community. As was prognosticated by a handful of critical observers of the coming "all volunteer" force, the combination of duration and small numbers assured the same units, the same men, most importantly, the same officers, would cycle through the AOs repeatedly.

First important fact: Where multiple tours, particularly more than three, were unusual in the Vietnam period, they have become the norm since the invasion of Afghanistan.

Second important fact: Not until the spec ops officers drifted to the top of the command structure in sufficient numbers did a "winning" theory of victory emerge.

Third important fact: The forecast sense of "ownership" and "entitlement" in a context of "isolation" has emerged with concomitant frictions or at the least fissures between the civilians and the military.

Fourth important fact: The conduct of the wars by the civilian leadership of two successive administrations has not and does not inspire confidence on the part of the commanders responsible for both the lives of those under their command as well as avoiding a disastrous defeat at the hands of a highly motivated enemy.

Fifth important fact: The supremacy of civilian command is fundamental to the American way of understanding and waging war. Whenever this bedrock principle seems to be called into question or challenged--whether by an improvident comment as was the case sixty plus years go when General George S. Patton, Jr suggested arming his German POWs and marching on to Moscow or the clear insubordination of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951--the balloon goes up, fast and hard.

In his comments to the reporter for Rolling Stone, General Stanley McChrystal appears to be challenging his civilian lords and masters. And, in a way he was. However, more to the point, General McChrystal was expressing the net effect of the first four important facts. His remarks and the context which gave rise to them are the consequence of waging war, long and frustrating war for reasons of state, by an "all volunteer" force.

Arguably, had the troops been what they were during Vietnam, the "boys next door," both We the People" and the government would have been more engaged with the conduct of the war and willing to think better about the goals of the war(s) as well as the methods used in fighting. With equal plausibility it can be argued that a conscript army would have assured no disconnect between the troops on the ground and the society which gave rise to them--and issued their marching orders.

In many respects conscript armies are both larger and less efficient than vocational ones. The same may be said of democracies, at least as far as inefficiency is concerned. Countering this accurate accusation is an affirmative defense. Democracies are best served by armed forces which fully and completely represent them as to makeup, values, and tight integration.

Even a man such as General McChrystal, the most complete and professional man of war the Geek has ever met, could and probably would agree that an administration as well as a military command structure would have to think longer, harder, and better before committing the US to war if it was fought in large part by civilians temporarily in uniform--draftees rather than by "volunteers." Probably the general would also agree that having draftees under his command would go a long way to assuring that he thought better, explained more completely, and elicited the cooperation and support of those over him as well as those under his command.

It is easy to understand the frustrations and stresses which caused General McChrystal and his staff to blurt out the intemperate remarks attributed to them. It is even easier to understand the well intended desire to remake the US forces into an "all volunteer" form with the untended consequences embodied in the first four important facts.

Mr Obama--This Isn't The Time To Kick Ass!

Rolling Stone magazine living up to its founding tradition as a pillar of the counterculture and deep opponent of the US War in Vietnam is bringing out an article on General Stanley McChrystal which has caused the overly sensitive Nice Young Man From Chicago and his henchmen to go ballistic. As a result General McChrystal has been forced to apologize for saying unkind words about various Team Obama heavyweights and has been recalled to Washington to explain his remarks to SecDef Gates and, presumably, the thin-skinned Obama.

Worse than this recall--which at the least serves to undercut McChrystal's moral authority in theater--the POTUS may well fire the man who has the best chance of pulling something less than total defeat out of the Afghanistan morass. Should Mr Obama take this action either directly or using a safe cut-out such as Secretary Gates or Admiral Mullen, it would constitute a self-inflicted wound with potentially fatal consequences.

In the upcoming profile style article, General McChrystal and his staff are reported to have made less than flattering comments about (1) Vice President Biden, (2) Obama Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke and (3) US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry. Others high in the ranks of Team Obama may have been skewered as well, since only Hilary Clinton was reputedly unscathed. (It is to be hoped that had Mr Gates been the target of a barb or two that his vast experience in Washington has served to cushion their impact.)

The foundation for the critical comments made by either McChrystal or members of his staff resides in the events of last Fall during the unnecessarily prolonged pseudo-debate over the correct American strategy for Afghanistan and the number of additional troops which would be needed to execute that strategy effectively. The Obama orchestrated exercise in foot-dragging was marked by leaked memos, rumors, counter-rumors, and other sorts of typically mean and petty bureaucratic infighting.

It was at this time that Ambassador Eikenberry leaked documents which were critical of McChrystal's request for extra men as well as casting aspersions on both the character and election of Hamid Karzai. To infer that Eikenberry's CYA oriented exercise torqued off General McChrystal and others genuinely seeking a path other than defeat by which to exit Afghanistan would be an exercise in accuracy.

It deserves mention that Ambassador Eikenberry's most undiplomatic excoriation of Afghanistan's president not only hindered General McChrystal but also marked the beginning of the steep and slippery downward slope of Afghan-US relations which has continued to date. The ventilation of frustration and anger with Eikenberry's self-serving act in the presence of a journalist was most unwise, most unfortunate, and most regrettable. But, the basis of the charge was both accurate and fair.

McChrystal and others have been frustrated and angered by Special Envoy Holbrooke as well. Mr Holbrooke has made the mistake of reading and believing his own press releases with the result that he considers himself to be The World's Leading Expert on Hostilities Termination and Conflict Resolution. This preposterously inflated self-assessment is based upon Mr Holbrook's role in brokering the Dayton Peace Accords, which played a less than considerable part in helping bring the ethnic and religiously based violence scarring former Yugoslavia to an end. The hosannas sung to Mr Holbrooke by press and Bill Clinton's White House do not merit Mr Holbrooke's conclusion that he Knows Everything Worth Knowing about both the political and military aspects of interventionary operations. If Mr Holbrooke's emails drip the same smugness and rectitude his remarks on camera and before Congress do, it is easy to see why General McChrystal and his staff are more than a tad annoyed to receive them.

Vice-President Biden is, of course, a cretin. Joe (The Biggest Mouth This Side Of Hugo Chavez) made his intellectually challenged position abundantly clear during the "debate" over AfPak strategy when he seriously proposed that the US withdraw from Afghanistan. At the same time we would cover Pakistan or at least the FATA with horizon-to-horizon swarms of Predators and Reapers so as to snipe al-Qaeda members at very low risk to ourselves.

The fact that this ludicrous idea was not met immediately with gales of derisive laughter but rather was given what appeared to be a respectful hearing in the corridors of power speaks volumes as to the level of strategic and operational thinking (that word used generically only) in the Obama administration. If General McChrystal was called upon to explain to the Policy Level wallahs just what was wrong with War According To Joe, full justification for any number of statements of jocose persiflage is to be found.

Gates and Mullen have engaged in preemptive damage limitation. Both men have severely chastised General McChrystal. This was done, not because the general deserved it but rather in the hopes it might head off some disastrous presidential act of pique.

The word on the street is President Obama likes everything "nicey-nicey" around him. Only the POTUS is allowed to have a temper tantrum, to show outrage, or, even, to be pissed off. We all know that Mr Obama has been looking for some "ass" to kick.

If the president is not in a hurry to be in the Oval while the US loses the war in Afghanistan, he had best decide that General McChrystal does not possess an ass worthy of kicking.

Pull Out Now! The UN Says The War Is Lost

The UN has taken a look at the security situation in Afghanistan. The worthies and experts at that strategic think tank didn't like what they saw.

But, being willing to look defeat square in the face without blanching, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon who is, as everybody knows, the finest military theorist since Karl von Clausewitz as well as an operational level commander on a par with George Patton, has informed the Security Council that Afghanistan is going to hell in a high speed, low drag wheelbarrow. Using the ever reliable indicators of roadside bombs, assassinations of low to mid-level government personnel in the provinces, and "complex" attacks, the SecGen all but declared the Taliban to have won.

The SecGen is not alone in his dismal appraisal of American and allied fortunes in Afghanistan. Over the past few weeks, those two pillars of independent, disinterested, and agenda-free impartial assessment of American success or failure in both war and diplomacy, the WaPo and the NYT, have made reached the same conclusion, at least by implication. The only feature lacking in either outlet is an editorial demanding a prompt American surrender to the Mighty and Pure Defenders of the One Truth Faith.

Admittedly, there are a number of good reasons to feel both gloom and doom hovering over the valleys of Afghanistan. The Afghan National Forces are far more a myth than a substantial reality capable of effective action in the field. The Karzai regime is corrupt, inefficient, self-serving, and far more interested in continuing its hold on power than seeing hostilities termination leading to long term conflict resolution. Mr Karzai himself is an excellent Afghan politician but a very infuriating partner with whom to engage.

At the same time Taliban deserves credit. It is comprised of tough, resilient fighters led by reasonably competent commanders. It has a set of clear goals. A very definite agenda well founded on religion. Beyond that Taliban has the support and assistance of the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence and, thus, constitutes a branch of the armed forces of Pakistan. As if that were not sufficient, Taliban receives support from Iran. Training camps are located convenient to the Afghan border in the wastes of rural Iran while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps provides instructors. In a gesture of religious fraternity, the Iranians also provide explosively formed penetrators and other useful gadgets.

Even with the augmentation of American combat forces, the manpower available to the US and ISAF for combat missions is minimal (to put it charitably.) The correct decision by General McChrystal to limit the use of indirect and air delivered fire places more of a burden on the ground pounders, thus making the war even more manpower intensive. In order to assure that few (preferably no) Afghan non-combatants are killed by the "infidels," it is necessary to conduct each and every operation no matter how large or small on a retail basis, up close and personal.

Longer term this self-imposed constraint on the lethality of the battlefield is not only good, it is absolutely necessary. McChrystal understands perfectly that if civilians are to be killed, it is essential that they be killed by the insurgents. Insofar as Taliban et al kill civilians, non-combatants, women, children, and old men, whether by a roadside bomb, a suicide IED, or a "complex" attack, the resulting body count strengthens the counterinsurgent while weakening the insurgent.

That consideration constitutes a critical nuance unnoticed by either Generalissimo Ban Ki-Moon or the Deep Strategic Thinkers at the WaPo and NYT. The primary victims of the increased usage of roadside bombs and similar IEDs have been Afghan civilians. The same is true of attacks carried out by "martyrdom seekers" whether using suicide vests or vehicle borne IEDs. Even many of the larger attacks, characterized in the UN report as "complex" have resulted in more civilian than foreign combatant deaths.

The roadside bombs, the assassinations of minor government, police, and military personnel, even the majority of the "complex" attacks such as the strikes on foreign occupied guesthouses have not only resulted in an increased loathing for Taliban on the part of Afghans but show a high measure of desperation driving Taliban.

In previous insurgencies, assassination of local personnel have been a prominent feature either of the beginning of the insurgency or as a strong indicator of its being defeated. The same applies to indiscriminate attacks resulting in a high level of casualties among the uncommitted majority of the civilian population.

Previously in Iraq, in Pakistan, and in Afghanistan, when the insurgents have started killing civilians in large numbers, there has been an immediate push-back on the part of the threatened civilians. This is being seen again in Afghanistan in the past few months--the same period employed by Feldherr Ban Ki-Moon as a base for his prognostication of impending defeat.

Increasingly, local villagers equipped with (to use the term employed by US military sources) "personal assault weapons" have joined Afghan, US, and ISAF units to engage and destroy Taliban cells. The same upward trend is seen in the flow of unsolicited and actionable intelligence from locals who have had it up to their beards with Taliban.

Afghans, not unlike most people everywhere, are not strong on the idea of getting killed. They don't even appreciate the fine theological distinction between being killed by an "infidel" or an "apostate" rather than a good Muslim, a jihadi. Not surprisingly, the Afghans are ready, willing, and eager to seize the moment and abate the Taliban nuisance.

Rather than being indicators of near-term defeat, the increased Taliban reliance upon IEDs, assassination, and the odd media spectacular points to a loss of confidence within the command echelons of the insurgents. Taliban has lost the initiative in the quotidian conduct of operations; as a comparison between friendly initiated, hostile initiated, and meeting engagements shows, the capacity to control the pace and direction of operations has shifted increasingly in favor of the US and ISAF.

This pleasant reality in no way lessens the underlying reality that the war is not over. The US and its allies are not yet sure of achieving the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing," but the vectors have shifted in that direction. The next six to twelve months will be a long, hard pull in Afghanistan. Marja is not yet fully secured. The Kandahar operation has been delayed. Most importantly, the Afghan national government and forces have not yet shown either the will or the ability to carry their share of the freight.

Right now the major lost opportunity is not military but falls rather in the area of governance. The US and its allies have fallen too far into the trap of believing that the central government of Afghanistan is just that--a government. The US has also allowed itself to believe that success in Afghanistan cannot occur without the existence of a strong, credible, and effective central government.

These twin notions are bogus. For much of its existence, Afghanistan has gotten along quite well without a strong, credible, and effective central government. The Afghan culture states that a person's primary loyalty is to the extended family, secondary loyalty is to the clan, and the tertiary loyalty is to the tribe. This hierarchy allows but does not compel a loyalty to the central regime in Kabul.

This situation implies that Afghans have a high propensity toward and a good capacity for self-organizing. The self-organizing process moves from the most local to the more distant and has the automatic advantage of assuring high group coherence through the necessity for voluntary collaboration in the search for mutual self-interest.

The operational consequence of this orientation within the human terrain of Afghanistan is obvious. The US and its allies should--must, perhaps--put Kabul to the side and deal with the local power structure. The winning political approach is that of empowering the self-organizing capacities of the Afghan villages, the neighborhoods of Marja or Kandahar. Working with and backing the needs of the locals in all aspects of security, governance, and economic development would allow the effective circumvention of the obstructionists of Kabul. Doing things this way would have the additional advantage of cutting off Taliban from any pretense of legitimacy, by denying it the large target of central government corruption, cronyism , and flat out inefficiency.

There is a very high probability that General McChrystal is as aware of the self-organizing and provincial orientation of the Afghan human terrain as he is of the grave inadequacies of the central regime. If his lords and masters inside the Beltway can be brought to see the light, there is a better than good chance that the next few months will see a political success parallel the probable military defeat of Taliban.

There is, of course, only the slimmest of chances that the Obama administration can wake up to the tribal and family realities of Afghanistan so as to give a green light to adding the final ingredient which would well neigh onto guarantee success of an acceptable sort in Afghanistan. And, there is absolutely no chance in hell that the WaPo-NYT Strategic Studies Academy or Geo-Political Genus Ban Ki-Moon will ever get it.