The London Times has finally ripped the curtain of silence to small shreds with an article drawing on a well done paper from the London School of Economics, which institution has a plethora of expertise far surpassing the dismal science for which it is named. Based upon extensive interviews with past and present Taliban figures as well as former and current ISI personnel and others in the government of Pakistan, the conclusion of the report is both stark and irrefutable. It was quite pleasant to read in an open source the unspeakable truth: ISI is the ongoing mainbrace of Taliban and this is known to and approved of by the Pakistani government at the highest level, the country's president, Asif Ali Zardari.
Despite all the odious protestations of the Bush/Cheney administration and its successor under Obama that Pakistan is an ally in a joint war against "terrorism" or "radical extremism" or simply the named groups al-Qaeda and Taliban, the truth is simply that Pakistan consorts more eagerly with the enemy than it does with the US. Not even the billions in bribes have served to budge the government of Pakistan, or the Pakistani army, let alone ISI from the course of supporting, facilitating, assisting, the Scrofulous Vermin of the Koran.
There are good reasons for the position adopted by Islamabad in the closing days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At that time it appeared Pakistan could create strategic depth for itself by using a proxy force to rule Afghanistan when the Red Army finally headed home. The US was indifferent. As long as the Soviets got and stayed got, the administrations of Reagan and H.W. Bush were happy. No one at the top two levels of the national security and foreign policy staffs cared for the nuances of Afghan politics nor the fine grained details of just how Pakistan sought to outpoint India in their never ending conflict.
During the years of assisting the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance Americans had come to find the Afghans to be a very difficult sort to work with. There was no great objection from the fieldhand level when the endgame of the proxy effort against the Red Army was turned over to the Paks.
It has to be admitted that the Pakistanis took to the assignment with vim, vigor, and vitality. They were skilled and able in the task of taking the young men from the Saudi funded madrassas near the border and turning them into the Taliban. The ISI guys were Muslim, some quite oriented to political Islam and all that implies. They were also good nationalists and were oblivious to the ill effects Taliban had on the Afghan social, political, and economic life as long as the strategic interests of Pakistan were served.
For some years the ISI para-military officers rode high. Afghanistan was dominated by Taliban. Other ISI created and run Muslim entities waged asymmetrical war against the Indian main enemy particularly in Kashmir. During the same stretch of time in the mid to late nineties, ISI became increasing aware of and entwined with al-Qaeda.
This is not to say that ISI either worked directly with or abetted Osama bin Laden or even knew of specific plans, but rather that ISI had a loose working relation with al-Qaeda, which came in handy for the Sublime Ethereal Shaykh when he and his associates relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. Relations between ISI and Osama were warm enough that, when the US launched a cruise missile attack on the man's camp, he received a timely phone call from a Pakistani who knew the time the Tomahawks would be crossing Pakistani air space.
This one phone call, which had to be from a senior member of the Pakistani military or ISI, assured Osama was out of the impact area in a timely fashion. And, it assured the US would suffer the trauma of 9/11. Unsurprisingly, no heads rolled even metaphorically for this most treacherous phone message.
Even an observer no closer to the scene than the planet Mars could not have missed the way in which ISI personnel with al-Qaeda and Taliban wallahs in hand were able to leave Afghanistan by air and foot as the American boots advanced at an unduly leisurely rate. There are strong indications that the days following the American "invasion" constituted in part a carefully choreographed ballet between the Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies and the government, army, and intelligence service of our good and great ally, Pakistan. (Oh, may the winds of the universe grant the Geek a life long enough so that he can see the documents when they finally emerge from the Burn Before Reading file!)
Not to put too fine a point on the matter--the Pakistanis absolutely hate the US. Yes, there are individual exceptions, but the general climate of opinion in the hellhole of Pakistan is that there is an evil triad out to get them: India, Israel, and the US. The relative ranking of the three satanic powers varies over time, but none ever slip from the list no matter what the realities might be.
The government of Pakistan, its army, and ISI resonate perfectly with this climate. It propels the government to denounce the Predator strikes in the FATA even though interviews with the locals in the areas liable to Predator attention show support for the strikes. (Consult the archives of the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor for documentation.) The real deal is simply that the tribesmen exposed most up close and personal to the Taliban of either or both Pakistani or Afghan origin dislike them the most and are most pleased when a Hellfire missile energetically disassembles some Talib.
During the past year or so the government of Pakistan, its army, and even the puppet masters of ISI have come to realize that, like Dr Frankenstein, their monster has eluded complete control and threatens its creator. That more than any alleged US pressure (the Obama administration pressuring? Since when? Unless the victim is Israel) made it necessary for the army to go through the motions of fighting Taliban. The very methodical actions first in Swat and then in South Waziristan were calculated to provide ample opportunity for the bag guys to evacuate to safer areas while minimizing friendly fatalities.
Pakistan will undertake only the bare minimum of actions necessary to convince their homegrown Talibs to focus on India and the foreigners rather than attack domestically. At the same time the operations conducted by Pakistani security forces will make certain that the surviving Talib are better skilled in the arts of combat. In short, the Pakistanis are serving as a live fire course of instruction turning out more competent jihadi to fight the Americans and others in Afghanistan. In the alternative, the foreign jihadis subjected to the Pakistani courses of combat instruction will go home as much better fighters.
What a fine concept! If you are the government, army, and ISI of Pakistan.
Much as it pains the Geek to once more lay the responsibility for the bootless policy of the US toward Pakistan at the feet of the inept Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies considering that the Obama administration is even more adrift at the policy level, such is the ground truth. The simplest and perhaps most accurate explanation for the Bush/Cheney decision to bribe our pretend ally into a further pretense of alliance is that of inertia. Previous administrations had made the same superficial, not to say lame brained appreciation.
Not even the Pakistani success at evading our half-hearted efforts to stop its nuclear weapons program served as a wake-up call. The Pakistani possession of a rudimentary nuclear arsenal simply served then to provide an excuse for more soft treatment. ("We can't piss off the Paks! They have the freakin' bomb!)
This overlooked the fact that the US had never, (not since the Truman administration when India was first seen as a dangerously pro-Soviet leaning country), not even once, tried a hard touch on Islamabad. Also overlooked is the accompanying reality that no Muslim country has ever responded positively to any touch other than a hard one. Soft play, the play of pretense, and bribes breeds contempt, contempt for the weakness exhibited.
So where does the situation finally blown wide open by the Brits leave us and our allies in Afghanistan? Simple. Between a rock--Karzai's search for a separate peace--and a hard place--the ISI sponsorship and protection of Taliban.
The answer? There is an answer, not a complete one to be sure. With respect to Afghanistan, focus on killing as many of the hard core jihadis of Taliban and akin groups as possible while empowering to the maximum degree possible the self-organizing potentials of Afghans at the local level. In the FATA ,continue or, better, expand the Predator attacks to the greatest extent supportable by actionable intelligence so as to kill as many heavyweights--and ISI officers--as possible in the shortest period of time.
Pakistan is the tougher problem. The hole we have dug for ourselves there is too deep to be filled quickly. This means we had best limit our aid while preparing for ground and air actions so as to neutralize their nuclear stockpile and supporting facilities. Particularly if the political Islamist strain in the society and government--including the army and ISI--becomes oriented toward the notion of outdoing Iran in the capacity to use indirectly applied nuclear fire on an "infidel" target.
Most of all it is critical to cease privileging Islam. There is danger in pretending that political Islam is any different from Communism or National Socialism. It is an ideology hostile in all respects to the values, interests, and goals of the US and other civilized states. Further, it is aggressive, given to duplicity of a degree which would have embarrassed even Goebbels, and more implacable than Joe Stalin on a tear.
The unfortunate reality is that the war between political Islam and the civilized states has barely started. Equally unfortunate is the fact that Pakistan, even more than Iran, is the major epicenter of aggressive political Islam. Look at Pakistan and see the face of the enemy.
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