Fer sure, Mr President. You might not know it, but that isn't the way things work. Not in the real world of actual soldiers, real insurgents, and if-they-hit-you-you-die bullets. Whether you know it or not, whether you intended it or not, you have hit the reset button in your war in Afghanistan.
To get a grip on this ground truth requires starting with a very basic observation about the nature of successful counterinsurgency in general and what this means for Afghanistan. A primary reality of counterinsurgency is that one cannot kill one's way to victory. Killing people and breaking things plays a role in counterinsurgency, but a very limited one.
The focus of competition between the insurgent and his opponent is is the collective mind of the uncommitted majority of the affected population. Each side seeks to mobilize the support of the uncommitted majority to its side while denying the opponent the opportunity to do the same.
Simultaneously and at a more fundamental level each side--insurgent and counterinsurgent--is seeking to progressively reduce the political will of his opponent while maintaining that of his side. This dual track war means that the side which can maintain its political will while reducing that of his enemy as well as attracting a greater deal of active support from the uncommitted majority than the opponent will succeed.
This twin, interlocking dynamic is seen to have been at work in every insurgency throughout history, particularly the history of the past two or three hundred years. It is at work in Afghanistan today.
Killing people and breaking things plays a role in accomplishing the tasks of undercutting the enemy's political will as well as mobilizing the uncommitted majority at the expense of the adversary. This does not imply that the traditional characteristics of war--killing people and breaking things--is unimportant. Rather, it means that the traditional aspects of war are very important.
The strategic and operational level concepts as well as the tactical approaches which implement the first two on a daily basis must properly define who to kill, how to kill, and when to kill in a way which maximizes the effectiveness of killing in both the undercutting of the enemy's political will and the attracting of the greater percentage of the uncommitted majority. The unique requirements of counterinsurgency call into question the traditional US military algorithm of firepower kills and killing brings victory.
General Stanley McChrystal's understanding of insurgency and the twin, interlocking dynamics which serve to define success or failure prompted him to place the highest value on using US, Afghan, and other allied forces to protect civilians even at the cost of making combat operations more difficult to undertake and complete. His view of the dynamics of successful counterinsurgency also pointed him in the direction of accepting higher friendly casualties if doing such would assure safety for the uncommitted majority.
This understanding is not one easily accepted by conventionally oriented soldiers as well as the civilians who must take the political heat for casualties. The conventional American soldier has been raised in a school which places the highest priority on protecting our troops. The next highest priority is that of killing the maximal number of hostile forces in a minimum amount of time.
The slogan of the conventional soldier, a slogan which is perfectly suited for peer-to-peer wars, is "find, fix, and destroy." That is, use superior technologies of reconnaissance and surveillance to locate the enemy force. Then, employ high volumes of indirect and air delivered fire to fix him in place, to deny him the chance to move. Finally, by superior mobility put enough friendly troops in place to destroy any enemy which survived the fix-in-place stage.
The use of the firepower heavy approach to war proved most counterproductive in Afghanistan (and scarcely less so in Iraq.) General McChrystal came to his job already aware of the limitations of conventional doctrine. Even if he hadn't, the all too obvious rebirth of Taliban as well as the profound hostility felt to "foreign" forces by the uncommitted majority of Afghans would have made it so.
McChrystal replaced the "shoot, move, communicate" so as to "find, fix, and destroy" approach to the war with one which correctly changed the emphasis to protecting the uncommitted civilian population, offering inducements to the soft-core supporters of Taliban, and placing ever increasing direct pressure on the hard core insurgents with the intent of mobilizing support from the uncommitted majority and undercutting the political will of the Talib to continue fighting.
In practice this approach meant the US willingly put aside most of its advantages in indirect and air delivered firepower, put its troops at greater risk of being wounded or killed, and, of necessity, slowed the tempo of combat. Each and everyone of these features violated long standing practices of the US Army (and, to a much lesser extent, the Marine Corps.)
It is not at all surprising that this approach, dubbed "courageous restraint," did not sit well with the more conventionally minded officers and senior NCOs who comprise the majority of the US forces in Afghanistan. It is not surprising either that General David Petraeus has promised to "review" the policy of courageous restraint.
This review will undoubtedly be greeted by hosannas on the part of the conventionally minded men in Afghanistan. It will also be met with sighs of relief by the grunts at the sharp point as no one who occupies that necessary and very uncomfortable place is happy with the notion of placing his one and only skin at risk in order to protect the host civilian population. Then, of course, the legion of hairy-chested politicians, pundits, and TV watching super-strategists who have the bravery of being out of range will cheer a more robust way of fighting the war.
In Afghanistan, the locals have shown their opinion of "courageous restraint" in very real and really beneficial ways. As the incidents of civilian deaths and injuries collateral to US, ISAF, and Afghan National Forces operations have decreased, the flow of actionable intelligence from locals has increased. This has resulted in a steady and steadily accelerating shift in initiative from the insurgents to the counterinsurgents.
Taliban has reacted to the palpable shift in battlefield initiative by resorting to terror tactics which smack of desperation. Taliban has increased its use of indiscriminate IEDs which results in civilian casualties. Taliban has employed assassination of low ranking pro-government tribal leaders and officials. It has even hung an eight year old boy as a spy for the British Army. The net effect of these methods has been the demobilization of Taliban support and its remobilization to the "foreigners" and even the Kabul government.
In short, the courageous restraint concept has resulted in Taliban killing its way to defeat.
Even the thought of change in the McChrystal concept should perturb anyone interested in an ultimate American success in Afghanistan. The fact that General Petraeus would even consider reviewing an approach which is so clearly working is alarming. As a political general, David Petraeus may be more concerned about the mutterings in the ranks about the additional burden placed upon American warriors by the McChrystal understanding of the requirements of successful counterinsurgency. If this is the case, he is worried about the wrong matter.
The fact that General Petraeus was in command in Iraq during the time that the elements placed into play by others took effect gives no reason to believe that he is perceptive enough to see the nature of the great differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, the differences which make Afghanistan the far more difficult venue. Nor should one take undue comfort from General Petreaus having been in overall charge of the process of fabricating the new field manual on counterinsurgency. There is a world of difference between writing an abstract doctrine of theoretically universal application and fighting one, specific war in one, specific human terrain.
The take away is simple to state; hard to practice. General McChrystal developed a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the nature and character of the war in Afghanistan. He developed a strategic and operational concept for waging that one, specific war which showed success from the moment it came out of the box.
Unfortunately, it appears that General Petraeus is all too willing to compromise the success from the moment he accepted the new assignment. Even more unfortunate is the reality that President Obama did not know (or pretended not to know) that a change in command automatically means a change in strategy.
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