Russia Chooses A Side

While it is not a surprise, the decision of Vladimir Putin's regime to join China in the support of North Korea (or, if not precisely that, in opposition to the South Koreans and thus the US) must be a disappointment to the Obama administration.  If the vaunted "Team of Rivals" which constitutes the Obama inner circle had a realpolitik view of life, the sharp turn against Seoul and Washington would not be a disappointing further rejection of the "Reset Button" policy.

In calling for an emergency closed door UN Security Council meeting on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Russians were doing the expectable.  In the Russian condemnation of the US for not immediately convening the emergency meeting in its role as this month's chair, Moscow was doing the predictable.  When Moscow called for the cancellation of the impending South Korean live fire exercises on Yeonpyeong Island, the Masters of the Kremlin went over the edge.  No longer could they maintain the pretense of evenhandedness; the characterization of the military exercises as a "dangerous aggravation" demonstrates clear partisan orientation.

In so closely associating itself with China, the Russians have embarked on a risky course of diplomacy, a course with one intention which may well result in a defeat on another, far more important diplomatic front.

The Russian move is linked to the ratification of the new START pending in the Senate.  As the Russians have no bull in the Korean herd unlike Beijing, the goal of their demarche in the UNSC must be that of demonstrating to the Obama administration the consequences of a failure on the part of the "US side" to ratify the treaty without further delay or modification.  The Kremlin is flexing its trouble making muscles in a high profile venue to show unmistakably that there will be a price to be paid should the Republicans stall the ratification process or insist upon modifications which would necessitate reopening the entire negotiation effort.

In the present Korean context, the North Koreans continue to be very much in the wrong.  Their actions, whether sinking a South Korean warship or bombarding an island located to the south of the Northern Limit Line, Pyongyang has acted contrary to the provisions of the 1953 Armistice as well as relevant international law.  The South Korean responses to date including the live fire exercises have been both "restrained" (to use the favorite word of both Beijing and, now, Moscow) and completely within its rights as a sovereign state.  No observer unless blinded by the requirements of ulterior motives and objectives can deny that.

In its support of South Korea, which includes a refusal to engage in a re-run of the Six Power Talks without Pyongyang making serious and severe concessions in advance, the Obama administration is on the side of the angels.  To hold talks with the Hermits of the North without the Hermits first demonstrating a genuine repentance would be to reward aggression, submit to extortion, and unduly reinforce the foundations of a regime facing a possible succession crisis.  It would be, in short, counterproductive and self-defeating.

The Russian leadership is not comprised of situationally naive people.  Putin, Medvedev and company well understand that the US position is both realistic and justified by regional political dynamics.  More than most governments, that of Russia understands the political and diplomatic games of extortion from both sides of the relationship.

So there is no direct rationale for the Russian effort to muck about in the Korean swamp.  There is, however, a very powerful indirect one.  The Kremlin wants the new START ratified quickly and cleanly.  The Boys at the Top understand that there is a potent opposition to the new treaty within the Republicans of the Senate.  Thus they are hopeful that a bit of pressure might somehow, someway, push the Obama administration into doing something to pull the Republican fangs.

It is even possible that Putin, et al may even entertain the notion that the Republicans in the Senate might get the message, might come to understand what is at risk should the new START not be ratified.  If this is the case, the Geek fears they have vastly overestimated the mentality of the Republican opposition.  The current exhibition of Russian intransigence is more likely to stimulate left over Cold War apprehensions regarding the intentions of the Kremlin than to serve as an example of what might be expected absent START ratification.

The proposed treaty is not perfect from the American perspective particularly with respect to force modernization and anti-ballistic missile system development.  Objections in these areas are not figments of feverish Republican imaginations, nor are they baseless renewals of Cold War fears.

Even with the asymmetries built into the treaty, it deserves ratification.  There are benefits to the US.  The most important of these is the reestablishment of the inspection regime which lapsed with the expiry of the former treaty.  The reduction in (to use the old Soviet term) "nuclear charges" is to the advantage of the US as well given the expense of maintaining the larger number of active and reserve "charges" and delivery systems.  Provided that the current or some future administration does not use the new START as a cover for an unwillingness to pay the economic and political price of force modernization, that feature of the treaty should not serve as an obstacle.

This leaves the objections centering on ABM research, development, and deployment as a legitimate point.  This point along with the very ticklish problem of theater or tactical nuclear weapons can be put to one side for the moment without the US suffering any real disadvantage over time.

This implies that most of the Republican objections are not so much rooted in the language of START as they are in a general distrust or dislike of the Russian government today.  While superficially resembling the so-called "Cold War mentality" so often invoked by rhetoricians in both Beijing and Moscow, it is not the same.  The distrust and dislike of Russia's government stems instead from the highly nationalistic behavior of that government coupled with the perception that the Russian government is, in fact, a non-democratic regime tainted with corrupt authoritarianism.

These perceptions are accurate.  Russia is not and never has been a democracy.  It is not and never has been noted for honest, transparent governance.  Russia is not and never has been free of a strong authoritarian bent.

So what?

It matters not that Vladimir of the Bare Chest cannot live up to the requirements of the Boy Scout Oath.  It matters not that a Russian election is not open, fair, honest.  It is utterly irrelevant that corruption is rampant.  It is of no consequence that the rule of law consists of whatever the Person in Charge says it is.

All that really matters is the ground truth that Russia is what it always has been--a country strongly motivated by nationalism, by the unqualified pursuit of national interest.  The very fact that Russia is nationalistic to an extent that few in the American elite can comprehend is the greatest single reason in favor of ratifying START.  A new treaty puts some verifiable limits on Russian expansion in the nuclear arena.  It places a ring fence around nuclear deployment and the size of the ready use nuclear arsenal.

To put it in very simple words: The more nationalistic a government is, the more vital it is to put limits, verifiable limits on its actions.

While imperfect, this is what START does.  It is all it does.  And, doing so is very much in US interests.

This is why the Russian posture on Korea is so troublesome.  By its unnecessary skewing in favor of the Chinese defined line and totally unjustifiable tilt against South Korea exercising its sovereign rights, the Kremlin may have strengthened the opposition to START.  It may even have provided a political impetus or at least cover for some conservative Democrats to break with Obama administration and vote against the treaty.

If this assessment of Russian motives and goals is close to accurate, it implies something larger and more important about the current Russian leadership.  The implication is both simple and alarming.  The Kremlin Boys, or at least the one who counts most, Vladimir Putin, has no clear understanding of how American politics operate or how Americans at the top of the political pyramid think.

Of course, with its emphasis on the fiction of a "Rest Button," the Obama administration generally and the president in particular have done nothing to educate the Russians topside in the whys and ways of US politics.  If anything the administration and president have convinced the ever-so-muscular Putin that the US has gone soft, flabby, and irresolute, and, thus, is suitable for a bit of creative bullying.

If that is the case, the Kremlin has made another serious miscalculation.  One mile of bad diplomatic road almost always leads to another.