Is Tunisia The New Paradigm?

Many observers, particularly those who live in the Arab countries of the Mideast, see the overthrow of the aging authoritarian president, Ben Ali, as a sign of things to come in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, even the feudal oil kingdoms of the Gulf.  These optimistic folk revel in the apparent success of an unprecedented exercise in "people power."

There are striking but superficial similarities between the social, political, and economic dynamic which brought an end to the quarter century of Ben Ali's reign and those obtaining in other Mideast countries, particularly Egypt.  But, as history has so often shown, the differences are far more critical than the appealing similarities.

Ben Ali was only the second chief of state in the fifty plus years of Tunisian independence.  His predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, ushered in both independence and a rigid one party state rule.  Bourguiba was a realist in his domestic and foreign policy pursuing good relations with the ex-colonial power, France, while insisting on secularization, educational development, and economic progress domestically.  His thirty-one year regime provided a sound basis for Tunisia both socially and economically while stunting the country's political growth.

Ben Ali displaced Bourguiba in a non-violent coup in 1987.  His early terms in the office of president were distinguished only by his fealty to Bourguiba's visions.  However, by the end of his fifteenth year in power, Ben Ali had become increasingly repressive, given to nepotism and familial corruption and evermore remoteness from the people of Tunisia.  During terms number four and five, the general distaste for the regime grew apace, but manifestations of discontent were handled readily by the police.

As distaste for the regime grew so also did the wealth of the presidential family including the relatives of his second wife, a nearly illiterate one time beautician.  The situation would have remained in stasis had it not been for the impact of the global recession, particularly the hit taken by the large, educated, secularized, and European oriented youth of the country.

Bourguiba had emphasized the control of population growth with excellent results.  This insulated Tunisia against the early effects of too much education and too few suitable jobs.  However, the global recession upset the delicate balance with results which disproportionately hit the urban under thirty population.  In this context it should be mentioned that Tunisia is heavily urbanized with seven out of every ten people living in the cities.  Similarly Tunisia boasts an unusually large number of people with a post-secondary education.

In many but not all of these features--urbanization, a precarious balance between population growth and job growth, a significant number of young, educated, and under- or unemployed people, a rigid, one party political dynamic, inefficient, overbearing repression by police, corruption and nepotism at the highest level of government, maldistribution of wealth--Tunisia is closely resembled by Egypt, Algeria, and the Gulf states.  The same is true to a slightly lesser degree with respect to Jordan, Libya, and Syria.

None of this should be taken to imply that Hosni Mubarak is soon to go the way of Ben Ali.  The reason is to be found in the differences between Tunisia and the other Arab states.  Most of the critical differences are matters of degree rather than substance.  For example, Tunisia's population has a higher percentage of recipients of post-secondary education than the other countries in the region.  The average family size in Tunisia--an important consideration when evaluating the potential for political involvement by youth--is smaller than in the other Arab states.  The percentage of urbanites is larger.  The percentage of under-thirties with direct experience living in Europe is larger.  In short, the population of Tunisia is disproportionately educated, urban, technologically savvy, literate, and comes from a childhood of relative privilege.

Other differences are structural.  Tunisia has a small and non-politicized army.  While the police are more political than not, the army sat--and continues to sit--on the sidelines.  Its high command refused to suppress the escalating demonstrations/riots.  This was critical to the decision by the president to leave and the prime minister to step aside in favor of the legislative speaker.  Also structural is the matter of religion.  Tunisia is Muslim to be sure, but it is a country in which the seeds of violent political Islam or even the purportedly non-violent sort peddled by the Muslim Brotherhood have never been allowed to take root.

The act which triggered the final month of escalating unrest is quite atypical for an Arab/Muslim state and society but quite emblematic of Tunisia's uniqueness.  The event was the public self-immolation of a twenty-six year old university graduate who was forced to support himself as a fruit and vegetable peddler.  After being hassled by the police for having no license, Mohamad Bouazizi, took his own life in the same attention demanding way as did the famed Buddhist monks of South Vietnam fifty years ago--he doused himself with gasoline and struck a match.

Some Muslim clerics along with government spokesmen condemned Bouazizi's suicide as "non-Islamic."  This attempt at marginalization was unsuccessful to say the least.  It can be argued that the condemnation offered by Muslim clerics deligitimized any Islamist message.  Because of the widespread use of Internet, SMS, and other horizontal means of communication the death of Mr Bouazizi had an impact far from the small town of Sidi Bouzid.

Unemployed graduates were joined by urban workers and others in demonstrations and riots publicized by SMS and social networking sites in a manner redolent of raves and flash crowds.  The demonstrators were never effectively and efficiently repressed by the police.  It is important to note that the Tunisian organs of internal security were not and never have been efficiently repressive.  They could oppress but never gain the unchallenged upper hand which provides the necessary suppression of opposition.  In short, the police could repress enough to be counterproductive but not enough to be suppressive.  That has always been the worst case for an authoritarian regime.

In this very critical way then Tunisia is at a distance from countries such as Egypt.  Hosni Mubarak has a very efficient set of repressive instruments at his disposal including the army.  The same is true with other regimes which superficially resemble the old government in Tunisia.  Not to put too sharp a point on the matter, all the other potentially threatened governments have both the will and the ability to drown the opposition in blood.

It must never be forgotten that other countries from Algeria to Egypt and beyond have strong groups adhering to violent political Islam.  This means the usually more secular folks who would constitute a "people power" opposition would not have the field to themselves but would face Islamists as well as the status quo government and its supporting elites.

Putting together the similarities and differences leads to one conclusion: The events of the past month and days in Tunisia do not constitute a new paradigm for other societies and polities in the Arab Mideast.  While it would be very nice if the contrary were the case, the probability of any other authoritarian regime in the region being toppled in a manner akin to the downfall of Ben Ali is very slim to none.

Still there is a lesson here for the Deep Thinkers of the current administration.  It would behoove the US and other Western states including former colonial powers to take a long hard look at the possibilities for assisting "people power" movements in the region.  The neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney administration were right in pushing for democracy in the Arab states even if they were dead wrong in their belief that armed exercises in coerced regime change constituted the best means to foster democracy.  Working with nascent or incipient "people power" movements, even or especially those of the "leaderless" sort constitutes a far, far better way.