It's The Economy, Stupid! (Or Is It?)

Recycling the old Clinton campaign adage is appropriate in part, but only in part for the looming Iranian presidential election. While we in the West are most hung up on Ahmedinejad's oratory on subjects ranging from the mullahocracy's pursuit of nuclear weapons to the necessity of expunging the "Zionist entity" to the strident proclamations regarding the non-existence of the Holocaust, none of these matter to the Iranian street. To the Iranians generally the name of the game is the economy.

To err on the side of accuracy, the real deal is the nearly prostrate condition of the economy as well as Ahmedinejad's propensity for prevarication on that reality. When Ahmedinejad won his unexpectedly convincing victory a while back, it was with the promise that Iran's oil riches would find their way to the dinner plates of the Iranian versions of Joe and Jane Sixpack. To say that the promise remains unfulfilled is to engage in world class understatement.

While the collapse of last year's record setting oil prices played a role in the meltdown of the Iranian economy, that was the lesser contributor to the current situation of high inflation and very high unemployment. The greater causes can be laid directly to the policies of Ahmedinejad and his clerical masters.

The mullahs and their mouthpiece have tossed oodles and gobs of the long green at military targets. The spinning centrifuges and the new generation of solid fuel boosters did not come cheap. Even without the sanctions which have caused an unspecifiable but far from negligible increase in costs, these projects and systems are big, very big ticket items.

Below the glitz of the centrifuges and missiles, the Iranians have spent an ever increasing percentage of their diminishing GDP on conventional weapons for their air, ground and naval forces. The overall size of the military, including its paramilitary components, have been increased--in part to offset the thirty plus percent unemployment among young men.

In addition, the Iranian government has continued to funnel large sums into their client groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Largess has also been spread among troublemaking groups from Afghanistan and Iraq to such far away places as the Philippines and Latin America. Quite simply, keeping and expanding the terrorist networks established as far back as the early Eighties is an expensive proposition, the costs of which are only partially offset by an increasing involvement in the fabrication, transportation and distribution of drugs.

Along with the guns, Ahmedinejad--with the necessary support of the senior clerics--has tossed money in the direction of "butter." The base of Ahmedinejad's support was and is the poor, the marginal and the most devout. Make work and relief projects as well as subsidies both open and disguised have been necessary to keep the support of these segments of the population. Holding the poorest from harm has been critical in Ahmedinejad's political future.

Mir Hossein Moussavi draws his support from the young, the "middle class," the less devout. His rivers of green draw from the waters of those who do not get the subsidies, the relief, the people who must work forty-eight hours a day to begin to make ends meet. The "Greenies" also include those who are nationalistic in what might be termed a "Persian" sense rather than one which rests on Islamism. These are the more educated, the more plugged into the world, who have been feeling an increased sense of embarrassment from Ahmedinejad's flights of oratorical excess around the world.

In addition the Moussavi supporters include those who rightly worry about the probable consequences of a continuation of intransigence on the nuclear issue. These Iranians have a sufficient grip on reality to recognise what will happen if Israel decides that the emerging Iranian nuclear threat must be removed regardless of costs.

The mullahocracy's policy of intransigence, more intransigence and even more intransigence has served the regime's interests well for thirty years now. Breaking the norms and customs of international relations has worked well--misleadingly well. The direct and proxy employment of terror, assassination and the other ploys of the twilight sort of war has also worked well--again misleadingly well.

Quite simply, all trains eventually reach the end of the line. The same may be coming true with respect to the thirty years of defiance, obstinacy, and lethal operations. Among the supporters of Moussavi this is a factor which equals or perhaps surpasses the economy.

President Obama does not want to see the military instrument employed in order to bring about a final solution to the Iranian conundrum. No American president has sought out war--not even Theodore Roosevelt despite rumors to the contrary. FDR didn't send the American navy against Japan on 6 December 1941. Harry Truman did not order an invasion of North Korea in 1950. The much maligned LBJ did not eagerly ship ground combat forces to South Vietnam in 1965.

Even George W. Bush didn't stare at a globe hoping to find a country to invade before 9/11.

The Obama version of "give peace a chance" is not new, not unprecedented. But, like the other peace oriented presidents before him, there well may come the day when war seems to be the least-worst option. That day may be upon him long before he or the rest of us expects or desires.

Undoubtedly there are Iranians who recognise this. There may even be members of the clerical elite, the powers in the back room of Iranian politics, who realise it as well.

Ultimately, it is the latter rather than the former who will make the crucial decision to drop the thirty year long policy and embark on a new course. No matter how the election turns out, the mullahs of Ayatollah Khamenei's inner circle make the decisions and enforce them.

The race in Iran is tighter now than any observer might have thought even two weeks ago. It is still unlikely that Moussavi will win. However, a strong showing by the challenger is enough.

Enough to fire warning shots across the bows of the mullahs and frontman Ahedinejad alike. There will be two rounds in particular in this electoral barrage.

The first is it's-the-economy,-stupid! The second is the limits of defiance.

The mullahs will have good reason to re-evaluate the commitment of vast amounts of the country's limited resources to military uses. They will have good reason to ask if they have pushed the forbearance of the West too far. They might wonder if they are perilously close to the line, the limits of tolerance.

The mullahs might even be so un-Islamist as to take a look at history. If they were to make such a bold move, they would discover that American presidents of the Democratic Party are the most likely to take the most robust military action when pushed over the line. Consider Woodrow Wilson, a peace loving man of almost True Believer status. Pushed beyond his limits, the Marines landed in Mexico and elsewhere, and the US went to war only six months after Wilson had won re-election as the man who "kept us out of war."

Or, they might consider Harry Truman's response to the North Korean invasion. Truman not only invoked the UN successfully as diplomatic cover for our military response, he signed off on NSC 68 which put us firmly on the road to the hydrogen bomb, long range missiles, the arms race with the Soviet Union and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

Or, they might reflect on JFK. The Kennedy White House following the president's humiliation at the Vienna summit went full tilt in a campaign against Castro, sent special forces to Laos and ramped up our ability to counter presumed Soviet sponsored insurgencies throughout the world. Among other consequences were the Vietnam War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the last nanometer of the brink of nuclear war.

Even Jimmy Carter, the most un-warlike man to sit in the Oval since Rutherford B. Hayes, would have sent the troops to Iran in 1979--had he not already dismantled our special operations capacity and rapid response interventionary potential.

Barack Obama does not have the kind of mentality to accept diplomatic kicks to the groin while keeping his famed smile intact. President Obama (and the Democratic Congressional leadership) likes to see himself as a progressive, a globalist, even a post-nationalist. But, as the historical record demonstrates clearly, people of a similar self-characterisation have gone to war with a rush and a fury which almost surpasses understanding.

The Iranian regime has lied, assassinated, terrorised and generally behaved as global Bad Actor without real hindrance for thirty years. Along the way the mullahs have repressed and impoverished their own people to say nothing of dragging the long generations of proud Persian nationalism through the mire of Islamism. Now, with a little bit of luck, the elections will produce results which include the clerics re-evaluating their relations with both the Persian people and the governments of the world.

However, if the Supreme Ayatollah and his ilk insist with continuing more of the same old, same old, they and the rest of the world are in for a stretch of very bad road. All that can be hoped for realistically is that Moussavi will do well enough to force the assorted ayatollahs, imams and other bearers of clerical authority to discover that Allah wills, "Cowboy, mend your ways--now!"

H.W. Bush Created A Test--And Flunked It

As posted previously, presidents are more often than not faced by unanticipated tests thrown in their faces by the dynamics of global politics--not necessarily the machinations of persons of evil intent. On occasion presidents become essential co-conspirators in the making of the test.

An excellent example of this is LBJ and the decision to escalate the US involvement in the Vietnamese War. He did this by authorizing Operation Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against North Vietnam.

There was no need for the operation. Intelligence had shown clearly that the flow of weapons and other materiel from North to South was of no moment to the Viet Cong capacity and will to conduct offensive operations successfully. Intelligence also demonstrated clearly that there were no US national or strategic interests at stake in the region. Indeed, the often cited "Domino Theory" had been shown to have no basis.

The air campaign had two easily foreseen if unintended consequences.

The first, in the words of a perceptive historian of the period was, "In an effort to end a problem which did not exist--infiltration of men and supplies from North to South, the US created a problem which could not be solved--the infiltration of men and supplies North to South."

The second effect of Operation Rolling Thunder was the investment of American political prestige and potency. Air operations are not stealthy. They announce to the world that an area has become of great importance to the US. Thus the potential for de-commitment from the area is greatly impaired.

The continued deterioration of the military situation in South Vietnam left LBJ with a test. To cut our losses before they became politically and diplomatically unacceptable or to escalate the American commitment by introducing ground combat forces. The President opted for the latter.

The results we know. All too well.

George H.W. Bush was more than a co-conspirator in the greatest foreign policy test which he faced. Arguably, he created the test which he ultimately failed with consequences which remain with us today.

H. W. was not inexperienced in the summer of 1990. Rarely had a man come to the Oval with a more impressive resume. He had foreign policy experience out the ying-yang. He knew his way around the corridors of international politics well enough to navigate them blindfolded.

The President and the senior members of his administration that summer must have been aware of the long festering dispute between Iraq and Kuwait over the latter country's slant drilling under the hazily marked border and tapping oil reserves which Saddam Hussein believed in all sincerity were Iraqi. They must have been situationally aware regarding Iraq's need for money in the wake of the long and very costly war with Iran.

These two factors taken together strongly indicated that the new US ambassador to Iraq should receive very carefully drafted and detailed instructions on US policy regarding the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. Instead the instructions both written and oral were vague.

As a result Ms Glaspie conveyed the impression of US indifference to the manner in which Saddam solved his problem with Kuwait. The Iraqi dictator concluded that the US saw the problem as an Iraqi internal matter.

Saddam's conclusion was not irrational. Nor was it unjustified. He interpreted the American vagueness in an Iraqi historical context. This context defined Kuwait as a "lost" Iraqi province based upon the political nature of the Ottoman Empire and the consequences of the Franco-British dismantlement of that empire following WW I. The context also contained the recent US "tilt" toward Iraq during the recently concluded war with Iran.

In short, Saddam took the hazy American stance as an operational green light to seize Kuwait.

The posture of the Iraqi Army during and immediately after the crossing of the Kuwait border showed that there was no intention on the part of Baghdad to continue military operations into Saudi Arabia. The quick and decisive blitz of Kuwait was the limit of Saddam's ambitions.

Given the American surveillance and reconnaissance assets extent at the time there is no doubt that we were quite well apprised of the Iraqi intentions and capacities. This did not stop the Bush Administration from flatly lying to the Saudi regime regarding the threat to it.

The manufacturing of this "test" of US resolve and power projection capacity did not end with pouring duplicity upon the House of Saud in super-tanker quantities. The same sort of duplicity was poured all over the world as well as within the US.

Even a few months into the build-up phase of the war, the cynic (which is to say the realpolitik oriented historian) had the clear impression that the exercise had been intentional, provoked and desired. It was not a crisis forced upon the US and the world by the ambitions of a single dictator.

In short, the Gulf War was one that was wanted by Washington (and arguably a number of other capitals around the world.) A short, successful war against Iraq would serve long-term US policy interests such as assuring that no single state would have the potential to dominate the Persian Gulf region. A crippled Iraq would not pose a threat to the Gulf, the Mideast (read Israel) or the stability of regional oil production and prices.

As in a more recent US war in Iraq, the real failure of the test came the day after conventionally defined military victory had been achieved.

While we will not know until some day in the distant future when the relevant documents are finally declassified it may well be that the Deep Thinkers of H.W.'s administration didn't realise until the guns fell silent that Saddam would remain in power and Iraq would become the classic "wounded enemy." It may well be that not until the 100 hour blitz ended with worn machines and exhausted troops that unless one of two equally distasteful and risky actions were taken, the Saddamites would remain in power leaving us with a long duration, low-grade crisis.

As the war ended with US troops on the outskirts of Basra and dramatic pictures of the "Highway to Hell" on our television screens, the administration had to bite the cliched bullet. The guys in and around the Oval had three choices. They were all bad.

The first was to continue the war. Drive on to Baghdad. This would mean more time, more troops and, most compellingly, a hell of a lot more bodies in bags coming into Dover AFB. We knew from observing the Iran-Iraq War that the Iraqi Army had a great capacity for resistance. We also knew that the best components of the Iraqi Army had been withdrawn from harm's way in a prudent and timely fashion. It could be a long, long and very bloody slog.

The second choice was arming and equipping (and probably directly supporting) Shiite insurgents. This implied a strong possibility of inviting Iranian sub rosa elements into the affair. Any benefit to Iran would violate the US policy requirement of assuring no one state emerged paramount in the area. It would also mean having to somehow contain the obnoxious Tehran regime. Also implicit in the calculus was the probable impact upon Saudi Arabia of seeing Shiites gain bloody hegemony over the Sunni minority.

The third option was the one we took. Pressure intended to spark a military coup against the Saddamite regime. The third option marked the failure.

It is one thing to manufacture a "crisis." It is another to manipulate the outcome of the "crisis" so that a meaningful policy success is achieved.

The administration of H.W. Bush succeeded in creating a test for itself. It failed the test of its own making.

In so doing the father provided the ground for the son. W. Bush created a test with the invasion of Iraq, an invasion intended in pertinent part to finish the uncompleted work of H.W. Like the father, the son failed the test of his own devising.

The lessons from H.W.'s failure, from W.'s failure are the same as that of LBJ's failure. Before creating a "crisis" either in whole or in part (or for that matter responding to a genuine crisis) an administration must have both the wit and the will to do three things.

First, there must, absolutely must, be an awareness of the historical context in which one is and will be operating. This means an awareness of the history, both objective and subjective of the human terrain upon which we will be operating.

The second is to be fully attuned to the universality of the Law of Unintended Consequences. This can best be understood as being the full-bore application of Clausewitz's small caliber dictum "no plan survives first contact with the enemy."

Finally, when the use of military force is considered, an administration and its military commanders must focus not so much on the achievement of mere military victory. No. They have to focus on the days after the victory parade.

After all the purpose of war is to produce a better state of peace.