Iraq--Time To Declare Victory And Go Home

Colonel Timothy Reese was, quite a few years ago, a very smart captain. He has gone up in rank. And, stayed high in both intellect and, more importantly by far, intellectual and moral courage.

Intellect and the courage to act upon it regardless of any possible negative impact on the career trajectory abound in a (leaked) memo published in today's NYT. Although those further up the food chain in Iraq immediately claimed that the memo represented only one man's view and was not a statement of policy, Colonel Reese delivered hot metal on target regarding the state of play in Iraq at present.

In essence he contends that the US has done about all it can do and further efforts whether in US combat operations or in holding the hands of the Iraqis will be more likely to backfire than not. He does believe that the Iraqi armed and security forces are now capable of containing and expunging the remaining insurgent threats.

While that is on the optimistic side in the Geek's view, it in no way militates against either the accuracy or the trenchant nature of the colonel's core argument. His supporting architecture comes in two parts.

The first portion focuses on the present weaknesses and liabilities of the government of Iraq (GOI). Most of the points he makes in his memo are well known and have been for some time. Taken together they point to the potential of ongoing political turmoil, but not to the necessary expansion of violence. The GOI is at the very best an extremely weak reed on which to place hopes of a stable prosperous state. But that is not to argue that Iraq is already a failed state in the making.

The second line of argument focuses more concretely on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In dealing with the military side of the equation, Reese not only comments on longer standing matters but the "changes in attitude" which resulted after Maliki declared "victory" over the Americans on 30 June 09.

As armed forces reflect accurately the polity and society which created and maintains them, it comes as no surprise that Colonel Reese identifies the majority of chronic problems in the ISF as being legacies of the Baathist/Saddam era. The ISF is at root a Soviet style force with all that implies. All the US efforts to date including "massive partnering" with the ISF have not eradicated the pernicious effects of this reality.

As a result the ISF lack initiative, flexibility, forward planning, good officer-NCO-enlisted relationship dynamics, an emphasis on MOS skill training, operational rehearsals or even after action analysis. The ISF C2 is rigid and centralised in the Soviet manner--a form of political control that not only suited the Baathists and Saddam but would fit the desires of any ambitious political chieftan such as al-Maliki. (Truth in Blogging requires the Geek to admit the last was his assessment and is not contained in the Reese Memo.)

Regardless of all American urgings, the senior command and political leadership of Iraq are unable or unwilling to root out fundamental blocks to the development of a non-political, professional military. Cronyism, corruption, and political interference run rampant as does laziness and a general inability or unwillingness to acquire even the rudiments of a professional force. None of this will change, the colonel maintains, regardless of the presence or absence of US advisers or combat partners.

In his profoundly negative evaluation, the colonel is both writing in tandem with other knowledgeable observers and showing a blunt honesty not commonplace in US experience over the past few decades. It is, as Colonel Reese notes, remarkable and praiseworthy that the US has been able to bring into existence the ISF as it is, warts and all. The ISF does have the necessary minimum combat capacity to act as an internal security force if the threats do not rise above their current level. It is capable of a marginal degree of self-sustainment. And, it could get better, even much better, if the political lords and masters of the place allow it to.

Since the American withdrawal from the cities a month back and the the concomitant "victory over the Yankees" celebration headed by al-Maliki, the relations between Americans and ISF have worsened in the colonel's estimate. He notes, for example, that the ISF does not allow the US to engage in operations which are compliant with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA.)

The ISF units are unwilling to cooperate with US troops in engaging targets the US command considers high value. This attitude carries over into a reluctance to carry out even routine operations. Unstated, but implied, and certainly experienced in the closing period of the Vietnam War, ISF unit commanders are more than willing to ignore the presence and advice of Americans attached to their unit for the purpose of providing operational and training guidance.

In short, Colonel Reese is right. The "surge" worked. US combat units did break the back of the several insurgencies both sectarian and political. With the possible exception of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) the several anti-government forces have been forced onto the deep defensive and, save for suicide bombings, have only a very limited offensive capacity. American blood bought enough of a military success that the US can legitimately say it has achieved the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing."

This means that the US can and should withdraw its combat forces at a rate greater than that first intended when the SOFA was finalised. SecDef Gates has already alluded the other day to the very real possibility that an additional combat brigade will be pulled out of theater ahead of schedule.

More than ever and with more reason than ever, the time has come to shake the dust of Iraq from our boots and get on with the war in Afghanistan.

And, that's a fact, Jack!

Back To Business--Iraq And Democracy

When the neocons of the Bush-Cheney justified the Great Adventure in Regime Change, two points which were made almost to the point of occasioning projectile vomiting--at least on the part of the Geek. No, not the WMD allegations. No, not the contention that Saddam was a thoroughly icky-poo person given to brutal dictatorship and bouts of aggression.

These are the two points.

Iraq deserved democracy of the more-or-less American sort complete with an independent judiciary, a federal system, pluralism, separation of faith and state, an unfettered media and, last but most certainly not least, robust free enterprise--of a properly regulated sort.

The war effort would not cost the taxpayers a doggone red cent. In fact, the US would make a profit since our companies would have an inside track on the post-war contracts including those for developing new oil fields.

Well, golly, gee, didn't that sound just grand?

Sure. If one was ignorant of such trivia as Iraqi history; the effects of prolonged internal war; the nature of Iraqi political, social, and ethnic dynamics; and the role of nationalism in the Iraqi concepts of self. Or, to put it simply and in translation: The more things change, the more they stay the same.

As if the displacement of Saddam Hussein's regime never occurred, the Iraqi government and military are favoring France in the award of contracts covering infrastructure repair and expansion as well as military procurement. In turning away from American companies and embracing French, the government of Nuri al-Malaki is not only rolling the clock back to the Seventies when France was the number one source of weapons, it is deliberately sticking its thumb in the eye of Uncle Sam.

The favoring of French companies is not so much a triumph of Nicholas Sarkozy's personal diplomacy as it is akin to declaring "great victory" as the American troops withdrew from Iraqi cities the other day. It is an expression of nationalism, of sovereignty. It is a carefully calculated gesture of ingratitude meant to solidify Maliki's credentials as a genuine Iraqi nationalist.

Maliki has ambitions. Further, he has made no attempt to hide this reality.

Chief among these is his stated desire to rid Iraq of the "consensus democracy" which was a product of the years of transition under the heavy-handed procounsulship of Paul Bremer. The current Iraqi prime minister admits that the consensus approach might have been necessary at the beginning of the post-Saddam, post-Baath period, but it has outlived its usefulness.

Maliki is now calling for an end to the special "set-asides" built into the constitution so as to "protect" the interests of the Kurds and Sunnis. In his view these prerogatives now endanger both "true democracy" in the country and the capacity of the central government to provide essential and basic services to the totality of the population.

Each of the three major ethnic or religious communities has been guaranteed a specific senior position in the central government with the result that the tripartite head must agree if anything major is to be done. It is a clone of the old system of allocation of offices employed in Lebanon before the comfortable arrangement was blown away in the several internal wars.

The same potential is resident within the current Iraqi situation as Maliki sees affairs. He is probably, almost certainly correct in this. While the "consensus" or office and power allocation scheme was necessary to get any organic instrument approved, it carries the germs of its own destruction within it.

Maliki proposes an accurate census be followed by a redrafting of the constitution along the lines of one person, one vote without any sort of "set asides" on the national level. The result of this would be to place the center of political power with the Shia majority. In principle this may be justified.

But, it is harder to do so in practice. The rub comes in the question of protecting the rights and, to be blunt, the community ego of the minority Sunnis and Kurds. The US has elaborate structures including the Supreme Court which carry the brief of protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority. Even so the will of the majority often tramples both the sensitivities and the rights of the minority under foot.

Iraq does not have and will not develop in the near- to mid-term any similar institutions. There are no inherent mechanisms to assure that Sunnis and Kurds will not be ground into the dust as have been the small Christian communities in Iraq during recent months and years.

The Sunnis, who long enjoyed the exercise of power under the British and then after the Baathist overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, have no reason to believe that the Shia will treat them any more gently or with any more consideration than they treated the Shia during the long years of Sunni ascendancy. The Kurds are both very well aware of and proud of their ethnic and linguistic difference from the Arabs.

More, many Kurds are fully wedded to the idea of an independent Kurdistan as the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq can attest. Under any sort of "one-person-one-vote" formula, the Kurds would have more reason than ever to seek merger with their compatriots (term used intentionally and advisedly) in Turkey and Iran.

This would, of course, send the balloon straight up, pronto.

The same would occur if the minority Sunnis appealed to their coreligionists in Saudi Arabia.

Nothing in al-Maliki's stated aspirations addresses either the Kurd or Sunni difficulty other than in terms of glittering generalities of no substance. His current over emphasis on nationalism and finger-flipping Independence from the US must be intended to counter the deep fissures which underlie the Iraqi national identity.

The validity of this approach is questionable. Both Sunnis and Kurds have demonstrated the continued will and ability to counter objectionable Shia driven central governmental acts by both the threat and use of violence.

The current capacity of the purportedly non-sectarian, non-ethnic security forces and army to be either a "school for citizenship" or an effective suppressant is open to question. So also is al-Maliki's ability to refrain from using these organs of state security as an instrument of Shia (and al-Maliki personally) domination.

An argument can be made for the desirability, even the necessity, of a strongman based central government with a few democratic trappings. This mode of autocracy wearing a skinny fig leaf of democratic respectability is commonplace throughout the Mideast and North Africa. Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya among others have relied on this approach for political and social stability. All have succeeded to a great extent.

In so far as Iraq has a political culture and history it is in the same mold. With the bloody overthrow of the British installed monarchy fifty years ago, Iraq became a one-party state in which dissent was poorly tolerated to say the least. The result was--until Saddam miscalculated disastrously with his launching of the Iraq-Iran War and, later, the invasion of Kuwait--a level of prosperity and stability enviable in the region.

The sanguinary effusion which followed the US invasion may have made the majority of Iraqis so war weary that the acceptance, even the eager embrace of another one-party state replete with the instruments of effective repression and some pretence of democracy is not out of the question. Al-Maliki may be counting on war weariness to bring his vision of the non-consensual democracy into existence.

His own very rapid rise from obscurity to power may have emboldened al-Maliki to believe that he has what it takes to be the strongman of Baghdad. He may be right. Or, he may not.

In any event there is no doubt that he intends to see his successful semi-coalition expand in the elections scheduled for next year. He may even be somewhat honest when he states that his "National Alliance For the State Of Law" is not a Shia instrument but rather a genuine aggregation of all Iraqis who seek a rule of law, not men nor clerics, nor outside influences.

His National Alliance has not yet provided either transparency, or a government and judicial system free of corruption, or any real coming together of the three major communities, and it may never do so. But, the National Alliance has and is creating an atmosphere of nationalism, national pride, and the appearance of national Independence even as American boots still churn the sands of Iraq.

This implies that al Maliki may have the capacity to carry off what he proposes. He may create a one-party state with both repression and aspects of democracy which will be stable or at least orderly. It is the best, realistic outcome the US government can hope for.

In the alternative, the nightmare one, Iraq dissolves under the lash of Kurdish independence, Sunni demanded intervention from Saudi Arabia and, finally, Iranian entrance to "protect" the Shia from "foreign" persecution.

Ain't democracy wonderful?

It's Their Bed, Let 'Em Rest In Peace

Magic day Number One is fast approaching in Iraq. Tuesday, 30 June 2009 is the day upon which all US troops are to be out of all Iraqi cities. A small residuum of trainers, advisers and providers of specialised services such as medical evacuation will be tolerated in urban Iraq. Tolerated, that is, as long as they keep a very low profile.

The Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki has declared this First Magic Day to be one of national rejoicing, feasting, and festival. Cutting to the chase, Maliki called it a "great victory." The US has declined to comment on this declaration which implies that, somehow, the Americans have been defeated by the will of the Iraqi people and their government.

In what almost appeared as an afterthought, the joyful Prime Minister warned that there would be continued efforts on the part of unspecified individuals and groups to destabilize the situation. He added that "with Allah's will I and you will be ready for them."

The Iranian people, or at least those contacted by the NYT, a group which included senior Iraqi security officials, did not share the PM's hope--or willingness to rest the future of their nation and lives on the will of Allah. Considering the recent epidemic of very lethal vehicle bombings, the trepidations expressed seem to be far more rooted in reality than the Maliki declaration of victory and national day of fest and festivals.

Another cloud is on Maliki's upbeat horizon. He is being seen as Saddam incarnate. This is an overstatement, but the reality that Maliki is not the limp wristed, easily pulled by the nose sort of fellow he was initially viewed as being is most assuredly true--and necessary. There can be no arguing against the proposition that Maliki is using violence and intimidation against those who would be so bold as to oppose him. Arguably, that is the reality of Iraqi politics now and into the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately for the future of Iraq--and Maliki--the necessity of compelling political opponents to fall into line behind the PM is of much less importance than the capacity of the government and its security forces to defeat or, at the very least, deter the armed anti-government groups. Stopping the bombers is far more critical than silencing critics.

The "great victory" of having the American combat troops leave urban areas including Mosul and Kirkuk as well as the sprawling Sadr City portion of Baghdad according to the Status of Forces Agreement reached last year is much less of an accomplishment for the government than it is an inducement for such hostile groups as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. In case the PM has not noticed it, the hostiles claim that they will succeed according to the much invoked "will of Allah."

Prayers, declarations and other such attempts to either discern or motivate the decision of the deity are of far less utility in the countering of violence and the protection of citizens' lives than is the capacity to shoot first, straighter, and faster. The US combat troops demonstrated a clear superiority over the hostiles during the past two years. The years which saw violence drop faster than a Republican forgets his marriage vows were the years of maximum effective employment of American intelligence, mobility, and firepower.

The hostiles, the gun-thugs, the seekers after "martyrdom" who were not killed or captured by the American troops were sufficiently deterred by the negative possibilities of encountering the often maligned Americans to seek less risky ways of passing their time and conforming to the perceived "will of Allah." That those dangerous days are over is evident in the noise of bombs and the wailing of the injured.

Iraq is now the possession of the Iraqis and the government which they elected in a process which constituted the most open, transparent, and honestly conducted exercise in democracy in the history of the Mideast outside of Israel. Whether well-advised or not, the Status of Forces Agreement has been signed and is being implemented.

The meticulous care with which the US has implemented it as well as the delicate way in which the US has treated the political sensibilities of Maliki and his investment in the "great victory" are a credit to the mature way in which the administration is pursuing the necessary endgame strategy. Over the past several years, in all the weary months since President George W. Bush prematurely announced "Mission accomplished," the US has cleared the decks so that Iraq does belong to the Iraqis.

It is up to them and them alone to determine whether or not the blood, death, and devastation which marked the end of the Saddam Hussein period will bring about a long, peaceful, and prosperous period or not. Should Iraq energetically disassemble into warring factions whose pursuit of power is punctuated by suicide and roadside bombs, it will be their choice--and not ours.

No one should expect Iraq to be as tranquil as Switzerland nor should its politics be expected to be any more fair and honest than, say, that of Chicago. Tranquility may come over time. Honest elections may someday emerge. Whether they do or not is not the affair of the US.

We have done what we must to clean the mess our unnecessary, unjustifiable, and perhaps ultimately counterproductive adventure in regime change created. Our money, our troops' blood and death, bought the time and political space necessary so that Iraqis might create their own vision of politics, society, and economics.

As the days count down to Magic Day Number Two, the date next year when all (well, almost all) of our forces depart Iraq, there is little we can do to assure the best possible outcome. Iraq might benefit from further training for its military and security forces. It will benefit from the influx of US and other Western oil companies in the development and improvement of its oil fields. The movement of other investments into the country cannot but be of assistance.

Beyond that, on issues such as will Maliki become closer to Saddam in his style of government or will Iraq crumble before the mass of Islamist jihadist pressure and subversion on the part of Iran, there is not much we can do. Or should.

The lessons of history demonstrate that nations cannot be built by outsiders. Outsiders cannot, as Woodrow Wilson once vowed, "teach them to elect good men." Outsiders cannot assure tranquility and prosperity eternal.

Regardless of what happens now in Iraq, the Obama administration and We the People must remember that Iraq is now the bed the Iraqis make. We will have to let them lie on it in peace (or not.)