Obama Steps On His Dick With Golf Shoes

To nobody's great surprise but to the total dismay of any American who cares whether the US fails in Afghanistan or not, the Very Thin Skinned and Shallow Minded man who currently occupies the Oval fired (or, technically speaking, "accepted the resignation of") General Stanley McChrystal today. The president is scheduled to do the impossible--explain and justify his decision later today, as soon as the TelePrompter can be loaded with the appropriate platitudes.

Mr Obama has dual hatted General Petraeus to serve as commander in Afghanistan in addition to his current job as CINCENTCOM. (Well, it does simplify the chain of command as Petraeus is now his own boss.) General Petraeus did an adequate job as commander in Iraq and, is well thought of by Republicans. Most importantly from the perspective of the Oval Office Inmates, General Petraeus has spent most of his career in billets requiring a nuanced interaction with journalists and politicians.

General McChrystal, as is shown by the ill-advised remarks so eagerly seized upon and quoted by the writer of the Rolling Stone piece, is by background, training, experience, and orientation a warfighter, a special operator. Men of this variety as the Geek can attest from much personal experience, are given to blunt honesty, eschewing the finely nuanced speech so beloved by politicians, journalists, and academics. In short, General McChrystal calls it as he sees it to the best of knowledge and belief.

Blunt honesty and the integrity which sustains and permits honesty constitute an anathema to politicians and others who must make deals regardless of actual cost. One may be certain that General Petraeus will never rock any administration boat, insult any civilian lamebrain, or perturb the sleep of even the unjust.

Whether General Petraeus can win the military portion of the war in Afghanistan is a more open question. While there are never any certainties in war--other than men will die--the informed, impartial observer would have been reasonably sure of backing a winner with McChrystal and his radically different approach to the war in Afghanistan. That degree of confidence can no longer be said to exist, if for no other reason than the impact of the McChrystal sacking on the morale of American forces and on the willingness of the Karzai regime to put a high degree of trust and confidence in the will and ability of the Americans to win.

Another very real impact of the Obama decision to rid himself of the troubling general resides with the enemy. There is no doubt but the Taliban and others of its ilk will be encouraged in their will to resist by the removal of the only senior American commander to have bested the black hats in both the military and political arenas of war.

Where the McChrystal strategy and operational doctrine focused in large measure on disrupting the organizational integrity of the insurgents, the Obama action has been to disrupt, perhaps fatally, the American organization. Where McChrystal had taken great pains to demoralize the senior echelons of Taliban et al, the Obama action has done the same to the good guys--to us and our allies including the Afghan National Forces.

In the forthcoming rationalization there is a high likelihood that Mr Obama will echo the words of all too many writers of editorials and others of the pundit class. He will aver, or at the least, imply, that General McChrystal was both insulting and insubordinate in his words and the words of his staff.

This justification is, at best, a crock of caca.

The characterizations offered of Joe Biden, and Messrs Eikenberry and Holebrook to say nothing of the other "wimps" in and around the White House may have been ill-chosen but they were accurate in the extreme. With the exception of SecDef Gates and SecState Clinton (exceptions that were made explicitly by General McChrystal and his staff), the members of "Team Obama" have demonstrated repeatedly that they were incapable of understanding and appreciating the realities on the ground in Afghanistan. If not evil counselors, these worthies have shown themselves as inept counselors. They merit the disapprobation heaped upon them by the general and members of his staff.

The truth, particularly when presented in a very blunt way, may be both inconvenient and painful, but that does not make it any less of the truth. The president had put on the combat boot of the general's words and loudly announced by his action that the boot both fits and pinches.

As for the insinuation that the general was being in any way insubordinate or rejecting of civilian supremacy, that accusation is utterly specious. It has utterly no validity. If one wants to witness insubordination in action he need only revisit the Affair of General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur.

Dugout Doug directly and repeatedly violated explicit orders given him by the president of the United States, Harry Truman. For that, General MacArthur well deserved being fired as he was by President Truman.

Nothing said by General McChrystal is in the same universe with what MacArthur did. General McChrystal violated no orders. Nor would he. A man of the background and experience of McChrystal would obey any lawful order he was given. Or, if obedience would violate his greater oath to the Constitution or his responsibility to and for the lives of the men under his command, then General McChrystal would do the honorable thing--he would resign his commission.

The Geek has heard men say far worse words concerning their superiors both uniformed and in mufti than anything attributed to General McChrystal or his staff. Heck, the Geek has said far worse during the stress of a war ill-fought and the sight of men dying without useful outcome. But, the Geek and others like him were fortunate that they were of low rank--and that they had no rat of a journalist pretending collegiality while in their midst.

It is a personal misfortune for General McChrystal and a national tragedy for all Americans that the general was not similarly situated and thus able to speak openly, honestly, and candidly about people of high station who by their actions betray the trust which had been placed in them.

Throwing Israel Under The Bus

Israel has been tossed under a slew of buses over the years, right back to the decades preceding its creation, when the British Foreign Ministry filled as it was (and is) by Arabists repeatedly tossed the not-yet-state toward the onrushing "omni." This fine tradition was followed by the US State Department, which wanted ever so much not to be "present at the creation" of the new Zionist state over sixty years ago.

Most recently, at least in the eyes of the famously outspoken former mayor of New York City, Ed Koch, President Obama and "his team" have been making a maximum effort to toss Israel under the Arab powered Mideast Express. The Mayor has a point at least as far as appearances are concerned. And, it must be noted, in foreign relations all appearances are, de facto, declaratory policy.

This means simply that appearances are reality.

Obama's pressure campaign when considered in conjunction with his "outreach" efforts to the governments of the "Arab and Muslim world" gives the strong, almost irrefutable appearance of a strong tilt against Israel. When the cavalier treatment afforded Benjamin Netanyahu is added to the mix, the result substantiates the Koch Interpretation.

One result, perhaps the single most important one, of the Obama get-tough-with-Israel policy is to give Palestinian Authority chief Abbas perfect cover not to hold any substantial negotiations with Israel. Abbas must have fallen to his knees, banged his forehead on the mosque floor in thanksgiving to a most merciful and compassionate Allah for this divine favor. Now, Abbas and his cohorts would not have to take the heat as they did when former Israeli PM Olmert offered peace and land on terms surpassing the most Abbas had ever hoped for. (Recall that Abbas did not even deign to reply to the Olmert peace offer--not even to reject it.)

Since President Obama has done everything to convey that Israel must accept the Saudi Plan including retreat to the pre-Six Day War armistice line--which includes the Green Line in Jerusalem--and accept a Palestinian version of the law of return, it is now impossible for Abbas and the PA to accept any less. Intentionally or not President Obama has issued an unlimited license to the PA for equally unlimited intransigence.

This assures two outcomes: There will be no Mideast Peace unless it is imposed by outsiders such as the Quartet; Israel will be forced to live with one more utterly implacable neighbor dedicated officially to the destruction of "the Zionist entity."

This is a good operational definition of throwing Israel under the bus.

The reason adduced by Mayor Koch for the Obama policy is simple: Propitiate the Arab and Muslim states.

This is also the reason which was presented by the British Foreign Ministry for favoring the Arabs in the Thirties and Forties. It is also the motive for the position taken by Secretary of State Marshall, the State Department generally, and Secretary of Defense Forestal for their opposition to American recognition of Israel in 1949.

The Marshall calculation was straightforward. There were thirty million Arabs, many of whom sat on oil fields critical to the defense of Europe should the Soviet Union attack. Geopolitically, strategically, the position of Secretary Marshall was (and is) quite defensible. President Truman understood this but went with recognition as doing such was, bluntly, the right thing to do given the recently revealed off-the-scale-of-ready-comprehension genocide practiced by the Nazis.

Truman's successor, Dwight Eisenhower, saw the geopolitical dynamics in a way identical with Marshal. It was for this reason that Ike pursued a policy of complete evenhandedness. The US would not sell arms to Israel. When Israel conspired with England and France for the unprovoked invasion of Suez in 1956, Eisenhower moved quickly to end it and roll the invaders back. Throughout his administration the focus was on oil, more specifically its necessity for NATO to successfully resist a Soviet invasion. (In this context it is necessary to recall that the first expression of the "Domino Theory" saw the wave of states falling to the Communist orbit rolling from Vietnam to India and ending in the Persian Gulf states.)

The Eisenhower policy ended with JFK, who authorized the sale of weapons (HAWK anti-aircraft missile batteries) over the objections of both the State and Defense departments. Once this threshold had been passed, it was an easy matter to sell offensive systems (M-60 main battle tanks and A-6 ground attack aircraft) as was done by President Johnson. This action was taken over the objections of State and Defense and despite warnings from the JCS staff and CIA that Israel would mount an offensive war as soon as the equipment had been absorbed.

This prediction came true with the Six Day War. Israel plausibly argued that the war was defensive in nature albeit preemptive in execution. The role played by the US in the war including the use of American origin equipment, the relatively muted position taken by the US in its diplomacy, and the abject acceptance of the transparently false excuses offered by Israel for its attack upon the USNS Liberty, demonstrated to the Arab states generally that the Americans had become the sponsor of Israel.

There is a great deal of legitimacy for the Arab view in the wake of the Six Day War. For reasons more accurately assignable to the category "domestic politics" than to the one labeled "foreign policy," the US was unable to bring Israel to a less aggrandizing position in the heady days following the "splendid little war."

During the waning days of LBJ as well as those of his successor, Richard Nixon, the State Department as well as Defense, and, on occasion, CIA, all warned of the negative consequences brought by the US tilt to Israel. Short of levering Israel out of the occupied territories of Sinai, the West Bank, and Golan, there was nothing the US could do which would have ameliorated the negatives which clouded Uncle Sam's image and influence throughout the Arab and Muslim countries.

Henry Kissinger employed all of his considerable talents to repairing the damage to the US position in the Mideast, but these all foundered in the winds of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The actions taken by the US both to limit the testicle reclaiming Egyptian penetration of Sinai and provide Israel with the means of effectively striking back spoke much louder in Arab ears than did the rhetoric of Kissinger.

That the US would stick by Israel was undoubted during all the years following Yom Kippur. The many twists, turns, talks would never impede the fundamental relationship between Israel and the US. The simple fact that the US had done the right thing in 1949 combined with the evermore effective stoking of American public opinion by Israel to assure the steady state of unfailing US support.

The very concept of "throwing Israel under the bus" would have been unthinkable outside of the bastions of liberal, multicultural elitism as little as a year ago. There had been some erosion of American support for the "embattled David" surrounded by legions of "Goliaths." The images of Israeli suppression of the First and Second Intifadas had been damaging as had been the recurrent appearances of Israeli obscurantism and duplicity in the endless round of peace talks. Regardless, the default position for most Americans, both hoi polloi and hoi oligoi, remained supportive of Israel.

Presidents Clinton and W. Bush had attempted to put pressure on Israel to be more accommodating, less absolutest in its bargaining posture. That this level of pressure worked in conjunction with Israeli domestic political opinion can be seen in the Olmert proposal, the one which was never acknowledged by Abbas.

There was no evident need to increase the pressure on Israel even with the shift to the Right shown in the most recent elections there. More to the point, there was nothing to be gained, and much to be lost by ramping up the muscle directed at Israel.

Importantly, the increased pressure has centered on the portion of the multifaceted peace challenge which is both least susceptible to pressure, Jerusalem, and in favor of the party least able to negotiate substantially, the PA. Had pressure been applied to Israel with the focus being its withdrawal from the Golan Heights, there are strong reasons to conclude the results would have been positive.

If the motivation of the current Obama pressure program is that of currying favor with the assorted Arab and Muslim states with a view toward gaining assistance in the diplomatic campaign against Iran and the very real war with Islamist based jihad, the administration has chosen the wrong playing field. Giving Jerusalem to the PA, forcing Israel back to the pre-1967 "borders," elevating Palestine to state status, each and all bode little potential return.

The recognition of Syria as the key player would have made more sense. Putting Syria in its proper role, gaining a settlement of the Golan question would have gone much, much further in the direction of isolating Iran, offsetting Arab fears, and gaining an important ally in the joint struggle against the jihadist threat.

The ultimate sorrow and pity of the present Obama policy is that it seeks to reverse Truman's having done the right thing fifty plus years ago while gaining no advantage for the US. It is a lose-lose proposition.

And, Mr Obama, no Nobel Peace Prize is worth that cost.

Playing Politics With History

Bruce Ackerman teaches law at Yale. Being a lawyer by trade, Professor Ackerman is good at making an argument. It does not bother the professor that he shoots history in the neck.

In his WaPo op-ed piece last Saturday, Professor Ackerman compares General Stanley McChrystal's forthright statement at the previous day's conference at the Strategic Studies Institute with the insubordinate actions of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. The comparison is specious. It is misleading in the extreme. It is historically as wrong as a cat barking.

Professor Ackerman is not the only person pontificating from a basis of historical ignorance--willful or otherwise. Today in the WaPo, Eugene Robinson plays the same game albeit without referencing the famed Truman-MacArthur donnybrook. Richard Cohen completes the WaPo trifecta. Mr Cohen does drag the ghosts of Truman and MacArthur back into the spotlight.

Now, for the edification of pundits great and small, here is why the analogy between the comments of the bluntly spoken and honest minded General McChrystal and the statements, letters, and actions of the prima donna of the US Army, Douglas MacArthur, is wrong. And, bucko, here is why any comparison between the bluntly spoken and honest minded Harry Truman and the present incumbent are wrong as well.

First it is essential that the context of the Truman-MacArthur contretemps be established. The general was a legend in his own mind--and the popular perception of We the People. Having defied orders, failed to take precautions despite warnings, and generally fouled up the defense of the Philippine Islands at the outset of World War II in the Pacific, MacArthur was turned into a "hero" by the press with the connivance of the Roosevelt administration. The president was in desperate need of a "hero," genuine or not, in the darkest days of the war.

For the balance of the hostilities in the Pacific, MacArthur was an adequate but far from brilliant commander. He was, however, a genius at public relations so that his halo glistened ever more brightly as the war continued. (It might be noted that the grunts bestowed upon the General a far from flattering nickname, "Dugout Doug.")

At the end of the war, MacArthur became the de facto ruler of Japan. Most but not all historians reckon that the General did a decent job of running Japan, but it must be noted that his major accomplishment was allowing the Japanese to rediscover their democratic experience which had been masked with the rise of militarism during the late Twenties and Thirties. He invented nothing, but didn't stop the Japanese from exercising their remarkable capacities for self-organization in both political and economic matters.

When the North Koreans invaded the South in June 1950 it came as a bolt from the blue to Washington--and MacArthur. MacArthur had precluded the CIA and its predecessors from operating in his geographic areas of responsibility both during and after World War II. As a result there was no American intelligence agency operating in the Korean peninsula which might have provided adequate warning.

In the confusing opening days of the war as first South Korean and then American troops were defeated--badly, it was Harry Truman and his administration which acted both decisively and effectively. Truman and his people (which group included some of the most gifted foreign policy personalities in recent American history) made a number of critical and time sensitive decisions which had two important consequences.

First and foremost, the decisions assured the war would be limited in scope, goals, and means. There would be no widening of the war geographically. The goal was initially limited to restoring the status quo ante. The means strictly eschewed the nuclear option.

The first turning point in the war came with the twin successes of defense and offense. The defensive success was that of stopping the North Korean Peoples Army at the Pusan Perimeter. The offensive success was, arguably, MacArthur's finest moment--the amphibious landing at Inchon, far behind the NKPA lines.

MacArthur's finest moment left as fast as it came. Almost immediately he lost sight of the initial goal and replaced it with one of his own--the defeat of the NKPA, occupation of North Korea, and the forced unification of the two Koreas. The Truman administration went along with the General.

The movement of US, South Korean, and other UN forces into the North had the result of bringing the Chinese into the war. Despite ample warnings through diplomatic channels, the General poo-pooed the possibility of the Chinese entering in any number.

He was wrong. The Peoples Liberation Army moved with dramatic effect into the war. The US, South Korean, and other forces were compelled into rapid and sometimes disorderly retreat. MacArthur lost it.

He demanded that the atomic bomb be used. He proposed sowing a radioactive band of death along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. He demanded that the Chinese Nationalist forces be "unleashed" against the Mainland.

All of this was contrary to the limited war policy which had been decided upon by President Truman. The General was (as the military terminology has it) "counseled" and even gently, very gently reprimanded. Privately of course. The General was touchy. His ego was quite easily bruised.

MacArthur was a man upon whom subtlety was lost. He ignored the "counselling" and "guidance" provided by the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. He shot off his mouth criticizing the Truman decisions. At one point he violated orders regarding an upcoming effort to start ceasefire talks by imperiously and publicly demanding the virtual surrender of the NKPA and the Chinese.

That torpedoed the first effort at talking peace.

Then the General allowed the public release of a letter he had written to the Republican leader in the House of Representatives. The letter was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Truman presidency. No US commander before that (or since for that matter) had ever penned such a bitter and baseless diatribe against his commander-in-chief.

Had the MacArthur strategy been put into effect as it was laid forth in the letter and other public statements, the US would have taken on a land war in China and a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. MacArthur's strategic view would have resulted in an American defeat to say nothing of costing lives beyond counting.

Truman faced the rank and dangerous insubordination with firmness, decisiveness, and a willingness to run enormous political risks. In his decision to fire MacArthur he was backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff including its chairman, Omar Bradley. The bantam from Missouri fired the General from Megalomania.

Truman was excoriated in the majority of the press. The Republicans yelled for his scalp. In the end, Truman and his administration survived the storm of congressional hearings, press abuse, popular disapproval. Ultimately, the General as he predicted in his speech to a joint sitting of Congress simply "faded away." History (or at least historians) pronounced Truman right and MacArthur wrong.

There it is. History, complex events, in a small capsule. Easy to understand. Even a law professor ought to be able to wrap his brain around it.

General McChrystal has not been insubordinate. He has done nothing other than to follow his orders. He was tasked with assessing the state of the war. He did. He was told to be blunt and honest. He has been.

The London remarks were not out of line in the slightest. No orders were given that were of the gag variety. Even the President has acknowledged that.

However it is more than passingly strange that members of the chattering and political classes who demanded a full, public debate of the Iraq "surge" a few years back are now reaming out General McChrystal for doing that both in public and private regarding the Afghan mess.

President Obama should have realized that when he took the advice of Secretary of Defense Gates and others and appointed General McChrystal, he was naming a man renowned for his straight forward way and total intellectual integrity--to say nothing of moral courage. General McChrystal is a rare man. He is a professional man-at-arms, not a careerist ticket puncher with his nose firmly in place--and not on his face.

Just as General McChrystal is not General MacArthur updated, President Obama is not a brand new and improved version of President Truman. Truman made decisions and took personal responsibility for them. He acted quickly and decisively without regrets, without polls, and without looking back.

He consulted to be sure. But he made the decisions. He exercised leadership. He did not follow the winds of either his party (and he was the most yellow dog of yellow dog Democrats) or the American public. As the sign on his desk read, "The buck stops here."

Nor did Truman dither. Hold endless review sessions. Endless meetings with senior staff. He listened. He read. He chose. He acted. He acted in a timely manner. He was, of course, not a lawyer so he understood the real world meaning of that lawyer-loved phrase, "time is of the essence."

Truman would have appreciated McChrystal. He would have listened to McChrystal. Then he would have decided. Quickly. Effectively.

Truman deserved McChrystal. But, he had MacArthur.

McChrystal deserves Truman. He has Obama.

Pity.