The Winds Of Hypocrisy And Idiocy Blow Again

The rather disreputable bunch (or individual) at WikiLeaks has captured the attention of entirely too much of the world's mainstream media.  In a case which resembles a sort of "this verse, same as the first," WikiLeaks has provided its favorite media outlets with advance copies of an enormous (391,000+) low level, tactical "Significant Activities" reports.  These are the same sort and level of routine document as constituted the earlier and much smaller batch release.


The SigAct reports provide a blurry look at a complex war from the perspective of a myriad of eyes quite close to the ground.  Their content varies in actual significance.  Similarly, the documents range in quality from highly incisive to pretty much of a let's-pretend-we've-done-something-today sort.  There are more than a few occasions when two or more SigActs cover the same events in the same period of time but with such different perspectives that the result seems to be several different events occurring at widely separated times and places.  Depending on the mindset of the person compiling the SigAct, the verbiage may be so dense in milspeak as to be incomprehensible without a translator.


The reporting of the contents of the mountain of milspeak by the assorted mainstream media is like that which took place a few months ago after WikiLeak's first release.  The best way to characterize the MSM approach is to recollect a brilliant scene from the classic movie Casablanca.


Remember the scene where Claude Raines as the smarmy French police official tells Rick that his bar is being shut down?  "I'm shocked, shocked I tell you to find out gambling is going on here."  At that point a flunky comes in and says, "Your winnings, inspector."  


A more perfect emblematic rendition of hypocrisy cannot be found--unless it is in the media treatment of the current data dump.  Maidenly protests of shock have ensued over several matters found in the great mound of otherwise boringly repetitive, utterly mundane, and, taken overall, quite insignificant activities.  


(Shock the First) More Iraqi civilians may have been killed by either friendly or hostile forces than officially announced to date.


(Shock the Second) American troops did use lethal force when vehicles approaching checkpoints or overtaking convoys did not heed warning signals--including shots--and stop as ordered.


(Even Bigger Shock Number Three) Iraqi security forces abused, even killed, suspected insurgents without the Americans acting immediately and robustly to stop the illegal acts.


The media could not contain their surprise when the documents demonstrated that the oft repeated American accusations of Iranian direct involvement in the arming, training, and directing of insurgent forces were based in fact.  


Each and every one of these highlighted matters constitutes either base hypocrisy or utter idiocy for two simple reasons.  Simple reason number one: The assorted MSM outlets had reporters in theater, assigned to the relevant American and other allied forces throughout the period covered by this dump.  Simple reason number two: We have been down this road before, during the Vietnam War--and the same MSM had reporters covering that war as well.


If any of the Chorus of Shocked And Outraged Maidens had consulted their own morgues, the result would have been both educational and important for accurate framing of the Iraq story.  Leaving aside the one very high profile war crime committed by US personnel, the Mai Lai shootings, the files would have shown reports both spiked and printed of other American acts which could accurately be termed war crimes.  The files would also have disclosed the widespread and very widely covered stories of South Vietnamese security forces abusing captured hostile personnel and those suspected of assisting the hostiles in manifold ways--including murder.  The US and other media also noted the US personnel on scene usually did not stop the abuses.


The morgue search would also have revealed that in the Vietnam War as in wars generally, civilians are killed.  As in the cases cited from Iraq, the killing of civilians can and often has resulted from actions on the part of the civilians which seem to the soldier to be a threat.  Since war is a get-or-get-got activity, it should not surprise anyone oriented in time and place that the soldier will shoot if warnings have no effect.


Because civilians tend to litter the battlefield in unseemly numbers and at most inconvenient locations, it is not shocking that some are killed despite the best intents of the troops.  Nor is it shocking that fatality counts can vary widely over time.  Disparities of count between "official" reports and the SigActs is not evidence of cover up or a policy of understating the lethal effects of American combat operations.


The war in Iraq was an interventionary war after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime.  Even though the US was the major actor in theater, the legal and policy fiction that we and other foreign forces were operating in support of the Iraqi government was paramount.  The Iraqi security forces not unlike their South Vietnamese equivalents forty years earlier had a very touchy sense of nationalism.  


The sensitivities of Iraqi personnel--particularly at the command level--inhibited the capacity of the US to act robustly and rapidly to end abusive practices.  The relations between tactical units in the field in Iraq, as had been the case in Vietnam, were always problematic so company and field grade officers rarely felt free to get tough with their Iraqi counterparts.  This meant the most common response was to file a report, kick the problem upstairs, and hope the heavyweights topside would solve it.


More than that the Americans could not do if there was going to be any realistic possibility of shifting combat and security responsibilities to the Iraqi forces.  It is simple for a journalist to sit back and engage in condemnation.  That is not a luxury available to the guy at the spot.


Then it must be recalled that Iraq had a pre-invasion history which was heavy in torture and extajudicial executions.  The history lacked any appreciable dedication to the rule of law or the tempering of "justice" with either mercy or self-interest.  The same history also produced a lengthy record of scores in need of settling while abrading any concern about the judgement of the future.


Given the history of Iraq prior to the invasion as well as the nature of the war being waged between the security forces (including foreign contingents) and the insurgents propelled by faith in violent political Islam, the real shock is how few unnecessary deaths are recorded in the SigActs.  Considering the contexts, both historical and contemporary, the Americans not only fought a clean war but exercised a great deal of influence on the behavior of Iraqi security units.  Had it been otherwise the blood would have gushed rather than merely oozing from the released documents.


Either the NYT or the WaPo (they run together in the Geek's mind) characterized the SigAct reports as providing a "fine grained" view of the war.  That's true as long as it is remembered that in this case the view is an extreme close up, the sort of close up which distorts the image beyond both comprehension and accuracy.  The distortion is made all the greater when a media outlet chooses to ignore the weight of the majority of the reports--mundane, not filled with atrocities real or imagined, but replete with fire missions not fired, aborted air strikes, and all the other consequences of a command structure and operational doctrine which exhibited a sound and accurate understanding of the basic principle of counterinsurgency--You Cannot Kill Your Way To Victory--as well as the corollary--A Dead Civilian Is A Victory For The Enemy.


Arguably, the release of the reports by WikiLeaks has harmed both the US and the fragile polity in Iraq.  But it is incontrovertible that the treatment of the leak by the MSM has done even more damage.  By their framing and inexcusable idiocy, evidenced by willful historical ignorance as well as overlooking the presence of their own reporters during the time and at the places covered by the SigActs, the MSM has done a potentially great harm to the US.


The degree of harm is indicated by the totally expectable demands by the UN for a complete investigation of the American inaction in the presence of Iraqi human rights abuses and possible war crimes.  By setting the stage for an exhibition of America bashing by an organization filled with professional haters of all things and all actions American, the MSM--particularly those located in the US--have hit a new low point in their "buyers remorse" over having sung unquestioning hosannas in support of the invasion of Iraq.


American MSM have not been noted in recent years for having either a sense of shame or a commitment to telling it like it is rather than how they would like it to be.  The full-throated pursuit of a blame-America-first agenda by leading news outlets in the US does journalism no credit.  Nor is it in the better interests of the country or We the People.  


Nor will all the boiler plate special pleadings about the sacred right to know make the treatment of the leak and its contents any less dishonest.  The public does have a right to know, but that right is for the entire story, the whole truth, not carefully selected and framed portions of a complex reality.

Pull Out Now! The UN Says The War Is Lost

The UN has taken a look at the security situation in Afghanistan. The worthies and experts at that strategic think tank didn't like what they saw.

But, being willing to look defeat square in the face without blanching, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon who is, as everybody knows, the finest military theorist since Karl von Clausewitz as well as an operational level commander on a par with George Patton, has informed the Security Council that Afghanistan is going to hell in a high speed, low drag wheelbarrow. Using the ever reliable indicators of roadside bombs, assassinations of low to mid-level government personnel in the provinces, and "complex" attacks, the SecGen all but declared the Taliban to have won.

The SecGen is not alone in his dismal appraisal of American and allied fortunes in Afghanistan. Over the past few weeks, those two pillars of independent, disinterested, and agenda-free impartial assessment of American success or failure in both war and diplomacy, the WaPo and the NYT, have made reached the same conclusion, at least by implication. The only feature lacking in either outlet is an editorial demanding a prompt American surrender to the Mighty and Pure Defenders of the One Truth Faith.

Admittedly, there are a number of good reasons to feel both gloom and doom hovering over the valleys of Afghanistan. The Afghan National Forces are far more a myth than a substantial reality capable of effective action in the field. The Karzai regime is corrupt, inefficient, self-serving, and far more interested in continuing its hold on power than seeing hostilities termination leading to long term conflict resolution. Mr Karzai himself is an excellent Afghan politician but a very infuriating partner with whom to engage.

At the same time Taliban deserves credit. It is comprised of tough, resilient fighters led by reasonably competent commanders. It has a set of clear goals. A very definite agenda well founded on religion. Beyond that Taliban has the support and assistance of the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence and, thus, constitutes a branch of the armed forces of Pakistan. As if that were not sufficient, Taliban receives support from Iran. Training camps are located convenient to the Afghan border in the wastes of rural Iran while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps provides instructors. In a gesture of religious fraternity, the Iranians also provide explosively formed penetrators and other useful gadgets.

Even with the augmentation of American combat forces, the manpower available to the US and ISAF for combat missions is minimal (to put it charitably.) The correct decision by General McChrystal to limit the use of indirect and air delivered fire places more of a burden on the ground pounders, thus making the war even more manpower intensive. In order to assure that few (preferably no) Afghan non-combatants are killed by the "infidels," it is necessary to conduct each and every operation no matter how large or small on a retail basis, up close and personal.

Longer term this self-imposed constraint on the lethality of the battlefield is not only good, it is absolutely necessary. McChrystal understands perfectly that if civilians are to be killed, it is essential that they be killed by the insurgents. Insofar as Taliban et al kill civilians, non-combatants, women, children, and old men, whether by a roadside bomb, a suicide IED, or a "complex" attack, the resulting body count strengthens the counterinsurgent while weakening the insurgent.

That consideration constitutes a critical nuance unnoticed by either Generalissimo Ban Ki-Moon or the Deep Strategic Thinkers at the WaPo and NYT. The primary victims of the increased usage of roadside bombs and similar IEDs have been Afghan civilians. The same is true of attacks carried out by "martyrdom seekers" whether using suicide vests or vehicle borne IEDs. Even many of the larger attacks, characterized in the UN report as "complex" have resulted in more civilian than foreign combatant deaths.

The roadside bombs, the assassinations of minor government, police, and military personnel, even the majority of the "complex" attacks such as the strikes on foreign occupied guesthouses have not only resulted in an increased loathing for Taliban on the part of Afghans but show a high measure of desperation driving Taliban.

In previous insurgencies, assassination of local personnel have been a prominent feature either of the beginning of the insurgency or as a strong indicator of its being defeated. The same applies to indiscriminate attacks resulting in a high level of casualties among the uncommitted majority of the civilian population.

Previously in Iraq, in Pakistan, and in Afghanistan, when the insurgents have started killing civilians in large numbers, there has been an immediate push-back on the part of the threatened civilians. This is being seen again in Afghanistan in the past few months--the same period employed by Feldherr Ban Ki-Moon as a base for his prognostication of impending defeat.

Increasingly, local villagers equipped with (to use the term employed by US military sources) "personal assault weapons" have joined Afghan, US, and ISAF units to engage and destroy Taliban cells. The same upward trend is seen in the flow of unsolicited and actionable intelligence from locals who have had it up to their beards with Taliban.

Afghans, not unlike most people everywhere, are not strong on the idea of getting killed. They don't even appreciate the fine theological distinction between being killed by an "infidel" or an "apostate" rather than a good Muslim, a jihadi. Not surprisingly, the Afghans are ready, willing, and eager to seize the moment and abate the Taliban nuisance.

Rather than being indicators of near-term defeat, the increased Taliban reliance upon IEDs, assassination, and the odd media spectacular points to a loss of confidence within the command echelons of the insurgents. Taliban has lost the initiative in the quotidian conduct of operations; as a comparison between friendly initiated, hostile initiated, and meeting engagements shows, the capacity to control the pace and direction of operations has shifted increasingly in favor of the US and ISAF.

This pleasant reality in no way lessens the underlying reality that the war is not over. The US and its allies are not yet sure of achieving the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing," but the vectors have shifted in that direction. The next six to twelve months will be a long, hard pull in Afghanistan. Marja is not yet fully secured. The Kandahar operation has been delayed. Most importantly, the Afghan national government and forces have not yet shown either the will or the ability to carry their share of the freight.

Right now the major lost opportunity is not military but falls rather in the area of governance. The US and its allies have fallen too far into the trap of believing that the central government of Afghanistan is just that--a government. The US has also allowed itself to believe that success in Afghanistan cannot occur without the existence of a strong, credible, and effective central government.

These twin notions are bogus. For much of its existence, Afghanistan has gotten along quite well without a strong, credible, and effective central government. The Afghan culture states that a person's primary loyalty is to the extended family, secondary loyalty is to the clan, and the tertiary loyalty is to the tribe. This hierarchy allows but does not compel a loyalty to the central regime in Kabul.

This situation implies that Afghans have a high propensity toward and a good capacity for self-organizing. The self-organizing process moves from the most local to the more distant and has the automatic advantage of assuring high group coherence through the necessity for voluntary collaboration in the search for mutual self-interest.

The operational consequence of this orientation within the human terrain of Afghanistan is obvious. The US and its allies should--must, perhaps--put Kabul to the side and deal with the local power structure. The winning political approach is that of empowering the self-organizing capacities of the Afghan villages, the neighborhoods of Marja or Kandahar. Working with and backing the needs of the locals in all aspects of security, governance, and economic development would allow the effective circumvention of the obstructionists of Kabul. Doing things this way would have the additional advantage of cutting off Taliban from any pretense of legitimacy, by denying it the large target of central government corruption, cronyism , and flat out inefficiency.

There is a very high probability that General McChrystal is as aware of the self-organizing and provincial orientation of the Afghan human terrain as he is of the grave inadequacies of the central regime. If his lords and masters inside the Beltway can be brought to see the light, there is a better than good chance that the next few months will see a political success parallel the probable military defeat of Taliban.

There is, of course, only the slimmest of chances that the Obama administration can wake up to the tribal and family realities of Afghanistan so as to give a green light to adding the final ingredient which would well neigh onto guarantee success of an acceptable sort in Afghanistan. And, there is absolutely no chance in hell that the WaPo-NYT Strategic Studies Academy or Geo-Political Genus Ban Ki-Moon will ever get it.

Playing Politics With History

Bruce Ackerman teaches law at Yale. Being a lawyer by trade, Professor Ackerman is good at making an argument. It does not bother the professor that he shoots history in the neck.

In his WaPo op-ed piece last Saturday, Professor Ackerman compares General Stanley McChrystal's forthright statement at the previous day's conference at the Strategic Studies Institute with the insubordinate actions of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. The comparison is specious. It is misleading in the extreme. It is historically as wrong as a cat barking.

Professor Ackerman is not the only person pontificating from a basis of historical ignorance--willful or otherwise. Today in the WaPo, Eugene Robinson plays the same game albeit without referencing the famed Truman-MacArthur donnybrook. Richard Cohen completes the WaPo trifecta. Mr Cohen does drag the ghosts of Truman and MacArthur back into the spotlight.

Now, for the edification of pundits great and small, here is why the analogy between the comments of the bluntly spoken and honest minded General McChrystal and the statements, letters, and actions of the prima donna of the US Army, Douglas MacArthur, is wrong. And, bucko, here is why any comparison between the bluntly spoken and honest minded Harry Truman and the present incumbent are wrong as well.

First it is essential that the context of the Truman-MacArthur contretemps be established. The general was a legend in his own mind--and the popular perception of We the People. Having defied orders, failed to take precautions despite warnings, and generally fouled up the defense of the Philippine Islands at the outset of World War II in the Pacific, MacArthur was turned into a "hero" by the press with the connivance of the Roosevelt administration. The president was in desperate need of a "hero," genuine or not, in the darkest days of the war.

For the balance of the hostilities in the Pacific, MacArthur was an adequate but far from brilliant commander. He was, however, a genius at public relations so that his halo glistened ever more brightly as the war continued. (It might be noted that the grunts bestowed upon the General a far from flattering nickname, "Dugout Doug.")

At the end of the war, MacArthur became the de facto ruler of Japan. Most but not all historians reckon that the General did a decent job of running Japan, but it must be noted that his major accomplishment was allowing the Japanese to rediscover their democratic experience which had been masked with the rise of militarism during the late Twenties and Thirties. He invented nothing, but didn't stop the Japanese from exercising their remarkable capacities for self-organization in both political and economic matters.

When the North Koreans invaded the South in June 1950 it came as a bolt from the blue to Washington--and MacArthur. MacArthur had precluded the CIA and its predecessors from operating in his geographic areas of responsibility both during and after World War II. As a result there was no American intelligence agency operating in the Korean peninsula which might have provided adequate warning.

In the confusing opening days of the war as first South Korean and then American troops were defeated--badly, it was Harry Truman and his administration which acted both decisively and effectively. Truman and his people (which group included some of the most gifted foreign policy personalities in recent American history) made a number of critical and time sensitive decisions which had two important consequences.

First and foremost, the decisions assured the war would be limited in scope, goals, and means. There would be no widening of the war geographically. The goal was initially limited to restoring the status quo ante. The means strictly eschewed the nuclear option.

The first turning point in the war came with the twin successes of defense and offense. The defensive success was that of stopping the North Korean Peoples Army at the Pusan Perimeter. The offensive success was, arguably, MacArthur's finest moment--the amphibious landing at Inchon, far behind the NKPA lines.

MacArthur's finest moment left as fast as it came. Almost immediately he lost sight of the initial goal and replaced it with one of his own--the defeat of the NKPA, occupation of North Korea, and the forced unification of the two Koreas. The Truman administration went along with the General.

The movement of US, South Korean, and other UN forces into the North had the result of bringing the Chinese into the war. Despite ample warnings through diplomatic channels, the General poo-pooed the possibility of the Chinese entering in any number.

He was wrong. The Peoples Liberation Army moved with dramatic effect into the war. The US, South Korean, and other forces were compelled into rapid and sometimes disorderly retreat. MacArthur lost it.

He demanded that the atomic bomb be used. He proposed sowing a radioactive band of death along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. He demanded that the Chinese Nationalist forces be "unleashed" against the Mainland.

All of this was contrary to the limited war policy which had been decided upon by President Truman. The General was (as the military terminology has it) "counseled" and even gently, very gently reprimanded. Privately of course. The General was touchy. His ego was quite easily bruised.

MacArthur was a man upon whom subtlety was lost. He ignored the "counselling" and "guidance" provided by the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. He shot off his mouth criticizing the Truman decisions. At one point he violated orders regarding an upcoming effort to start ceasefire talks by imperiously and publicly demanding the virtual surrender of the NKPA and the Chinese.

That torpedoed the first effort at talking peace.

Then the General allowed the public release of a letter he had written to the Republican leader in the House of Representatives. The letter was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Truman presidency. No US commander before that (or since for that matter) had ever penned such a bitter and baseless diatribe against his commander-in-chief.

Had the MacArthur strategy been put into effect as it was laid forth in the letter and other public statements, the US would have taken on a land war in China and a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. MacArthur's strategic view would have resulted in an American defeat to say nothing of costing lives beyond counting.

Truman faced the rank and dangerous insubordination with firmness, decisiveness, and a willingness to run enormous political risks. In his decision to fire MacArthur he was backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff including its chairman, Omar Bradley. The bantam from Missouri fired the General from Megalomania.

Truman was excoriated in the majority of the press. The Republicans yelled for his scalp. In the end, Truman and his administration survived the storm of congressional hearings, press abuse, popular disapproval. Ultimately, the General as he predicted in his speech to a joint sitting of Congress simply "faded away." History (or at least historians) pronounced Truman right and MacArthur wrong.

There it is. History, complex events, in a small capsule. Easy to understand. Even a law professor ought to be able to wrap his brain around it.

General McChrystal has not been insubordinate. He has done nothing other than to follow his orders. He was tasked with assessing the state of the war. He did. He was told to be blunt and honest. He has been.

The London remarks were not out of line in the slightest. No orders were given that were of the gag variety. Even the President has acknowledged that.

However it is more than passingly strange that members of the chattering and political classes who demanded a full, public debate of the Iraq "surge" a few years back are now reaming out General McChrystal for doing that both in public and private regarding the Afghan mess.

President Obama should have realized that when he took the advice of Secretary of Defense Gates and others and appointed General McChrystal, he was naming a man renowned for his straight forward way and total intellectual integrity--to say nothing of moral courage. General McChrystal is a rare man. He is a professional man-at-arms, not a careerist ticket puncher with his nose firmly in place--and not on his face.

Just as General McChrystal is not General MacArthur updated, President Obama is not a brand new and improved version of President Truman. Truman made decisions and took personal responsibility for them. He acted quickly and decisively without regrets, without polls, and without looking back.

He consulted to be sure. But he made the decisions. He exercised leadership. He did not follow the winds of either his party (and he was the most yellow dog of yellow dog Democrats) or the American public. As the sign on his desk read, "The buck stops here."

Nor did Truman dither. Hold endless review sessions. Endless meetings with senior staff. He listened. He read. He chose. He acted. He acted in a timely manner. He was, of course, not a lawyer so he understood the real world meaning of that lawyer-loved phrase, "time is of the essence."

Truman would have appreciated McChrystal. He would have listened to McChrystal. Then he would have decided. Quickly. Effectively.

Truman deserved McChrystal. But, he had MacArthur.

McChrystal deserves Truman. He has Obama.

Pity.