In War Murphy Always Wins

According to reports tracing back to a highly placed and usually reliable source, General David Petraeus via Prime Minister David Cameron, the kidnapped British (Scots actually) aid worker employed by an American company in Afghanistan died as the result of friendly fire on the part of the Special Forces rescue force.  The reported cause of the woman's death was a grenade.  It has not been stated if the grenade in question was hand thrown or fired from a rifle mounted launcher.

That distinction is critical.  If the lethal weapon was a hand thrown fragmentation grenade, it was bad enough.  If, however, the grenade was of the launched sort, it was a misuse of force which may not be criminal but was blatantly stupid.

Hostage rescue is a most demanding tactical operation.  That is why certain units, the SAS in the UK or Delta and other forces in the US, were tasked with and trained for the incredibly difficult job of forcible entry, very prompt neutralization of all hostiles, and securing unharmed the hostage(s.)  Carried out in the hours of darkness and normally in confined spaces, the requirements of split second timing, coordination, weapons control, swift and perfectly orchestrated movement are legion.  The opportunities for lethal error are also manifold.

The first prerequisite for a successful hostage rescue (other than having a team which is fully trained and properly equipped for the task) is detailed intelligence regarding the physical layout of the area where the hostage(s) is held as well as the number, placement, armament, and other relevant details of the hostage takers.  Right now it is an open question as to whether or not this level of actionable intelligence was available to the rescuers.  Also, an open question exists as to whether or not sufficient time for briefing and (highly desirable) rehearsal was available.

The overarching question yet to be answered was the most basic: Were the members of the rescue party properly trained, equipped, and prepared for the mission?  Quite frankly, simple Special Forces training and experience is not sufficient preparation for a hostage rescue mission.  Even the most able and experienced Special Forces or SEAL troopie is not automatically qualified for this sort of thing.  The necessity of a properly trained team (put emphasis on the last word as hostage rescue even more than typical combat operations is a team matter, remember split second timing of orchestrated fire and movement in dark, close quarters) is more urgent if the pre-op intelligence is scant and time prohibits rehearsal.

Presumably, these questions and others, such as why were launched explosive grenades authorized, will be raised by the forthcoming joint UK-US investigation.  It may even be that the investigators will look into the matter of why American rather than British assets were employed?  Was it a matter of time?  Or, were appropriate British assets not available in theater?

Presumably, the investigators will examine the question of time.  This is the key issue when considering the alternative of gaining Ms Norgrove's release by negotiation.  Local Afghan officials have maintained that the local tribal elders were ready and willing to engage in palaver with the bad guys.  The family of the deceased has already been rather vehement on this, and it is to be expected the negotiation issue will be widely raised by politicians and media types--particularly those whose ignorance of war is surpassed only by their desire to see the US either out of or defeated in Afghanistan.

An unpleasant reality is any person kidnapped by members of groups espousing violent political Islam had best be considered dead the moment they are seized.  This does not imply that negotiations (provided they give the thugs nothing meaningful) nor forcible rescue attempts should not be considered, planned, and executed if appropriate.  Rather, it means the family of the victim and the media should be told to hold no specific hope, no positive expectations.  This is harsh but utterly necessary in order to inhibit future kidnappings for political or monetary ransom.

This approach demands a very stern "Birkenhead drill" on the part of governments, and, even more, the family.  There is a model--and an inspiration--for this.  Years ago an American Marine officer was kidnapped, held by one of those old style secular Arab terror outfits in Lebanon.  He was tortured and ultimately murdered.  Imagery of the butchered body were made available.  The officer's wife--another Marine--from the beginning of her ordeal played the stiff upper lip role with fine distinction, at one time saying that she had to consider her husband dead, but if he returned it would be as Lazarus--but far more warmly welcomed.

Her performance in its bravery and complete integrity is a tough act to emulate.  However, considering the nature of the enemy today--barbarically indifferent to killing or dying, fully committed to a religiously derived agenda, lacking any ethic beyond winning--no other manner of dealing with the phenomenon is feasible.

At the same time it is incumbent upon the senior command in Afghanistan to be certain that properly trained and equipped teams are available immediately in theater.  National pride cannot be allowed to interfere with hostage rescue.  It does not matter what the nationality of the victim is--all that counts is the capacity of the team(s) on call.  If SAS is best--use it.  If an American unit is best, then use it.

The inadvertent, certainly unintended death of Ms Norgrove is a tragedy not only for her family and friends.  It is a misfortune of the first degree for the US force involved and for the US effort generally as it provides ammunition for those who oppose continued operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere against the advocates of violent political Islam.

This means the US, the UK, and other forces must study what went wrong in the rescue attempt and put the proper reforms in place--quickly.  As sure as Muslims pray five times a day there will be more snatches in Afghanistan.  The snatch is a tool becoming ever more popular with the Mighty Warriors of the One True Faith not only in Afghanistan but wherever the Thugs of the Koran are present.

So Much Confusion. So Little Time

Once again it appears that the current neocon ninny regime in and around the White House does not know the difference between feces and shoe polish. Unfortunately, it comes as no surprise.

The current administration has an unsurpassed record at not knowing who or what the enemy in the Great Global War on Terrorism might be. Why shouldn't it keep up its distinguished record?

This time around is a clone of the first. Way back when, We the People thought the goal of military operations was the destruction of al-Qaeda and its sort-of-state sponsor, the Taliban of Afghanistan. With a whoop and a hollar off we went (in horribly insufficient force) as the Great Posse of Justice to bring in Osama and company dead or alive.

Before the posse had done much more than rearrange some real estate in Afghanistan and allow the heavyweights of both "criminal" organisations to head south of the border down Pakistan way, the name of the enemy changed. It wasn't Osama anymore. The new blackest of the black was Saddam Hussein.

A larger posse was formed. The evildoer was toppled, hunted down, interrogated, tried and convicted. Hung. Case closed!

Not bloody likely!

Leaving aside several intervening years, events and deaths, a new villain emerged. Actually, the blackturban had been there all along. For some reason that is too arcane for the Geek to grasp, it suddenly served the current administration to (again) announce his existence.

Enter Iran, skulking with a centrifuge under each arm and an evil grin above the several day growth of beard.

The nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic as well as its support of anti-Baghdad and anti-US elements in Iraq to say nothing of its general record as a regional troublemaker are all good and sufficient reasons for the US (and others) to see the mullahocracy as a clear and present danger to both national interests and global tranquility.

Ignoring for now the window of engagement opportunity offered by the Tehran government in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq which was idiotically slammed in the beards of the mullahs by the neocon ninnies, suffice it to say that adding Iran to the mix of unfinished business in Iraq and Afghanistan was ill-advised. No. It was blatantly boneheaded!

Equally gripless was the current administration's continued pretense that Pakistan was a full and effective ally in the Great Global War on Terrorism. Coddling the Islamists in Islamabad, in the Pakistani military, in the Inter Services Intelligence was somewhere between counterproductive and suicidal.

The net result of the shift in "Main Enemies" from the Taliban/al-Qaeda crew in Afghanistan to the Baathists of Iraq, when coupled with the initial failure to put enough boots on the ground in Afghanistan and wilful, continued denial that elements of both the Pakistani National Forces and ISI were complicit with the fugitive blackturbans in the mountains of FATA, was the regrowth of Taliban, the continuation and strenghtening of al-Qaeda and the emergence of a Pakistani version of Taliban as the de facto government in much of the FATA. That's real success.

For a long damn time now anyone and everyone with enough sense to know rocks roll down hill has acknowledged that there was only one way to eliminate the leadership cadre of al-Qaeda and the restrengthened refugee Taliban.

No. Not armed Predators, useful as those machines are. No. Not a major cross-boarder operation by US or Afghan National Forces. Too high visibility. Too complex logistically.

The way?

Employment of US Special Operation Forces in conjunction with CIA "pilot personnel" and their local agents. This approach has been sanctioned by doctrine and used effectively for many, many years.

CIA and other components of the US intelligence community have had highly qualified assets with full linguistic and cultural competence on the ground in the Afghanistan-FATA area of operations. The local agents are in place and (usually) capable. An indication of the pervasiveness and locally presumed effectiveness of the penetration is provided by the periodic reports (and videos) of the blackturbans "executing a US spy."

The special operations forces exist to go on into the mountains and valleys of the FATA and do the job. We the People now know that the plan for doing this has existed for months. We also know that the plan has been disapproved by the current administration.

The ostensible reason for this disapproval is fear of possible negative repercussions should the Pakistani government become aware of what we are doing. Or that the Pakistani government would not authorise our actions.

(See, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/washington/30tribal.html?_r=1&th=&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&emc=th&adxnnlx=1214846804-MffwRuRYNt7YLQa7pOpq5w)

Oh? Really?

Cut to Iran.

Seymour Hersh who has a long and reasonably distinguished record for investigative reporting in national security affairs has published an account of the US clandestine operations underway in Iran from a base in western Afghanistan. His account appears in the current New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh/?yrail

American Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assets have been and are being deployed into Iran with a view toward potentiating the efforts of "dissident" ethnic minorities and assisting in destabilising the mullahocracy. Congress has funded the effort to the tune of some four hundred megabucks.

In principle the Geek has no objections to making the mullahs' lives a tad more unpleasant. In practice, the way in which the current administration is seeking to go about the job is--being as kind as possible--wrongheaded.

The groups we are seeking to potentiate are neither reliable nor aligned with longer term US interests in Iran or the region. And, as history well demonstrates, simply funding private wars never brings much a positive national policy result.

Now, walk this through with your friendly tour guide, the Geekmo.

USSOCOM and CIA "pilots" are not numerous. The time and effort necessary to find, select and train such people is extensive. There just aren't that many of them--yesterday or today or tomorrow.

In short, you've got to use them where they will have the most effect, the most positive effect in the accomplishment of national goals. Informed assessments come together on one point.

The point?

Using our linguistically qualified, regionally experienced USSOCOM and intelligence personnel to clandestinely work in FATA is infinitely more likely to pay dividends than frittering them away on the neocon ninny ambition of "quiet" regime change in Iran.

It's way past time to get a grip on this reality. You have to focus on your enemy if you're going to defeat him.

Shifting targets means you miss them all.

Got that, Decider and Commander Guy?