Looking For The "Perfect Weapon"

In a perfect world we would fight "perfect wars" using "perfect weapons." A "perfect weapon" would be one which killed only hostile combatants while not inflicting any collateral damage on civilians or civilian property. A "perfect weapon" would have a combination of accuracy and constrained lethality so as to assure that only those in need of killing received its attentions.

As an added benefit the hypothetical "perfect weapon" could be employed without putting a single friendly soldier in harm's way. It would protect the "good guys" while terminating with the most extreme prejudice each and every "bad guy" until the survivors within the second group gave up the war as a very bad idea.

The US has pursued the still elusive "perfect weapon" with a high degree of persistence over the years. And, its persistence has paid off--to an extent.

The closest approximation to the "perfect weapon" we possess currently is found in the often maligned unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) typified by the Predator and Reaper craft. These systems can and do kill specific, targeted individuals of high value within the ranks of the Islamist jihadist ranks without extreme collateral damage. And, without risk to the Americans operating the systems.

It is the latter reality--the absence of risk to Americans--which has aroused the ire of Code Pink and similar anti-war organizations. While one might think that reducing the body count in war would be a goal agreeable to those opposed to even the most legitimate of wars, it is not. Code Pink and company have engaged in a campaign of great vitriol and little realism to end the use of armed UAVs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

This campaign has been enhanced by the position taken by the UN Special Rapporteur on miscellaneous asininities connected with wars undertaken by the US. (OK, that isn't the man's actual job title, but it conveys the flavor of his position.) This worthy has hinted darkly that the use of UAVs might constitute a species of war crime. Why this might be the case is at best murky and leaves unexamined why dropping iron bombs on a village containing armed combatants along with civilians would not be a "crime" as well.

There is no doubt but that the use of armed UAVs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have been effective. The Long War Journal keeps very close track on the UAV employment in the AfPak region and parses the claims of civilian as opposed to combatant fatalities and injuries very carefully. A quick perusal of the record over the past two years shows that fifteen senior and sixteen mid-level al-Qaeda personnel have been taken off the board by UAVs. The numbers concerning Taliban are equally good.

The UAVs not only perturb the organizational integrity of the Islamist jihad groups by eliminating key personnel, they disrupt movement, enervate morale, lower combat efficiency of the hostile trigger pullers and bomb makers generally. The various statements by Taliban figures in particular as well as the results of interrogations show the overall effectiveness of the Predator and Reaper attacks cannot be overstated easily.

Perhaps the chief limitation on the possibility of the UAVs being considered "perfect weapons" is the size, lethality, and radius of destruction of the munitions they deliver. Neither the Hellfire missile (initially developed and deployed over thirty years ago as an air delivered anti-armor weapon) nor five hundred pound precision guided bombs can be considered constrained lethality devices. The size of the bursting charge as well as the nature of the fragments created combine to assure that these weapons are more area than point in their effect.

Either Hellfire or the five hundred pound bomb will and have destroyed vehicles, structures, or sizable open air assemblies. This state of affairs is fine provided all of those downrange are sure enough combatants. In this context it must be noted carefully that neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban nor any other groups of this ilk are notably scrupulous about separating civilians including women and children from the combatant types.

While there will be targeting errors regardless of the layers of review and approval, the primary responsibility for collateral damage rests with the Islamist jihadis. As long as these Glorious And (Self) Righteous Goons of the One True Faith are unwilling or unable to sequester their martyrdom seeking trigger pullers, bomb makers, and the like from non-combatants, collateral damage will occur.

(A parenthetical thought: Quite possibly, given the belief system of the good Muslims who constitute the jihadist groups, it is believed that a favor is being done for the women, children, and other non-combatants in that should the Hellfire hit, all hands will go to Paradise.)

In time technology will produce the necessary refinements that will result in lower area lethality without impairing the capacity of the UAV delivered munitions to kill selected individuals. The Israelis have been making strides in this direction with the development and deployment of ever smaller but still highly accurate air-delivered munitions which kill the target but, absent a secondary explosion from the target's own explosives, leave those standing around unhurt. As senior US commanders well appreciate the need to reduce the perception of collateral damage among civilians, one can be reasonably sure the US is proceeding in the same direction as the Israelis.

A "perfect weapon" might also be characterized by an absence of diplomatic complaints over its usage. By this standard the Predator and Reaper are most imperfect weapons. The government and military of Pakistan as well as any number of Pakistani journalists, academics, and "strategic thinkers" have made many mighty moans over the dire consequences which will necessarily attend the use of UAVs. With tones and words suitable to an announcement of the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it, these Pakistani patriots warn that the UAVs are driving an infinite number of peaceful people into the camp and arms of al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Associates.

The Greek chorus of Islamabad also thunders against the horrid violations of that most precious of commodities--Pakistani sovereignty. Of course the great claque of opposition from Pakistani politicians and generals is not motivated by fear over the actual effect of the UAVs (except in so far as they hurt the Islamist jihadis supported by the Pakistani Army, Inter-Services Intelligence, or members of the political structure.)

Rather the Pakistanis see the UAVs as a "perfect enough weapon" that they want to possess it themselves. Not for service in the air over the FATA but for duty on the only "frontline" which matters--the common border with India.

It is safe to put the self-serving whines of the Pakistanis in the same category as the hopelessly misguided simpering of Code Pink. Both are irrelevant to the continued successful employment of Predators and Reapers in theater. Both are testaments of a backhanded sort.

The sniveling of Code Pink and the plaints of Islamabad are both actually powerful attestations to the fact that the US is coming ever closer to the development of the "perfect weapon."

Well, bucko, we can be grateful for that. And, we can only hope that we get closer to perfection very, very soon.

Is China Just One More Country With A DC Lobby?

The WaPo has an article reporting on the increased effectiveness of China's lobbying efforts inside the Beltway. The tone of the piece is more than a tad laudatory.

A number of members of both houses of Congress (all of the Democratic Party persuasion) are quoted. All have nothing but nice things to say about China and the Gnomes of Beijing who run the place.

The WaPo grudgingly allows that this upbeat tone on the Hill does not reflect the views of the majority of Americans. The writer, John Promfit assigns this backwards attitude on the part of many in We the People to either China's Communist past or its record in the human rights department.

Duh!

Just how could so many otherwise sensible Americans be so wrong? How could affairs have come to such a sorry pass that We the People do not, as does one of the Congressional worthies notes, see "the Chinese as Chinese and not Communists?"

Guess it must be the sheer cussed reactionary nature of so many of us in the hoi polloi. Right, Senator Kerry? How else can it be that your wave of applause for the munificent and benevolent Chinese is not shared by every American who has not been duped by the barely concealed populist fascists of the Tea Party movement?

Or, to advance an alternative which is both more parsimonious and more rooted in the real world of evidence and behavior: The Americans who distrust the Chinese (even while buying the products of their factories and slave labor camps) have a far more accurate understanding of the Chinese government, its past and its future intentions than the assorted Democrats. Rather than irrational fear or the after effects of "a Cold War mentality," the distrust of China evinced in recent public opinion polls might be based on a coolly reasoned appraisal of the policies, actions, and rhetoric of the Chinese government.

While the Congresspeople and Senators may not know it, the only political party in the People's Republic of China is the Chinese Communist Party. (OK for you detail minded folks: There are another eight small parties, all controlled by the CCP.) This fact implies strongly that China is, in fact, a Communist country even though there is an obvious and large number of privately owned enterprises--all of which exist on government sufferance and will continue to operate only as long as it is the interests of the state and government.

Thus the distrust of Beijing because it is Communist is not a relic of the bad old days of the Cold War but a realistic appraisal of the current and future reality of China. Score one for the benighted American public.

While the Congresspeople and Senators may not know it, China is not, as one of the quoted Democrats averred, just like the UK, France, or Germany--but trying to play catchup in its lobbying activities. The UK, France, Germany may undertake a little discrete espionage against the US. Each of these long standing allies of the US may periodically undertake a bit of bash-on-Uncle-Sam.

China is in an entirely different category all together. Its espionage actions, including those of a cyber nature, far transcend in frequency, persistence, and breadth those of any other nation including the far-from-friendly Russia. On the diplomatic front China is normally opposed to any demarche at the UN and elsewhere which is supported by the US or its Western European associates. Whether the Iranian nuclear question, anthropogenic climate change, or any other matter of seemingly shared concerns, Beijing is always within the opposition.

The American hoi polloi is both aware of these facts and, unlike the aforementioned Democrats, factors its awareness into its appreciation of China's relation with the US both at the present and in the future. Score two for We the People.

Unmentioned in the encomiums flowing from the Democratic Party statesmen is the explosive growth of the Peoples Liberation Army. The Chinese possess a military capacity far surpassing any legitimate defense need. Further, all the straws in the defense wind indicate that the Chinese are neither slowing nor likely to slow the continued development of the PLA. Given the absence of any current or near-term threat to Chinese territory, the only plausible reason for the ongoing investment in the military is the utility of a large, modern and well equipped military as a diplomatic support instrument. (Whether a nation speaks loudly or softly it is more likely to be heard if it possesses a very big stick.

The American public is aware of this unmentioned T. rex at the dinner table even if the Deep Thinkers of the Democratic Party on the Hill are oblivious. Score three for We the People.

One fact of life mentioned by the Democrats is both real and very, very potent. China holds a lot of dollars and dollar denominated IOUs of American origin. This is the well known remember-boy-we-hold-your-note approach to life. The very fact that the Gnomes of Beijing hold multiple billions of our dollars and IOUs assures them of a quite respectful hearing on the Hill.

The attention and respect given to the needs, desires, and views of the Gnomes of Beijing grow in tandem with the Congressionally driven need to borrow ever increasing mountains of money to fund the dreams of the Progressive Caucus's (and President Obama's) Great Transformational Agenda. It may be mere coincidence but it is of more than passing interest that each and every of the quoted cheerleaders for China has voted for (1) TARP, (2) the stimulus bill, and (3) the most expensive of the health care overhaul measures (as well as other assorted "progressive" spending measures of dubious utility.

With the deficit already in numbers with which only astronomers are comfortable and the high probability it will go ever higher, the need for borrowing back more of the dollars spent by We the People on items of Chinese provenance comes more and more pressing. Since most if not all of the quoted Democrats are committed internationalists, the notion of exchanging diplomatic freedom as well as American national and strategic security for a large mess of potage is quite thinkable.

Perhaps the lure of more easily borrowed money is of such power that the assorted fine folks quoted can overlook such bagatelles as this year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the midpoint of the Great Famine which accompanied the Chinese Great Leap Forward and cost, according to Chinese governmental figures, some fifty million Chinese lives. To this day the Beijing regime has never, never acknowledged the famine occurred as a result of state policy, state planning, state indifference, and state control of all aspects of Chinese life--and death.

Some of the people quoted in the WaPo article might be inclined to toss out that bit of critical history as irrelevant to today's world politics. Such cavalier dismissal of the greatest man-made famine in human history is, self-evidently, wrong.

Within today's Chinese senior leadership are to be found men who were present in junior roles during the two "Greats," the famine and the leap forward. They knew and know what happened and see no ethical problem. Instead they see lessons learned: Collectivism does not work, control, total control, of the media of communication, the writing of history, and the collective memory of the nation all work very well for regime maintenance.

Germany admitted its collective culpability for the Holocaust. The Soviet Union, long before its dissolution, acknowledged the central role played by both Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the vast famine in the Ukraine and elsewhere during its forced draft move to collectivize agriculture.

The Chinese government has never accepted the reality that its failed policy was the direct cause of the massive three year die-off of its own people. Nor is there any probability that Beijing will ever do so--even though the tail can be pinned on the dead donkey of Mao.

Compared to the Great Famine or the devastation brought by the Cultural Revolution, the more recent human rights abuses of the Beijing regime pale into virtual insignificance. This in no way downplays the responsibility of the Chinese government in its ongoing suppression of basic human rights. It in no way relieves the Gnomes of Beijing from their direct, personal guilt for the egregious violation of international conventions to which the regime has formally subscribed.

China is not like other countries. It is not like Germany, France, the UK or even Russia. It is not even in the same minor leagues of total disregard for basic human rights as the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Sudanese. It is one of a kind. A league of its own.

The American public--or at least a large portion of it--is evidently aware of this. The Democratic Party "China Lobby" is apparently not.

This degree of willful self-delusion must exist for a reason. There is a reason. It is to be found in that great nearly final line in the film Fargo. Perhaps you remember it--

"All of this. For a little bit of money."

You Gotta Give al-Qaeda Credit

The 30 December hit on Forward Operating Base Chapman which resulted in the deaths of several highly experienced CIA officers including the Chief of Base (COB) represents a triumph for the Glorious Warriors of Martyrdom. The use of the Jordanian medic and long standing jihadi, Human al-Balawi, constituted an excellent example of a penetration operation conducted with both fine planning and exceptional attention to detail as well as a degree of patience which would have done credit to the Chinese.

The successful detonation of the bomb concealed on his person by the physician turned suicide bomber also represents a dramatic failure by CIA in following the basic rules of tradecraft. There is nothing mysterious about tradecraft. It is a combination of slightly paranoiac commonsense and good criminal procedure.

First and foremost tradecraft depends upon never trusting anyone--other than one's closest associates--completely. Or, to use the translated Russian proverb so beloved by Ronald Reagan, "Trust--but verify." In working a human source--which is what al-Balawi was supposed to be--it is an imperative that the source have face time only with his controller. Sure, there can be very occasional exceptions to that basic requirement, but the idea of allowing a double agent--which is what al-Balawi was--in close proximity with several officers including the COB is a major lapse.

No matter what hopes might have been placed on al-Balawi's capacity to play pointer to senior al-Qaeda personnel, no matter what assurances might have been provided by the General Intelligence Department in Jordan as to al-Balawi's new allegiances, he should have been handled only by his controller with other interested people viewing discretely. If it was absolutely essential, a second person, even the COB, might have entered the room with al-Balawi.

There is no doubt but most if not all double agents are prickly characters in need of constant reassurances, unending absolution, and careful psychological manipulation. Often the demands of a double are outrageous. Whenever possible they should be complied with. But, never, repeat never, at the risk of compromising security or the integrity of the totality of the operation.

If there was no way around allowing al-Balawi to not only meet in person but be in close physical proximity to a number of officers, then there should have been an appropriate trade-off. Imagine this dialogue:

Al-Balawi, "I must see them all. My information is too important."

Case officer controller, "Sure thing, but I have to pat you down first. Nothing personal, but I gotta follow regulations or my ass is grass. I'm sure you understand."

But this elementary precaution--a technique which was common in previous combat zones--was not followed. Presumably this lapse was due to the Agency's "lust for knowing" and the concomitant deep desire to finally put paid to some of the most obnoxious and able of al-Qaeda's senior personnel.

It is easy to understand how lust could overpower the necessary caution of tradecraft when one considers that the Chief of Base had spent eight years as a full time chaser of Islamist jihadists. There is no doubt but she wanted desperately to nail one or more al-Qaeda heavyweights to the barn door.

Another factor which might have contributed to the temporary (but quite fatal) lapse of reason is the nature of the relationship between CIA and Jordan's GID. It has existed for years. Since long, long before al-Qaeda came into existence, since before the Six Day War, the Agency has had a fine working relationship with GID. The relation has survived any number of political strains as well as the death of King Hussein. Undoubtedly there was a great desire not to give any offense to a close ally, particularly given the ability and critical utility of the GID to US intelligence services.

Yet the Jordanians had only had possession of al-Balawi for a little less than a year. Considering the depth of al-Balawi's public commitment to Islamism, to jihad, as well as the fact that he loathed, hated, detested Israel to a degree which bordered on monomania, nine or ten months is a remarkably short time to accomplish a 180 degree reversal in a man's values and motives.

Al-Balawi and his al-Qaeda controllers were able to deceive Jordan's intelligence personnel completely. This is to the credit of the enemy. That the Agency took GID assurances at face value is a discredit to the American spooks.

"Trust--but verify!"

Presumably the Agency did some verification. It is self-evident that whatever independent measures might have been employed by Langley, they were not enough. Admittedly, how much is enough is a very subjective judgement call based upon a large number of contextual and personal considerations. The still small voice embodied in tradecraft always whispers, "Err on the side of caution."

In this case the Agency's people in the field did not. They died as a result.

Death in the world of the spooks is a reality. There is a wall filled with commemorative plaques in Langley which attests to that ground truth. Just like any military service, an intelligence organization sucks it up and presses on after taking losses. As is the case in the military it is essential that the dead be memorialized not simply with plaques, medals, or speeches but by an accurate understanding of what went wrong so that proper action can be taken to prevent future losses.

In this case the lessons learned are simple. The first is one must always follow the most cautious application of tradecraft. The second is: "Trust--but verify!"

A Primitive And Unconstructive People

It is small wonder that the Islamist jihadists (as well as the less violently inclined sympathizers and supporters who profess and practice politically oriented Islam) see the Arabian Peninsula of twelve hundred or so years ago as the desired paradigm of the human condition. These people and the societies which produce them are--like their desideratum--both primitive and unconstructive.

When the famed American diplomat and historian, George Kennan first used the term, "primitive and unconstructive," he was referring to a particular stance taken by the Soviet Union of Joe Stalin's day. As a man both knowledgeable of and sympathetic with Russian culture over its vast sweep of time, Kennan never would have applied the term to the entirety of the Russian population no matter how appropriate it might have been with respect to the Soviet strongman.

Faced with the actions and words of Islamist jihadists as well as the never ending paeans sung by the political Islamists to the glorious past of Islam during and after the life of the Perfect Man, Kennan would have been tempted to use the term to apply to an entire people. Or at least a significant component of that people.

Consider for a second the social and cultural nature of the assorted heartlands and havens of Islamist jihadism: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia. All of these geographical expressions (as well as others less closely associated with al-Qaeda or Taliban or al-Shabaab or any of the other multiplying forces of jihad) are essentially tribal. Rulership is based on what anthropologists formerly (in less sensitive times) termed "the mighty man" or the "strongman." Socially and culturally all are disconnected from the streams of change running elsewhere in the world except to exploit those technological developments of use to them from cell phones and laptops to liquid explosives and automatic weapons.

To put the matter bluntly, the places which have given birth and later succor to the jihadists and the political Islamists who cozen and control them are as primitive as the society and culture which existed on the Arabian Peninsula over a thousand years ago. The historical record shows that the legacy of the long dead Muslims of the Peninsula as well as their successors along the roads of war and conquest has been marked by a singular lack of a constructive orientation.

Despite the best efforts of Muslim apologists, the historical record demonstrates beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt that the world today owes very, very little to the creative minds, the productive imaginations of Muslims over the past millennium or so beyond providing sanctuary for Jewish intellects fleeing the mindless repression of the Catholics in Europe particularly Spain.

Developments which have marked the construction of the modern world emerged not from those standing in awe of the Perfect Man and the Companions but those who either bowed to the Cross, contemplated the Buddah, or eschewed religion all together. Europe, North America, and Asia were and are the founts of constructive developments in all fields of human discourse. This is what irks the adherents of the primitive and unconstructive views propounded by Islamist jihadists.

For more than a thousand years the tribally based Muslim religion throughout its great swath of territory from Morocco to Indonesia has done nothing to advance the human condition. And, the march of Islam from its cradle to its current extent has seen far more bloodshed, far more persecution, far more destruction than that inflicted by the long conflicts between varieties of European Christians or between Christians and Muslims.

Only in the colonial sphere can the record of Christians descend to the valleys of devastation which mark the course of Islamic conquest and exploitation. Even in this worst of all Christian campaigns it must be said with honesty that the Europeans did try to create, did try to repair damage, did try to improve in many ways the human condition in the regions they seized. Yes, often the attempts were futile, often they were misguided, occasionally the attempts were both cynical and self-serving. Nonetheless, the balance shows the Christian's did make a good faith effort to bring sophistication in politics, medicine, law, technology, education, social mores, and cultural customs.

The Muslims did none of these things. Societies and polities remained simple, primitive, under the sway of "mighty men" and backward looking clerics. Until challenged, dominated by the West, the lands and people of Islam existed in an eddy of time, motionless as the larger currents of change, innovation, discovery, accomplishment swirled by.

The Islamists and those in Islam who support them either openly or tacitly want to regain the safety of their little motionless warp in time. Worse, they want to stop the currents of change.

There is a deceptive appeal in the simple. The simple life, the closely ordered life, the life which runs according to timeless principles enshrined by both the sacred literature and tradition seems so attractive because it reduces the risks of life, the perils of existence, the messy uncertainties of change. A strong, pure faith backed by a strong "mighty man" has great seductive power--particularly to those who have never left the world of the personal, the tribal, the ever-so-simple.

Even to some living in far more politically, socially, culturally, and technologically sophisticated places than the FATA of Pakistan or the barren hills of Yemen find a sweet, sentimental appeal in the notion of a simplified life in which the never ending dislocations of "progress" are noted by their absence. The human brain molded by its emergence in a simple society of family and tribe, an existence which was as timeless as the rhythm of the seasons and the movements of game, still homes in on the "simple life" as a compass needle seeks True North.

The Islamists and their armed jihadist component want to bring back the Good Old Days by force, violence, and fear. They will continue their efforts unless killed to the last man--an option which is not practical in any sort of real world terms even if it could be ethically justified--from one tribal venue or another. The most rational option available for a long term defeat of the jihadists is the ending of tribalism in those places where it and Islam coexist.

That option looked at objectively is very, very difficult to achieve. It is so not because it would take great amounts of thought, effort, and money. The detribalization of the Muslim world is difficult, not to say impossible, to achieve because the simple life is "primitive and unconstructive." It is in that reality that the appeal resides.

Raising The Ugly(?) Of Profiling

The matter of profiling prospective passengers on international flights (and perhaps other venues as well) is again under discussion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, perhaps the word "discussion" is inappropriately mild. Acrimonious, emotional exchange of diatribes might be closer to the reality of things.

One ground truth on which all considerations of profiling is simple: It works. The experience of El Al airline over the past thirty years shows that conclusively. This ground truth is the single greatest reason in support of profiling.

The second ground truth regarding profiling is simply that it is offensive to all people who for whatsoever reason fall into the suspect category. The Geek is no stranger to this ground truth as there was a time in this country not that many years ago when all long haired men were viewed by security and police personnel as potential drug smugglers--despite the fact that no person would be so stupid as to use someone of an evident "hippy" appearance to run drugs on their behalf.

The Geek recalls with wry amusement all the times he was taken aside for "enhanced screening" even though he had valid ID up the ying-yang and was travelling on Official Business simply because he wore his hair in long braids in a form of tribute to his Apache ancestors. This sort of intrusive and often quite obnoxious secondary searching happened in a number of US airports as well as some in the UK, Germany, and even Luxembourg. To say the Geek was rankled is to engage in understatement.

Emotionally, therefore he is in sympathy with the views of those who are opposed to profiling as an insult to Muslims, Arabs, other people of color, and so forth. People would be insulted by the inevitable occurrence of profiling errors. The insult will be all the worse given that today's TSA employees are even more given to a species of arrogant rudeness far surpassing that exhibited by their predecessors of a decade and more ago.

Rationally, however, the Geek must go with the position that profiling is a valuable method of screening out potential threats even if it has a high false positive component. Considering both the problems of intelligence analysis pointing to a discrete, identifiable threat, and the exceptional vulnerability of an airliner in flight, the extra sieve of profiling is justified.

The first task is assuring to the greatest extent humanly possible that commercial airliners and other similar high value targets are secure from terrorist threats as the highest priority. A reliance upon advanced, expensive technology alone is insufficient. So is placing all hopes on the leak proof effectiveness of warning intelligence. Even a combination of the two is not sufficient guard to provide the appropriate level of safety for those travelling by air--or living and working on the ground below the flight path.

At the same time profiling is not an anodyne. It cannot and should not be used as the primary barrier in airline security. More, it is not a general purpose tool which can be used with equal effect to protect other high value targets such as sports arenas, concert venues, shopping malls, and office complexes. There are simply too many members of these target constellations with entirely too many of us bipeds coming and going for profiling to have any utility.

This set of considerations implies that the risks of alienating large segments of our own people or foreign populations is inherently limited. There is no real world based reason to conclude that the implementation of profiling will cause diplomatic difficulties with Muslim, Arab, or African nations. Neither, particularly if the matter is handled with any degree of sensitivity below that of purely barbarian, is their any realistic basis for the contention that racism, xenophobia, or any other manifestation of fear and hate will ripple through We the People.

The matrix of features which can be employed in a system of profiling is both well established and generally known. This implies that the utility of profiling is time limited as the Islamist jihadist groups will seek ways to fly below the profiler's radar in the same way the drug smuggling rings quickly learned what sort of person would be most likely to pass by the security and law enforcement surveillance without notice.

In the short term profiling would offer very real advantages in both the deterrence and interdiction of terrorist attempts to target flights to and from the US. Even a short term benefit would have longer term utility as it would provide the time necessary for the US and its allies to develop and implement more effective strategies and operational level doctrine for defeating the Islamist jihadist groups around the world.

There is just one major problem with profiling. It would require that the US government actually put a name to the enemy for the very first time. It would require the dropping of euphemisms like "violent extremist" and call it what it is: Islamist jihadist.

Telling it like it is might be too tough for the Nice Young Man From Chicago, and that means profiling will be dead on arrival forever.

Come On, People! Foreign Affairs Isn't Me.

If President Obama, the Nice Young Man From Chicago, fell prey to honesty he would make that sort of candid self-assessment to We the People. Every since LBJ the Democratic Party has a fine record of tossing up successful presidential candidates who are both uninterested and untutored in the Great Game of Nations.

Presidents Carter, Clinton, and now Obama have all been remarkably disengaged in the making and executing of foreign and national security policy. In all these cases the lack of interest was, at least initially, supported by a vast majority of We the People. Activism overseas is not an attractive option to Americans, particularly if the activism results--as it usually does--with involvement in some sort of distant war being waged for hazy reasons.

For Americans of and over a (to use the delicate French expression) "a certain age," Vietnam surpassed even Korea as the shorthand for "distant, bloody, unvictorious war fought for uncertain reasons and for hazy goals." Thus it is small wonder that Carter was just jake in the foreign policy department. That is until 1979, the year of the Iranian Revolution and concomitant hostage "crisis."

The Republicans mastered the art of seeming to be tough on foreign adversaries without doing much. Reagan's response to the Beirut barracks and embassy bombings could have been taken from the Carter or Clinton playbook. Even George H.W. Bush's adventure in repelling Iraqi aggression was waged less with a policy end in mind and not anything approximating victory.

Despite his evident attempt to properly calibrate the American view of foreign affairs with the domestic needs of economy and re-election, G.H.W. was replaced by a foreign policy nullity, the ever-so-nimble Bill Clinton. Mr Clinton was a policy wonk--a domestic policy wonk. His taste for, interest in, knowledge of, or moral authority over both foreign and military policy was so close to zilch that it would take the intellectual equivalent of trace DNA analysis to discover the man's brain marks on anything useful in these areas.

It was, after all is said, the irresolute, hesitant and overall wrong as a soup sandwich responses of the Clinton administration to events in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen that convinced the Islamist jihadists of al-Qaeda that the US could be terrorized out of the Mideast with impunity. We know what that finally morphed into.

No one can accuse George W. Bush of being irresolute, hesitant, or weak in response to the attacks of 9/11. His responses, however, fell into the wrong-as-baked-watermelon category. His "punitive expedition" into Taliban's Afghanistan was too fast, executed by too few, focused on the wrong goals, and morphed at warp speed into the plague state of "nation building." His follow on in Iraq not only assured Afghanistan would become a close approximation of the one that got away, but was wasteful, unnecessary, counterproductive, and flatly wrongheaded in concept and execution. No matter how unpleasant a character Saddam Hussein might have been, the US had neither strategic nor national interests at play there no matter how fervently the neocon ninnies of the day might have wished.

Once again We the People wanted a president with less of a foreign policy orientation. The Nice Young Man From Chicago was--and is--just that. The only sad part of this reality is that the rest of the world wants an American president who understands both the global dynamic and the American role in it--and is willing to use all the instruments of national power to pursue a clear policy as to what sort of world order the US can survive and thrive in.

The reason for this is not that the world wants an American imperium. It most assuredly does not. (Nor does the US.) What is wanted is a clear, systematic, realistic policy from the world's still pre-eminent Great Power so that individual nations' policies might be formulated either for or against those of the US.

The US has not formulated a consistent policy for either the global political order or for its policies with respect to either regions of the world or threats presented by groups inherently and violently hostile to the US and what it stands for. Instead the Obama administration has lurched from ad hoc to ad hoc, from one smiling statement to the next or, worse, from smiling offer of "engagement" to snarl and growl of "hold accountable."

It is no wonder that in chancelleries great and small, hostile, neutral, or friendly there is much eyebrow lifting, head shaking, and rolling of eyes. Just what country with what policy is the US today, anyhow? Great Believer in the "International Community" or go-it-alone paradigm?

Is Iran the enemy? The "friend we haven't met, yet?" A threat? If a threat, actual or potential? If potential, when will it become actual?

Is Israel an ally? An adversary? An intractable client? A client at all?

Are the Palestinians justified in their most extreme demands? Sort of justified? Not at all justified?

The list can and does go on. We change colors and cloaks on policy regarding Russia, China, the totality of Latin America. With the possible exception of Antarctica, the Obama administration has shifted its stance more than once on every landmass around the world. Just as it has on climate change, the international financial system, and a host of other topics.

Then there is terrorism or, to err on the side of accuracy, Islamist jihadism. The administration is adrift at the policy level as to the most basic issue presented by this armed, violent, and very well motivated threat: Is it a matter of law enforcement or national defense? Do we send a cop or land the Marines as a response?

Or do we hope to smile and simper our way out of the killing zone?

Or do we duck behind some local excuse for a government hoping that if we provide the means, the intelligence, the logistic and communications support, the expendable locals can do the killing and dying?

Or do we hope to stumble on some mixture of smiles, threats, local forces, and specialist American forces including UAVs to somehow counter the threat? If this is the least-worst way to conduct the "war" on Islamist jihadists, it is long past time for the Obama people to lay out a coherent strategy.

A coherent strategy must be part and parcel of a larger equally coherent theory of international politics. If it isn't, the result will be that which inevitably accrues to ad hoc, jury rigged national security policies--failure.

The blame game of pinning the tail of the foreign affairs donkey on the W. Bush administration is no longer to be allowed. The clock on that gambit has run out. The Great Game of Nations (and non-national actors) now belongs solely to the Nice Young Man From Chicago and those who he has chosen to run the germane departments and agencies of his administration.

Mr Obama (and We the People) had best remember that the last time a president was both inept and unrealistic in foreign and national security affairs the end result was 9/11. He might also ruminate on the proposition that Osama bin Laden will still have his job after Mr Obama has lost his.

The Bad Guys Succeed Only With Our Help

Remember, bucko, the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize. The goals of terror are essentially negative. To put the best face on a strategy based on terror, particularly that of the suicide sort, the desired end is one of deterrence.

With respect to the US the minimum strategic goal of each and all of the al-Qaeda clones is identical with that of Osama bin Laden. The goal is to deter the US from any military presence in Arab Muslim states as well as continuation of its diplomatic, economic and military support of Israel. The goal is to force the US to stop doing that which it has been doing.

In a larger way the strategic hope is that by deterring the US from continuing policies of many decades standing they will accomplish the same with other Western actors. The US must remain the main focus since even when a terror attack may have a desirable impact from the perspective of its authors as was the presumed linkage between the Madrid bombings and the subsequent election, the results were too narrow track to be even slightly satisfactory. It mattered not if Spain kept troops in either Afghanistan or Iraq or withdrew them ASAP.

Substantially the hope of the Glorious Martyrdom Wannabes and those who offer religious comfort, political motivation and technical preparation is identical with those who once believed that hanging pickpockets would deter the pickpockets busily picking pockets in the crowd around the gallows. That didn't work. Neither will al-Qaeda and its ilk.

Here is why, bucko.

Deterrence works only in those rare occasions where it is mutual, based on a truly existential threat and the decision makers on both sides are not only rational actors but share the same calculus of rationality. Deterrence is assured if, in addition to the foregoing, both deterred actors have alternatives by which to pursue their respective policy goals below the deterred level of conduct.

It doesn't take a lot of thinking to remind oneself as to the one long time deterrence worked. Right on, bucko, the mutually assured destruction period of the Cold War.

Since the dynamic of the relationship between al-Qaeda or the rest of the Islamist jihadist groups and the US meets none of the tests of functional deterrence, they are doomed to fail in achieving their policy ends, no matter how minimally defined. The US is not going to cut and run from its obligations either in Arab Muslim states or regarding Israel.

So, all the bad guys can hope for is a species of self-inflicted defeat on our part. The worst part of this thesis is that it is not too much to hope for. The self-inflicted defeat option is a realistic one.

There are several reasons to justify this gloomy conclusion.

One is the misuse of US military power in both Afghanistan and Iraq. While both situations have changed for the better, the net effect on We the People has been negative. We have little stomach for more military engagements with Islamist adversaries.

The second reason is the economy. Thanks to a series of world class blunders on the part of three administrations (Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama) the US has a foreign funded deficit which severely crimps our capacity for independent action on the global stage. This situation will only worsen in the near to mid-term without major changes in D.C.

Thirdly one must not underestimate the impact of the post-modernist, multi-cultural oriented, blame-America-first, pity-the-poor-and-alienated portions of the American elite. Their influence in politics, the media, and academia is significant and growing. These "useful idiots," to use Lenin's phrase, can do much to sap American political will and internal confidence. They are the Islamists' Fifth Column.

Finally, as David Brooks noted in an op-ed piece in the NYT, We the People are not the same today as were our predecessors of fifty or seventy-five years ago. We want perfect outcomes and demand that the central government and the tools of the bureaucratic state provide such all the time. We are no longer willing to acknowledge that perfection is not possible in the real world, and we will not be held harmless from all those many things that go bump in the dark.

For people of this mentality surrender is an option--provided it is not termed as such. As long as we can hide behind the positive such as declaiming faith in "the international community" we can wave a carefully concealed white flag.

It is appealing and true to say, "We aren't the world's policeman." Or, "Israel has too much power over our domestic politics." Or, "If we pull out of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and so on, the Islamists will leave us alone." Or, even, "Get rid of poverty in Yemen, Somalia or wherever and there will be no more willing martyrs."

All true--at least in part. All dangerously wrong--at least in major part. But, convincing ways to put tie dyed colors on the universal flag of surrender.

The terror merchants of Islam cannot win. Not alone. They need us to do the heavy lifting.