Keep gripping the fundamental reality of our war in Iraq. The purpose of all wars to reach a better state of peace. In Iraq that means a better state of peace for US interests. More importantly, it means a better state of peace for the Iraqis.
Keep holding onto the second fundamental reality of our war in Iraq. If we lose, pull out, beat feet, Dx the whole damn mess, the result will be a worse state of peace. For the US. For the world. For the Iraqis.
True, there are excellent reasons, many of which the Geek mentioned in earlier posts, why the war should never have been undertaken. Stipulated: the US invasion should never have occurred. Further stipulated: The US occupation of Iraq is the direct result of a very bad policy decision by the "commander guy."
Now we're riding the tiger and there is no easy way to dismount. Nor should we dismount. Not until the tiger is, if not a pussy cat, at least not a man-eater.
The first, baby steps toward taming the tiger were outlined in the previous post. Baby steps don't win or even finish a marathon. More, and larger, faster steps are needed for that.
There is a problem. So many steps, large steps, even daring steps have to be taken so quickly that it is hard to consider them one at a time. Even to attempt a sequential consideration carries with it the risk that the steps will be seen as a hierarchy, with each step in the sequence being dependent on the success of its predecessor.
This isn't the case. All the large steps are necessary. They are interlocked. However, a few depend upon the successful completion of the others.
Here they are in summary form. (The Geek almost wrote "bullet" form, but that might be unseemly given that it's war and killing that are being considered.)
1. Rediscover or redevelop our political will. Reject the emotionally satisfying but ultimately counterproductive of pulling what we did in Somalia--a quick display of retreat while muttering, "They didn't appreciate what we were doing for them. Screw 'em and the horse they rode in on," or with tooth-gnashing and hand-wringing, crying, "We shouldn't have gone there. We've made things so much worse."
2. Convince the administration to come clean with our policy. The war is no longer all about promoting democracy or providing warm fuzzies such as liberty and pluralistic institutions. It's no longer about "fighting terrorism." Now the war is about assuring that Iraq is stable and functional enough to preclude the emergence of Iran or any other country as the regional hegemon. The war might also, in a lesser way, be about lowering the appeal of terrorism as a policy option in either political or cultural frames.
3. The Administration, Congress and We the People must acknowledge that our troops have signed a Covenant with Death and as our part of the contract the nation must not and will not allow those who have been killed on our service to be tossed on the garbage dump of defeat.
4. Reject an imperial presence. That means letting all parties in Iraq know beyond any shadow of a doubt that we are going to leave the moment the Iraqi state is stable, the Iraqi forces up to the task of defending against external threats and internal violence. It might also mean abandoning the currently under construction US Embassy compound of twenty buildings on more than a hundred acres which gives every appearance of being the seat of a regional pro-counsel, not a mere diplomatic representative.
5. Talk to Iran. Don't bomb it. Don't even try to destabilize it with "non-lethal Presidential Findings" and so-called black operations. Don't invite Iran to enter the war openly as we invited North Vietnam to do back in 1964-5. At the same time the US can't make any behind-the-scenes agreements with Iran or even wink-wink, nudge-nudge type understandings that would give rise to a de facto, unannounced Iranian presence, even dominance in Iraq.
6. As mentioned earlier, stop acting like an occupier. This means stop kicking in doors, waging war on civilians, even writing rules to govern the approved use of torture. Only occupying powers fight with torture, area weapons and the boot in the door (or in the face.) it also means sending the contract training and security personnel back to home. If it's not a purely military mission, it should be undertaken by Iraqis--not foreign nationals and least of all Americans.
7. The US force on the ground. Hold on to this. That's on the ground, not in the air over Iraq or in the off-shore waters must be increased. It must focus on two missions. Provide a wall of security to the uncommitted majority. Train Iraqi forces behind this wall so that they can take over from us in the fullness of time. Work to get the economy so that the combination of lowered violence and increase opportunity will get some of the nearly 900,000 internal refugees to leave the camps and go back home.
8. Enlist the women of Iraq on the side of stability. This means refraining from waging war on them by bombs from above or feet on the door. The Israelis have been waging war on women in the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian entity for years with the result that each new generation of boys becomes the next generation of jihadists. We can't make the same mistake. It also means using culturally appropriate means of reaching out to the women, recognising their potential influence for peace and stability. After all, they have the most to lose and the least to gain by ongoing jihad and counter-jihad.
9. Accept seemingly unpleasant ways of war fighting. For example, targeted killings. Carefully premeditated and coldly planned assassinations of key hostile personnel may make us queasy. It may rub against our moral sensibilities. However, as a tactic, it works and works well. The lowest butcher's bill way of defeating an insurgent is politely called "organizational perturbation" in delicate academic circles. As we found out more than a few times in Vietnam, killing a key man in the right way at the right time causes a thousand followers to reconsider their plans.
10. Be patient. No counterinsurgency is won in 90 days or even four years. It took us over a decade to lose in Vietnam. It took the British more than a decade to win in Malaya against a much softer opponent in a far smaller territory without an immediately available sanctuary or two.
The Geek will take each of these points and expand it. Then he will tackle the most vexing problem of all. How to take the fun out of jihad for the young men flocking to the jihadist recruiting centers.
That said, the Geek reserves the right to rant whenever the US does something particularly gripless in or around Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thursday, May 31, 2007
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
Not Losing In Iraq--First Step
Get a grip on this. In Iraq we, the self-proclaimed good guys, are the occupiers. Not the liberators. The occupiers.
Get a grip on this. No one, but no one likes occupiers. People don't even like liberators--if they stay around too long.
Get a grip on this. There is no way in the real world that people can be convinced to like occupiers.
If we are not going to lose, the very first challenge is convincing more Iraqis to dislike us less.
That's right, dislike us less. Not love us. Not even like us. Just dislike us less.
That's what makes the job at all possible. We don't need all or even most or even very many Iraqis to like us and our presence in their country. We merely need more of them, perhaps only a plurality of the population to dislike us a bit less.
Why?
Two reasons.
First, and more importantly, so that the average person will see that he or she has a real, direct and immediate stake in enhancing internal stability and decreasing violence. A stake that goes beyond the immediate, compelling desire not to be killed or injured. A stake in an Iraqi future. Not an American view of the future. No. An Iraqi view of a collective Iraqi tomorrow.
Secondly, we need the cooperation, the full and voluntary assistance, of the Iraqi in the street. The person on the ground is the best, often the only, source of critical information. As any experienced cop can testify, a snitch is good. Two snitches are better. And so on.
Beyond information no matter how critical, it is the attitude of the individual and his or her family regarding the occupier that is the terrain on which the counter insurgent war is fought. The much derided Vietnam era phrase, "winning the hearts and minds," is absolutely true.
Only by positively affecting the perceptions and attitudes of the individual Iraqi can our presence be redefined from "occupier" to "peacemaker" and "peacekeeper." Only by changing the perceptions and attitudes of the individual Iraqi can our presence be seen by more than a minuscule few as something that will assist in bringing a better future into existence.
Fine words, fine ideas, sanctioned by history, but so what? The words are easy to write or say. The lessons of history are there, easy to understand. Still, without being able to put them into real world effect, they remain lifeless, useless.
How must we change what we're doing in Iraq to give vitality to these words and the lessons of two successful counter insurgent wars in the Philippines, as well as the defeat in Vietnam.
At the very top of the list is stop waging war on the uncommitted majority. The majority of any population in a violence ridden environment simply want to be left out of the crossfire. The uncommitted majority support neither the insurgents nor the occupiers and the government it backs.
Iraq Slogger today http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/2995/Uninvited_Guests_US_Soldiers_in_Iraqi_Homes
reports on the kind of annoyance, which no matter how it may be spun by local commanders or Pentagon spokespersons turns members of the uncommitted majority into active or passive supporters of the insurgents. Kicking in doors, rousting people from their homes, tossing the home in a search for weapons, or suspects or whatever else is guaranteed to brand US forces as the "Occupier."
We must not wear that brand. Unless we want to lose.
Even worse than the kicking in of doors, the pounding of American boots on Iraqi stairs is the destruction of civilian homes and the killing or injuring of civilians, members of the uncommitted majority. A minor example was reported today. It's also from Iraq Slogger. http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/2990
It was a minor incident. Not the kind the MSM would even notice. US fighter-bombers hit targets in a residential area of Mosul injuring four.
Imagine the effect on those injured. Their relatives. Those who watched the attack from nearby. Those who hear about it. Watch it on TV. Imagine the propaganda handed to the insurgents.
Is this the kind of future any Iraqi would hope for? The jets screaming down. The explosions. The silence as the dust rises. The low cries or loud shrieks of the wounded. Is this the future you would want?
When the boot kicks in the door or when the bombs hit your house or the house next door, who do you blame? The insurgents? Or those whose feet kicked and fingers triggered? The fellow Iraqi or the Occupier?
Second guess doesn't count.
Stop waging war on the uncommitted majority. That's the beginning. That's the first baby step toward changing perceptions and attitudes. That's the first necessary small move in converting ourselves from Occupier to something less self-defeating.
There are more steps. Bigger steps. Perhaps harder steps.
"Like what?" You ask.
Like don't wage war on women. Get the women on our side and the future will surely follow. Next from the History Geek.
Get a grip on this. No one, but no one likes occupiers. People don't even like liberators--if they stay around too long.
Get a grip on this. There is no way in the real world that people can be convinced to like occupiers.
If we are not going to lose, the very first challenge is convincing more Iraqis to dislike us less.
That's right, dislike us less. Not love us. Not even like us. Just dislike us less.
That's what makes the job at all possible. We don't need all or even most or even very many Iraqis to like us and our presence in their country. We merely need more of them, perhaps only a plurality of the population to dislike us a bit less.
Why?
Two reasons.
First, and more importantly, so that the average person will see that he or she has a real, direct and immediate stake in enhancing internal stability and decreasing violence. A stake that goes beyond the immediate, compelling desire not to be killed or injured. A stake in an Iraqi future. Not an American view of the future. No. An Iraqi view of a collective Iraqi tomorrow.
Secondly, we need the cooperation, the full and voluntary assistance, of the Iraqi in the street. The person on the ground is the best, often the only, source of critical information. As any experienced cop can testify, a snitch is good. Two snitches are better. And so on.
Beyond information no matter how critical, it is the attitude of the individual and his or her family regarding the occupier that is the terrain on which the counter insurgent war is fought. The much derided Vietnam era phrase, "winning the hearts and minds," is absolutely true.
Only by positively affecting the perceptions and attitudes of the individual Iraqi can our presence be redefined from "occupier" to "peacemaker" and "peacekeeper." Only by changing the perceptions and attitudes of the individual Iraqi can our presence be seen by more than a minuscule few as something that will assist in bringing a better future into existence.
Fine words, fine ideas, sanctioned by history, but so what? The words are easy to write or say. The lessons of history are there, easy to understand. Still, without being able to put them into real world effect, they remain lifeless, useless.
How must we change what we're doing in Iraq to give vitality to these words and the lessons of two successful counter insurgent wars in the Philippines, as well as the defeat in Vietnam.
At the very top of the list is stop waging war on the uncommitted majority. The majority of any population in a violence ridden environment simply want to be left out of the crossfire. The uncommitted majority support neither the insurgents nor the occupiers and the government it backs.
Iraq Slogger today http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/2995/Uninvited_Guests_US_Soldiers_in_Iraqi_Homes
reports on the kind of annoyance, which no matter how it may be spun by local commanders or Pentagon spokespersons turns members of the uncommitted majority into active or passive supporters of the insurgents. Kicking in doors, rousting people from their homes, tossing the home in a search for weapons, or suspects or whatever else is guaranteed to brand US forces as the "Occupier."
We must not wear that brand. Unless we want to lose.
Even worse than the kicking in of doors, the pounding of American boots on Iraqi stairs is the destruction of civilian homes and the killing or injuring of civilians, members of the uncommitted majority. A minor example was reported today. It's also from Iraq Slogger. http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/2990
It was a minor incident. Not the kind the MSM would even notice. US fighter-bombers hit targets in a residential area of Mosul injuring four.
Imagine the effect on those injured. Their relatives. Those who watched the attack from nearby. Those who hear about it. Watch it on TV. Imagine the propaganda handed to the insurgents.
Is this the kind of future any Iraqi would hope for? The jets screaming down. The explosions. The silence as the dust rises. The low cries or loud shrieks of the wounded. Is this the future you would want?
When the boot kicks in the door or when the bombs hit your house or the house next door, who do you blame? The insurgents? Or those whose feet kicked and fingers triggered? The fellow Iraqi or the Occupier?
Second guess doesn't count.
Stop waging war on the uncommitted majority. That's the beginning. That's the first baby step toward changing perceptions and attitudes. That's the first necessary small move in converting ourselves from Occupier to something less self-defeating.
There are more steps. Bigger steps. Perhaps harder steps.
"Like what?" You ask.
Like don't wage war on women. Get the women on our side and the future will surely follow. Next from the History Geek.
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
How Old Do You Gotta Be to Join the Jihad?
History Geek isn't going to tell more history tales on how to not lose in Iraq. Not today, at least. No. Time to bring up another problem on which darn near no one has a grip.
The problem?
Demographics. More specifically, the number of young males in Iraq and the Mideast. This is a problem because it's the kids who do the fighting. To a teenager, fightin' and dyin' can be way cool, even way, way cool.
"Whoa there, History Geek." I can hear you thinking. "Just the other day, maybe a week or two back, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House, announced that 'Young people' around the world want peace."
Sure enough, that's what she said. All over the MSM. The History Geek is certain she meant what she said. But, the Geek wonders if the world she examined included the Mideast or Afghanistan, or Iran, or--never mind, you get the point.
Ms Pelosi needs to get a grip on reality. She might even watch some of the videos on YouTube. The ones that popped up initially on Islamist web sites, the ones that show the fearless young jihadists taking the war to the icky-poo crusaders and the apostate local forces.
Or even the clips showing a montage of roadside bombs going off and vehicles going up usually with a fine display of fire and smoke and flying body parts. The damn things are so compelling that the US military has been responding with combat actualities of its own.
If the videos don't convince Ms Pelosi that war can be an exciting game for the young in mind and body, she could visit some of the books over at the Library of Congress. She'll find them under two categories: history and population statistics.
Or if reading is too much work, she might have her staff go out to the nearest hood and select a couple of hundred teenage males at random. (It has to be the hood because the sample, like the enormous majority of under 25's in the Mideast, must be comprised of those kids for whom the future holds little or no promise.)
Then get the sample together in an auditorium and show the videos. (Following the videos some of the neat computer games available on some Islamist sites can be offered, but this part is optional.)
And probably impossible.
Why?
Because the crowd will be going wild after the first few clips. Hoots will be hooted. Feet will be stamped. Seats will be pounded. Be warned, Ms Pelosi, the footage really gets the blood, young blood of any race, nationality, or religion up and running. The violence, actual and plotted, is guaranteed to be temple pounding, vein throbbing good!
Therein lies a problem. One which the US has never confronted before. Indeed, only one country has waged counterinsurgency against an opponent where the majority of the male population is still in the raging hormone, gonad pounding years under twenty-five. Israel.
That's right Israel. And, look at the success the IDF has been enjoying for forty years now.
The Israeli military is good, very good, despite occasional spectacular failures such as the one in Lebanon last year. The Israelis have political will out the ying-yang. They have no choice. For them the ongoing war is inherently existential. (Of course, it is existential for the Palestinians as well.)
Intelligence (open source) indicates persuasively that the vast majority of the fighters we are and will be confronting are drawn from the same nearly bottomless manpower pool as the hijackers back on 11 September 01. The under 25's.
Get a firm grip on this. In Afghanistan, and in the Palestinian conflict, the majority of the combatants, the suicide bombers, the roadside bomb planters, the snipers has been drawn from the most marginal, the most hopeless, the most alienated portion of the young male population.
Take a firmer grip on this. That reality is changing. Has changed. Particularly regarding the fighters in Iraq. Most particularly the foreign fighters who come to Iraq for some OJT in urban guerrilla warfare.
How is it changing?
As the emotional appeal of the Islamist world view and goals increases, and, it is increasing every day, a greater number of "advantaged" young men join the jihad. Members of the middle, and upper middle classes, young men with good educations, the chance for a genuine future with personal and economic security that many Americans would envy are chucking it over to enlist in the jihad.
Why?
There are a number of reasons ranging from the psychological to the anthropological but one central reason is rooted in history. The reason is identical to those used by the Fascists of Italy three quarters of a century ago. Or, the Nazis shortly thereafter. Or the Khmer Rouge whose Killing Fields blighted the late 1970s.
The reason comes as a statement followed by a question. "Once we were so great; now we are so small. Why?"
The reason comes in the answer to the question. It is an answer given by the Fascists, the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge, and now the Islamists.
The answer to the question "why," is simple, even simply wrong, but it has more power than a dozen dial-a-yield hydrogen bombs. "Because we have abandoned the faith of our fathers."
"Once we were so great; now we are so small. Why?" Pause. "Because we have abandoned the faith of our fathers."
There are many reasons why the Arab and Persian Muslims have fallen so far from the peak of greatness nearly a thousand years ago. Most of the reasons are inherent to the Arabs and the Persians themselves. These are unpleasant for any member of today's Arab or Persian societies to contemplate.
It is far easier to focus on the wrongs done to Arabs, to Persians, to Muslims by the rest of the world. There is enough truth in the bill of particulars regarding colonialism, economic colonialism, cultural colonialism to support calls for revenge and recompense.
There is enough truth to the charges that can be leveled against American policy in the Mideast since 1957 to support a specific set of accusations against the United States. To believe that the United States is the Great Satan, the oppressor of Muslims, the Final Crusader.
The substantial truth of the charges is irrelevant today. The precise apportionment of blame is irrelevant now. What counts is the appeal of the Islamist demand for redress of the past, the re-emergence of Islam to world prominence, not to say dominance.
Warped history is a powerful tool. Used in the answer to the question "why," it is a potent motivator of young men. It is a nearly invincible propaganda weapon, particularly considering that in Islam there is no separation between faith and state, nor can there ever be. No matter how peace oriented or violently militant a Muslim might be, the embracer of peace and the wearer of bombs agree that religion and politics are one and the same.
And so, the kids of privlege, just like Osama bin Ladin, folk hero, join in common cause with the kids of the souks, Franz Fannon's archetypal "Wretched of the Earth," to lay us low. Lay us low in Iraq. If successful there, lay us low throughout the world.
Inexhaustible manpower. Motivated manpower. Increasingly talented and educated manpower. More and more, combat trained and battle hardened manpower. That's the demographic problem we face.
The White House and Pentagon were gripless about this problem four years ago. They are gripless regarding it today. Do we flounder on or is there an answer?
Could be. Stand by for more hints from history.
The problem?
Demographics. More specifically, the number of young males in Iraq and the Mideast. This is a problem because it's the kids who do the fighting. To a teenager, fightin' and dyin' can be way cool, even way, way cool.
"Whoa there, History Geek." I can hear you thinking. "Just the other day, maybe a week or two back, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House, announced that 'Young people' around the world want peace."
Sure enough, that's what she said. All over the MSM. The History Geek is certain she meant what she said. But, the Geek wonders if the world she examined included the Mideast or Afghanistan, or Iran, or--never mind, you get the point.
Ms Pelosi needs to get a grip on reality. She might even watch some of the videos on YouTube. The ones that popped up initially on Islamist web sites, the ones that show the fearless young jihadists taking the war to the icky-poo crusaders and the apostate local forces.
Or even the clips showing a montage of roadside bombs going off and vehicles going up usually with a fine display of fire and smoke and flying body parts. The damn things are so compelling that the US military has been responding with combat actualities of its own.
If the videos don't convince Ms Pelosi that war can be an exciting game for the young in mind and body, she could visit some of the books over at the Library of Congress. She'll find them under two categories: history and population statistics.
Or if reading is too much work, she might have her staff go out to the nearest hood and select a couple of hundred teenage males at random. (It has to be the hood because the sample, like the enormous majority of under 25's in the Mideast, must be comprised of those kids for whom the future holds little or no promise.)
Then get the sample together in an auditorium and show the videos. (Following the videos some of the neat computer games available on some Islamist sites can be offered, but this part is optional.)
And probably impossible.
Why?
Because the crowd will be going wild after the first few clips. Hoots will be hooted. Feet will be stamped. Seats will be pounded. Be warned, Ms Pelosi, the footage really gets the blood, young blood of any race, nationality, or religion up and running. The violence, actual and plotted, is guaranteed to be temple pounding, vein throbbing good!
Therein lies a problem. One which the US has never confronted before. Indeed, only one country has waged counterinsurgency against an opponent where the majority of the male population is still in the raging hormone, gonad pounding years under twenty-five. Israel.
That's right Israel. And, look at the success the IDF has been enjoying for forty years now.
The Israeli military is good, very good, despite occasional spectacular failures such as the one in Lebanon last year. The Israelis have political will out the ying-yang. They have no choice. For them the ongoing war is inherently existential. (Of course, it is existential for the Palestinians as well.)
Intelligence (open source) indicates persuasively that the vast majority of the fighters we are and will be confronting are drawn from the same nearly bottomless manpower pool as the hijackers back on 11 September 01. The under 25's.
Get a firm grip on this. In Afghanistan, and in the Palestinian conflict, the majority of the combatants, the suicide bombers, the roadside bomb planters, the snipers has been drawn from the most marginal, the most hopeless, the most alienated portion of the young male population.
Take a firmer grip on this. That reality is changing. Has changed. Particularly regarding the fighters in Iraq. Most particularly the foreign fighters who come to Iraq for some OJT in urban guerrilla warfare.
How is it changing?
As the emotional appeal of the Islamist world view and goals increases, and, it is increasing every day, a greater number of "advantaged" young men join the jihad. Members of the middle, and upper middle classes, young men with good educations, the chance for a genuine future with personal and economic security that many Americans would envy are chucking it over to enlist in the jihad.
Why?
There are a number of reasons ranging from the psychological to the anthropological but one central reason is rooted in history. The reason is identical to those used by the Fascists of Italy three quarters of a century ago. Or, the Nazis shortly thereafter. Or the Khmer Rouge whose Killing Fields blighted the late 1970s.
The reason comes as a statement followed by a question. "Once we were so great; now we are so small. Why?"
The reason comes in the answer to the question. It is an answer given by the Fascists, the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge, and now the Islamists.
The answer to the question "why," is simple, even simply wrong, but it has more power than a dozen dial-a-yield hydrogen bombs. "Because we have abandoned the faith of our fathers."
"Once we were so great; now we are so small. Why?" Pause. "Because we have abandoned the faith of our fathers."
There are many reasons why the Arab and Persian Muslims have fallen so far from the peak of greatness nearly a thousand years ago. Most of the reasons are inherent to the Arabs and the Persians themselves. These are unpleasant for any member of today's Arab or Persian societies to contemplate.
It is far easier to focus on the wrongs done to Arabs, to Persians, to Muslims by the rest of the world. There is enough truth in the bill of particulars regarding colonialism, economic colonialism, cultural colonialism to support calls for revenge and recompense.
There is enough truth to the charges that can be leveled against American policy in the Mideast since 1957 to support a specific set of accusations against the United States. To believe that the United States is the Great Satan, the oppressor of Muslims, the Final Crusader.
The substantial truth of the charges is irrelevant today. The precise apportionment of blame is irrelevant now. What counts is the appeal of the Islamist demand for redress of the past, the re-emergence of Islam to world prominence, not to say dominance.
Warped history is a powerful tool. Used in the answer to the question "why," it is a potent motivator of young men. It is a nearly invincible propaganda weapon, particularly considering that in Islam there is no separation between faith and state, nor can there ever be. No matter how peace oriented or violently militant a Muslim might be, the embracer of peace and the wearer of bombs agree that religion and politics are one and the same.
And so, the kids of privlege, just like Osama bin Ladin, folk hero, join in common cause with the kids of the souks, Franz Fannon's archetypal "Wretched of the Earth," to lay us low. Lay us low in Iraq. If successful there, lay us low throughout the world.
Inexhaustible manpower. Motivated manpower. Increasingly talented and educated manpower. More and more, combat trained and battle hardened manpower. That's the demographic problem we face.
The White House and Pentagon were gripless about this problem four years ago. They are gripless regarding it today. Do we flounder on or is there an answer?
Could be. Stand by for more hints from history.
Monday, May 28, 2007
Not Losing In Iraq
Not all wars are created equal. For the United States at least, some are far more important than others.
The US involvement in the Vietnamese War was one we could afford to lose. Don't get me wrong, I don't think it was a good thing that we lost. I certainly don't think it was no big deal that more than 60,000 Americans were killed there for no positive outcome. I don't believe that our defeat brought about a better state of peace for the South Vietnamese, no matter how well that segment of the population has been doing in recent years.
But, get a grip on this: We could accept the defeat in Vietnam without any long term consequences to our role and status in the world.
True, after our self-inflicted defeat (hang on to that concept, I'll be returning to it later) the US turned introspective, lost our grip on the Cold War dynamic, allowed our military to become a hollow shell, and took some heavy hits economically. Nonetheless, the defeat didn't matter in the long run.
At least not to our position of leadership in the world.
The defeat did have long term consequences here at home. That's the first reality on which a firm grip must be taken.
The second grip necessitating reality is simply that the war in Iraq is one that we can not afford to lose. A defeat in Iraq carries with it the very strong possibility, even the near-certainty of long term consequences.
I'm not hyperventilating here. A defeat in Iraq may quite well cause a tectonic shift in global politics. A defeat would diminish the status and influence of the United States globally. A defeat under whatsoever guise will affect every aspect of international life from the cost of gas to the capacity of the United States to operate as a peacemaker and honest broker. It could even conceivably result in the something we have dreaded but avoided for sixty years.
The use of nuclear weapons.
I am willing to bet my most prized externally visible attribute--my hair--that the administration never realized that it was taking our country into a war that couldn't, strictly speaking, be won, but could very easily be lost. I'll bet hair that it never considered what the worst case outcome--defeat--would mean to the US.
Not only did the administration delude the nation with badly polluted intelligence, it ignored good intelligence which pointed out the many, many dangers we would face in Iraq after the false dawn of "victory."
Worse, the administration deluded itself. Apparently the White House and the Defense Department (at least the top side civilian component) committed the blunder of believing its own propaganda.
They believed that the Iraqis would greet us as liberators.
They believed that Iraq was a fully functional state.
They believed Iran would be cowed into submissive, or at least passive, status as an on looker.
They believed Sunni and Shi'ite would lie down together as lamb and lion.
What in hell were these folks smoking, snorting or running up?
You don't need access to Tippy Top Secret Burn Before Reading intelligence reports to know beyond even an unreasonable doubt that each and every one of these beliefs was utterly, catastrophically, gloriously wrong. Wrong as grilled watermelon.
So wrong that any person holding them with a straight face must either be a politician or someone not at all oriented as to time, place and reality. (Or perhaps both.)
On the basis of these delusions the US went into Iraq as we had Afghanistan with too few troops on the ground. On the basis of these delusions we sacked the Iraqi armed forces, government bureaucracies, police forces. We kicked all alleged Baathists out of state owned enterprises and public utilities.
We didn't do anything that stupid after the defeat of Germany. Where we did, it was temporary. We quickly realized that nothing would run without the participation of former Nazis.
To be successful, pragmatism must often trump emotions and zeal, or even a sense of justice. Unpleasant, but true. Get a grip.
As a result of these actions (and others too numerous to reference right now) all based on the delusions listed, we were behind the power curve before President Bush stood in front of the infamous 'Mission Accomplished" banner.
The delusions, the stupid policy regarding "de-Baathification" and the deficiency of boots on the ground have been step one on the road to self-inflicted defeat.
Step two has been our attempt to square an impossible circle: Train an effective Iraqi army and internal security force while fully engaged in a counter insurgent campaign.
Step three has been our attempt to engage in the hazy idea called "nation building" while facing a multi-party shooting war.
The results to date of these steps along the way of defeat have been obvious.
The initiative lies with the insurgents.
The Iranians have been handed a low cost, high payoff way of nibbling the US to death.
The Islamists have received a shot of growth hormone.
The Iraqis have been turned from being major actors in their own country to the role of target and by-stander.
"OK," you say. "Now what?"
Glad you asked.
Take a firm grip on this prickly reality. To not lose the United States must invest more, perhaps a lot more, lives.
Take a firm grip on this equally sticky reality. To not lose the United States must be willing to invest a lot more time, years certainly.
We will not lose in Iraq if and only if we accept that the current butcher's bill will grow a lot bigger and we will all grow a lot older before we can declare that we have avoided defeat.
These dirty truths are dictated by historical experience. This kind of war, insurgency, in all its many forms and details, is at root a contest of political wills. The political will of the insurgent versus the political will of the counter insurgent. Bombs, bullets, shells, dead bodies and ruined buildings alike are simply means by which the strength of the opposing political wills are tested.
A test of political will is a test of patience. A test of a people's capacity to accept death. A test of a people's ability to tolerate apparent lack of success. A test of a people's willingness to keep on keeping on, to make a long slog up hill in a driving rain with no end in sight.
Ultimately, this is the test We the People failed in Vietnam. It is the test We the People cannot fail in Iraq unless we are ready, willing and able to consent to a diminished role in the world and all that implies for us socially, economically and psychologically.
History shows the nature of the insurgent-counter insurgent war. It is unpleasant, to say the least.
History also shows that means exist by which the war can be shortened, the top of the mountain made more visible through the sleeting rain. It shows ways in which the load on the back can be made lighter.
The History Geek's lessons from our (vast) experience with insurgency as well as the experience of others, in short form:
Send more troops. Not aircraft, not ships, not artillery and tanks. Troops. On the ground.
Train the Iraqis behind a protective shield. All combat training is essentially on-the-job, but don't take it to unnecessary extremes.
Use our military and police for training, not private contractors.
Send the private security and training personnel home. In the long run this fighting on the cheap approach beloved by Cheney is counterproductive. It's like giving Ex-lax to a person with the runs.
Quit looking for a high-tech fix. As we found out in Vietnam, there's a low-tech counter for every high-tech capacity.
Develop a believable capacity to leave. Essential to pressure whatever regime is in power in Baghdad.
Make the Iraqi citizens more effective stakeholders in their own security. In the past we developed many workable tactics to bring this about. It was one of the bright, unreported stories out of our Vietnam failure.
Focus on the human terrain. The often derided battle for the "hearts and minds" of the uncommitted majority is the battle that counts most in avoiding defeat.
Don't invite Iran to openly enter the war. The single greates mistake we made in the Vietnam War was inviting the North to come on in.
Unconvinced? OK. The History Geek will take these points, and some others not listed and expand on them in later posts.
The US involvement in the Vietnamese War was one we could afford to lose. Don't get me wrong, I don't think it was a good thing that we lost. I certainly don't think it was no big deal that more than 60,000 Americans were killed there for no positive outcome. I don't believe that our defeat brought about a better state of peace for the South Vietnamese, no matter how well that segment of the population has been doing in recent years.
But, get a grip on this: We could accept the defeat in Vietnam without any long term consequences to our role and status in the world.
True, after our self-inflicted defeat (hang on to that concept, I'll be returning to it later) the US turned introspective, lost our grip on the Cold War dynamic, allowed our military to become a hollow shell, and took some heavy hits economically. Nonetheless, the defeat didn't matter in the long run.
At least not to our position of leadership in the world.
The defeat did have long term consequences here at home. That's the first reality on which a firm grip must be taken.
The second grip necessitating reality is simply that the war in Iraq is one that we can not afford to lose. A defeat in Iraq carries with it the very strong possibility, even the near-certainty of long term consequences.
I'm not hyperventilating here. A defeat in Iraq may quite well cause a tectonic shift in global politics. A defeat would diminish the status and influence of the United States globally. A defeat under whatsoever guise will affect every aspect of international life from the cost of gas to the capacity of the United States to operate as a peacemaker and honest broker. It could even conceivably result in the something we have dreaded but avoided for sixty years.
The use of nuclear weapons.
I am willing to bet my most prized externally visible attribute--my hair--that the administration never realized that it was taking our country into a war that couldn't, strictly speaking, be won, but could very easily be lost. I'll bet hair that it never considered what the worst case outcome--defeat--would mean to the US.
Not only did the administration delude the nation with badly polluted intelligence, it ignored good intelligence which pointed out the many, many dangers we would face in Iraq after the false dawn of "victory."
Worse, the administration deluded itself. Apparently the White House and the Defense Department (at least the top side civilian component) committed the blunder of believing its own propaganda.
They believed that the Iraqis would greet us as liberators.
They believed that Iraq was a fully functional state.
They believed Iran would be cowed into submissive, or at least passive, status as an on looker.
They believed Sunni and Shi'ite would lie down together as lamb and lion.
What in hell were these folks smoking, snorting or running up?
You don't need access to Tippy Top Secret Burn Before Reading intelligence reports to know beyond even an unreasonable doubt that each and every one of these beliefs was utterly, catastrophically, gloriously wrong. Wrong as grilled watermelon.
So wrong that any person holding them with a straight face must either be a politician or someone not at all oriented as to time, place and reality. (Or perhaps both.)
On the basis of these delusions the US went into Iraq as we had Afghanistan with too few troops on the ground. On the basis of these delusions we sacked the Iraqi armed forces, government bureaucracies, police forces. We kicked all alleged Baathists out of state owned enterprises and public utilities.
We didn't do anything that stupid after the defeat of Germany. Where we did, it was temporary. We quickly realized that nothing would run without the participation of former Nazis.
To be successful, pragmatism must often trump emotions and zeal, or even a sense of justice. Unpleasant, but true. Get a grip.
As a result of these actions (and others too numerous to reference right now) all based on the delusions listed, we were behind the power curve before President Bush stood in front of the infamous 'Mission Accomplished" banner.
The delusions, the stupid policy regarding "de-Baathification" and the deficiency of boots on the ground have been step one on the road to self-inflicted defeat.
Step two has been our attempt to square an impossible circle: Train an effective Iraqi army and internal security force while fully engaged in a counter insurgent campaign.
Step three has been our attempt to engage in the hazy idea called "nation building" while facing a multi-party shooting war.
The results to date of these steps along the way of defeat have been obvious.
The initiative lies with the insurgents.
The Iranians have been handed a low cost, high payoff way of nibbling the US to death.
The Islamists have received a shot of growth hormone.
The Iraqis have been turned from being major actors in their own country to the role of target and by-stander.
"OK," you say. "Now what?"
Glad you asked.
Take a firm grip on this prickly reality. To not lose the United States must invest more, perhaps a lot more, lives.
Take a firm grip on this equally sticky reality. To not lose the United States must be willing to invest a lot more time, years certainly.
We will not lose in Iraq if and only if we accept that the current butcher's bill will grow a lot bigger and we will all grow a lot older before we can declare that we have avoided defeat.
These dirty truths are dictated by historical experience. This kind of war, insurgency, in all its many forms and details, is at root a contest of political wills. The political will of the insurgent versus the political will of the counter insurgent. Bombs, bullets, shells, dead bodies and ruined buildings alike are simply means by which the strength of the opposing political wills are tested.
A test of political will is a test of patience. A test of a people's capacity to accept death. A test of a people's ability to tolerate apparent lack of success. A test of a people's willingness to keep on keeping on, to make a long slog up hill in a driving rain with no end in sight.
Ultimately, this is the test We the People failed in Vietnam. It is the test We the People cannot fail in Iraq unless we are ready, willing and able to consent to a diminished role in the world and all that implies for us socially, economically and psychologically.
History shows the nature of the insurgent-counter insurgent war. It is unpleasant, to say the least.
History also shows that means exist by which the war can be shortened, the top of the mountain made more visible through the sleeting rain. It shows ways in which the load on the back can be made lighter.
The History Geek's lessons from our (vast) experience with insurgency as well as the experience of others, in short form:
Send more troops. Not aircraft, not ships, not artillery and tanks. Troops. On the ground.
Train the Iraqis behind a protective shield. All combat training is essentially on-the-job, but don't take it to unnecessary extremes.
Use our military and police for training, not private contractors.
Send the private security and training personnel home. In the long run this fighting on the cheap approach beloved by Cheney is counterproductive. It's like giving Ex-lax to a person with the runs.
Quit looking for a high-tech fix. As we found out in Vietnam, there's a low-tech counter for every high-tech capacity.
Develop a believable capacity to leave. Essential to pressure whatever regime is in power in Baghdad.
Make the Iraqi citizens more effective stakeholders in their own security. In the past we developed many workable tactics to bring this about. It was one of the bright, unreported stories out of our Vietnam failure.
Focus on the human terrain. The often derided battle for the "hearts and minds" of the uncommitted majority is the battle that counts most in avoiding defeat.
Don't invite Iran to openly enter the war. The single greates mistake we made in the Vietnam War was inviting the North to come on in.
Unconvinced? OK. The History Geek will take these points, and some others not listed and expand on them in later posts.
Saturday, May 26, 2007
There's Still A Chance Not to Lose in Iraq
But, not losing won't be easy. Notice, I wrote, "not losing." I didn't write that there is still a chance to win in Iraq. That was intentional.
There is one simple reason why the US cannot "win" in Iraq. The reason is that we have never realistically defined victory.
Worse, we never had a set of well defined, concrete goals which were relevant to both our capabilities and interests on the one hand and the realities on the ground in Iraq on the other. Without goals, it is impossible to define victory in any way other than a collection of hazy, soft, warm fuzzy generalities.
Wait one, History Geek! You say. We had one goal. Getting rid of Saddam Hussein.
Sure did. We had that concrete, limited goal and we accomplished it. So what?
Don't get me wrong. I have thought Saddam Hussein was a bad idea since before he came to power. Back when he was just one seemingly undistinguished figure on the reviewing stand, it was apparent to a few of us that he was the dude with the finger on the trigger.
So, I've always been in favor of removing his genes from the pool. We've done that. Good for us. Still, the question remains: So what?
We ended up occupying a country which closely resembled one of those companies taken over by the Mafia. An empty shell behind a glossy facade. A gutted wreck of what once had been a going concern.
While Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz and Feith were gripless about this fundamental reality, the intelligence community had the real deal tightly in its grasp. This is one gargantuan policy blunder that can't be off-loaded on the usual battered child--CIA. They had a grip.
Not only did the Agency understand the empty hulk behind the propaganda facade, it also well understood what was most likely to happen on the day after the US declared victory. The men and women in the shadows had a grip on this: The solid nitrogenous waste would hit the air impeller.
That's right. The shit would hit the fan--on steroids.
Osama bin Ladin, his followers, his imitators, even the wannabes would get a shot of growth hormone that would surpass our capacities to counter. The mullahs and ayatollahs and imams in Tehran would get the opportunity of a lifetime to export their "revolution."
Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz, Feith and their associates didn't want to get the message. And they didn't.
The President, George W., says he got the message but as the "commander guy," the "guy who makes the decisions." he decided that the benefits outweighed the risks.
What the hell kind of scale was he using?
Well, ignoring unpleasant intelligence is not an impeachable offense. If it had been the nation would have seen John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, ceremoniously kicked out of the Oval Office after proper rituals in the House and Senate.
So, there we were one day after victory, with stupid grins on our collective faces and our thumbs in an anatomically improbable location wondering, "What the hell now?"
The short answer comes in several parts. Watch wolfish grins grow on Iranian faces. Stand around as new jihadists blew themselves, assorted Iraqi civilians and our troops into small, bloody protoplasm flakes. Hire and fire one pro counsel and commander after another. Shove more troops into harm's way. Try different tactics. Surge. Rediscover the Iraq Study Group.
It all adds up to one word. Lose.
That's the short answer. Lose.
Roll it around in your mouth. Spell it. L. O. S. E. Sounds good? Feels good? Is good for the United States? Is good for the world? Good for the Iraqis maybe?
No. To all of the above, No!
It may be good for those who wish political advantage or to those pursuing personal interest. (Hear that, Ms Clinton, Ms Pelosi, Mr Obama, Mr Edwards, Mr Gulliani?) But, to those who have a grip on the longer term interests of the United States and the world, the word "lose" sounds frightening, horrifying, revolting.
We may not be able to win, but we can still not lose.
It won't be easy because not losing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) is much more difficult than not losing was in Vietnam. Iraq is a much tougher proposition than Vietnam ever was.
And, never forget, we lost in Vietnam. More than a decade, more than 60,000 American lives, billions of dollars almost beyond count, great and long lasting public support and still we lost.
The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam resemble one another in some essential respects. Iraq is and Vietnam was a combination of internal insurgency and external aggression. In South Vietnam we faced insurgents--the Viet Cong--and an external aggressor, North Vietnam.
In Iraq we face both insurgents and an external aggressor, Iran. At the moment Iran is playing a covert game just as the North Vietnamese did initially. But, that can change. Bad moves on our part can make sure it does.
The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam differ from one another in at least one critical way.
The Vietnamese fought a conventional guerrilla war. They used standard weapons and tactics. They presented more or less conventional targets that could be and were effectively engaged from time to time by our ground forces both conventional and special.
The Iraqi opponents do not use conventional guerrilla warfare weapons and tactics. They rarely present targets that can be effectively engaged by our forces. Unlike the Vietnamese enemies, the Iraqi opponents prefer the suicide bomber, the roadside bomb, the sniper.
These tactics, particularly the one involving a single suicidal individual with a vehicle full of explosives or even a C4 laden vest, are very, very difficult to counter. Most of the usual American advantages of technology are rendered useless.
You can see the same dynamic at work in Palestine. The Israeli military is far from incompetent. Time after time it has shown its definite superiority in all forms of conventional war including operations against organized guerrilla units. Despite this the IDF is less than effective in countering or deterring the suicide bomber or the barrage of more-or-less homemade rockets.
It's not that they haven't tried. The Israelis have tried nearly every coercive approach imaginable during the forty years they have been occupying all or some of the territory gained in the Six Day War.
Can we hope to do better? Can we hope not to lose?
Sure. It means getting a grip on historical experience. Our own and that of others such as the Israelis and the British. It means taking risks. It means taking a firm grip on some very unpleasant realities.
It means more Americans must die.
Does this mean that History Geek has the key to wisdom that has eluded others, those in high places? No. It means the key is there for all of us to use.
The key which will come here soon.
There is one simple reason why the US cannot "win" in Iraq. The reason is that we have never realistically defined victory.
Worse, we never had a set of well defined, concrete goals which were relevant to both our capabilities and interests on the one hand and the realities on the ground in Iraq on the other. Without goals, it is impossible to define victory in any way other than a collection of hazy, soft, warm fuzzy generalities.
Wait one, History Geek! You say. We had one goal. Getting rid of Saddam Hussein.
Sure did. We had that concrete, limited goal and we accomplished it. So what?
Don't get me wrong. I have thought Saddam Hussein was a bad idea since before he came to power. Back when he was just one seemingly undistinguished figure on the reviewing stand, it was apparent to a few of us that he was the dude with the finger on the trigger.
So, I've always been in favor of removing his genes from the pool. We've done that. Good for us. Still, the question remains: So what?
We ended up occupying a country which closely resembled one of those companies taken over by the Mafia. An empty shell behind a glossy facade. A gutted wreck of what once had been a going concern.
While Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz and Feith were gripless about this fundamental reality, the intelligence community had the real deal tightly in its grasp. This is one gargantuan policy blunder that can't be off-loaded on the usual battered child--CIA. They had a grip.
Not only did the Agency understand the empty hulk behind the propaganda facade, it also well understood what was most likely to happen on the day after the US declared victory. The men and women in the shadows had a grip on this: The solid nitrogenous waste would hit the air impeller.
That's right. The shit would hit the fan--on steroids.
Osama bin Ladin, his followers, his imitators, even the wannabes would get a shot of growth hormone that would surpass our capacities to counter. The mullahs and ayatollahs and imams in Tehran would get the opportunity of a lifetime to export their "revolution."
Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz, Feith and their associates didn't want to get the message. And they didn't.
The President, George W., says he got the message but as the "commander guy," the "guy who makes the decisions." he decided that the benefits outweighed the risks.
What the hell kind of scale was he using?
Well, ignoring unpleasant intelligence is not an impeachable offense. If it had been the nation would have seen John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, ceremoniously kicked out of the Oval Office after proper rituals in the House and Senate.
So, there we were one day after victory, with stupid grins on our collective faces and our thumbs in an anatomically improbable location wondering, "What the hell now?"
The short answer comes in several parts. Watch wolfish grins grow on Iranian faces. Stand around as new jihadists blew themselves, assorted Iraqi civilians and our troops into small, bloody protoplasm flakes. Hire and fire one pro counsel and commander after another. Shove more troops into harm's way. Try different tactics. Surge. Rediscover the Iraq Study Group.
It all adds up to one word. Lose.
That's the short answer. Lose.
Roll it around in your mouth. Spell it. L. O. S. E. Sounds good? Feels good? Is good for the United States? Is good for the world? Good for the Iraqis maybe?
No. To all of the above, No!
It may be good for those who wish political advantage or to those pursuing personal interest. (Hear that, Ms Clinton, Ms Pelosi, Mr Obama, Mr Edwards, Mr Gulliani?) But, to those who have a grip on the longer term interests of the United States and the world, the word "lose" sounds frightening, horrifying, revolting.
We may not be able to win, but we can still not lose.
It won't be easy because not losing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) is much more difficult than not losing was in Vietnam. Iraq is a much tougher proposition than Vietnam ever was.
And, never forget, we lost in Vietnam. More than a decade, more than 60,000 American lives, billions of dollars almost beyond count, great and long lasting public support and still we lost.
The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam resemble one another in some essential respects. Iraq is and Vietnam was a combination of internal insurgency and external aggression. In South Vietnam we faced insurgents--the Viet Cong--and an external aggressor, North Vietnam.
In Iraq we face both insurgents and an external aggressor, Iran. At the moment Iran is playing a covert game just as the North Vietnamese did initially. But, that can change. Bad moves on our part can make sure it does.
The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam differ from one another in at least one critical way.
The Vietnamese fought a conventional guerrilla war. They used standard weapons and tactics. They presented more or less conventional targets that could be and were effectively engaged from time to time by our ground forces both conventional and special.
The Iraqi opponents do not use conventional guerrilla warfare weapons and tactics. They rarely present targets that can be effectively engaged by our forces. Unlike the Vietnamese enemies, the Iraqi opponents prefer the suicide bomber, the roadside bomb, the sniper.
These tactics, particularly the one involving a single suicidal individual with a vehicle full of explosives or even a C4 laden vest, are very, very difficult to counter. Most of the usual American advantages of technology are rendered useless.
You can see the same dynamic at work in Palestine. The Israeli military is far from incompetent. Time after time it has shown its definite superiority in all forms of conventional war including operations against organized guerrilla units. Despite this the IDF is less than effective in countering or deterring the suicide bomber or the barrage of more-or-less homemade rockets.
It's not that they haven't tried. The Israelis have tried nearly every coercive approach imaginable during the forty years they have been occupying all or some of the territory gained in the Six Day War.
Can we hope to do better? Can we hope not to lose?
Sure. It means getting a grip on historical experience. Our own and that of others such as the Israelis and the British. It means taking risks. It means taking a firm grip on some very unpleasant realities.
It means more Americans must die.
Does this mean that History Geek has the key to wisdom that has eluded others, those in high places? No. It means the key is there for all of us to use.
The key which will come here soon.
Thursday, May 24, 2007
John Edwards Is Out To Lunch--Or Worse!
Originally, I was going to take a look at how the US could still succeed in the Iraq adventure, but John Edwards, former Senator from North Carolina and current Democratic presidential wannabe, got in the way of my plan. I swear that he is either the most gripless politician in the US today or he is lost in the zone. Either the Twilight Zone or O-zone, I'm not sure.
In either event, he's become my bete noir. Worse, Edwards' latest lunacy has driven me to the desperate position of having to agree with a White House staffer. Specifically, Peter Wehner a deputy assistant to the president and director of the Office of Strategic Initiatives who wrote a ditty on Edwards' idiocy in Real Clear Politics http//www.realclearpolitics.com/article/2007/05/edwards_view_is_wrong_and_dang.html.
In his speech two days ago to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the ex-senator and nearly perpetual candidate showed that he didn't have a grip on several important realities. What's at stake in Iraq for the US. What's been happening in Iraq. What alternatives are available beside de facto defeat for the US in Iraq. And, finally, logic.
In case you missed the numerous reports of the speech in the MSM, here are the highlights. Withdraw 40 or 50 thousand troops immediately. Withdraw the rest some time in the next year. However, the US should station enough forces in the region to "prevent genocide," to assure that the "civil war" doesn't "spill over" and to make certain that Iraq doesn't "become a safe haven for al-Qaeda."
He also termed the war on terrorism not so much a policy as a "bumper sticker."
Leaving aside the gratuitous insult which I presume is meant to be some sort of crowd pleaser, but which actually demonstrates his awesome ability to conflate two separate albeit mutually reinforcing considerations, the main points of his proposal deserves a response.
First, I have to put some blue sky between myself and Wehner. He obviously believes that our invasion of Iraq was a good idea, a very good idea. I don't. It was a bad idea. A very bad idea.
Now back to Edwards and getting a grip on reality.
Wars are much easier to start than to end. The easiest way to end a war is to quit. To give up. It's a hell of a lot harder to end a war by bringing into existence that elusive critter--a better state of peace.
We never should have started the war. There was no basis for it. The intelligence used to support the decision to invade was polluted at best, fabricated at worst.
The most knowledgeable observers and analysts understood that there was no community of interest whatsoever between al-Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime. There never was. There never could be given the Islamist base of "the Base." Nor were there any weapons of mass destruction. In short, as everyone but the most gripless members of the red meat eating far right must understand perfectly: There was no reason to invade.
That having been said, several central realities remain. We invaded. We have occupied. We have removed Saddam. We have installed a government. A constitution, no matter how incomplete and imperfect has gone into operation with our approval and support. We have killed beaucoup Iraqis. We have seen nearly 3,500 of our uniformed citizens killed.
We started the war. We have to finish it. Finish it by bringing about a better state of peace, not by quitting as Edwards would have us.
Why?
Set aside for the moment the fact that quitting consigns our dead to the trash heap of casual, meaningless losses. Forget if you can, that these Americans were killed in our collective service, whether or not we approve of the war.
Look at the realities. Get a grip on the realpolitik of the war.
Realpolitik factor number one: If we lose, the Iranians win. At the least, Tehran and the mullahs who run it will become the regional hegemonic power.
Realpolitik factor number two: If we split out, the affiliates of al-Qaeda will be emboldened and empowered. The events of 9/11 might well pale in comparison to what will happen then. But, there's more. Much more.
Realpolitik factor number three: If we leave, there is a good to excellent chance that Iraq will become the latest failed state. It will be like Somalia on steroids. No small time sideshow like Sierra Leone. No bloody little affair like Rwanda.
No. It will be a major, major main attraction. Compared to the hurricane which will certainly occur when Iraq collapses, the decade of interventionary wars, genocide and diplomatic posturing over the corpse of Yugoslavia will be a belch. Iran's forces both open and covert will cross the border to "protect" the Shia majority. Turkey will have "no option" except to occupy the Kurdish region to "guard" it's interests, to "defend" against a widening of its own Kurdish insurgency. The Sunni minority will appeal to Saudi Arabia or Syria or both for "assistance" against the "oppressor."
Get the picture?
Oh, consider this. Not all Shi'ites by a long shot approve of the mullahs in Tehran. After all, Shia Iraqis are Arabs. Shia Iranians are not. Another add-on: There are other groups in Iraq, not just Shia and Sunni Arabs, not just Kurds. There are other groups as well. Recall that Iraq is not an organic nation-state, but an artificial creation of western diplomats at the end of World War I and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
Looks great doesn't it? Blood enough to satisfy the most eager viewer of slasher flicks and car chase movies.
Is that sort of mess really in the American best interests, Mr Edwards? (If you have any doubts have one of your staff go check the latest gasoline prices.'
Also, Mr Edwards, since you proposed that we leave enough troops somewhere unspecified in the region to prevent genocide and civil war spill-over, how many men will it take to go back to Iraq after its collapse and impose order? Did you think that one through before you shot off your mouth in New York?
Second guess doesn't count.
Neither did you think about the options open to the US now other than defeat. That's obvious. Wehner has some. I don't agree with all of them.
I have some others that the smart guys at the White House haven't come up with yet. Mine are drawn from history, not from the combination of political considerations and strategic desperation which I see as the sub-text for Wehner's concepts.
Mine will have to wait for a later post. The nest post, I hope. It depends on whether or not Edwards or some other vacuum head hacks me off.
In either event, he's become my bete noir. Worse, Edwards' latest lunacy has driven me to the desperate position of having to agree with a White House staffer. Specifically, Peter Wehner a deputy assistant to the president and director of the Office of Strategic Initiatives who wrote a ditty on Edwards' idiocy in Real Clear Politics http//www.realclearpolitics.com/article/2007/05/edwards_view_is_wrong_and_dang.html.
In his speech two days ago to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the ex-senator and nearly perpetual candidate showed that he didn't have a grip on several important realities. What's at stake in Iraq for the US. What's been happening in Iraq. What alternatives are available beside de facto defeat for the US in Iraq. And, finally, logic.
In case you missed the numerous reports of the speech in the MSM, here are the highlights. Withdraw 40 or 50 thousand troops immediately. Withdraw the rest some time in the next year. However, the US should station enough forces in the region to "prevent genocide," to assure that the "civil war" doesn't "spill over" and to make certain that Iraq doesn't "become a safe haven for al-Qaeda."
He also termed the war on terrorism not so much a policy as a "bumper sticker."
Leaving aside the gratuitous insult which I presume is meant to be some sort of crowd pleaser, but which actually demonstrates his awesome ability to conflate two separate albeit mutually reinforcing considerations, the main points of his proposal deserves a response.
First, I have to put some blue sky between myself and Wehner. He obviously believes that our invasion of Iraq was a good idea, a very good idea. I don't. It was a bad idea. A very bad idea.
Now back to Edwards and getting a grip on reality.
Wars are much easier to start than to end. The easiest way to end a war is to quit. To give up. It's a hell of a lot harder to end a war by bringing into existence that elusive critter--a better state of peace.
We never should have started the war. There was no basis for it. The intelligence used to support the decision to invade was polluted at best, fabricated at worst.
The most knowledgeable observers and analysts understood that there was no community of interest whatsoever between al-Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime. There never was. There never could be given the Islamist base of "the Base." Nor were there any weapons of mass destruction. In short, as everyone but the most gripless members of the red meat eating far right must understand perfectly: There was no reason to invade.
That having been said, several central realities remain. We invaded. We have occupied. We have removed Saddam. We have installed a government. A constitution, no matter how incomplete and imperfect has gone into operation with our approval and support. We have killed beaucoup Iraqis. We have seen nearly 3,500 of our uniformed citizens killed.
We started the war. We have to finish it. Finish it by bringing about a better state of peace, not by quitting as Edwards would have us.
Why?
Set aside for the moment the fact that quitting consigns our dead to the trash heap of casual, meaningless losses. Forget if you can, that these Americans were killed in our collective service, whether or not we approve of the war.
Look at the realities. Get a grip on the realpolitik of the war.
Realpolitik factor number one: If we lose, the Iranians win. At the least, Tehran and the mullahs who run it will become the regional hegemonic power.
Realpolitik factor number two: If we split out, the affiliates of al-Qaeda will be emboldened and empowered. The events of 9/11 might well pale in comparison to what will happen then. But, there's more. Much more.
Realpolitik factor number three: If we leave, there is a good to excellent chance that Iraq will become the latest failed state. It will be like Somalia on steroids. No small time sideshow like Sierra Leone. No bloody little affair like Rwanda.
No. It will be a major, major main attraction. Compared to the hurricane which will certainly occur when Iraq collapses, the decade of interventionary wars, genocide and diplomatic posturing over the corpse of Yugoslavia will be a belch. Iran's forces both open and covert will cross the border to "protect" the Shia majority. Turkey will have "no option" except to occupy the Kurdish region to "guard" it's interests, to "defend" against a widening of its own Kurdish insurgency. The Sunni minority will appeal to Saudi Arabia or Syria or both for "assistance" against the "oppressor."
Get the picture?
Oh, consider this. Not all Shi'ites by a long shot approve of the mullahs in Tehran. After all, Shia Iraqis are Arabs. Shia Iranians are not. Another add-on: There are other groups in Iraq, not just Shia and Sunni Arabs, not just Kurds. There are other groups as well. Recall that Iraq is not an organic nation-state, but an artificial creation of western diplomats at the end of World War I and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
Looks great doesn't it? Blood enough to satisfy the most eager viewer of slasher flicks and car chase movies.
Is that sort of mess really in the American best interests, Mr Edwards? (If you have any doubts have one of your staff go check the latest gasoline prices.'
Also, Mr Edwards, since you proposed that we leave enough troops somewhere unspecified in the region to prevent genocide and civil war spill-over, how many men will it take to go back to Iraq after its collapse and impose order? Did you think that one through before you shot off your mouth in New York?
Second guess doesn't count.
Neither did you think about the options open to the US now other than defeat. That's obvious. Wehner has some. I don't agree with all of them.
I have some others that the smart guys at the White House haven't come up with yet. Mine are drawn from history, not from the combination of political considerations and strategic desperation which I see as the sub-text for Wehner's concepts.
Mine will have to wait for a later post. The nest post, I hope. It depends on whether or not Edwards or some other vacuum head hacks me off.
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Senator Edwards, The Iraq War and Memorial Day
Either former North Carolina Senator and Democratic Party presidential wannabe is truly desperate, or he is terminally out to lunch. It has been widely reported that he called upon his supporters to use Memorial Day to protest the war in Iraq. The most recent report of his remarks is in the Nashua, NH "Telegraph" . While there are no doubt many who agree with Mr Edwards, there are some who don't, such as the American Legion.
I hate to climb in the same bed as an organization I wouldn't join if you held a gun to my head. But I have no choice.
John Edwards! Get a grip!
You are as wrong as soup sandwich on two counts. First: Memorial Day is more than a three day weekend. It is more than the unofficial start of summer. It should be more than a time to protest a war.
It should be a time to think. To think about those Americans who have been killed in our various wars. Particularly to think about the reasons for which they were killed. To think about what--if anything--the butchers' bill of which each person was a small entry actually bought.
The primary reason a war, any war, is fought is to bring about a better state of peace. For some of our wars, most notably World War II, the outpouring of blood did buy a better state of peace. The Americans who died between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the final day of the war--VJ Day--did not die without purpose. Other Americans, most recently the over sixty thousand who were killed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War died for absolutely nothing.
Think about that for a moment. Consider sixty thousand men, young men with hopes, dreams, plans for the future transformed from living, loving, fearing, hoping human beings into mere sanitation problems. Without an outcome which might justify the loss of one's life.
Mr Edwards would have made a far better statement about himself and his country had he called upon his supporters to ask themselves, "What do we want the three and a half thousand Americans who have already been killed in Iraq to have died for?"
He might have reminded his supporters--and all of us--that all people in the military have signed a Covenant With Death whether they realized or not when each raised a right hand and swore an oath of service. Like all covenants this particular one has two parts. Two parts in a statement of reciprocity.
The individual acknowledges that death is a real possibility of service to our nation.
The nation, for its part, promises that death will not be without purpose or meaning.
Meaning and purpose go beyond, far beyond, flag draped coffins, statutes or monuments or well meaning words. Meaning and purpose come from one final reality only. The death, the individual's small entry in the final butcher's bill of history will have accomplished something. The something is simply: A better state of peace.
The Nation did not honor its portion of the Covenant in the Vietnam War. We the People simply got fed up. We the People washed our hands with an indifference that even Pilate did not feel. We the People said, "Screw them! Screw their lives. Screw their deaths."
John Edwards wants us to do the same now.
He needs to get a grip. A grip on several realities.
The first reality is one I agree with completely. Invading Iraq was wrong. Absolutely, unalterably, completely wrong. It was as General Omar Bradley famously said regarding a war with China in 1951, "The wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time."
The second reality, one that apparently eludes Edwards, is that it is far easier to stage an invasion and defeat an inferior conventional force than it is to bring about a better state of peace. The only way open to us now to both redeem the policy from the failure it otherwise so richly deserves is to uphold our Nation's part of the covenant and press on to bring about a better state of peace.
Pressing on will require more Americans to die. A reality remains.
The reality?
An abject withdrawal, no matter how cloaked and covered by Congressional action, or "will of the people" rhetoric means We the People break our covenant with those who have been killed on our service. But, it means more than that.
It means that Iran will expand its sway in the region. Take a firm grip on that. Looking at Iran simply as a nation-state pursuing its own, subjectively defined national interests, leaving Islam out of the equation except as a tool of state, Iran has definite ambitions. Ambitions that run directly against our interests both in the region and the world.
Nothing would suit Iran's desire for regional dominance, and potential Great Power status more than seeing the US quit Iraq, withdraw to its side of the Atlantic and, as we did after the Vietnam cut-and-run, turn timid and introspective. Doubt me?
Check out a recent This is London or the admittedly anti-Mullah Iranian National Resistance Council . Consider Iran's regional aspirations in connection with its nuclear program and ask yourself, "Is it really, really in our best long-term interests to get out of Iraq without leaving behind a reasonably stable, reasonably competent government and a reasonably integrated nation?"
Even without considering how an American withdrawal might encourage Islamist terrorists, is Mr Edwards pursuing the best course of action for our nation over the long haul when he counsels getting out of Iraq?
But, he might protest, as might many other Americans, "If we stay there, how can we be sure that more lives won't be lost without reaching the better state of peace?"
Fair question. I'll take my shot at answering it in my next post.
I hate to climb in the same bed as an organization I wouldn't join if you held a gun to my head. But I have no choice.
John Edwards! Get a grip!
You are as wrong as soup sandwich on two counts. First: Memorial Day is more than a three day weekend. It is more than the unofficial start of summer. It should be more than a time to protest a war.
It should be a time to think. To think about those Americans who have been killed in our various wars. Particularly to think about the reasons for which they were killed. To think about what--if anything--the butchers' bill of which each person was a small entry actually bought.
The primary reason a war, any war, is fought is to bring about a better state of peace. For some of our wars, most notably World War II, the outpouring of blood did buy a better state of peace. The Americans who died between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the final day of the war--VJ Day--did not die without purpose. Other Americans, most recently the over sixty thousand who were killed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War died for absolutely nothing.
Think about that for a moment. Consider sixty thousand men, young men with hopes, dreams, plans for the future transformed from living, loving, fearing, hoping human beings into mere sanitation problems. Without an outcome which might justify the loss of one's life.
Mr Edwards would have made a far better statement about himself and his country had he called upon his supporters to ask themselves, "What do we want the three and a half thousand Americans who have already been killed in Iraq to have died for?"
He might have reminded his supporters--and all of us--that all people in the military have signed a Covenant With Death whether they realized or not when each raised a right hand and swore an oath of service. Like all covenants this particular one has two parts. Two parts in a statement of reciprocity.
The individual acknowledges that death is a real possibility of service to our nation.
The nation, for its part, promises that death will not be without purpose or meaning.
Meaning and purpose go beyond, far beyond, flag draped coffins, statutes or monuments or well meaning words. Meaning and purpose come from one final reality only. The death, the individual's small entry in the final butcher's bill of history will have accomplished something. The something is simply: A better state of peace.
The Nation did not honor its portion of the Covenant in the Vietnam War. We the People simply got fed up. We the People washed our hands with an indifference that even Pilate did not feel. We the People said, "Screw them! Screw their lives. Screw their deaths."
John Edwards wants us to do the same now.
He needs to get a grip. A grip on several realities.
The first reality is one I agree with completely. Invading Iraq was wrong. Absolutely, unalterably, completely wrong. It was as General Omar Bradley famously said regarding a war with China in 1951, "The wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time."
The second reality, one that apparently eludes Edwards, is that it is far easier to stage an invasion and defeat an inferior conventional force than it is to bring about a better state of peace. The only way open to us now to both redeem the policy from the failure it otherwise so richly deserves is to uphold our Nation's part of the covenant and press on to bring about a better state of peace.
Pressing on will require more Americans to die. A reality remains.
The reality?
An abject withdrawal, no matter how cloaked and covered by Congressional action, or "will of the people" rhetoric means We the People break our covenant with those who have been killed on our service. But, it means more than that.
It means that Iran will expand its sway in the region. Take a firm grip on that. Looking at Iran simply as a nation-state pursuing its own, subjectively defined national interests, leaving Islam out of the equation except as a tool of state, Iran has definite ambitions. Ambitions that run directly against our interests both in the region and the world.
Nothing would suit Iran's desire for regional dominance, and potential Great Power status more than seeing the US quit Iraq, withdraw to its side of the Atlantic and, as we did after the Vietnam cut-and-run, turn timid and introspective. Doubt me?
Check out a recent This is London or the admittedly anti-Mullah Iranian National Resistance Council . Consider Iran's regional aspirations in connection with its nuclear program and ask yourself, "Is it really, really in our best long-term interests to get out of Iraq without leaving behind a reasonably stable, reasonably competent government and a reasonably integrated nation?"
Even without considering how an American withdrawal might encourage Islamist terrorists, is Mr Edwards pursuing the best course of action for our nation over the long haul when he counsels getting out of Iraq?
But, he might protest, as might many other Americans, "If we stay there, how can we be sure that more lives won't be lost without reaching the better state of peace?"
Fair question. I'll take my shot at answering it in my next post.
Monday, May 21, 2007
Let the Tribesmen Handle It and Leave Iraqi Government Alone
A Covenant With Death or A Contract With Defeat, Pt 4.
In Afghanistan the reality of the human terrain on which we and our allies are fighting about which we must get a grip is simple and basic. There is no single, Afghan people. Not now. Not ever.
The Afghans are deeply divided. Divided by language. Divided by culture. Divided by history. They've never been unified. Not even when under extreme pressure from the outside. The British and Russians discovered this a century and a half ago when they fought over Afghanistan, invaded it, even occupied parts of it. Each side of the Great Game could find or buy partisans willing to sell out their fellow Afghans for power or gold.
Even during the Soviet occupation, not all Afghans resisted. Those who resisted were bitterly divided into more than a half dozen different groups. Originally, the Taliban was one of the--as our people called them--Seven Dwarfs. The Taliban was a late comer, a wannabe resistance group which had only one advantage. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency supported it.
The Taliban never got a firm grip on power. Even without the "shock and awe" efforts of the US, Taliban would have collapsed to internal opposition. All we did was hasten the process, give the Taliban a reason to regroup with greater cohesion and bounce the rubble which was and is Afghanistan a little higher.
In the past few months under the leadership? of the late and quite unlamented Mullah Dadullah the Taliban changed its tactics from rather conventional guerrilla war which was getting them nowhere slowly to one which was bringing about their defeat.
The change?
For reasons that died with him, Mullah Dadullah instituted a campaign of suicide bombings directed against the Afghan civilian population and kidnappings/murders directed against Afghans who cooperated with the foreign forces or the journalists covering the war.
The upshot of Dadullah's new approach was quick in coming. The uncommitted majority of the population, the mass of Afghans who simply wanted to be left alone to get on with their lives and perhaps benefit from the nationbuilding efforts of the US and NATO turned increasingly against the Taliban. Intelligence (and media) reports showed this clearly.
At this point all the US and the other outsiders had to do was step back and step down. Sure, the nationbuilding and people-to-people programs had to continue as did local security efforts. But, offensive combat except in the few areas near the Pakistani border where Taliban fighters and supplies infiltrated could be stopped without loss of momentum.
Afghan villagers have guns. Always have. Always will. They know how to use them. Every invader has discovered this fact. Afghan civilians like civilians everywhere don't enjoy being blown up, shot up or extorted.
All we had to do was look the other way as the locals abated nuisances. Oh, we could clean up afterwards, if necessary. Even provide intelligence concerning an incoming Taliban threat so as to enhance the local response. We might even have done something that worked quite well for a while in South Vietnam, embed an American infantry squad with the local defense volunteers.
We didn't do any of these things. Instead we have come close to snatching defeat away from the Taliban.
How'd we manage this?
Aircraft. Fast moving, high tech planes with big damn bombs and fast firing cannon. We like air power. We believe (rightly) that air delivered firepower saves lives on the ground. The lives of our troops. And, it does. I'm typing today because a Marine zoomie or two saved my butt once upon a time
There's a downside to air power, though. It kills everyone in its way. Black hat. Civilian. Makes no difference. Our use of air power killed Afghan civilians. Destroyed their homes. Plowed their crops into oblivion.
This hacked off the civilians. They don't understand "regrettable mistakes." All they understood was the dead bodies of family, neighbors, friends. Not surprisingly this resulted in the Afghan legislature showing annoyance. Annoyance which hurts the cause of defeating the Taliban.
What should we do now?
Accept the Covenant With Death. This means that for some time to come our troops will be at a slightly greater risk, but we must send the fighter-bombers home. At the same time we have to trust the Afghan's more.
They've got the guns. They have their homes, their lives, their families' lives at stake. They have a reason or two to eliminate the Taliban. Cooperate with them. Assist them to do their job of protecting their lives and property better.
Sure, the new central government won't like this approach. It means that over time it will be at greater risk from its own citizens. But, that's the way it has always been in Afghanistan. No government has gone to its collective bed at night in full security. It may not be a system that we Americans would like, but it is one with which the Afghans have been comfortable for a long, long time. (Anyway, why should a tax collector sleep the sleep of the just?)
Can you believe it? Now there is talk around Washington, particularly in Congress that it may be time for regime change in Baghdad. Change the regime that we invaded to change the regime to.
Wait one! I've seen this part of the movie before. In South Vietnam, time after time between November 1963 and a decade later. Man! I can't take it. It'll have to wait for a later post.
In Afghanistan the reality of the human terrain on which we and our allies are fighting about which we must get a grip is simple and basic. There is no single, Afghan people. Not now. Not ever.
The Afghans are deeply divided. Divided by language. Divided by culture. Divided by history. They've never been unified. Not even when under extreme pressure from the outside. The British and Russians discovered this a century and a half ago when they fought over Afghanistan, invaded it, even occupied parts of it. Each side of the Great Game could find or buy partisans willing to sell out their fellow Afghans for power or gold.
Even during the Soviet occupation, not all Afghans resisted. Those who resisted were bitterly divided into more than a half dozen different groups. Originally, the Taliban was one of the--as our people called them--Seven Dwarfs. The Taliban was a late comer, a wannabe resistance group which had only one advantage. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency supported it.
The Taliban never got a firm grip on power. Even without the "shock and awe" efforts of the US, Taliban would have collapsed to internal opposition. All we did was hasten the process, give the Taliban a reason to regroup with greater cohesion and bounce the rubble which was and is Afghanistan a little higher.
In the past few months under the leadership? of the late and quite unlamented Mullah Dadullah the Taliban changed its tactics from rather conventional guerrilla war which was getting them nowhere slowly to one which was bringing about their defeat.
The change?
For reasons that died with him, Mullah Dadullah instituted a campaign of suicide bombings directed against the Afghan civilian population and kidnappings/murders directed against Afghans who cooperated with the foreign forces or the journalists covering the war.
The upshot of Dadullah's new approach was quick in coming. The uncommitted majority of the population, the mass of Afghans who simply wanted to be left alone to get on with their lives and perhaps benefit from the nationbuilding efforts of the US and NATO turned increasingly against the Taliban. Intelligence (and media) reports showed this clearly.
At this point all the US and the other outsiders had to do was step back and step down. Sure, the nationbuilding and people-to-people programs had to continue as did local security efforts. But, offensive combat except in the few areas near the Pakistani border where Taliban fighters and supplies infiltrated could be stopped without loss of momentum.
Afghan villagers have guns. Always have. Always will. They know how to use them. Every invader has discovered this fact. Afghan civilians like civilians everywhere don't enjoy being blown up, shot up or extorted.
All we had to do was look the other way as the locals abated nuisances. Oh, we could clean up afterwards, if necessary. Even provide intelligence concerning an incoming Taliban threat so as to enhance the local response. We might even have done something that worked quite well for a while in South Vietnam, embed an American infantry squad with the local defense volunteers.
We didn't do any of these things. Instead we have come close to snatching defeat away from the Taliban.
How'd we manage this?
Aircraft. Fast moving, high tech planes with big damn bombs and fast firing cannon. We like air power. We believe (rightly) that air delivered firepower saves lives on the ground. The lives of our troops. And, it does. I'm typing today because a Marine zoomie or two saved my butt once upon a time
There's a downside to air power, though. It kills everyone in its way. Black hat. Civilian. Makes no difference. Our use of air power killed Afghan civilians. Destroyed their homes. Plowed their crops into oblivion.
This hacked off the civilians. They don't understand "regrettable mistakes." All they understood was the dead bodies of family, neighbors, friends. Not surprisingly this resulted in the Afghan legislature showing annoyance. Annoyance which hurts the cause of defeating the Taliban.
What should we do now?
Accept the Covenant With Death. This means that for some time to come our troops will be at a slightly greater risk, but we must send the fighter-bombers home. At the same time we have to trust the Afghan's more.
They've got the guns. They have their homes, their lives, their families' lives at stake. They have a reason or two to eliminate the Taliban. Cooperate with them. Assist them to do their job of protecting their lives and property better.
Sure, the new central government won't like this approach. It means that over time it will be at greater risk from its own citizens. But, that's the way it has always been in Afghanistan. No government has gone to its collective bed at night in full security. It may not be a system that we Americans would like, but it is one with which the Afghans have been comfortable for a long, long time. (Anyway, why should a tax collector sleep the sleep of the just?)
Can you believe it? Now there is talk around Washington, particularly in Congress that it may be time for regime change in Baghdad. Change the regime that we invaded to change the regime to.
Wait one! I've seen this part of the movie before. In South Vietnam, time after time between November 1963 and a decade later. Man! I can't take it. It'll have to wait for a later post.
Thursday, May 17, 2007
How To Decide: Covenant Or Contract
A Covenant With Death or A Contract With Defeat, Pt. 3
Why are wars fought? Really that’s a no-brainer. Wars are fought to achieve a better form of peace.
The next question isn’t any harder. A better state of peace, from which combatant’s perspective? There is only one historically accurate answer. It depends on who wins the war.
This dynamic is equally true whether the war is a conventional interstate war or an insurgency. The contestants don’t agree, don’t come close to agreeing on what constitutes a better state of peace.
From the perspective of the United States a better state of peace would exist when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Baathist regime of Saddam in Iraq were ended. Of course, Sheik Omar and Saddam Hussein didn’t agree, even though there were some Afghanis and Iraqis who no doubt believed that the US had the right attitude.
Regime change is properly the concern of those under the domination of the government who object to the status quo and want to effect a change. When the change is prompted by an outside power, the correct term is either "aggression" or "invasion" regardless of whatever fig leaf of crypto-legality such as "preemptive self-defense," or a UN Resolution might be delicately held over the genitalia of policy.
The United States (or any other outside power for that matter) would have been within historical precedent, if not legality, had it sought to foster or facilitate an offensive insurgency. An offensive insurgency, you ask? That’s the polite term for revolution, an internal war where the overthrow of the existing political, social and economic order is sought. The classic examples are the French, Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions.
It’s not that we didn’t try, at least in Iraq. The problem came when the US government failed to get a grip on one easily ignored but absolutely critical fact. The best an outsider can hope to do is effect the course of an insurgency on the margins, to advance it slightly, to retard it a bit, to turn its course ever so slightly. There was a second central fact USG didn’t grasp either. The insurgent you support must show a genuine capacity to win even without your help.
Was that a skeptical snort I heard?
Consider our War of Independence. True that war was a defensive insurgency, where the goal was simply to establish a no-go zone for a remote government without any goal of tossing the current regime out, but the principles are identical to those applying to the offensive variety.
Despite excellent diplomatic representation in Paris by the overwhelmingly popular and influential Ben Franklin, the French held off until the Continental Army had defeated the British at Saratoga, an act that proved the Americans might win without assistance. This took much of the risk out of aiding the insurgents.
Risk to the French was further reduced by inventing the concept of "plausible deniability" nearly two centuries before the Eisenhower Administration coined the term. This was done by furnishing material aid through a dummy private company. (For those of you who play Trivial Pursuit, if it still exists, the name of the front corporation was Hortelez and Company.) In addition, French Army officers were encouraged to take leave and visit the scenic American colonies.
Regarding both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US did not wait to see if a domestic insurgent group with a genuine capacity to win against the two regimes existed. In Afghanistan the probability of a successful insurgency was set back considerably when Osama bin Laden performed a service for the Taliban chief, Sheik Omar, by arranging the hit on the only credible, militarily effective opposition leader. The situation in Iraq was different.
In Iraq there was no internal figure capable of mounting a successful insurgency. There were no giants, only dwarfs. The current administration seized upon one of the dwarfs, perhaps the smallest of the lot and decided he would be our man in Iraq. Our man, Chalibi, hadn’t lived in Iraq since Jimmy Carter resided in the White House, but he looked good in a suit and had a fine line of patter which was believable to those who knew nothing about Iraq and Iraqis.
Leaving poor personnel decisions to the side, the reality was stark. The best opportunity the US had enjoyed for fostering and aiding an offensive insurgency came and went in the first few weeks after the first war in 1991. For reasons that will give mounds of dissertation materials for future generations of history PhDs, the H.W. Bush Administration declined to take the chance.
A decade or so later that left only one apparent choice: invasion.
The goal of the invasion was, above all else, removing Saddam Hussein and his regime. The definition of victory which follows from the goal must have been the capture or death of Saddam and his senior lieutenants. The theory of victory was derived from the military mottos quoted earlier: Shoot, move, communicate in order to Find! Fix! Destroy!
With Saddam and his henchmen safely under the ground or behind bars, presumably the Iraqis, good democrats one and all, imbued with the spirit of pluralism and free enterprise, would rise up gratefully and create a new government acceptable to the US. Dream on, Mr Vice President. Only in your wildest hopes, SecDef Rumsfield. Keep on hallucinating, Mr Wolfewitz, Mr Feith. Maybe in your favorite video games, Mr President. Trouble is, this is the real world.
Afghanistan without the presence of a dynamic, charismatic figure of proven military and inter-tribal diplomatic skills presented an almost identical problem. Defeating the Taliban forces in the field was difficult enough. (A fair argument that the US and its allies didn’t defeat the Taliban can be made, but not here, not now.)
Time to get a grip on the realities of the human terrain. Only then can an assessment be made regarding whether we should sign a covenant with death or bite on the contract with defeat.
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
Sign the Covenant or Take the Contract
A Covenant With Death and A Contract With Defeat
The US military has some nice buzz-word sets for use in conventional war. First there's, "Shoot, move, communicate!" This cap-busting, running around and talking has a goal. It's the second buzz phrase: Find! Fix! Destroy!
Kind of gives you shivers of excitement, doesn't it?
With superior surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering technologies find the enemy wherever he might be. Using superior air and ground mobility and air delivered firepower, make the enemy stand and fight. And, then, when he does--squash him like a grape with overwhelming firepower!
Now, that must really give the stay-at-home commander guy a real thrill between the legs.
Trouble is that these phrases don't matter in counterinsurgency. They have to be replaced by one which history dictates. One we Americans don't like--even though we won our independence using it. The new phrase is this: Presence, patience, persistence.
What do they mean, these words, presence, patience and persistence?
Presence means the counterinsurgent has to be there, on the ground, up close and personal. Not up above zipping through the sky. Not out there somewhere in the ocean. Right there in and among the humans which constitute the terrain where the war will be fought, won or lost.
Patience means being willing and able to spend all the time necessary. Waste time perhaps. Certainly to expend time without knowing if victory is coming measurably closer or not for this is a war without phase lines, lacking physical objectives. It is a war won or lost by intangibles, the gaining or losing of support, the increase or decrease of the will to keep on keeping on. Fought on human terrain, waged in human perceptions and beliefs, where time and patience like the slow wearing of water on granite takes its toll, either achieving success or acknowledging defeat.
Finally consider persistence. It is the twin of patience implying the capacity and the ability to keep eyes on the prize even if the prize is not all that might be desired. Insurgencies rarely end with a decisive victory, a peace treaty a triumphant parade. Hostilities, the shooting, bombing and killing subside, peter out, perhaps even stop formally with some form of armistice, but the struggle for political authority will go on. It may take years, even generations for the conflict finally to be resolved.
For example, when did the American War of Independence, a defensive insurgency using both conventional and guerrilla forces end? With the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown? The Peace of Paris? Or the Treaty of Ghent in 1815? Or the War Between the States, an unsuccessful (if you're Dixie bred and born) defensive insurgency. Was it the surrender of General Lee? Perhaps the surrender a few weeks later of Joe Johnson's well equipped and highly motivated potential guerrilla army in the mountains of North Carolina? Or was it with the end of Reconstruction over a decade later? (For bonus points, when was the North-South conflict resolved? Has it?)
The combination of presence, patience and persistence implies another area where one must get a grip. Counterinsurgency is a manpower heavy kind of war. It takes boots on the ground, and a lot of them. One hundred fifty thousand men would not be too many for Afghanistan. Four hundred thousand would not be extreme for Iraq.
That many men and women means a lot more targets for the black hats. More targets means more body bags (excuse me, the correct term is "human remains pouches".) It also means a lot more money, a lot more economic, social and political dislocation on the home front. Put the emphasis on "political" because that's the 900 pound gorilla.
The fear of political repercussions drove Lyndon Johnson with the full support of both parties in Congress to decide that the Vietnam War would be fought by draftees and not reservists and National Guardsmen. After all, the "kids" had always grumbled, but gone to war before. And, more importantly, the "kids" unlike the older Reservists, or Guardsmen didn't have wives, children, jobs, ties in the community. Hell, they didn't even have the vote yet. Of course, history records that LBJ et al were wrong as a soup sandwich about the consequences of the draft coupled with a long, long and seemingly inconclusive war.
The architects of the current wars thought that technology could effectively replace boots on the ground. They believed (wrongly as it has been turning out) that aircraft, ROVs, more lethal munitions than used in any previous war and the information handling systems at our disposal would allow us to fight a lean and mean war with minimal manpower.
They also must have thought that by limiting our boots on the ground, they would limit the body bags arriving at Dover AFB. Yes. And, No.
The planners in the bowels of the Pentagon and over at the White House failed to get a grip on another historical reality of war, particularly insurgent war. At some point in every war, it is the dead, not the living who dictate policy.
That's right. The dead dictate policy. In the back of commander guys' brains, in the back of many minds in politics and the media is the uneasy thought. "Can we admit these Americans died in vain, for nothing?"
So where's the problem? We had over 60,000 die for nothing at all in Vietnam. So far barely more than a twentieth of that have been killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The answer is simply that Vietnam on the one hand and Afghanistan and Iraq on the other do not share the same global political context. We could experience a defeat in Southeast Asia without any real, long lasting diminishment of our role in the world. A better state of peace did not depend upon our winning in Vietnam.
(This reality was predicted in 1964 by Sherman Kent the Director of National Estimates at CIA in a memo to the President. Kent told Johnson that it wouldn't harm our strategic interests in the slightest if "South Vietnam is taken over by the Communists." Strange to today's ears, but sometimes CIA gets it right.)
Right now, or at least in the next few months we the people have to decide if we are willing to sign the covenant with death, the death of more good men and women or will we accept the offered contract with defeat. To make the choice we have to get a grip on what the consequences will be, how either choice will effect a better state of peace than existed prior to the twin invasions.
That will come in Part 3.
A Covenant With Death and A Contract With Defeat
A Covenant With Death and A Contract With Defeat, Pt 1
When a person joins the military he or she signs a covenant with death. True, the recruiter doesn't mention it and few people ever think of it until it's way too late.
It's not pleasant to think about or acknowledge the covenant that has been signed. I sure didn't enjoy the idea whenever it flashed across my consciousness. No matter how hard I tried to ban it, the thought always came back: You know, they really are trying to kill me.
The covenant doesn't care about race, religion, gender, or sexual preferences. Death follows the ultimate of don't ask-don't tell policies. While the covenant particularly applies to infantrymen, it applies to all military occupation specialties. In a war without fronts like Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, the covenant applies to everyone no matter how REMF the person might be. The mine, the roadside bomb, the odd rocket or mortar shell, the ambush invite everyone to die.
In an even lesser known (or acknowledged) codicil to the covenant, the individual agrees that he or she might be taken prisoner, kidnapped, snatched by the black hats. The individual might be held for years in conditions making the worst of medieval dungeons look like five star spas in comparision. (Of course, the black hats may simply get flatly medieval on your body and mind as well.)
If the covenant applied with impartiality to the draftee forces which did the heavy lifting in World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, it applies all the more rigorously today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now we have an "all volunteer force." whether the Regulars, the Reserves or the National Guard. Each and every member of each and every component signed unread the Covenant With Death, including the Capture Codicil.
This is where we, the American people as well as the troops in or going to the Twin Wars must get a grip. A grip on reality. The reality of war. The reality of counterinsurgency. The reality of being an occupying power.
As an occupying power we are engaged in war. It is a war of a particular and peculiar sort, counterinsurgency. This is a war fought by its own unique rules and methods. It is as different from conventional wars such as World War II or even the first few days of the Invasion of Iraq as NFL football from soccer.
Methods and tactics, hardware and doctrine that can bring a quick and decisive victory in a conventional war will result in a long, slow and certain defeat when used in counterinsurgency.
In conventional war saving friendly lives has the highest priority. In conventional war saving time counts for much for not only does that save lives, it assures the political will of the nation remains strong and committed.
In conventional war the use of firepower, preferably highly mobile firepower commanded and controlled by a flexible communication system allows a force concentrate its effort and obliterate the enemy. Firepower kills. Killing brings victory.
The US has long focused on refining its doctrine, tactics, organization and equipment to provide the most flexible, mobile and lethal military forces. We have suceeded brilliantly as the successes against the Iraqi conventional forces in two wars showed.
So what?
So this. It is massively irrelevant. Period. When Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz, Feith and company planned our wars, particularly the one in Iraq, they focused (with I have often imagined lip-licking, gonand-grabbing adolescent anticipation) on "shock and awe."
Shock and awe. No doubt, the US military machine in full noise-making, thing-breaking, body-killing splendor can shock and awe anyone who watches and doesn't die in the process. I suppose they imagined that the survivors whether in Afghanistan or Iraq would be shocked and awed into gibbering thanks for the liberation with arms outstretched to embrace pluralistic democracy, liberal institutions and free enterprise.
What the hell were they smoking?
In both countries the insurgency started before the US press stopped cheering our victory.
Now the real war started. The war we weren't ready to fight. The war, perhaps, our highest officials never thought we'd have to fight.
Here we were, the NFL champs all suited up, playbook in hand. Right off we hit a problem. The other guys, the insurgents, were playing soccer--on a rugby field.
What's wrong with those insurgents? Don't they read the papers? We had won! We held the capitals. We held the cities. Their leaders were dead or on the run. Their conventional forces were routed. Hey! By all the standards of conventional war, the Afghans and Iraqis had been stripped naked, defenseless, their necks under the heels of our boots.
The better state of peace for which all wars are fought (at least in principle) was ours to dictate. Theirs to gratefully accept.
The reality on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq was easy, very easy to predict on the basis of history. The long, mixed experience with both insurgency and counterinsurgency extending from our War of Indpendence through the War Between the States to the Vietnam War.
Some folks, a minority of folks, would welcome our presence and the new order brought in my the US and its allies. Some folks, again a minority, would oppose us and our new order. Most people would simply want to get on with their lives according to their culturally conditioned expectations, hopes and fears. The majority view was simple: leave me alone; let me live in peace; color me a major non-participant.
Take a hard grip on this basic fact. The majority of the population, any population whether caught up in purely internal political violence or the aftermath of invasion and occupation (I refuse to use the euphamism, regime change.) want only to sit it out.
This uncommitted majority become a large part of the human terrain on which the new war, the war of insurgent and counterinsurgent will be fought out.
There is another part of the human terrain where the war will be fought. This part is the civilian population of the invading countries. Once again, there is a three part division. Some folks will be supportive, even wildly supportive of the invasion. A smaller percentage will be opposed, even wildly so, of the invasion. Many, perhaps most, will sit somewhere in the middle, not wanting the home team to lose, but not being sure they're comfortable with the role of occupier.
Get a firm grip on this second fact. The population of the invading country is a critical component, even the most critical area of the human terrain where the war is fought. (I use the singular, because the focus now is on the US and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.)
Now for the third fact. It comes from history too. From the history of every insurgency in our experience. You can read it's emerging reality every day on-line.
The third fact? Simple. The side which can accept casualties and expend time will defeat the side which seeks to limit casualties and save time.
To put it another way. If the United States cannot accept the Covenant With Death, it has signed a Contract with Defeat.
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