Not Losing In Iraq

Not all wars are created equal. For the United States at least, some are far more important than others.

The US involvement in the Vietnamese War was one we could afford to lose. Don't get me wrong, I don't think it was a good thing that we lost. I certainly don't think it was no big deal that more than 60,000 Americans were killed there for no positive outcome. I don't believe that our defeat brought about a better state of peace for the South Vietnamese, no matter how well that segment of the population has been doing in recent years.

But, get a grip on this: We could accept the defeat in Vietnam without any long term consequences to our role and status in the world.

True, after our self-inflicted defeat (hang on to that concept, I'll be returning to it later) the US turned introspective, lost our grip on the Cold War dynamic, allowed our military to become a hollow shell, and took some heavy hits economically. Nonetheless, the defeat didn't matter in the long run.

At least not to our position of leadership in the world.

The defeat did have long term consequences here at home. That's the first reality on which a firm grip must be taken.

The second grip necessitating reality is simply that the war in Iraq is one that we can not afford to lose. A defeat in Iraq carries with it the very strong possibility, even the near-certainty of long term consequences.

I'm not hyperventilating here. A defeat in Iraq may quite well cause a tectonic shift in global politics. A defeat would diminish the status and influence of the United States globally. A defeat under whatsoever guise will affect every aspect of international life from the cost of gas to the capacity of the United States to operate as a peacemaker and honest broker. It could even conceivably result in the something we have dreaded but avoided for sixty years.

The use of nuclear weapons.

I am willing to bet my most prized externally visible attribute--my hair--that the administration never realized that it was taking our country into a war that couldn't, strictly speaking, be won, but could very easily be lost. I'll bet hair that it never considered what the worst case outcome--defeat--would mean to the US.

Not only did the administration delude the nation with badly polluted intelligence, it ignored good intelligence which pointed out the many, many dangers we would face in Iraq after the false dawn of "victory."

Worse, the administration deluded itself. Apparently the White House and the Defense Department (at least the top side civilian component) committed the blunder of believing its own propaganda.

They believed that the Iraqis would greet us as liberators.

They believed that Iraq was a fully functional state.

They believed Iran would be cowed into submissive, or at least passive, status as an on looker.

They believed Sunni and Shi'ite would lie down together as lamb and lion.

What in hell were these folks smoking, snorting or running up?

You don't need access to Tippy Top Secret Burn Before Reading intelligence reports to know beyond even an unreasonable doubt that each and every one of these beliefs was utterly, catastrophically, gloriously wrong. Wrong as grilled watermelon.

So wrong that any person holding them with a straight face must either be a politician or someone not at all oriented as to time, place and reality. (Or perhaps both.)

On the basis of these delusions the US went into Iraq as we had Afghanistan with too few troops on the ground. On the basis of these delusions we sacked the Iraqi armed forces, government bureaucracies, police forces. We kicked all alleged Baathists out of state owned enterprises and public utilities.

We didn't do anything that stupid after the defeat of Germany. Where we did, it was temporary. We quickly realized that nothing would run without the participation of former Nazis.

To be successful, pragmatism must often trump emotions and zeal, or even a sense of justice. Unpleasant, but true. Get a grip.

As a result of these actions (and others too numerous to reference right now) all based on the delusions listed, we were behind the power curve before President Bush stood in front of the infamous 'Mission Accomplished" banner.

The delusions, the stupid policy regarding "de-Baathification" and the deficiency of boots on the ground have been step one on the road to self-inflicted defeat.

Step two has been our attempt to square an impossible circle: Train an effective Iraqi army and internal security force while fully engaged in a counter insurgent campaign.

Step three has been our attempt to engage in the hazy idea called "nation building" while facing a multi-party shooting war.

The results to date of these steps along the way of defeat have been obvious.
The initiative lies with the insurgents.
The Iranians have been handed a low cost, high payoff way of nibbling the US to death.
The Islamists have received a shot of growth hormone.
The Iraqis have been turned from being major actors in their own country to the role of target and by-stander.

"OK," you say. "Now what?"

Glad you asked.

Take a firm grip on this prickly reality. To not lose the United States must invest more, perhaps a lot more, lives.

Take a firm grip on this equally sticky reality. To not lose the United States must be willing to invest a lot more time, years certainly.

We will not lose in Iraq if and only if we accept that the current butcher's bill will grow a lot bigger and we will all grow a lot older before we can declare that we have avoided defeat.

These dirty truths are dictated by historical experience. This kind of war, insurgency, in all its many forms and details, is at root a contest of political wills. The political will of the insurgent versus the political will of the counter insurgent. Bombs, bullets, shells, dead bodies and ruined buildings alike are simply means by which the strength of the opposing political wills are tested.

A test of political will is a test of patience. A test of a people's capacity to accept death. A test of a people's ability to tolerate apparent lack of success. A test of a people's willingness to keep on keeping on, to make a long slog up hill in a driving rain with no end in sight.

Ultimately, this is the test We the People failed in Vietnam. It is the test We the People cannot fail in Iraq unless we are ready, willing and able to consent to a diminished role in the world and all that implies for us socially, economically and psychologically.

History shows the nature of the insurgent-counter insurgent war. It is unpleasant, to say the least.

History also shows that means exist by which the war can be shortened, the top of the mountain made more visible through the sleeting rain. It shows ways in which the load on the back can be made lighter.

The History Geek's lessons from our (vast) experience with insurgency as well as the experience of others, in short form:
Send more troops. Not aircraft, not ships, not artillery and tanks. Troops. On the ground.
Train the Iraqis behind a protective shield. All combat training is essentially on-the-job, but don't take it to unnecessary extremes.
Use our military and police for training, not private contractors.
Send the private security and training personnel home. In the long run this fighting on the cheap approach beloved by Cheney is counterproductive. It's like giving Ex-lax to a person with the runs.
Quit looking for a high-tech fix. As we found out in Vietnam, there's a low-tech counter for every high-tech capacity.
Develop a believable capacity to leave. Essential to pressure whatever regime is in power in Baghdad.
Make the Iraqi citizens more effective stakeholders in their own security. In the past we developed many workable tactics to bring this about. It was one of the bright, unreported stories out of our Vietnam failure.
Focus on the human terrain. The often derided battle for the "hearts and minds" of the uncommitted majority is the battle that counts most in avoiding defeat.
Don't invite Iran to openly enter the war. The single greates mistake we made in the Vietnam War was inviting the North to come on in.

Unconvinced? OK. The History Geek will take these points, and some others not listed and expand on them in later posts.