Keep gripping the fundamental reality of our war in Iraq. The purpose of all wars to reach a better state of peace. In Iraq that means a better state of peace for US interests. More importantly, it means a better state of peace for the Iraqis.
Keep holding onto the second fundamental reality of our war in Iraq. If we lose, pull out, beat feet, Dx the whole damn mess, the result will be a worse state of peace. For the US. For the world. For the Iraqis.
True, there are excellent reasons, many of which the Geek mentioned in earlier posts, why the war should never have been undertaken. Stipulated: the US invasion should never have occurred. Further stipulated: The US occupation of Iraq is the direct result of a very bad policy decision by the "commander guy."
Now we're riding the tiger and there is no easy way to dismount. Nor should we dismount. Not until the tiger is, if not a pussy cat, at least not a man-eater.
The first, baby steps toward taming the tiger were outlined in the previous post. Baby steps don't win or even finish a marathon. More, and larger, faster steps are needed for that.
There is a problem. So many steps, large steps, even daring steps have to be taken so quickly that it is hard to consider them one at a time. Even to attempt a sequential consideration carries with it the risk that the steps will be seen as a hierarchy, with each step in the sequence being dependent on the success of its predecessor.
This isn't the case. All the large steps are necessary. They are interlocked. However, a few depend upon the successful completion of the others.
Here they are in summary form. (The Geek almost wrote "bullet" form, but that might be unseemly given that it's war and killing that are being considered.)
1. Rediscover or redevelop our political will. Reject the emotionally satisfying but ultimately counterproductive of pulling what we did in Somalia--a quick display of retreat while muttering, "They didn't appreciate what we were doing for them. Screw 'em and the horse they rode in on," or with tooth-gnashing and hand-wringing, crying, "We shouldn't have gone there. We've made things so much worse."
2. Convince the administration to come clean with our policy. The war is no longer all about promoting democracy or providing warm fuzzies such as liberty and pluralistic institutions. It's no longer about "fighting terrorism." Now the war is about assuring that Iraq is stable and functional enough to preclude the emergence of Iran or any other country as the regional hegemon. The war might also, in a lesser way, be about lowering the appeal of terrorism as a policy option in either political or cultural frames.
3. The Administration, Congress and We the People must acknowledge that our troops have signed a Covenant with Death and as our part of the contract the nation must not and will not allow those who have been killed on our service to be tossed on the garbage dump of defeat.
4. Reject an imperial presence. That means letting all parties in Iraq know beyond any shadow of a doubt that we are going to leave the moment the Iraqi state is stable, the Iraqi forces up to the task of defending against external threats and internal violence. It might also mean abandoning the currently under construction US Embassy compound of twenty buildings on more than a hundred acres which gives every appearance of being the seat of a regional pro-counsel, not a mere diplomatic representative.
5. Talk to Iran. Don't bomb it. Don't even try to destabilize it with "non-lethal Presidential Findings" and so-called black operations. Don't invite Iran to enter the war openly as we invited North Vietnam to do back in 1964-5. At the same time the US can't make any behind-the-scenes agreements with Iran or even wink-wink, nudge-nudge type understandings that would give rise to a de facto, unannounced Iranian presence, even dominance in Iraq.
6. As mentioned earlier, stop acting like an occupier. This means stop kicking in doors, waging war on civilians, even writing rules to govern the approved use of torture. Only occupying powers fight with torture, area weapons and the boot in the door (or in the face.) it also means sending the contract training and security personnel back to home. If it's not a purely military mission, it should be undertaken by Iraqis--not foreign nationals and least of all Americans.
7. The US force on the ground. Hold on to this. That's on the ground, not in the air over Iraq or in the off-shore waters must be increased. It must focus on two missions. Provide a wall of security to the uncommitted majority. Train Iraqi forces behind this wall so that they can take over from us in the fullness of time. Work to get the economy so that the combination of lowered violence and increase opportunity will get some of the nearly 900,000 internal refugees to leave the camps and go back home.
8. Enlist the women of Iraq on the side of stability. This means refraining from waging war on them by bombs from above or feet on the door. The Israelis have been waging war on women in the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian entity for years with the result that each new generation of boys becomes the next generation of jihadists. We can't make the same mistake. It also means using culturally appropriate means of reaching out to the women, recognising their potential influence for peace and stability. After all, they have the most to lose and the least to gain by ongoing jihad and counter-jihad.
9. Accept seemingly unpleasant ways of war fighting. For example, targeted killings. Carefully premeditated and coldly planned assassinations of key hostile personnel may make us queasy. It may rub against our moral sensibilities. However, as a tactic, it works and works well. The lowest butcher's bill way of defeating an insurgent is politely called "organizational perturbation" in delicate academic circles. As we found out more than a few times in Vietnam, killing a key man in the right way at the right time causes a thousand followers to reconsider their plans.
10. Be patient. No counterinsurgency is won in 90 days or even four years. It took us over a decade to lose in Vietnam. It took the British more than a decade to win in Malaya against a much softer opponent in a far smaller territory without an immediately available sanctuary or two.
The Geek will take each of these points and expand it. Then he will tackle the most vexing problem of all. How to take the fun out of jihad for the young men flocking to the jihadist recruiting centers.
That said, the Geek reserves the right to rant whenever the US does something particularly gripless in or around Iraq and Afghanistan.
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