There's Still A Chance Not to Lose in Iraq

But, not losing won't be easy. Notice, I wrote, "not losing." I didn't write that there is still a chance to win in Iraq. That was intentional.

There is one simple reason why the US cannot "win" in Iraq. The reason is that we have never realistically defined victory.

Worse, we never had a set of well defined, concrete goals which were relevant to both our capabilities and interests on the one hand and the realities on the ground in Iraq on the other. Without goals, it is impossible to define victory in any way other than a collection of hazy, soft, warm fuzzy generalities.

Wait one, History Geek! You say. We had one goal. Getting rid of Saddam Hussein.

Sure did. We had that concrete, limited goal and we accomplished it. So what?

Don't get me wrong. I have thought Saddam Hussein was a bad idea since before he came to power. Back when he was just one seemingly undistinguished figure on the reviewing stand, it was apparent to a few of us that he was the dude with the finger on the trigger.

So, I've always been in favor of removing his genes from the pool. We've done that. Good for us. Still, the question remains: So what?

We ended up occupying a country which closely resembled one of those companies taken over by the Mafia. An empty shell behind a glossy facade. A gutted wreck of what once had been a going concern.

While Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz and Feith were gripless about this fundamental reality, the intelligence community had the real deal tightly in its grasp. This is one gargantuan policy blunder that can't be off-loaded on the usual battered child--CIA. They had a grip.

Not only did the Agency understand the empty hulk behind the propaganda facade, it also well understood what was most likely to happen on the day after the US declared victory. The men and women in the shadows had a grip on this: The solid nitrogenous waste would hit the air impeller.

That's right. The shit would hit the fan--on steroids.

Osama bin Ladin, his followers, his imitators, even the wannabes would get a shot of growth hormone that would surpass our capacities to counter. The mullahs and ayatollahs and imams in Tehran would get the opportunity of a lifetime to export their "revolution."

Cheney, Rumsfield, Wolfewitz, Feith and their associates didn't want to get the message. And they didn't.

The President, George W., says he got the message but as the "commander guy," the "guy who makes the decisions." he decided that the benefits outweighed the risks.

What the hell kind of scale was he using?

Well, ignoring unpleasant intelligence is not an impeachable offense. If it had been the nation would have seen John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, ceremoniously kicked out of the Oval Office after proper rituals in the House and Senate.

So, there we were one day after victory, with stupid grins on our collective faces and our thumbs in an anatomically improbable location wondering, "What the hell now?"

The short answer comes in several parts. Watch wolfish grins grow on Iranian faces. Stand around as new jihadists blew themselves, assorted Iraqi civilians and our troops into small, bloody protoplasm flakes. Hire and fire one pro counsel and commander after another. Shove more troops into harm's way. Try different tactics. Surge. Rediscover the Iraq Study Group.

It all adds up to one word. Lose.

That's the short answer. Lose.

Roll it around in your mouth. Spell it. L. O. S. E. Sounds good? Feels good? Is good for the United States? Is good for the world? Good for the Iraqis maybe?

No. To all of the above, No!

It may be good for those who wish political advantage or to those pursuing personal interest. (Hear that, Ms Clinton, Ms Pelosi, Mr Obama, Mr Edwards, Mr Gulliani?) But, to those who have a grip on the longer term interests of the United States and the world, the word "lose" sounds frightening, horrifying, revolting.

We may not be able to win, but we can still not lose.

It won't be easy because not losing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) is much more difficult than not losing was in Vietnam. Iraq is a much tougher proposition than Vietnam ever was.

And, never forget, we lost in Vietnam. More than a decade, more than 60,000 American lives, billions of dollars almost beyond count, great and long lasting public support and still we lost.

The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam resemble one another in some essential respects. Iraq is and Vietnam was a combination of internal insurgency and external aggression. In South Vietnam we faced insurgents--the Viet Cong--and an external aggressor, North Vietnam.

In Iraq we face both insurgents and an external aggressor, Iran. At the moment Iran is playing a covert game just as the North Vietnamese did initially. But, that can change. Bad moves on our part can make sure it does.

The Iraq war and the War in Vietnam differ from one another in at least one critical way.

The Vietnamese fought a conventional guerrilla war. They used standard weapons and tactics. They presented more or less conventional targets that could be and were effectively engaged from time to time by our ground forces both conventional and special.

The Iraqi opponents do not use conventional guerrilla warfare weapons and tactics. They rarely present targets that can be effectively engaged by our forces. Unlike the Vietnamese enemies, the Iraqi opponents prefer the suicide bomber, the roadside bomb, the sniper.

These tactics, particularly the one involving a single suicidal individual with a vehicle full of explosives or even a C4 laden vest, are very, very difficult to counter. Most of the usual American advantages of technology are rendered useless.

You can see the same dynamic at work in Palestine. The Israeli military is far from incompetent. Time after time it has shown its definite superiority in all forms of conventional war including operations against organized guerrilla units. Despite this the IDF is less than effective in countering or deterring the suicide bomber or the barrage of more-or-less homemade rockets.

It's not that they haven't tried. The Israelis have tried nearly every coercive approach imaginable during the forty years they have been occupying all or some of the territory gained in the Six Day War.

Can we hope to do better? Can we hope not to lose?

Sure. It means getting a grip on historical experience. Our own and that of others such as the Israelis and the British. It means taking risks. It means taking a firm grip on some very unpleasant realities.

It means more Americans must die.

Does this mean that History Geek has the key to wisdom that has eluded others, those in high places? No. It means the key is there for all of us to use.

The key which will come here soon.