Iran is both.
Underneath its risible surface Iran is a lethal menace. The Iranian mullahocracy and the government which fronts for it is a weapon pointed at its own citizens. The same deadly duo is a life threatening condition for the Mideast.
And, potentially, for the world as a whole.
Given the recent remarks by Ayatollah Ahmed Elmalhoda that feminists are "whores and foreign spies," the Geek expects the count of female corpses to grow in the Islamic Republic as Stalwart Defenders of the Faith execute these vile suborners of the Revolution and the Will of Allah. For details see, http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Religion/?id=1.0.2200287203.
The Ayatollahs'take on feminism would simply be bitterly amusing were it not for the past record of the regime in blocking Internet sites seen somehow as facilitating the Tehran described "destabilizing" agendas of foreign governments sponsoring feminism as subversion. The potential for humor is drained by the simple reality that the mullahocracy's hatred and fear of women allows the continuation of a policy of death by stoning despite official avowals that the barbaric practice had been made illegal. (As if hanging, decapitation or shooting somehow made the killing of women for adultery any less primitive, barbaric and savage.)
Iran's threat to the peace and stability of the Mideast has been made abundantly clear in recent days by the success of its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as the meeting over the weekend between the Defense Ministers of Iran and Syria.
The Iranian threat to the region is also behind the recent interest in developing nuclear energy by the majority of the Mideast countries led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. All of these eager seekers after the nuclear grail have taken the same line as the Iranians--they only want splittable atoms for the peaceful production of electricity.
Yeah. Right. And, "The check is in the mail," or "I'll call you tomorrow, babe."
Iranian nuclear ambitions also threaten the peace of the world. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) the report cannot be made public (see the IAEA website http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/iranreport0508.html.) The New York Times along with about half the world's mainstream media have copies.
The NYT gave the report above the fold billing and quoted its tough language. Take a look--http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html?th&emc=th.
It comes as no shock that the Mouthpiece of the Revolution, PRESS-TV, saw the report as another IAEA award for Transparency in the Pursuit of Peace Loving Atoms. That view is at http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=57458§ionid=351020104.
The Iranian Republic News Agency was more restrained--by Iranian standards downright understated in its well below the fold coverage. http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-20/0805279642004910.htm.
Regardless of framing, the underlying reality remains unchanged. Iran is seeking independent enrichment of uranium. It is installing new design, domestically fabricated high efficiency centrifuges. Foreign intelligence sources including but not limited to the US point at basic work conducted to provide effective weaponization of a uranium based bomb.
The mullahocracy has countered only by vitrupitation, denials and diversions such as the proposal for a conference that would include not only nuclear matters but regional concerns generally and Iranian worries about Venezuela and Bosnia.
What really makes Iran dangerous is not the nuclear stalemate per se.
No. What makes the mullahocracy and its facade government dangerous is the rapidity with which Iran is imploding economically, socially and politically.
For two years and more, capital has been fleeing Iran at an ever accelerating rate. This flight has been complemented by economic policies that can, at best, be characterized as suicidal. As a result, Iran is on the verge of uncontrollable hyperinflation.
For the moment Iran (along with Venezuela, its cohort in flirting with hyperinflation as well as partner in a recently announced joint bank) has been protected from its own economic throat slitting by the rise in oil prices. But, that rise is not unending. Indeed, it may have already ended without an extra barrel being pumped from the lands of OPEC.
Few governments have long survived hyperinflation.
Iran is also facing other internal problems. Unemployment is high and growing higher. At the least the national rate is twenty-five percent with higher percentages among the urban population generally and youth. The escalation in global food prices, in part caused by the rise in oil, is hitting a very large segment of the Iranian population very, very hard.
Another round of UN sanctions or even a more rigid enforcement of the sanctions regime currently in place will push the Iranian economy over the edge. The underlying discontent with the aging mullahocracy will be strongly exacerbated by the increase in the economic misery index.
When faced with a strong possibility of internal unrest, including violent opposition to the regime, governments have often sought to displace anger and frustration onto an external target. The Geek is certain that you can all think of examples.
The mullahocracy and its governmental talking dummies have already been taking that route. The "Zionist enemy" gets its unfair share of abuse daily. So also do the "Imperial powers" with the Great Satan at their head. Now, the feminists have been added to the list.
Rhetorical violence has its limits. At some point mere words do not counter the anger at the regime. Action is needed. Action that will both unify people behind government and vent the power of fear and hate.
The violence can be internally directed. Stone some women. Hang some "spies." Shoot some "traitors to the revolution."
However, unless the conditions that produced the original fear and anger are not addressed, even the most robust internal displacement measures will lose effect.
Considering the record to date of the Iranian mullahs, it is not too likely that things will improve in Shia Land.
External displacement measures will be necessary. In the words of an old Marx Brothers movie, "You realise, gentlemen, this means war!"
Of course the mullahs realise that.
Not that they care.
One way or another the theocracy is going to plunge down the tubes. At least in a war there is some chance to go down with glory.
And, come to think of it, since war is never predictable as to outcome, there is even some chance, Allah Willing, that the regime would come through intact.
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6 comments:
Ok, realistically, after the last NIE report, Iran is pretty much off the table through Bush43, and maybe after that.
So why would Iran be looking for a fight. Logically, Iran would have to really get a collective case of the "Extreme Stupids" for their leadership (now, for just Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that's realistic), but just don't see that happening to the entire leadership.
It's one thing to overreach, and one can make the point that they have overplayed their political/military hand in Iraq, and are now in the process of having their hand severely degraded. But you will notice how they backed off, once they realized they didn't have the upper hand.
The Iranians are known for being contentious (again, putting it mildly), but are also fairly cautious. And honestly, they play a pretty smart board, considering what assets they have to play with.
They'll throw the language around, and they'll be occasionally provocative (the Persian Gulf comes to mind), but if push comes to shove, just can't see them pushing too hard for a big time, serious fight, because it will go down really hard for them.
Now, if it's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call by himself, well..... :(
Your points are all well taken. Eight months ago or even six--particularly after the NIE was released the Geek would have agreed with them completely.
So what has changed?
The Iranian response to the IAEA and the nature of the most recent IAEA report for one. A second is the rapidly accelerating economic deterioration within Iran. The third is the growing evidence of social/political strains within the country as a result of the failing economy. The fourth is the increasing adventurism of the mullahocracy and its governmental front. For example the ties with Hugo Chavez and--more disturbing--the strong indicators of an Iranian link with M-13.
The Geek has not joined with the neocon ninnies in favoring some sort of military preemption. Rather he is of the view that the application of enhanced sanctions or more robust enforcement of current sanctions might finally result in a less intransigent Iranian attitude.
Having said that the Geek hastens to add that further economic decline or an escalation in the current social fraying could, repeat, could result in the mullahocracy seeking to mobilize public opinion behind it against a foreign threat.
As you are no doubt aware the foreign threat gambit has been used countless times with good effect by other regimes facing internal difficulties. Thus the Geek hoped to sound a cautionary but not a belligerent note. He is concerned that the backlash against Bush might mute our collective sensitivities to a real Iranian threat as opposed to the continuation of zany business as usual by the Tehran honchos.
Ok, so in today's news we have:
"Ali Larijani was elected speaker of the Iranian parliament. In his new perch, the country’s former chief nuclear negotiator is bound to cause grief for his old rival, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The vote on Wednesday was not even close: Larijani walked away with all but 31 of the 263 votes cast as he defeated the incumbent, Gholam Ali Haddad Adel. The margin of victory signals that the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, supported Larijani, and with the backing of the clerics, the new speaker will be able to remake the political landscape in Tehran."
Link is: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/chang/8621
Which is all fine and dandy, but all this looks like to me is an increase in gridlock on the Iranian side, particularly in the economics arena. All it means is that if very little was being done before, somewhat less than nothing is the most likely result now.
Btw, looks like Iran has drastically expanded their money supply since President Ahmadinejad took office, which looks to be the primary cause of the pending hyperinflation.
There's all sorts of numbers flitting around out there, but it's not looking good for Iran. And if oil peaks and then drops, then they are really screwed.
I'm interested about the aspect of having a new Speaker, who is a direct rival of President Ahmadinejad. I'm not near as interested in the nuclear aspects (because I assume they are in agreement) as I am about the economic aspects, where I would assume there are some vast differences.
But can the new Speaker really have an influence in that area, or is it going to turn into one of those "inside" scorched earth fight-to-the-finish type of battles?
As of eight hours or so ago, the printing presses were still running with smoke pouring out. The Geek hasn't seen the slightest hint yet that the shift in Speakers has been reflected in a shift in economic policy.
Considering the past record of the Speaker versus the President, the Geek is inclined to see the development of what you correctly term a "scorched earth fight to the finish."
The Mullahocracy has been surprisingly vocal in recent days/weeks regarding the economy. However, theology or even a shrewd understanding of Iranian internal political dynamics addresses the economic question.
The collapse of the Iranian economic edifice will not be helped by the recent joint banking ventures with Venezuela. If anything it will make the situation worse. Neither will the joint banking scheme give Tehran a open door to evade the current sanction regime as some pundits have feared.
Unless the mullahs opt for a severe disinflationary policy coupled with actions to bring fugitive capital back, Iran may well have passed the point of no return.
That's what makes the situation dangerous. The mullahs either have to do something drastic and unpopular or do nothing and risk explosive internal unrest. Hanging dual citizenship victims as is scheduled for tomorrow or rhetorical outbursts against the US and Israel won't keep the lid on much longer.
That leaves the external option. The Geek doesn't obsess on it, but it is a real probability that must be kept in mind by both the current and the incoming administrations.
The problem with the power players in Iran turning to what you so nicely describe as the "external option" is that there's a different set of players these days to be affected, and turning to the "external option" most likely will boomerang back against Iran.
For example, where are they going to ratchet up the tension. Iraq? Tried that, all it got them was a severe (and continuing to date) degrading of both their political and military influence in Iraq.
Lebanon? I'm sure Syria is looking forward to being tossed out there into the fray to stir up trouble for Iran. Just because you fought Israel to a draw the 1st time doesn't mean you'll be that lucky in Round 2.
Afghanistan. That's a sure loser. Just as it's hard for the Coalition forces, the logistics are also equally hard for Iran. Not a favorable area to fight in. Besides, that area is where most of the drug smuggling into Iran comes from, so if the Coalition forces really wanted to be bastards about it, make it so the drug smugglers get to run their goods directly to the Iranian border w/o interference (in exchange for selling out the Taliban). Make dealing with those bad boys Iran's problem. It would be a short term deal from both sides, but nothing like getting to see both the Taliban and the Iranians taking it in the shorts at the same time.
The Gulf. Most likely, but that's sure to create an instant "battle royale" within the Iranian leadership/power circles, primarily due to economic considerations. First off, this could easily bottleneck most Iranian oil exports, which aren't going to the US anyway. It would also spike oil prices, which might seem good, except most of the effect would be on non US nations (like India, China, S. Korea, Japan, etc.), many of which already have government subsidies on refined petroleum products which are just bleeding them dry. Increase oil prices, increase government subsidy costs (not small change either).
You could literally see many of these nations all of the sudden end up siding with the US over putting a quick, sudden, and potentially "pointy edge" end to such Iranian adventurism.
Let's also not forget that if it is the Gulf, all the sudden lots & lots & LOTS of commerce (read: smuggling) that is going on in the Gulf all the sudden ends up under a very harsh spotlight, and there will be a whole lot of local players who suddenly get treated to a world where everything is being checked and watched.
How would you like to be a smuggler out on the Gulf moving goods and material into Iran knowing that because Iran's leadership got stupid, there are now at least 5-6 Predator-B's loaded with Hellfires up there just looking for a reason to take an interest in the likes of you? Could easily ruin your whole day.
If I wanted to implement a goal of creating hyperinflation in Iran on an expedited basis, destablizing the Gulf and disrupting oil exports (including Iran's) would be a pretty much sure fire approach to accomplish the goal.
The effects of the global economy in the Gulf actually ends up reducing Iran's options, because the primary negative effect could be on their own customers.
Thoughts?
The essential line of departure for assessing intentions and probable options for the mullahocracy is recognition that its calculus of rationality does not mirror that of the US or the West generally. The history of the Islamic Republic over the past twenty-nine years shows that clearly.
Indeed, a fair argument can be made for the following proposition: one of the major, if not THE major reason for Iran's consistent ability to vex US and Western policy makers generally has been the disconnect between the respective calculi of rationality.
The interlocking imperatives for the mullahocracy are maintenance of power and the extension of Shia authority beyond Iran's borders.
Of the two, the first is obviously more important. In this context it must be recalled that the mullahocracy has faced and barely survived an existential crisis during the Iraq-Iran War. The (effective) use of chemical munitions by the Iraqis coupled with obvious diplomatic isolation experienced by Iran as the gas clouds bellowed combined to shake the mullahocracy much more than was appreciated at the time.
One result of this existential crisis was the Iranian embarkation upon a forced draft program of WMD development. While attention has focused on the nuclear dimension, the Iranian efforts in chemical and biological weapons has been highly successful.
The second prong of the Iranian response to the existential crisis was the development and enhancement of its support of terrorist and subversive groups (The Geek uses the terms as applied from the US perspective. He appreciates the Iranians wouldn't use the same terms.) Tracking Tehran's involvement in subversive and/or terrorist groups in other countries shows a steady upward trajectory through and beyond the Nineties.
The mullahs and their "technical" experts correctly reckoned that enhanced capacities in the subversive/sponsored terrorism areas increased both the possibilities of horizontal escalation and ambiguous signature operations which would inflict damage without assigned culpability.
While the stability situation in Iraq has improved markedly in recent months, it remains, as senior officers readily concede, fragile and tenuous. The opportunities for the Special Groups to undercut stability are legion albeit risky for Tehran--at least as seen from the US.
While the mullahocracy was intensely hostile to Taliban seven years ago, that hostility was in large measure predicated upon the drive to establish an Iranian guided subversive presence in Afghanistan.
(Regarding the opium option: most flows to the West eventually since that is where the market and distribution system are most profitable; directing an increased flow into Iran would simply allow the IRGC to assist in the flow-through while taking a "modest" cut for services rendered. Hard currency is hard currency and the IRGC needs that commodity.)
Before the Geek lets this comment grow to "full post" length, consider the very strong probability that the mullahocracy has its own version of the Israeli "Samson Option." One, but not the only scenario is that which you mentioned--a good dust up in the Gulf. Yes, international oil prices would spike to catastrophic proportions. Most predictions of the worst realistic case sort center on the $300-$350/barrel level.
At this point even the insulating potential of government subsidies for domestic use gas or oil would be overwhelmed. All aspects of the global economy from the most rarefied financial derivatives to the cost of basic foodstuffs would be immediately, adversely affected.
International response would be almost immediate and potentially quite robust. In short, the feces would really hit the fan.
As is the case with the Samson Option, the temple would collapse, but maybe, just maybe without taking the mullahocracy down with it.
When compared to the certainty of falling through internal unrest (to which the mullahocracy is sensitive given its route to power nearly thirty years ago) and the imponderables of exercising one or another form of the external option, the second is far less unattractive than the first.
If Allah Wills (words to live by in Tehran and elsewhere.)
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