There has even been some degree of quacking over the High Minded concept of a regional pact making the Mideast an area free of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This notion, which is much more a product of Fantasyland than an emigrant from the shores of Utopia, is of a piece with the Obama vision of a world without any nuclear weapons anywhere.
There is not much to say in favor of nuclear weapons. Except one small, but very relevant fact. They, and the much maligned doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, have made the world safe for war.
That's right. The shadow of the mushroom cloud hovering over the chancelries of the globe have made the place safe for the waging of controlled, more or less purposeful war.
One can never say that the Big Bomb has kept the peace per se, not in the face of the historical record covering the past sixty-four years. But, the wars have not involved widespread, high intensity operations of the massively destructive scale of, say, the two World Wars. And, that is no small accomplishment given the international dynamics of the period.
Without the Israeli nuclear capacity the wars of the Mideast, including that of 1967, would have been far greater, far more bloody and not necessarily any more decisive in outcome than the low scale conflict which has occurred during this period of "Nuclear Ambiguity." The unchallenged possession of the "Samson Option" by Israel, not the diplomatic support of the US nor the nanny like nattering of the UN has limited and prevented regional hectatombs from happening.
The documentary hints which have leaked out around the Great Wall of Secrecy make it clear that the US government has been fully aware not only of Israel's ultimately successful efforts to develop and refine its nuclear weapons capabilities but the existence and size of the resultant stockpile. There is also no doubt of our complicity in maintaining the thin and porous scrim of secrecy behind which lurk the missiles and bombs of Israel.
The policy of nuclear ambiguity was dictated to Israel by the forces of reality.
The first was particularly important early in the Israeli development and procurement effort: The ambiguous threat is always perceived as being larger than any reality would dictate. Ambiguity encourages the enemy to contemplate the worst conceivable case, not the worst realistic one.
The second justification--no, requirement--for the ambiguity policy is the US Congress. In one of its fits of High Mindedness, Congress legislated that no country which possesses either nuclear weapons or an active research and development program in that area can receive US military assistance including monetary aid. Israel may no longer be dependent upon US money for its defense needs, but what rational government is going to chuck gigabucks without a very, very good reason?
Even the achievement of that long sought, but always elusive Holy Grail of a comprehensive Mideast peace agreement in no way nullifies the cruciality of Israel's nuclear deterrent. The German diplomatic maestro, Bismarck was reputed to have said regarding treaties--they are "mere scraps of paper." So also might any emergent Mideast leader.
Given the record of diplomatic agreement longevity in the Mideast, any dropping of defenses and deterrents in the warm glow of the post-signing celebrations would be the height of folly. It would be folly as well for Israel to rely upon some external protecting power rather than itself when faced by an existential threat.
Offers to extend the American nuclear umbrella over Israel are well-intentioned, but ultimately meaningless gestures. Forty-five years ago the abrasive but quite insightful French president, Charles de Gaulle, made that point in a characteristically blunt fashion when he questioned the willingness of the US to expose New York to the possibility of nuclear obliteration in order to protect Paris.
His point was very well taken. Other European leaders whispered what De Gaulle shouted. It was only the presence of American troops in the potential killing fields of Europe which gave any credibility to the nuclear umbrella concept. Except for the anglophobic French president, most Europeans were willing to concede that the US would go nuclear if and when their troops were on the receiving end of a Soviet strike.
Even the political power of AIPAC and other components of the Israel Lobby lacks the potency necessary to turn any American nuclear pledge from the dross of rhetoric to the gold of action in a time of dire need. Would We the People really, truly, undoubtedly continence the placing of New York or any other city at risk in order to protect Tel Aviv?
The second guess doesn't count.
Absent the Israeli nuclear deterrent, even though the shield of ambiguity has been holed, most notably by Robert Gates during his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense, there is no means of inhibiting a Mideast leader, Islamist most likely, from abandoning any then extant treaty or agreement to mount total jihad against the "Zionist Entity." There would be nothing to inhibit the manufacture and use of chemical, biological or radiological munitions against Israel with results which would lethal on a grand scale.
Nuclear weapons may be icky-poo in the extreme. Their use may be revolting to civilized sensitivities. They do have one redeeming factor in comparison to their equally nasty relatives in the clan of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Compared to chemical, biological and radiological munitions, nuclear weapons are both expensive and difficult to produce and stockpile. Chemical munitions can be manufactured quickly, easily and cheaply from widely available industrial precursors. Biological threats can be conjured up in a modestly equipped laboratory from progenitors which are available globally. Radiological weapons require nothing more than access to high level radwaste, a little bit of explosives and operators who are willing to die.
None of the "Smaller Three" demand major investment in infrastructure facilities which are as visible as they are expensive. None require highly trained and skilled technicians in brigade lots. None require equipment which is readily identifiable as to purpose and thus easily interdicted before or during shipment.
While the "Small Three" of the WMD clan lack the diplomatic prestige of the nuclear option, they make up for this deficiency by their ease and invisibility of manufacture. They are also more suited to ambiguous signature operations, which is an advantage if the author has reason to apprehend a military response to an attack.
And, as the recent "swine flu" imbroglio amply demonstrated, biological munitions have a potential for terror effects far outweighing any actual damage inflicted. Fear without any concurrent high body count is the terrorist's ideal. It represents maximum damage with both limited investment and very low potential of a military response by the victim country(ies.)
Without its nuclear deterrent Israel would be wide open to chemical, biological or radiological attack. Only the deterrent and uncertainty as to the threshold level which would trigger an Israeli atomic reaction has any genuine likelihood of keeping the "Small Three" threat remote in probability.
The government of Israel has taken a dim view of the NPT's inherent efficacy. While Brazil and South Africa abandoned their pursuit of a nuclear capacity it is doubtful that the NPT had any role in the decision. Brazil, by its own admission, had no reason to acquire the bomb. It had nothing to gain and much to lose by going ahead with its program. South Africa made its move as part of the groundswell of internal governmental change. Again, any linkage with the NPT owes more to High Minded wishful thinking than political reality.
Adherence to the NPT did not inhibit North Korea. The NPT is, after all, another of those "mere scraps of paper" to be abandoned when reasons of state demand. The Hermit Kingdom of the North ditched the NPT officially three years before its first test.
Not too much should be made of Japan or South Korea not pursuing a nuclear procurement effort. Each has the base for very rapid breakout. It would take either country only months, not years, to put a deliverable weapon on the shelves. Each could (and would) resign from the NPT if it saw more to gain by the action than would hypothetically be lost.
Like all treaties the NPT is no stronger, no more effective than the political will and self-perceived, subjectively defined national interests of the states which are signatory to it. The Great Menace of that chimera, global public opinion, in a manner akin to the sanctions of the UN Security Council, are toothless in comparison with a reason of existential nature compelling abandonment of the NPT.
Even when no official abandonment of the NPT has happened, as in the case of Iran, reasons of state will both allow and compel the "illegal" pursuit of nuclear weapons. As the Iranians have shown to date, the risks of doing so are acceptably slight. The differences between the Permanent Members of the Security Council as well as the needs of important constituencies within industrialised countries assure that economic and diplomatic sanctions are less effective than would be a black powder muzzle loader on a modern battlefield.
The Australians estimated in a recent White Paper that as many as twenty countries will have joined the Nuclear Club within the next decade or two. This conclusion does not seem to be unwarrantably pessimistic. Nuclear technology is ever more broadly disseminated around the world as is the supporting hardware. The proliferation of "civilian" reactors both research and power producing will drag the potential of increased distribution of nuclear weapons in its wake. There is no way around that reality. Knowledge plus hardware plus fissile material equals a bomb--actual or potential.
The lesson is simple. And, to many, unpleasant. The NPT is a thin, greasy, slippery rope on which to take a grip. It is more delusion than reality. It will let us down, hard, unless we put it in the same category as the halcyon hallucination of a "nuclear free world."
Getting a grip on the alternative of a world in which more countries have nuclear weapons or the rapid capacity to acquire these weapons is hard. Not impossible. Only hard. Deterrence, particularly that which resides in the hands of a responsible country such as the US (or, history shows, Israel) has protected us from worst case wars for over a half century. There is no reason to anticipate any change in the future.
A world without nuclear weapons is pleasant to contemplate. A continuation, even an expansion of mutually assured destruction is not.
Now ask yourself, would a world without nuclear deterrence in which the threat of the "Small Three" reigned supreme, its use not susceptible to effective retaliation be any better? Perhaps, it would be even worse?
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