The latest piece of amusement came along after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publicly reported that the Iranians had moved (with IAEA inspectors standing by) most of their stockpile of low enrichment uranium from its underground storage facility to a processing plant above ground. That's right, bucko, over two tons of the stuff right there in a shed visible and attackable from the air.
The physical movement came on the heels of the policy move announced by the Iranian Orator-in-Chief to the effect that Iran was proceeding with enrichment to the twenty percent level in order that Iranians might not lack medical radioisotopes produced in the elderly, US furnished nuclear reactor. The deed coming so quickly in the wake of the words pushed the hot buttons of Iran watchers from Tokyo to Washington. After all, even the most ignorant of diplomats and decision makers understands that once the twenty percent enrichment level is made it is all a bob sled run downhill to weapons grade product.
A flurry of meetings, consultations, and viewings-with-alarm ensued at warp speed. The focus of all these--including at least some of the recent visits to Israel by senior US military figures--has been twofold: Why did the Iranians move the goods? and How to keep Israel from responding to the opportunity?
The rather large contingent of those who believe the Iranians are slicker than Bill Clinton on a good day quickly (one is tempted to write "reflexively") ascribed the move to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which is allegedly seeking to invite an Israeli attack in pursuit of both national unity and a final war with the "Zionist entity." They argue that putting all the nuclear eggs in one basket (well, one large specially constructed cask) with a figurative sign reading "Bomb Here" would constitute an invitation the Israelis could not refuse and the results would be good from the perspective of a badly beleaguered regime.
The Iranian people would unite as one behind the mullahs and the mullahs' men. The hounds of war would be unleashed with the possible result being the "final solution" of the Zionist problem.
As a piece of reasoning this impressive exercise in conspiracy thinking hangs together. It meshes well with the rhetoric of the regime. It takes some account of realities both in the region and the world. It is good enough to assure that the given-to-nervousness Obama administration would launch a quiet diplomatic offensive to keep the Israelis on the reservation.
As reasoning the hypothesis is justifiable. As an exercise in realistic assessment it is not.
Iran is rather unlikely to place the vast majority of its uranium, its potential future nuclear capability, its diplomatic trump card, at high risk. The Koran wavers of Tehran are willing to take calculated risks but not make risky gambles. They are most likely convinced that neither Israel nor the US is convinced that the time is right for the "military option."
This assessment is correct. The push-comes-to-shove moment is not yet here. Arriving rapidly perhaps but not yet upon us.
Reinforcing the low probability of the move being a provocation is the reality that the Iranian centrifuge cascade has been showing itself to be inherently creaky and possessed of a less than impressive reliability. LEW once strewn across the landscape by missiles or bombs is not quickly nor easily replaced--particularly if the means of production are inefficient and cranky.
There is a simpler explanation. It lacks the charm and high drama of the Iranians-as-super-manipulators notion. But, it does meet both technical requirements and the past caution shown by the regime.
The alternative is this. The order to go ahead with twenty percent enrichment caught the engineers by surprise. To execute quickly they had no option but to move the LEW en bloc to the above ground facility and start the new cascade spinning. As was the case in the old Soviet Union, nothing must take precedence over meeting production norms.
This meant taking the calculated risk that Israel would be restrained from seeing an opportunity and taking it. This implied relying upon the Obama administration to carry Tehran's water effectively. It also assured that the production demand could be met in a timely fashion without delaying the production of more LEW.
Given the Obama administration's commitment to sanctions and consequent diplomacy, the Iranian bet was a safe one. Considering that China opposes sanctions as do several current members of the UN Security Council such as Brazil, the last thing the administration needs would be a typically muscular Israeli rising to the nuclear bait.
There is no doubt but JCS Chairman Mullen conveyed the "don't do it!" message loud and clear when he stopped in Israel last week. In doing so he was backstopped by the chief of police in Dubai and his investigation into the assassination of Hamas arms smuggler al-Mabhouh and the consequent diplomatic imbroglio.
The take-away? Simple. The Iranians are clever, but not that clever. They are goal oriented. Not yet suicidal.
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