Ahmadinejad is a very practiced player of brinksmanship, but he may have pushed the Russian button too hard for the good of his cause--gaining Iran nuclear weapons. The Iranian's "stern warning" that the American president was in the process of blowing his last best chance to gain Tehran's compliance with the much modified proposal to put some low enriched uranium in Turkish custody pending the delivery of twenty percent enriched fuel rods for its American supplied research and medical isotope producing reactor is more of the same old, "yadda-yadda and dabba-dabba-do," but his insulting "advice" to President Medvedev that the Russian needs to think longer and harder before joining the Western jihad against a "great nation" is a zebra of a completely different stripe.
The Russian response to Ahmadinejad's friendly counsel was not long coming. Nor was it particularly warm. Actually, "hot" would be a better characterization--as in white-hot with anger.
The Russian government is well aware that it has much more at stake in its relations with Iran than does the US. Russia has a wide variety of long-standing interests in play with Tehran, all of which are placed at real risk if Russia joins with the US, the UK, France, and Germany in rejecting the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil last weekend.
If the Iranian government and Mr Ahmadinejad really were as slicky-boy as they believe themselves to be, they would have had some slight chance of retaining some of the valuable support long given by Moscow at the UN and elsewhere. However, the "deal" put together by the Good Friends of Tehran did not begin to address the most fundamental and most troubling threats presented by the Iranian nuclear effort.
Since October, when Tehran first seemed to accept and then reject the initial proposal crafted by the US and its associates, the centrifuges have continued to spin. As a direct consequence, the temporary removal of twelve hundred kilograms of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium would not leave the Iranians with too little of the stuff to process to higher degrees of purity. The Russians can count as well as anyone else.
Secondly, the Grand Bargain left the Iranians committed to continuing to enrich their fissionables to a level of twenty percent even with the fuel rods en route. The only reason for this twist in Iranian policy was the desire to have a breakout capacity for weapons grade uranium, as it is vastly simpler and faster to go from twenty percent to ninety plus than it is to go from zero to 3.5 or from 3.5 to twenty percent. Having made more than a tad of highly enriched uranium themselves, the Russians know how the game is played.
Finally the Great Deal did not address the new and improved--and greatly enlarged--enrichment facilities which Tehran has under construction or planned. The new capacities are far in excess of whatever legitimate need for low enriched reactor fuel might be needed in the near term, or the much longer term for that matter. This discrepancy did not pass by the Russian eyes unnoticed.
Taken together with the insulting "friendly words" from Ahmadinejad, the Russians could be expected to go fast boost exoatmospheric. And, they did. The "advice" was categorically rejected by the top foreign policy advisor at the Kremlin, Sergei Prikhodko, as "political demagoguery." He added,
Any unpredictability, any political extremism, lack of transparency or inconsistency in taking decisions that affect and concern the entire world community is unacceptable for us.A better and more accurate description of Iranian behavior is hard to make.
A second Sergei, this time Sergei Karaganov, the head of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which is quite influential and reflects the thinking and views of those in the Kremlin, observed that the Iranians "were digging their own grave."
Of course, actions count for much more than mere words in foreign relations--a fact of life which has not penetrated the thinking of President Obama yet. For the Russians, as for many seasoned players of the game of nations, words are the necessary precursor of action--and point in the direction the actions will most likely take.
Currently, the Russian built reactor is scheduled to go online in August. It is, of course, possible now that "technical" problems might retard the event. Or, another dispute between Tehran and Moscow over the financial end of the transaction may emerge. Or, some other unforeseen difficulty will manifest itself. You get the point--Russia has the initiative and can use it when and how doing such best serves Russian national interests.
Then there is the matter of the S-300 air defense system. The Obama administration went the extra set of miles to exempt this deal from any upcoming sanctions much to the delight of the Kremlin. Now it is quite possible that the Ahmadinejad "friendly words" will serve to cause the Russians to reconsider delivery. They have, after all, been paid for the hardware in major part. It would be a no risk, no lose means of retaliation for the insults and intended pressure.
As any number of past American presidents could have informed Ahmadinejad, nothing fails faster in desired results with the Russians than pressure openly and ineptly applied. The Kremlin will and has responded favorably to demonstrations of political will resolutely applied over time, but never to open threats--most importantly those delivered with an outrageous effrontery.
It is possible that the Ahmadinejad fusillade was intended not for the Kremlin but rather for the folks back home in Buncomb County. The spewing of threats couched as concerned warnings might have simply been meant to cover Ahmadinejad's hind end from any sniping on the part of the ultras in Tehran or Qom. Or, the Iranian semi-maximum leader might simply have been his own, old, usual out-to-lunch self.
In any event, Ahmadinejad has provided a very real service for all of those who want to see Iran never obtaining nuclear weapons. Thank Allah for such large mercies as Ahmadinejad and his ever ready mouth.
No comments:
Post a Comment