The lightly redacted documents were released as the result of a request by an American researcher, Sasha Polakow-Suransky. The "incriminating" papers were supposed to be kept in the strictest of confidence by both governments, but the ANC offspring which currently runs the country had no problem taking an action which might discredit both its White dominated predecessor and Israel. This does raise the interesting question of the degree to which successor governments are bound by the commitments of those gone before, a question which has implications far beyond those of political and diplomatic embarrassment.
Not surprisingly the office of Shimon Peres, who is now President of Israel was quick to deny the allegations. What else is to be expected? The Israelis are most unlikely to admit, "Gosh, guys, you caught us. So much for nuclear ambiguity."
There is no shock contained in the offer to sell "all three sizes." Way back in the mid-Seventies, at least in certain circles located in a suburb of Washington, D.C., the buzz regarding nuclear cooperation between the pariah states of Israel and South Africa (on occasion Taiwan was mentioned as well) focused not only on mutual development schemes but the possibility of a direct sale. The buzz was pervasive enough that it was (and is) not credible that the US government at the highest levels was not aware of the the potentials involved.
In the immediate aftermath of the American debacle in Vietnam there was very real anxiety in the US government regarding Soviet "adventurism" in Africa among other areas. The realities of the day favored the Kissinger invention of regional hegemons acting as American proxies-for-stability in threatened areas. To this end the US offered increased assistance to, among others, the Shah of Iran, and countenanced the "two track" strategy and its aftermath in Chile.
Internal political pressures prevented any form of wide open support for the apartheid government of South Africa. Lower visibility efforts were permissible. The range of options would have included an absence of commentary regarding a joint nuclear development effort between Israel and South Africa or even a suitably sub rosa transfer of a limited number of nuclear weapons.
Not to sharpen the point too much, the US under different administrations of both parties had a real affection for the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity. It was seen with justice as having a desired inhibitory effect upon surrounding states. (This affection survived even the successful effort in nuclear blackmail practiced by the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War.)
It could be posited more (think Reagan) or less (think Carter) openly that a South African gambit in nuclear ambiguity would serve the same ends of stability enhancement in the south of Africa that it had in the Mideast. Not even the (in)famous "double flash" reports in 1990 served to push the US to a more open opposition of any nascent South African nuclear weapons program.
The overarching dictates of the Cold War assured that the US would limit its pressure on the much disliked apartheid regime. We needed not only stability in the region but also the direct assistance of the regime in our efforts to keep the sealanes of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean unimpeded by any Soviet threat. Down until the collapse of the Soviet empires both outer and inner, the cooperation of South Africa was vital to the protection of our national and strategic interests.
The proximity in time between the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Whites Only government serves to underscore not only the importance of American "understanding" but also the vital nature of South Africa to the prosecution of the Cold War. The turning of a Nelsonian eye to the nuclear ambitions of South Africa by Uncle Sam, which would have included any direct Israel-to-South Africa sale of nukes, was both expectable and justifiable in the dynamics of the day.
The release of the documents by the Zuma government is of use and benefit only to those who currently wish Israel ill. Of course, that crowd is both numerous and diverse, ranging as it does from the politically articulate elites of Europe and the US to the many Islamic governments around the world.
The release does, however, harm the efforts by civilized states to deny nuclear weapons to the mullahs of Iran. The harm may prove in the next few weeks to be of a major sort. This reality and its potential implications are what give the release interest.
In the real world where Iran either will or will not acquire nuclear weapons and all that goes with that, the South African government by this action has joined with the uncivilized states. It has linked with those who are either too naive or too ideologically prejudiced to see just what can result from a failure to ban the bomb for Iran.
South Africa's government does not deserve congratulations for its commitment to honesty and transparency. Rather it deserves rigorous condemnation for hurting the cause of preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.
It is regrettable in the extreme that the Guardian among others so despises Israel that is is eager to celebrate a victory for Iran.
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