If You Like Pakistan, You'll Love The "Arab Summer"

Now that all the hyperbolic prattling about the wave of democracy rushing tsunami like over the sands of Arabia is fading away, perhaps overpowered by the sounds of exploding NATO delivered ordnance in Libya, it is possible to take a less biased look at the most likely course of events for the long hot Arab "summer" which is looming like the smoke of an Arizona wildfire.  While the details of the forthcoming "summer" are obscure, the broad outlines are coming more clear by the day.

It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months.  This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment.  It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military.  Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.

In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed.  This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism.  Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.  But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.

Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence.  There is a simple reason for this prediction.  Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam.  Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.

Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely.  At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade.  At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power.  Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979.  To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.

The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired.  As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood.  It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders.  Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast.  No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces.  At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.

The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam.  The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora.  This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.

Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination.  This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole.  Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.

The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states.  They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools.  There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan.  The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.

The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt.  The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk.  Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole.  The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased.  As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.

The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises.  This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists.  Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy.  Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign.  Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly.  The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.

The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies.  This disengagement will exclude Israel.  The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.

With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense.  The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems.  As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium.  In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.

If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM.  The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0.  With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.

The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building."  We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention.  This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.

The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible.  The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition.  The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest.  To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.

On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan.  All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring.  The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad.  The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training.  Damn good training."