A Suggestion For Republican Presidential Aspirants

The next election is going to be decided primarily but not exclusively on the matter of jobs and who has the better ideas for creating them.  Other matters such as the deficit, national security, and foreign policy will be (much?) further down the list of voter concerns.  Of course, a terrorist outrage will change the priorities rather rapidly.

The reality is that jobs and the deficit are linked directly and materially to both national security and foreign policy.  There are a lot of people who may not like that linkage, may even argue that it doesn't exist today any more than it did in the good old days of the cold war.  Wishful thinking, for the world and its politics to say nothing of its economic dynamics have shifted markedly since the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union faded away.

The short period of apparent American unipolar dominance has ended.  The globalization phenomena have continued.  And, the threat of violent political Islam remains upon us.  All of these provide links between jobs, the deficit, national security, and foreign policy.  Given that no serious contender on the GOP side has put forth any excuse for a foreign and national security policy beyond traditional boilerplate and bromides, the Geek being public spirited has taken it upon himself to provide some ideas for the so far empty Republican platitudes.

Any viable foreign policy for the future must be predicated upon a few clear cut predicates which are both in our national interest and comport reasonably well with our historical values and norms.  Fortunately, it is not hard to have a policy which is true to our roots while protecting and advancing our future.  The matter is actually so simple that even a politician can grasp it.

The first principle of American foreign policy must be that of non-intervention.  By this, it is meant that the US will not intervene in the purely internal affairs of a sovereign state.  We may deplore and rhetorically condemn a state for what it does to its citizens.  We may deny it any cooperation, assistance, or support, but we will not use any method to seek regime change.  Unless.  Unless a state harbors, facilitates, or engages in the direct or indirect use of force against our interests, our citizens, or, under carefully circumscribed circumstances, those of states with which the US has a close and ongoing relationship.  Unless a state infringes on this bright and shining line, it and its leaders are safe from our kinetic capacities.

The US should get out of the foreign aid game except for humanitarian needs and then only in conjunction with ad hoc coalitions of states and NGOs having a shared concern in the specific need.  It is particularly critical that the US not provide any direct aid to any Muslim majority state so as to preclude the usage of that aid as "proof" that the US is paying jizya.  All too often Muslim clerics have taken the public position that the foreign aid provided by the US to, say, Egypt, is not aid but rather the protection money paid to Muslims under the doctrine of infidel submission to Muslim protection.

In a similar way, the US should ramp down its payments to the UN both for direct operating expenses and peacekeeping until they reach a level that the American per capita payment is no more than the average per capita contribution from the General Assembly's aggregate membership.  The UN is not particularly useful nor effective in meeting the needs of now and the future.  Far better are ad hoc coalitions brought together by coinciding national interest.  These coalitions have been far more effective from the days of the First Gulf War until now than has either the UN or regional organizations.

The US must also get out of the arms transfer game.  No more free weapons to anyone.  While direct military sales should remain intact, the long standing program of providing free or cut rate weapons to "friendly" states has long outlived its usefulness.  Over the decades, this approach has done much to perpetuate in power an array of highly distasteful dictatorships to no real advantage of the US and many disadvantages.

The time has come to dismantle the web of overseas military bases which are a no longer needed legacy of the cold war.  A few, small joint tenancy bases for rapid reaction and special operation forces must be retained but major overseas deployments and basing of heavy American units is not a strategic advantage any longer given the changes in the nature of future threats and defense technology generally.

Now for something radical.  The time is on us to furl the nuclear umbrella.  It is not credible any longer given the changes in the makeup of the nuclear club in recent years.  While the US must retain a finite deterrent oriented nuclear capability, the reality of now and the future is that regional balances of nuclear deterrence is more likely to be more credible to those smaller powers most tempted to go to war over long standing frictions or ambitions.  While this necessarily implies nuclear proliferation, this consequence will not make the globe less safe, rather it extends the dynamic of high risk equals high stability which was the hallmark of the cold war to potential regional conflicts.

This proposal does not mean an end to conflict but rather makes the world safe for war.  Conflicts will have to be carried on in ways which decouple the potential of escalation across the nuclear threshold.  With the possible exception of an eschatological regime, states are not given to mutual suicide pacts.  This in turn implies that most future wars--at least those between nuclear capable states--will be conducted by proxy, terror, targeted killings, or will occur in cyberspace.  Not pretty to be sure but without the globe rocking impact of even a very limited nuclear exchange.

This radical proposal is not radical so much as it is an honest acknowledgement that the nuclear control regime as well as the missile technology control counterpart sought by the status quo powers of the US, the USSR, and China has failed substantially.  States for reasons which are sufficient to themselves have violated the agreements which they have signed and transferred or allowed to have transferred prohibited knowledge and materials to non-nuclear, non-missile states.  This will continue with or without a clear abandonment by the US of the failed agreements and dependent regimes.

Knowledge is the key word here.  Not simply for nuclear and related matters but as a prime, perhaps the prime criterion for defining American relationship with other states.  Given that invention, innovation, and the pursuing of new knowledge is the key to a better, more prosperous and perhaps more stable and secure global future, it is imperative that the US guide its foreign relations on the principle of commitment to open and free inquiry and expression in all fields of discourse without exception or limit.

Our closest, broadest, and most profound relations must be with states which show a total dedication of some duration to free and open inquiry, expression, and exchange of information.  While relations with states which limit freedom of inquiry and expression are both possible and necessary, these must be both ad hoc and based simply on specific coinciding interests.  The most intimate relations the US can have are those with states which share the value of untrammeled inquiry and expression.

The more restrictive a state is of free inquiry and expression, the more arm's length the relation with the US should, must be.  This will work to the disadvantage of the restrictive state over time as will its very restrictiveness.  Indeed, a viable national security strategy is to cooperate with the restriction of information flow to the restrictive state.  This will hurt the restrictor far more than it will the US and its collaborators in this form of intellectual blockade.

Even though the US must retain a nuclear arsenal of finite deterrent orientation, our emphasis must be on approaches suitable for the post-nuclear environment.  This means further development of post-nuclear weapons systems whether hyperbaric explosives, smart nails, or similar projectiles and means of delivery.  It also means a much greater capacity in special operations including those of a lethal and black nature.  And, above all, it means a focus on cyberspace in both defensive and offensive ways.

The day of the massive naval fleet, the floating sovereignty of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier battle group, are ending.  This also applies to heavy armored forces which demand forward deployment or a long build-up period.  Arguably, the day of the manned bomber is also over or nearly so given the rapid improvements in the technology of UAVs.  On the budget front, this is a mix of good and bad news: less money for force maintenance but a lot more bucks for research, development, and procurement.  Such is life--no peace dividend.

This cursory view of the national security and foreign policy waterfront is meant to be indicative not a prescription.  The real deal on which to get a grip is simply that the world has changed and is changing more and much faster than the Romney-Gingrich-Palin-Huntsman-or whoever group appears to recognize.  It has changed more and much faster and in directions quite foreign to the mind of Professor Obama.  Someone out there needs to understand this and make some detailed policy statements that show they are actually well oriented in time and place.

It won't happen of course.  But one can hope for a change.  It is our future which is at risk.