Bad Analogies Equal Bad Results

There are a lot of people--including senior decision makers, even heads of state--who think by association.  You know it, the this-reminds-me-of-that approach to assessments and deciding.  It is this mental characteristic which results in the often used and frequently quite misleading reasoning by analogy.

Foreign policy, even matters of war and peace, are quite susceptible to reasoning by analogy.  A complex current situation is understood and explained by use of an overly simplified, normally highly inapposite analogy.

So it was during the Vietnam War when criticism of the war was typically rebuffed by use of the Munich analogy.  "Anything less than total commitment to stopping Ho Chi Minh is appeasement."  During the run up to the Gulf War twenty years ago, President George H.W. Bush constantly used Hitler as an analogy for Saddam Hussein--a comparison which was unfair to both men.

During the weeks preceding the more recent invasion of Iraq, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and many others assured each other and the American public that the invading troops would be greeted by cheering multitudes, bouquets of flowers, and general rejoicing in a manner identical with the reception given the American, British, and Canadian forces during the days following the landings in Normandy.  It was a heartwarming picture, easily reinforced by ancient black and white footage of joyously delirious French crowds waving American and other flags.  The idea like the grainy images were so appealing, so easy to believe, so seductive, so---

Wrong.  Utterly, absolutely, totally wrong.  The analogy used with such abandon by the planners and decision makers right up to the Decider Guy in the Oval equating the warmth purportedly extended to the Allied "liberators" in France with what would be expected in Iraq was tragically, disastrously wrong.  The tragedy and disaster alike came from the fact that planning for the day after was based upon an analogy which was not only indescribably wrong for the Iraqi context but was without basis in the reality of the days following 6 June 1944.

Wait one, Geek!  The old newsreels did show crowds of French and Belgian citizens kissing the GIs, the Tommies, tossing flowers, waving bottles of wine and champaign.  That was the truth.  All contemporary films, news reports, letters, even private diaries attest to that.

You bettcha, bucko.  The crowds, the cheers, the kisses were all genuine.  But, none came from the actual combat zone.  All happened after the breakout from the beachhead and the drive across France was in full sway with the Germans beating feet in all out retreat.

In the combat zones, in the areas surrounding the landing zones, the picture was completely different.  Different and not so encouraging.  Where the fighting occurred, there were no cheers, no kisses, no flowers, no joy.  The diaries, the letters, the censored and therefore never published dispatches, the intelligence reports all agree.  At best, the local folk, the French who cowered in fear as the bombs fell and the shells exploded, as their cities, towns, and villages were ground to dust by the white hot plow of war, were at best sullen, withdrawn, and anything but kindly predisposed to their "liberators."

The only reasons that armed resistance did not break out from the wells of local hostility were the lack of effective organization and, more importantly, the very high density of Allied personnel on the ground--some two million just before the breakout nearly two months after D-day.  Still, the anti-Allied sentiments were clear in attitudes and behavior alike across the ruins of Normandy.  The intelligence and civil affairs documents of the day make that obvious.

The joy of liberation sprang forth only in those areas of France and Belgium where there was no, or, at worst, minimal combat operations and concomitant damage and death.  Good feelings were directly proportionate to the lack of dead bodies and broken buildings.

Whether from pure ignorance or volitional misinterpretation, the Bush-Cheney neocon crew used a false analogy so neither the administration nor the military nor the American and world public were prepared for the instant outbreak of violence in the wake of the invasion.  There were no cheers.  No flowers tossed at the onrushing tanks.  No plethora of kissing.  There was a lot of looting.  A lot of shooting.  A lot of resistance both silently sullen and noisily hyperactive.

There was also a lot of local settling of old scores.  This aspect of the invasion and its aftermath could and should have been predicted on the basis of the World War II in France analogy.  The settling of assorted political scores, debts, vendettas poured swaths of blood the length and breadth of France.  This sanguinary effusion was well known at the time as it is by later generations of historians.  Only the Bush/Cheney crew seemed unaware of it with the result there were insufficient men and resources to deal quickly with the problems of "liberation."  The results of that are well known by all of us.

Bad analogy brought bad results.

But all the use of bad analogy does not exist on the American side of the hill.  It resides as well, for example, in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iranian president Ahmadinejad commented during his recent Great American Tour that the US had never been involved in a "real war."  He opined that not even World War II, generally considered to be an excellent example of the breed, constituted a "real war."  The Ahmadinejad view of history and war has been echoed repeatedly by senior Iranian governmental and military officials over the past several years.  The constant refrain of Iranian military supremacy and an equivalent lack of American competence in the field can be amusing or infuriating in its unrealistic appraisals.  However, it is based on reasoning by analogy.

The prevalent Iranian understanding of war is predicated quite unsurprisingly on the Iraq-Iran War, which started thirty years ago.  To the Iranians, particularly those of Ahmadinejad's generation, this singularly bloody and inconclusive multi-year conflict is the paradigm of modern war.  The Iranians have produced a narrative of the war which celebrates their steadfastness, bravery, willingness to die, ability to accept fatalities unequalled since the brutal combat on the Eastern Front during World War II.  The narrative always concludes that the ability of Iranians to die in windrows and keep on fighting constitutes the strength of their nation and thus its ability to best the US or Israel or whoever.

The problem comes in that the analogy of the Iraq-Iran War is utterly, totally, and absolutely wrong.  The ground truth behind this evaluation is the simple fact that the war was not a modern war.  Rather it was a Medieval war fought with modern weapons.  This is a crucial distinction which renders the analogy fatally dangerous to the Iranian decision makers who rely upon it in making choices regarding the confrontation with the US and other Powers.

The Iraq-Iran War was Medieval in its essential nature.  There was no concept of strategy, operations, or tactics beyond that of hurling masses of poorly trained or completely untrained men in assaults on prepared positions.  In this respect the Iraq-Iran War was far below even the stereotyped and unsuccessful approaches to combat seen on the Western Front between November 1914 and early 1918.

Even the use of missiles during the so called "war of the cities" phase of the Iraq-Iran War did not differ from the use of trebuchets tossing corpses and incendiary payloads over the walls of fortified towns during Medieval campaigns.  There was no aspect of modern mobility, modern command, control, and communications, no correct coordination of movement and firepower.

In comparison, the battles of Crecy or Agincourt were modern.  At least these showed tactical and weapons employment features of a novel sort with the result the British won at low cost against a larger French force relying on outdated methods.

Ahmadinejad and company do not show any appreciation of the American way of war either in its classical sense as exhibited in World War II or even in Korea and Vietnam or in its more evolved form exhibited in both Iraq wars as well as in Afghanistan.  Ever since the mind altering experience of the War Between the States, the US has emphasized the expenditure of materiel over the sacrifice of American lives.

During World War II or Korea or even Vietnam, the US was willing and able to heave awesome amounts of lethal stuff down range if such would save American lives.  In these conflicts the US was relatively oblivious to collateral damage and civilian deaths--as the French in Normandy found out on and after 6 June 1944.  It was not that the US intentionally sought civilian collateral damage.  Rather, it was the technological limitations which precluded any true precision which might have spared lives and property.

The imperatives of changing international norms as well as realpolitik considerations in interventionary operations combined with a need to assure that every round fired had a maximum probability of scoring a first round kill to propel the development of ever more accurate weapons and munitions.  It is not that the US now wants to wage bloodless war, but the need to limit collateral damage while enhancing the potential of killing those in need of being killed have become preeminent.  The ideal weapon from the American perspective now is one which will kill the target first time, every time, without splattering any viscera on the "innocent" person standing at the target's shoulder.

The result is the capacity to inflict awesome devastation on a target.  Whatever must be hit will be hit.  And, if hit, will be obliterated (hopefully leaving enough DNA in the smear of protoplasm to allow identification).  Even hardened or mobile targets cannot escape engagement and obliteration.  A very great deal of money and brain power have been expended on assuring the ability to find, engage, and destroy even fleeting and intentionally elusive targets.  As much has been spent on developing means to penetrate hardened targets with non-nuclear munitions and pleasingly destructive effects.

Coupling this weapons and munitions approach with a highly evolved intelligence, command, control, and communication system gives the US a capacity to find, fix in place, and destroy targets which is hard to match and impossible to exceed.  This constellation along with the superb mobility and flexibility of US forces constitutes genuinely modern war.

While the Iranians may have progressed somewhat beyond the Tenth Century level of warfare, which constitutes their paradigmatic experience, there is no reason to assess their level of competence in modern war to be anywhere near that of the US or other civilized states.  As a result, any reasoning by analogy with the Iraq-Iran War will prove (literally) fatal to the Iranian regime.

Bad analogy brings bad results.  Or, should the Iranians insist on basing their calculus of defiance on their narrative, the results may as severe as the ending of Iran as a functioning state.

Oh, well, it couldn't happen to a more deserving bunch of guys.

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The "War" Behind The War

The real conflict is being fought not in Afghanistan but rather over Afghanistan. The war behind the war is the one over how the US should fight in Afghanistan. It is a war between opponents even more bitter in their opposition than is the ISAF and Taliban.

The semi-covert war behind the overt one in Afghanistan is waged between conventional soldiers and the special operators. This war started long before Osama bin Laden came to realize that Allah or someone was calling upon him to wage jihad against the "Crusaders." It is a war which has been fought with greater and lesser vigor ever since the first conventional forces were sent to a predictable failure in Vietnam. It is likely to continue long after the last American boot has shaken the soil of Afghanistan from its sole.

The conduct and outcome of the war behind the war will do much to determine the degree to which the US succeeds or fails to achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing" in Afghanistan. The process of the war behind the war will also do much to dictate not only if the US will have to stage a rematch of the Civilized World versus the Islamists but also whether or not it will succeed or fail the next time around.

The firing of General McChrystal was one small skirmish in the war behind the war. McChrystal was the very definition of special operator. His entire active career was in special operations. McChrystal's intellectual focus was on the requirements for success in the most difficult of unconventional military operations, those of an interventionary nature, the wars of insurgency and its counter.

The astute observer would have counted McChrystal's days as numbered the moment he released his operational doctrine with its curtailment of American usage of artillery and air delivered firepower. With his reorientation on protecting civilian lives even at the cost of placing more Americans at greater risk, General McChrystal directly challenged a definer of the uniquely American way of war which has existed nearly long as the doctrine of civilian supremacy. The American way of war gelled in the aftermath of the War Between the States and its overwhelmingly high butcher's bill.

Ever since the Civil War, the sine qua non of US military operations has been the curtailment of American losses. Over the years and through the many, many wars which have occurred since 1865, the US has spent much time, much money, and a very great deal of industrial and technological innovation on the challenge of replacing loss of blood with the expenditure of munitions.

The defining profligacy of American firepower has been commented upon repeatedly by our allies and adversaries alike. During World War II, where either the British or the Germans would have sent a patrol, the Americans heaved tons of munitions downrange from artillery tubes almost beyond counting and aircraft formations which darkened the noon sky. The lavish expenditure of munitions went a very long way to assuring that American troops came home on their own two legs and not on a stretcher or in a body bag.

There is no doubt that in a peer-to-peer conflict, the American way of war is both effective and easily justified by its results. Even in a limited war in support of policy such as the Korean War, the American way of war limited costs to mere dollars and not lives. Nonetheless, the US did have to spill blood at meaningless terrain features such as Pork Chop Hill so as to convince the Chinese that we had the political will to fight on regardless of loss.

Hostile observers have long concluded that the American unwillingness to shed the blood of its troops constituted a fatal weakness. When this reluctance was linked (as it inevitably has been) to our equal distaste for expending time on something so wasteful as a war, some adversaries have become convinced that the sovereign counter to the US was to be found in combining the infliction of casualties upon us with the prolongation of the war.

The second part of the How To Defeat The Americans Theory has been called into question by the evident willingness of two presidents to keep on keeping on regardless of the prospect of "victory" or the growing unpopularity of the war with We the People. However, the first part, the more important part of the Recipe For Defeating the American Infidels, is still operative, still to be placed to a full and effective test.

Insofar as General McChrystal's operational concept of "courageous restraint" provided a real change in the views held by Afghan civilians toward the Americans, it was an operational and tactical success. A comparative consideration of enemy initiated versus friendly initiated and meeting engagements covering the months before and after the McChrystal ordered change shows the balance was shifting decisively in favor of the foreigners.

Not to put too sharp a point on the matter, the McChrystal doctrine turned the battlefield and political tides from the negative to the positive. McChrystal's sound understanding of the political and psychological nature of the insurgent-counterinsurgent conflict with its emphasis upon protecting the uncommitted majority from the harm of battle was paying off.

Ironically the successes, preliminary and incomplete as they were, had no impact upon the majority of the troops, particularly the officers, carrying out the new order of battle. To the men on the sharp end of the stick, the new rules of engagement were tantamount to fighting while leaving our best, most lethal, weapons left back at base.

No man, as the Geek well knows, likes the idea of taking more risks than the minimum necessary. The nature of operations in Afghanistan assures there are risks enough without seeming to add to them by limiting the use of artillery and air support. There is no surprise that the McChrystal approach would result in more than a little bit of bitching and moaning--particularly as the operational tempo ticked up with casualties doing the same.

The degree of complaint was far greater, however, than could easily be justified by actual combat losses, which showed no undue increase given the enhanced tempo of operations. But, the McChrystal approach did more than simply enhance the perceived (as distinguished from actual) risks on the battlefield, it called into question the entire "find, fix, and destroy" doctrine which has governed US military doctrine since before World War II.

Despite the fact that the "firepower kills and killing equals victory" approach to war was proven massively irrelevant in the Vietnam War, it was followed both in Iraq and Afghanistan far too long.

In Iraq, the change in American fortunes came with the "surge" but not because of the "surge." Rather the increase in American success came with a decrease in US inflicted Iraqi casualties. It came because the Marines and some Army units went from the "shoot-move-communicate" understanding of war to one which emphasized the human factors, the reality that the battleground which mattered was the perceptions and attitudes of the uncommitted majority of the Iraqi population coupled with constant pressure on the hard core of insurgent true believers.

General McChrystal's special forces played a very key role in the successes in Iraq attributed in the media and on the Hill to General Petraeus. McChrystal carried the lessons of Iraq along with the broader lessons of counterinsurgency with him to Afghanistan.

The mere fact that McChrystal, a lifelong member of the Special Forces, the red-headed stepchild of the Army, was jumped to command in Afghanistan was a major irritant to the conventional soldiers. McChrystal's predecessors were all good conventional troops, distinguished treadheads in the main. Nonetheless, they had lost control of the battlefield to the enemy.

When McChrystal's new approach bore immediate positive results, the irritation grew to overwhelming proportions. Making the irritation all the worse was SecDef Gate's view that the US would be facing asymmetrical conflicts and not peer-to-peer wars in the near- and mid-term future. If McChrystal's new doctrine were to succeed, the future for the treadheads and big bore tube meisters of the conventional army would be grim to say the least.

With that as context it isn't surprising that no voices were raised in defense of McChrystal's ill-advised words in Rolling Stone. It isn't surprising that all ran for cover behind the spurious notion that the outspoken spec-ops guy was an out of control rogue. Nor is it shocking that he was speedily replaced by a man, General Petraeus, who is a good, conventional man at heart.

Petraeus' dedication to the "firepower kills and killing brings victory" notion became evident during his confirmation hearings when he promised to "review" the limitations imposed on artillery and air delivered firepower. He will conduct the review and, in highest probability, slacken the restrictions.

Any slackening, any backing off from "courageous restraint" will inevitably result in collateral civilian causalities. With the best of intents, the closest of command and control, big guns and fast movers will kill non-combatants. As a result, the uncommitted majority of the Afghan population will once again swing toward Taliban and away from the US and ISAF. The situation will return to the status quo ante McChrystal.

At the same time, responsibility for the American failure will be offloaded to the Afghan government and security forces. There is much reason to do so. The Karzai government has a very laid back attitude toward the massive corruption which is and always has been a component of Afghan political life. The Karzai government is given to the notion of a separate peace with Taliban as such is in its own best interests given the conviction that the Americans will not stay the course and lack both the will and ability to defeat Taliban et al militarily.

While it matters only slightly to the US what sort of government rules in Afghanistan, it is a matter of key national importance as to whether or not the future government of the place thinks it is safe in offering safe haven to Islamist entities planning harm to the US and its interests or those of its allies. It is a matter of great national importance if other Islamist groups around the world are emboldened by the perception of an American military failure in Afghanistan.

However, it appears that these larger, longer term potentials resident in an American military failure is of far less concern to the conventional soldiers of the high ranks. Their lodestone is the superiority of the treads, tubes, and gunships of the "real" Army. Their hope is that another "incomplete policy success" in Afghanistan such as that experienced in Vietnam will end any consideration of future US involvement in these nasty little wars of intervention.

"No more Afghanistans" will join "No more Vietnams" as a way of allowing the generals and other budgeteers to get on with the real mission of preparing for wars the US is less likely rather than more to be fighting in the years to come. The "peace at any price" and "blame America first" contingents of the American political and media elite will embrace the same two slogans in their never ending campaign to assure the US drops to the second tier of nation-states.