Bad Analogies Equal Bad Results

There are a lot of people--including senior decision makers, even heads of state--who think by association.  You know it, the this-reminds-me-of-that approach to assessments and deciding.  It is this mental characteristic which results in the often used and frequently quite misleading reasoning by analogy.

Foreign policy, even matters of war and peace, are quite susceptible to reasoning by analogy.  A complex current situation is understood and explained by use of an overly simplified, normally highly inapposite analogy.

So it was during the Vietnam War when criticism of the war was typically rebuffed by use of the Munich analogy.  "Anything less than total commitment to stopping Ho Chi Minh is appeasement."  During the run up to the Gulf War twenty years ago, President George H.W. Bush constantly used Hitler as an analogy for Saddam Hussein--a comparison which was unfair to both men.

During the weeks preceding the more recent invasion of Iraq, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and many others assured each other and the American public that the invading troops would be greeted by cheering multitudes, bouquets of flowers, and general rejoicing in a manner identical with the reception given the American, British, and Canadian forces during the days following the landings in Normandy.  It was a heartwarming picture, easily reinforced by ancient black and white footage of joyously delirious French crowds waving American and other flags.  The idea like the grainy images were so appealing, so easy to believe, so seductive, so---

Wrong.  Utterly, absolutely, totally wrong.  The analogy used with such abandon by the planners and decision makers right up to the Decider Guy in the Oval equating the warmth purportedly extended to the Allied "liberators" in France with what would be expected in Iraq was tragically, disastrously wrong.  The tragedy and disaster alike came from the fact that planning for the day after was based upon an analogy which was not only indescribably wrong for the Iraqi context but was without basis in the reality of the days following 6 June 1944.

Wait one, Geek!  The old newsreels did show crowds of French and Belgian citizens kissing the GIs, the Tommies, tossing flowers, waving bottles of wine and champaign.  That was the truth.  All contemporary films, news reports, letters, even private diaries attest to that.

You bettcha, bucko.  The crowds, the cheers, the kisses were all genuine.  But, none came from the actual combat zone.  All happened after the breakout from the beachhead and the drive across France was in full sway with the Germans beating feet in all out retreat.

In the combat zones, in the areas surrounding the landing zones, the picture was completely different.  Different and not so encouraging.  Where the fighting occurred, there were no cheers, no kisses, no flowers, no joy.  The diaries, the letters, the censored and therefore never published dispatches, the intelligence reports all agree.  At best, the local folk, the French who cowered in fear as the bombs fell and the shells exploded, as their cities, towns, and villages were ground to dust by the white hot plow of war, were at best sullen, withdrawn, and anything but kindly predisposed to their "liberators."

The only reasons that armed resistance did not break out from the wells of local hostility were the lack of effective organization and, more importantly, the very high density of Allied personnel on the ground--some two million just before the breakout nearly two months after D-day.  Still, the anti-Allied sentiments were clear in attitudes and behavior alike across the ruins of Normandy.  The intelligence and civil affairs documents of the day make that obvious.

The joy of liberation sprang forth only in those areas of France and Belgium where there was no, or, at worst, minimal combat operations and concomitant damage and death.  Good feelings were directly proportionate to the lack of dead bodies and broken buildings.

Whether from pure ignorance or volitional misinterpretation, the Bush-Cheney neocon crew used a false analogy so neither the administration nor the military nor the American and world public were prepared for the instant outbreak of violence in the wake of the invasion.  There were no cheers.  No flowers tossed at the onrushing tanks.  No plethora of kissing.  There was a lot of looting.  A lot of shooting.  A lot of resistance both silently sullen and noisily hyperactive.

There was also a lot of local settling of old scores.  This aspect of the invasion and its aftermath could and should have been predicted on the basis of the World War II in France analogy.  The settling of assorted political scores, debts, vendettas poured swaths of blood the length and breadth of France.  This sanguinary effusion was well known at the time as it is by later generations of historians.  Only the Bush/Cheney crew seemed unaware of it with the result there were insufficient men and resources to deal quickly with the problems of "liberation."  The results of that are well known by all of us.

Bad analogy brought bad results.

But all the use of bad analogy does not exist on the American side of the hill.  It resides as well, for example, in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iranian president Ahmadinejad commented during his recent Great American Tour that the US had never been involved in a "real war."  He opined that not even World War II, generally considered to be an excellent example of the breed, constituted a "real war."  The Ahmadinejad view of history and war has been echoed repeatedly by senior Iranian governmental and military officials over the past several years.  The constant refrain of Iranian military supremacy and an equivalent lack of American competence in the field can be amusing or infuriating in its unrealistic appraisals.  However, it is based on reasoning by analogy.

The prevalent Iranian understanding of war is predicated quite unsurprisingly on the Iraq-Iran War, which started thirty years ago.  To the Iranians, particularly those of Ahmadinejad's generation, this singularly bloody and inconclusive multi-year conflict is the paradigm of modern war.  The Iranians have produced a narrative of the war which celebrates their steadfastness, bravery, willingness to die, ability to accept fatalities unequalled since the brutal combat on the Eastern Front during World War II.  The narrative always concludes that the ability of Iranians to die in windrows and keep on fighting constitutes the strength of their nation and thus its ability to best the US or Israel or whoever.

The problem comes in that the analogy of the Iraq-Iran War is utterly, totally, and absolutely wrong.  The ground truth behind this evaluation is the simple fact that the war was not a modern war.  Rather it was a Medieval war fought with modern weapons.  This is a crucial distinction which renders the analogy fatally dangerous to the Iranian decision makers who rely upon it in making choices regarding the confrontation with the US and other Powers.

The Iraq-Iran War was Medieval in its essential nature.  There was no concept of strategy, operations, or tactics beyond that of hurling masses of poorly trained or completely untrained men in assaults on prepared positions.  In this respect the Iraq-Iran War was far below even the stereotyped and unsuccessful approaches to combat seen on the Western Front between November 1914 and early 1918.

Even the use of missiles during the so called "war of the cities" phase of the Iraq-Iran War did not differ from the use of trebuchets tossing corpses and incendiary payloads over the walls of fortified towns during Medieval campaigns.  There was no aspect of modern mobility, modern command, control, and communications, no correct coordination of movement and firepower.

In comparison, the battles of Crecy or Agincourt were modern.  At least these showed tactical and weapons employment features of a novel sort with the result the British won at low cost against a larger French force relying on outdated methods.

Ahmadinejad and company do not show any appreciation of the American way of war either in its classical sense as exhibited in World War II or even in Korea and Vietnam or in its more evolved form exhibited in both Iraq wars as well as in Afghanistan.  Ever since the mind altering experience of the War Between the States, the US has emphasized the expenditure of materiel over the sacrifice of American lives.

During World War II or Korea or even Vietnam, the US was willing and able to heave awesome amounts of lethal stuff down range if such would save American lives.  In these conflicts the US was relatively oblivious to collateral damage and civilian deaths--as the French in Normandy found out on and after 6 June 1944.  It was not that the US intentionally sought civilian collateral damage.  Rather, it was the technological limitations which precluded any true precision which might have spared lives and property.

The imperatives of changing international norms as well as realpolitik considerations in interventionary operations combined with a need to assure that every round fired had a maximum probability of scoring a first round kill to propel the development of ever more accurate weapons and munitions.  It is not that the US now wants to wage bloodless war, but the need to limit collateral damage while enhancing the potential of killing those in need of being killed have become preeminent.  The ideal weapon from the American perspective now is one which will kill the target first time, every time, without splattering any viscera on the "innocent" person standing at the target's shoulder.

The result is the capacity to inflict awesome devastation on a target.  Whatever must be hit will be hit.  And, if hit, will be obliterated (hopefully leaving enough DNA in the smear of protoplasm to allow identification).  Even hardened or mobile targets cannot escape engagement and obliteration.  A very great deal of money and brain power have been expended on assuring the ability to find, engage, and destroy even fleeting and intentionally elusive targets.  As much has been spent on developing means to penetrate hardened targets with non-nuclear munitions and pleasingly destructive effects.

Coupling this weapons and munitions approach with a highly evolved intelligence, command, control, and communication system gives the US a capacity to find, fix in place, and destroy targets which is hard to match and impossible to exceed.  This constellation along with the superb mobility and flexibility of US forces constitutes genuinely modern war.

While the Iranians may have progressed somewhat beyond the Tenth Century level of warfare, which constitutes their paradigmatic experience, there is no reason to assess their level of competence in modern war to be anywhere near that of the US or other civilized states.  As a result, any reasoning by analogy with the Iraq-Iran War will prove (literally) fatal to the Iranian regime.

Bad analogy brings bad results.  Or, should the Iranians insist on basing their calculus of defiance on their narrative, the results may as severe as the ending of Iran as a functioning state.

Oh, well, it couldn't happen to a more deserving bunch of guys.

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Obama: The War Time Leader(?) And His Learning Curve

Continuing its record as a leading sycophant for the Nice Young Smiley Guy From Chicago, the NYT spewed hosannas on Mr Obama's steep learning curve as a war time president struggling with two inherited wars, the new peripherals consequent upon them, and his deep felt belief that the US and We the People need to be "transformed" in our domestic, quotidian lives. There should be no shock in the Geek's response, "What planet are you guys living on?"

The Geek brings several decades of beavering through the foreign policy archives (at least those so far declassified) of every post-World War II president from Truman through Clinton. This means he brings the vicarious experience of administrations covering the totality of the Cold War as well as the hot excrescences of Korea, Vietnam, assorted proxy conflicts, and interventions, both overt and covert of lesser sort around the world. This establishes a fair baseline for evaluating the conduct of war and foreign policy generally over the past nineteen months by Barack Obama and his "team."

The hot wash can be expressed quickly and accurately by two words: "inept" and "naive." One can add other terms, but to do so would be an exercise in redundancy.

It is tempting to compare Mr Obama with Bill Clinton as both men not only had zero experience with the US military, its defining culture, its world view, its imperatives, its strengths and weaknesses of doctrine or war fighting generally. Both men were notably uncomfortable in the presence of military personnel. Both projected a sense of defensiveness in the face of senior military commanders. Both men had tidy, lawyerly minds for whom the inherent messiness and unpredictability of war constituted anathema.

However the comparison would be unfair to both men so the temptation for comparison will be avoided with one exception. Mr Clinton obviously learned nothing during his eight years as Commander-in-Chief while Mr Obama apparently has learned very little in his nineteen months occupying the Oval.

This implies there is still hope for Mr Obama--if he experiences a learning curve in the future far, far steeper than the one shown to date.

A few considerations which escaped the strategic analysts of the NYT require attention.

One of the two wars "inherited" by Mr Obama had already been "won" as much as any such war can be said to by the day he took office. The much maligned "surge" pushed by George W. Bush accompanied by dramatic and positive changes in the tactics and operational doctrine employed in Iraq reduced the multi-party insurgency in Iraq to a level where it was thinkable to turn over security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

As some personnel on the ground argued at the time, by early 2009 the US combat forces had done all they reasonably could expect to do. Beyond that it was self-evident that the emerging political consensus headed and epitomized by the prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, focused on nationalism and national sovereignty. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with its date certain for the ending of US combat operations as well as one requiring the removal of all US forces was a key goal for Maliki and his supporters.

Given the political dynamics on the ground as well as the reduced level of violence, the only realistic option for the US was the withdrawal of combat units. As should of been expected, senior US commanders wanted a longer draw down period than did the civilians in Washington (or Baghdad) so the Obama "compromise" of nineteen months was the best of many proposed de-escalation timeframes.

No one in the outgoing Bush administration and certainly not holdover SecDef Gates expected the aftermath of the SOFA and consequent draw down would be a period of peace, love, and flower power in Iraq. The anticipated political stasis and uptick in insurgent violence has been no more than what any observer well oriented as to time and place would have predicted.

The best any intervenor can hope for in an insurgent environment is to produce a social, political, and security context in which the indigenous actors can have a reasonable expectation of engaging in conflict resolution. Any historian of insurgency well recognizes the vast gulf between hostilities termination and conflict resolution. This historian would also grant that history demonstrates convincingly that outside forces can bring about hostilities termination--provided no one expects such to occur in any formal way--but has a very, very limited capacity to influence the lengthy political process of conflict resolution.

The takeaway from the American endgame in Iraq is simple. Mr Obama needed to do nothing but allow the dynamics established by his predecessor to play themselves out. And, that is all he did.

Of far greater importance is a question. What lessons (if any) did Mr Obama learn from the experience in Iraq and then apply to his other "inherited" war?

The most critical piece of context in evaluating Mr Obama's "leadership" on the Afghanistan war is the simple fact that the US had been using a counterproductive set of strategic and operational procedures since the fatal day when the Bush/Cheney administration opted to go for the gold of "nation-building" rather than to limit American efforts to the narrow goal of destroying al-Qaeda and its host, Taliban.

In addition to the intellectual bankruptcy of American strategy and operational doctrine, the war was fought with too few resources. Making this dismal reality even darker was the composition of the deployed forces--too many were conventional in nature and too few specialists in the requirements of interventionary war and its sub-set, counterterrorism.

The long, long period of Obama dithering over "whether Afghanistan" a year ago resulted finally in a decision to commit more troops. The dilemma of Afghanistan, particularly the problem of regaining the initiative from the resurgent Taliban and its cohorts, could not be solved merely by putting more combat boots on the ground.

In addition to more troops, particularly troops of the right training, organization, equipment, and doctrine, a new set of operational and tactical concepts were needed. So also was a specific statement of goal with an attendant definition of success (or victory, if you prefer a blunter but not more accurate term) and, so as to assure resources were correctly and effectively orchestrated, a theory of victory which took into proper account the nature of the human terrain of the Afghan population as well as the weaknesses of the insurgents.

Mr Obama did approve more troops, less than the number sought by the in-country commanders but more, a lot more, than desired by the "progressive" base on which Mr Obama's ambitious domestic agenda depended. The force augmentation was wrapped in some new operational and tactical concepts which focused on protecting Afghan civilians while carrying the war offensively to the insurgents in their strongholds.

The new approach along with the first reinforcements brought encouraging results. The number of enemy initiated contacts decreased. The number of friendly force initiated ones increased. An indication of the success of the new concepts was seen as well in the Taliban's increasing use of indiscriminate attacks on soft, civilian targets.

Still, without a clear statement of goal, the war effort in Afghanistan will continue to drift. Unless the US explicitly rejects the ill-considered notion of creating a modern, western-style nation-state in Afghanistan, there is minimal chance at best that Washington and Kabul will be able to sing from the same sheet of music.

Any government in Kabul whether headed by Hamid Karzai or some other figure will be resistant to the max on such issues as anti-corruption, an independent, non-Islamic judicial system, transparency in government--or efficiency for that matter. The Afghan political leader who places the abstract of "nation-state" above the reality of family, clan, tribe, or province does not exist, or, if he does, will not gain power.

The very best the US and its allies can hope for is an Afghan government which does not harbor, support, facilitate, or assist in any way proponents of violent political Islam. This was all we could have expected when the first bombs fell or the first made-in-the-USA boots hit the Afghan soil.

It is all we can expect now, hundreds of lives and billions of bucks later. The sooner the Smiley Guy in the Oval understands that this limited outcome is dictated by the nature of the human terrain in Afghanistan and adjusts both our public goal and concomitant definition of success, the better for us--and Afghanistan.

It will not matter how many more Americans and other foreigners die in Afghanistan. It will not matter how much more we spend. It will not matter how much we hector, implore, threaten, or cajole. The basic human reality of the Afghan population is found in a couple of simple, easy to grasp concepts.

Afghans want peace. They really don't care who provides it, government, Taliban, whoever, as long as peace comes to any and all valleys, villages, and cities.

Afghans are traditional, tribal, Muslim, and self-organizing. They are not Westerners. They have no historically informed central identity--although any and every Afghan political figure will invoke the totem of nationalism when necessary or merely convenient. They have no historically evolved idea of a separation between faith and government. They are not people with a historically derived need to look to a central authority, either political or judicial, for protection against the harms to which life is heir.

Our interest in Afghanistan as in Yemen, Somalia, or other collapsing states, starts and ends with the assurance that none will become the safety zones from which adherents of violent political Islam can mount attacks upon us or our allies. It is just that simple, blunt, and brutal.

Each and every of the venues where violent political Islam may take firm root are like Afghanistan in that each has leaders who invoke nationalism as a defense against domestic political opposition. Each and every venue is like Afghanistan in other salient ways as well. Each is traditional, tribal, Muslim, and self-organizing. None are even as "Western" as Iraq.

It is in its "Western" features that Iraq is the odd man out in recent or current experience. But, even there, nationalism is waved as a sovereign remedy against domestic opposition. And, even in Iraq, basic loyalties are oriented toward family, clan, tribe, language, and variety of Islam. Not even Iraq has the same semi-abstract concept of nation-state as permeates the West.

The single greatest lesson not yet learned by Mr Obama is the rest of the world is not like the US. (Arguably not even the US in the flesh is like the US as an image in Mr Obama's mind.) Other people in other countries do not celebrate a national identity above all others. Other people in other countries do not have a great faith in the capacity or will of a central government to solve problems, heal hurts, protect against all harm, or address all inequalities.

While any people in any country are quite willing to take free money, free gifts from the US or any other country rich, generous, and naive enough to give, this is not an anodyne for belief systems which facilitate or accept violent political Islam. Addressing poverty, social, and political inequalities or marginalization, ending misogyny, ending arbitrary justice, are all laudable in and of themselves. But, doing any or all of these will not assure violent political Islam will not take root.

This leads to the second greatest lesson not yet learned by Mr Obama. The US and other civilized countries are faced by a threat from violent political Islam. While there may be other proximate causes for attacks on the US such as this country's support of Israel, the basic reality remains--violent political Islam sees the US as the main enemy and will bend every effort toward attacking, weakening and, should Allah will, forcing the US back to the confines of its own borders.

These are the largest unlearned lessons. There are others, smaller perhaps but still important.

So, what has Mr Obama learned? He has learned that he can ride another man's decisions to success. He has learned he can fire a general with all the right stuff needed to fight the war in Afghanistan successfully. And, perhaps most important, he has learned the NYT will continue to sing his praises no matter how undeserved.

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The Importance Of Asking The Right Question

Not that long back Joe (I've-Got-A-Bigger-Mouth-Than-Hugo Chavez) Biden touched off a minor firestorm of controversy when he opined that Iraq, "could be one of the big accomplishments of this administration." Former members of the Bush/Cheney crew immediately entered vigorous dissents.

This foundation stimulated the WaPo to ask the wrong question, "If the Iraq war is over does Bush get the W?" History indicates rather persuasively that an outside intervenor cannot "win" ultimately when the war becomes internal in nature. While the intervenor can lose in a very meaningful way (see the Vietnam debacle) the very best that can be hoped for at either the hostilities termination or conflict resolution end stages is "not-losing."

The concept of "not-losing" was defined by the outcome of the Korean War at the time of the armistice in summer 1953. It means, quite simply, that the enemy has not and can not inflict a military defeat. In Korea specifically, the Chinese and North Koreans could not militarily defeat the US, ROK, and UN coalition. Neither could the US et al militarily defeat the Chinese at a politically and diplomatically acceptable price. "Not-losing" was the necessary result.

The concept applies not only to conventional, limited wars in support of policy such as the Korean War. It applies with even more saliency to wars which are internal at root in which the US intervenes in pursuit of a policy goal. This was the case in Vietnam. It was and is the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan (even if the Bush/Cheney crowd did not realize it.)

Kicking Saddam's conventional forces in their collective groin was not and never could be conceived of as a genuine "victory." The defeat of the Iraqi army, the overthrow of Saddam was simply the opening move. The real war was yet to come. If Bush/Cheney and company thought otherwise, they must have had a dynamite dealer. It is evident that the junior--and at least some of the senior--military leaders did not share the administration's stash.

The refusal of the Bush policy makers to recognize the internal nature of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan finally brought the vultures home to roost. To his credit Bush acknowledged the reality of the war and its requirements at the last possible moment in 2007. To his greater credit the Texan held firm against torrents of obloquy and opposition to put enough American boots on the ground even as the body bags came home in ever greater number.

To continue the WaPo's sports metaphor President Bush deserves not a "W" but a "Save." He must share this credit with the military commanders on the ground who belatedly accepted the need to institute genuine, effective counterinsurgency tactics and operational concepts.

The result of the combination of more boots and more appropriate tactics suppressed the violence to a level which allowed and continues to allow the Iraqis to grope toward their own solution, their own "victory." The real deal in any internal war is that only the locals can define and achieve "victory."

The "victory" will never be complete, totally satisfying to the outsider (or even many insiders) but will allow conflict resolution to be pursued. Any ultimate resolution of an internal war, particularly one in an ethnically fractured, religiously divided, tribally based society will be very long, quite messy, and frustratingly inelegant.

That's the nature of the beast, whether the WaPo or the political scientists cited like the idea or not. The nature of the beast also means the violence will continue in Iraq for some time to come. It means the recent election will settle less than it creates. The important fact is that elections provide a means of conflict resolution which does not demand violence--even as they permit the bombings and shootings to continue. Only as Iraqis discover and prove to their own satisfaction that non-violent politics provides a better way to deal with deeply divisive issues will the violence inclined folks be both marginalized and eventually suppressed.

What has been and is true in Iraq is also true in Afghanistan. Should the US/ISAF/Afghan National Forces prove successful in suppressing Taliban and other insurgent groups, then President Obama will deserve a "Save" for his gutsy action in defying his own base and belatedly agreeing to a US troop augmentation. Of course, he will have to share the honor with General Stanley McChrystal.

The combined campaign currently underway may result in hostilities termination. At this point the US will have achieved the same outcome as it did in Iraq--"not-losing." That is the only and best outcome to which the US can aspire.

As in Iraq the road from hostilities termination to conflict resolution will be long, messy, not at all pretty, and quite unsatisfying from the perspective of the US and other Western nations. The process perforce will necessitate political arrangements with Taliban and other insurgent groups. Necessity will demand the road to and through conflict resolution be paved with Islam. The Afghans are Muslim and that implies an absence of blue sky between state and faith.

Conflict resolution as well as hostilities termination requires the cooperation and participation of Pakistan. As the two are so deeply involved in each others affairs, it is impossible to see an outcome which does not involve Islamabad.

The Pakistan connection may complicate and lengthen the process but it cannot be avoided. The Pakistanis have too much at stake in Afghanistan. Peace in the FATA and the always dominant fear of lack of strategic depth in the anticipated next war with India dictate this.

For years to come people will debate whether or not the loss of American lives and treasure were worth it in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This debate is one where no final answer can ever be achieved.

Afghanistan was forced upon us by Omar's refusal to give Osama bin Laden over despite vigorous diplomatic efforts. Arguably the resulting invasion was "worth it." Had the Bush/Cheney administration not been so eager to go to Iraq, and had the initial force been both stronger and more intelligently employed, the war would have been over within a year of the first boot hitting the Afghan soil. This didn't happen and now there is only the choice between losing and "not-losing." The second is the better.

The invasion of Iraq was both volitional and unnecessary (even arguably against the better interests of the US) but, having been initiated had to be carried through to a conclusion which did not involve an American military defeat. Redeeming the failure of decision making in the Oval has cost the US over four thousand lives and more money than can readily be comprehended.

The result may or not be good for the Iraqi people. The result may or not be "worth it," but that determination cannot be made by an American vice-president, nor an American newspaper, nor by We the People either today in the future.

The decision can be made only by the Iraqis. And, it can only be made when (and if) they successfully travel the long, hard road to and through conflict resolution.