Is NATO's Future In The Past?

NATO's long delayed mid-life crisis can't be ignored any longer. The sixty year old residuum of the long dead Cold War is facing a genuine existential dilemma. It's not pushing the envelope unduly to say that NATO has to seriously question its continued existence.

The Geek can hear you muttering, "What about Afghanistan?"

To which question he has to reply, "So what about Afghanistan?"

The half-hearted commitment of NATO forces to that gawdforsaken place was the result of one, hopefully never-to-be-repeated circumstance: 9/11. The horror and shock of that day stimulated NATO to invoke The-Attack-On-One-Is-An-Attack-On-All clause for the first and only time in its history.

The true worth of the invocation has been amply demonstrated by the reluctance of most of NATO's members to do anything beyond the lightest of light lifting. The unwillingness of the majority of NATO to translate the verbal to the actual has increased as the war in Afghanistan has rolled along year after endless year with the vision of defeat looming ever larger.

With the notable exceptions of Canada, the UK and France, NATO forces have been restricted to no-risk, non-combat settings where death from violence has been more rare than cool days in hell. Now even the Canadian and British governments, responding to popular disapproval of what is seen as an American adventure, are grumbling over the seemingly open ended commitment.

The quick, easy and not inaccurate explanation for NATO's status as a major non-participant in the Afghan War as well as the disenchantment with the effort ever more evident in Canada and the UK is that the Americans have blown the mission. A strong case can and has been mounted by the Geek and many others to the effect that the current US administration has been wrong as a soup sandwich in how it defined the mission as well as how it went about accomplishing it.

A far more important question lies below the surface of NATO's on-going failure in Afghanistan. That question is simple. Does NATO have a reason to go on living?

The outgoing NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, spoke optimistically regarding the future of the organisation during his appearance at the London meeting of the group's Foreign Ministers. His optimism was not widely nor obviously shared around the room.

What was evident at the meeting was a genuine fondness for the past. Thanks to the utter stupidity of the Georgian pretty-much-one-man-government and the eagerness of the Putin regime in the Kremlin to do a bit of neighborhood impressing muscle flexing, the specter of the Great Glowering Bear on the other side of the Trace has reemerged.

The Geek has a sneaking fondness for the past, particularly the Cold War part of it. The Trace (or Iron Curtain for those who prefer the more melodramatic) not only divided the Good Guys of the Free World from the Baddies of Commie Land, it was the reassuring, physical sign of stability. Get a grip on this: The Cold War period might have had its breathless moments of high risk as in the Cuban Missile Crisis but generally it represented a half century of very high stability and predictability.

Overall, the face off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was a contest in stasis. A fight without real risk. A time when certainty persisted year after year.

Sure, there were proxy conflicts in the periphery. Yes, there were the dirty, pointless wars of peace in Asia, Africa, Latin America. But, in the heartlands of both NATO and the WarPac, all was stable, safe and predictable.

Thus there nothing surprising or mysterious in more than a few NATO member countries seeing the reappearance of an aggressive Russia as a development more to be welcomed than feared. NATO can revert to its roots. Once more have the mission of deterring any Kremlin ambitions of regional hegemony.

Seeking the future in the past is one option for the aging alliance. It is not the only one. Several alternatives have been mooted recently both within NATO offices

The organisation could redefine itself as the protector, exemplar and exponent of the European and American values and norms which under girded NATO at its creation. In this model, states such as Georgia would not be considered for quick or certain membership in the alliance but would be both protected and mentored as they further developed the requisite norms and values.

Another option includes the first but adds to it responsibilities for stability maintenance operations on the fringe of Europe. This concept takes as its paradigm NATO actions in the dissolving Yugoslavia, which apparently are seen as having been highly successful.

A more expansive version of the stability oriented model adds limited out-of-theater responsibilities such as anti-piracy patrols. This version also contemplates a continued capacity for anti- and counter-terrorist actions in venues far removed from the NATO heartland.

For the truly ambitious there is yet another potential. NATO could serve as the political and military bridge between the European Union and North America. As such it would be the core group of what Senator John McCain called for as an alternative to the UN.

Following the path first marked by former French intelligence chief, Admiral Lacoste, this understanding of NATO would serve as the beginnings of an international league of genuinely democratic, pluralistic and liberal nations. (That they would also be the repository of much of the world's wealth can go unmentioned.)

It can be argued that the formation of this sort of NATO centered league of democracies would threaten both Russia and the Peoples Republic of China. It would. Be seen as a threat that is.

It's an easy perception to counter. Invite both nations to join. As soon as they can pass the test of being authentic democracies complete with a rule of law, independent judiciaries, multiple parties and elections somewhat more fair and transparent than those conducted in Chicago.

Of course both countries would refuse the invitation just as the Soviet Union rejected participation in the Marshall Plan. However, the door would be open and remain so. The choice to enter would always reside with those on the outside.

Perhaps this most expansive option is too idealistic for the present moment. Still, it has its appeals. A good offense is always preferable to a good defense. NATO has the potential for a real future. As long as its members recall that the future is never found in the past.

Ahh, It's So Easy To Forget--And So Dangerous

Gather 'round kiddies and Ole Uncle Geek will tell you a story. A story that has obviously been forgotten by assorted academics, politicians (both here and in Europe) and pundits (again both here and overseas.) A story that is relevant to our current problems with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Resurgent Russian Empire.

Long ago (the 1930s) and far away (Europe) there lived a man who was leader of his country. The country had been broken and impoverished and embittered by having lost a war. The leader wrought an economic miracle and made the people of his country feel strong and proud again. Now the leader and his newly empowered army faced a challenge.

The challenge was in a neighboring country. According to the Leader and his country's news media, the government of this next door neighbor was abusing and oppressing citizens who spoke the language of the Leader and his fellow countrymen.

The Leader proclaimed that this oppression of his co-Germanophones was unacceptable. A clear violation of their human rights. (Although, to be honest the Leader didn't use that term. It hadn't been invented yet.)

The Leader also gnashed his teeth over the government of this small eastern neighbor having signed agreements with large and powerful states located to the west of the Leader's country.

Something had to be done!

It was.

The heads of the western governments met with the Leader in the old and scenic city of Munchen for a conference designed to placate the Leader and assure "peace in our time."

Peace was assured. For one whole year. The small neighbor was ceremoniously dismembered and left open to a full occupation by the Leader's army.

Germany had triumphed. Hitler rode high on his charisma, political sagacity and the appearance of a military/diplomatic walkover.

A year later Hitler would try to do the same in Poland. For a while he was successful.

Now, kiddies, lets go back a few years earlier. Back to when the Leader rolled his political dice for the first time. Back to when he ordered the new and splendidly non-competent Wehrmacht to reoccupy the demilitarized west bank of the Rhine in violation of the treaty ending World War I.

A small contingent of German troops marched into the Rhineland under orders to beat feet beaucoup schnell if they met any resistance, no matter how slight. A single French military cop would have been enough.

There were no French MPs. There was no French response. The British likewise stood still and silent. Some even offered apologies and excuses for the German action.

It was, after all, their country, wasn't it?

And, the Versailles Treaty was too harsh, wasn't it?

And, Germany is too important economically to aggravate, wasn't it?

In truth, the governments of France and Great Britain took counsel of their fears. In truth, both governments made policy for today and hoped the future would take care of itself.

(The Geek calls this tendency of governments to make policy for today while disregarding the future consequences "The Aehrenthal Doctrine" after the Austrian Foreign Minister of the years preceding World War I. Famously, he once said, "I make policy for today. Let the future take care of itself.")

It would have been very easy to thwart Hitler at the time of the Rhineland move. It would have been reasonably easy to stop him at the time of Munich. It would have been harder, but not impossible, to stop him before the tanks and Stukas moved on 1 September 1939.

It was a hell of a lot harder to stop him later.

Well, kids we forgot all this with regard the Iranian nuclear ambitions. And, buckos, we have (or are) forgetting it all over again as the Russians make their moves to reestablish operational dominance over the states the Kremlin calls "the near abroad."

Arguably, even the dimwitted neocon ninnies of the current US administration have a better handle on the historical analogies then do our European colocutors. While the Geek doubts that the current administration is using historical analogy based reasoning in forming policy, it is clear the Europeans have forgotten completely what happened in their own area less than seventy-five years ago.

The Germans have made this quite explicit with statements to the effect that "now is not the time to lay blame or question motives." The German government has already opposed allowing Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO lest doing such annoy the Kremlin. Now, the Germans don't want to say anything harshly truthful about the ongoing Russian occupation of portions of Georgia such as the city of Gori.

Why this willful act of historical lobotomy?

The reason is the same as at least one of the primary motives behind the obviously long planned Russian invasion. It's all in one word,

OK, three words. Oil. Natural gas. Thirty plus percent of the first. Nearly half of the second.

Energy for Europe.

The Germans are simply more willing than others to appease the Leader in the Kremlin.

Don't you find it passingly interesting that the ceasefire brokered by French President Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union is silent on such key points as the territorial integrity of Georgia? Isn't it a tad instructive that the agreement allows the Russians to "augment" their "peacekeeping" presence in the secessionist provinces?

Can we say, "Munich--The Sequel?"

Now a quick turn to the Iranian front. The Germans are the biggest sanction busters in Europe. They talk a great game. They play a pathetic one.

Of course, the Germans and others might think and say that the Iranians haven't crossed any actual red lines in their nuclear work to date. They might honestly believe that there is plenty of time before any drastic action might be necessary.

A good case might be made for believing that time still existed in which to seek a compromise with Tehran or with the Kremlin. The Geek would be willing to make one himself---

Except for a couple of bothersome details.

To make a case for a long and easy process of diplomacy and accommodation with either or both Russia and Iran would require ignoring the lessons of history, which show conclusively that the earlier one acts to abate a nuisance, the easier it is.

And, it would require making policy for today in the hopes that the future would take care of itself.

At Last! A War Over Oil (Really)

For a long while now it has been an article of faith among some on the Left that the current administration's Great Adventure In Regime Change was caused by a slavering need to assure that Iraq's oil would be safe for Exxon et al.

Before that there were dark suspicions that H.W. Bush took his Grand Coalition to war not to roll back the Iraqi tide from Kuwait but to protect American oil interests in the Gulf region. At the time some of the Geek's academic coworkers hinted that somehow he was involved in this great plot to save the shareholders at the expense of American lives.

In the years before Desert Storm, long before invading Iraq was even a small glint in the eyes of Messrs Bush and Cheney or others of the neocon ninnie persuasion, folks on the Left imagined that the American efforts in South Vietnam were on behalf of Big Oil, making the South China Sea safe for Mobil and Chevron.

All these specters of dank conspiracies to sacrifice lives in order that Big Business might be provided with a few more significant digits in its bottom line must give a frisson or two of pure delight to those on the Left. Heck, the Geek even wishes they were true, documentable from the archives and not mere projections of fears or wishes, as he likes a good conspiracy hypothesis as well as the next guy.

Unfortunately they are not.

That is why it is so nice, so satisfying that we are finally looking at a real honest-to-gosh shooting war where the cause, the real deal, the shore enough is oil. Oil and the need to protect and enhance a monopoly in its distribution and sale.

It is even more delightful that the war is being waged on behalf of this supreme capitalist goal by the Kremlin. By Vladimir Putin. By Russia, onetime Vanguard of the Proletariat.

While Georgia might have swung the first punch in its ill-advised attempt to bring the secessionist province of South Ossetia back under its control, the Kremlin reaction showed all the hallmarks of long standing planning and preparation as well as a goal far more expansive then simply "protecting" Russian "peacekeepers and citizens" in the province.

In the closing years of Putin's presidency it became increasingly clear to all but the most addleheaded that Russia was feeling more than a little steroidal. The Kremlin was (and is) most unhelpful in the Iranian uranium enrichment problem. Putin (and his handpicked successor) have been both obdurate and seemingly blind to reality on the matter of basing American anti-ballistic missiles and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian strategic bombers are again flying in the finest Cold War fashion near the US and the UK.

The reason for this boisterous behavior after years of quiescence is simple. Russia has oil. Lots of oil. The old, badly dilapidated Soviet Siberian oil fields have been expanded and renovated in large measure by foreign investment. New pipelines have been built. Russian oil flows to Western Europe. The Euros flow back in a flood.

There is a speed bump in the highway of continued Russian oil based prosperity and the political advantages which can accrue from a monopoly on either or both production and distribution. There is oil in several of the Central Asian Republics. There are new pipelines which connect the producers in Asia with the consumers in Europe (and elsewhere.)

The most important of these big tubes runs across Georgia. Right through pro-West, pro-US Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) line runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey. It is US-backed.

The Russians bombed it yesterday. Considering the immediate irrelevance of the BTC to the operations being conducted by the Russian Army against the Georgian forces in South Ossetia, it is legitimate to ask, "Why?"

The answer isn't hard to find. Putin's goal is not removing Georgian troops from the disputed secessionist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. No. Putin's goal is much more than that. He wants to eliminate the long standing annoyance of Georgia's pro-American president, Mikhail Saakashvili in a short, sharp and salutary war.

This goal loops into another goal long held by Putin and company. Pacify the Caucasus. Pacification through effective hegemony. The same goal which fascinated various Czars and later attracted the full attention of Lenin and Stalin.

Hegemony over the Caucasus region provides the necessary first condition for re-establishing operational dominance if not full hegemony over the Central Asian Republics. Ah! A thought that would warm any Russian heart.

Particularly when operational dominance over the oil bearing areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia assures a Russian monopoly of non-Mideast origin oil to Europe and elsewhere. Capitalists and Communists agree on one thing: Nothing beats a monopoly.

Putin has long understood the power of possessing a scarce critical commodity. Russia has one. Russia flaunts the wealth and power which its possession confers. It is not surprising that Russia, like a crack dealership, wants to inhibit competition and raise prices.

An uptick in global oil prices as a result of the current fracas in the Caucasus is good for Russia. Good for Putin. A short war with a victorious conclusion would be infinitely better.

This possibility is worth taking a few risks to turn into reality. From the Kremlin's perspective the risks are very small indeed.

Georgia doesn't have much of an army. It will have to seek a negotiated settlement rapidly in order to preserve independence. The settlement might well include features far removed from autonomy or independence for the two break away provinces such as the removal of Georgia's president.

Given the retreat of a US presence in Central Asia to say nothing of the current American preoccupations with Iraq, Afghanistan and spinning Iranian centrifuges in the closing days of a badly discredited Administration, Georgia lacks Great Power support beyond soothing words and mood music. The Georgians are on their own. That's tough for them.

True the war might go badly for the Russians. It has the potential, if the Kremlin is not careful, very careful, to turn into a never-ending guerrilla affair in the Chechnya mode. Putin will have to take great pains to assure that this eventuality does not come to pass.

Vladimir might have been smiling with anticipation as he flew back from Beijing but his gut might have tightened just a bit if he remembered an all-too-true maxim of Clausewitz: No plan survives first contact with the enemy.