An Answer to Daniel Pipes

Daniel Pipes is a noted scholar of and writer about Islamist affairs. To say he is against Islamist jihadism is to engage in exceptional understatement. His position is well-reasoned, principled and well-rooted in both historical and contemporary reality. This must be kept in mind when considering a question he posed today (http://www.danielpipes.org/6269/does-turkey-still-belong-in-nato).

Pipes' specific question arises from the recent Turkish opposition to the appointment of Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to the NATO Secretary General's slot. While the issue was finessed by providing for a Turkish Deputy SecGen which provided a face-saving way for Erdogan to back down on the eve of President Obama's visit to Turkey, the question of Turkey's place in NATO remains, at least in Pipes' eyes.

Pipes contrasts the views of a former NATO SecGen, Willy Claes, and former Spanish PM, Jose Maria Aznar, with the seemingly mea culpa based remarks of Rasmussen after taking office. Both Claes and Aznar, the former as far back as 1995, saw Islamist jihadism as an enemy to NATO equal to that formerly presented by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states. Clearly both the outgoing and incoming NATO Secretaries General dissent from this position.

The real issue is not, as Pipes avers, whether or not Turkey should remain in NATO given its Muslim majority population and Islamist rooted government. That issue is bogus. Turkey will not be ejected and is quite unlikely to unilaterally withdraw from the alliance.

Turkey, as President Obama acknowledged openly in his speech before the Turkish National Assembly, is a critical piece of real estate for the West. It is also an important diplomatic fulcrum. NATO is well off with Turkey's membership. But, this should not be interpreted either in Ankara or elsewhere as granting the country a degree of say in the affairs of the alliance surpassing that of other members.

Nor should too much be made from the size of the Turkish army. It may be second in size only to that of the US within NATO but it has severe limitations. Some of these are strutural to the army. Others result from the political context in which the army operates.

(For example, the army is the final guarantor of domestic tranquility and sees itself in finest continental power style as the ultimate custodian of nationhood. This brings the army into a constant and sometimes wide open tension with the government with all the usual, predictable effects on combat efficiency and readiness.)

The underlying issue implied by but never stated in Pipes' article is this. What is NATO's mission, its reason for existence now and in the near future?

NATO has engaged in limited missions in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Had the previous administration not dropped the military and diplomatic balls so completely, NATO's first genuinely out-of-theater operation (OOTO) in Afghanistan would have been supported more fully and actively by the alliance. It had, after all, invoked Article Five of the NATO charter for the first and only time to date in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

Considering the responsibility accruing to the administration of George W. Bush for the resultant loss of enthusiasm for the OOTO, it is impossible to conclude whether this would extend to future deployments of a similar nature. While it is never out of fashion in some American circles to bash the Europeans (indeed the Geek does so on occasion,) it is not fair to assess the political mood of Europeans such as to bar participation in OOTOs of the future, particularly if such engage the frustration and anger of the elites of European countries.

It is possible to foresee a scenario such as genocide surpassing that alleged to have occurred in Darfur exciting such European sentiments as to result in a demand for NATO action. This potential is enhanced by any apparent unwillingness or inability of the UN to take effective, prompt action in this sort of crisis. Should such a hypothetical take place in a majority Muslim country with an Islamist regime, the stance of Turkey might be important in the decision making process.

As may be inferred from this briefly outlined hypothetical, the real difficulty is that NATO has no coherent policy regarding OOTOs. Such were never forseen when the alliance was formed sixty years ago. Arguably, the formation of a realistic, consensual policy regarding OOTOs might exercise some sort of deterrent effect upon those who wish the West ill. The formulation of any such policy would necessitate both the participation and agreement of Turkey.

Or, NATO could collectively reject the OOTO concept as part of its mission portfolio. This implies that the alliance continues to exist for the one and only reason which undergirded its creation: Standing on guard against any Russian armed aggression into Western and Central Europe.

This unitary reason for existence would, of course, exacerbate the problems confronting the relations between Russia and the NATO nations, particularly those which were once part of WarPact. A formal or even de facto declining of the OOTO mission could and would be used by Russian nationalists (which group includes both Putin and Medvedev) to justify higher military expenditures as well as the games the Kremlin plays regarding access to natural gas and oil either originating in or transiting areas under its domination.

Which ever way NATO goes in the next months and years, OOTO or Watch-the-Bear, Turkey is equally important for the alliance. No OOTO can be credibly put in place without the full participation of Turkey considering the most probable venues are in Muslim countries. Without Turkey, the Southern Flank as well as the Turkic speaking Central Asian Republics are militarily and diplomatically open and vulnerable.

NATO either must be clearly defined as to its mission or sent to early retirement. This decision set must be made sooner rather than later. And, it is a decision complex which cannot be adequately undertaken without the full and effective participation of Turkey, even a Turkey which seems to be drifting ever further from the vision of Ataturk.

North Korea Ain't The Problem Not Europe Either

It's not even Iran. The real problem isn't even Afghanistan, not completely.

The real deal challenge is Pakistan. The Obama administration's Afpak strategy puts an onus on the Pakistani government and military to operate effectively as a partner in the mutual campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces located in the FATA. Afpak envisions Pakistan as agreeing with the US contention that Taliban and akin Islamist jihadist groups constitute an existential threat to its existence.

The prospect of the government of Pakistan collapsing like a wall of sand before the Taliban tsunami shivers the timbers of the Obama ship of state. It should. But, that is not what is important.

What is important is the view from inside Pakistan. From the perspective of governmental officials, senior military commanders, Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence personnel, even from the worm level view of Pakistani troopies, townsmen and peasants in the hills. How do all these folk of varied potency and prominence see life? To what extent do they see an Islamist (as opposed to merely Islamic) Pakistan as a terminal condition, a threat to be avoided at all costs?

To put the matter slightly differently: Which is the greater existential threat in the eyes of Pakistanis great and small, Taliban and Sharia or India?

If, like a person well oriented as to time and place, you answered, "India," you are bang on.

The roots of the fear and loathing which are the emotional context of relations between India and Pakistan extend back centuries. Back to the time of the Mogul takeover of the Sub-continent. Back to the centuries of slow motion genocide committed by the Muslim overlords against the subjugated Hindu majority.

Regardless of the best efforts of that Saint of the High Minded, Gandhi, as the end of the Raj loomed near, the worm turned and Muslims died en masse. At the time of Partition the railroad tracks were (in some places quite literally and in others only figuratively) slick with Muslim blood.

Since then the struggle over Kashmir has assured that animosity has not lessened. Acting to exacerbate the loathing and hatred on the Pakistani side of the line is the fact that India has won the open wars which have been fought and seems little more than slightly inconvenienced or annoyed by the guerrilla and terror attacks in the disputed region.

India has the much larger population, economy and industrial base. It possesses strategic depth in comparison to Pakistan. Despite the various fissures which criss-cross the Indian human terrain, it has the necessary political and social cohesion to mount a successful war against Pakistan.

Such a war whether waged with or without nuclear weapons would be a major disaster for India.

For Pakistan a war if fought under current conditions would mean simply the end. Fini. El Finito. That is an existential matter to say the least.

In comparison the collapse of the current government would mean simply that Islam would reign supreme. Considering we Paks are all good Muslims, what's the problem? Sure, it would be an Islam of a particularly severe and totalistic nature, but what's wrong with that? Or so the typical Pakistani-on-the-street would ask.

It is true that Sharia Taliban style would prove onerous to some Pakistanis, particularly those of the educated, Western oriented elite. A Taliban controlled Pakistan would be repugnant to the West, to the US even if the Obama Disarmament Fairy whisked away the Pakistani nuclear weapons with a wave of a magic wand.

But (and here is the the humongous "but") this external view and reactions would not matter to the vast majority of the Pakistani population. Nor would it matter to the army and intelligence service of Pakistan.

Indeed, a Taliban/Sharia run Pakistan would constitute a strategic plus vis a vis India. It would provide for a more unified population acting under the strongest of imperatives--a linked national and religious identity. Beyond that, as mentioned in previous posts, a Taliban/Sharia based Pakistan would allow for the expansion of strategic depth into Afghanistan and perhaps beyond into at least some of the Central Asian Muslim majority republics. A Sharia base would provide a greater basis for full rapprochement with Iran.

Even this (necessarily) brief adumbration provides a sufficient architecture to hold a conclusion. The possibility, no, the strong probability of Pakistan "collapsing" in the next six to twelve months is not viewed with general alarm in Islamabad--or elsewhere in the country. Regardless of hectoring (or pleading) from Washington, the Pakistani majority whether civilian or military does not and will not see Taliban as an existential threat.

India alone holds that claim.

Yes, a nuclear weapons equipped, potential trans-national terrorist protecting, Taliban governed Pakistan is an unpleasant potential to contemplate from the perspective of Inside The Beltway. A Taliban dominated Pakistan with powerful tentacles extending into and possibly beyond Afghanistan may, but not necessarily will, present a threat to the US and its allies extending into the fog of the future.

However, there may not or is not much we can do about it.

Even if the government of Pakistan and its senior military commanders wake up tomorrow with a complete and absolute commitment to working in close partnership with the US in an effective counterinsurgency program directed against Taliban, there is no high (or perhaps even realistic) probability that such would prove effective in the short time available. Taliban has a firm hold on much of the FATA. By agreement with the government it runs Swat and Malakand. It has strong and growing support in the general population.

In short, the political/military struggle between Taliban and the government is Taliban's to lose.

And, they still have the potential to lose it. Or at least make conditions such that the government and senior military decide to join with the US developed program. Taliban may yet alienate enough of the not-yet-committed population so the government and military will refocus from combat on the plains of Punjab against India to the slog in the hills against the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Enough suicide bombings, enough armed assaults with fatalities among unarmed civilian or semi-civilian targets will do the job of shifting public opinion and support to the government. Enough beheadings of captured soldiers or paramilitary personnel will do the same among the snuffies in the ranks of the Pakistani security forces who are currently leaning toward Taliban. Enough floggings on video followed by telephone interviews with Taliban spokesmen saying "if we were in full control she would have been shot," will assure that the Western-leaning elite becomes monolithic in its support of the government against the Islamists.

The last best hope for the Obama Afpak strategy lies not with exhortations or with foreign aid directed to "counterinsurgency infrastructure support." It lies rather with the possibility, no, the probability that Taliban will act in ways which mobilize support to the government.

There is recent precedent for this hope. The Islamist jihadists of Iraq behaved in such barbaric ways as to push people to form and support the Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens. In Afghanistan way back before 9/11 Taliban excesses were undermining their support in the country and strengthening the potency of the Northern Alliance. In Swat in just a few weeks Taliban has started to erode the original gratitude for peace, for a decrease in hanging corpses and midnight gunfire, which was initially felt by the residents.

There is a lesson in this. A lesson less for the Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration than for the government, military, intelligence personnel of Pakistan, even for the observant Muslims of the country. Here it is. Simple to say and easy to understand.

Sharia in the abstract has much to recommend it. In practice, particularly as implemented by Islamic jihadists such as Taliban, Sharia is the writ of the gun-thug, the rule of the zealot with sword and whip, the law of the psychopathic True Believe before whom all must cringe in absolute submission--or die.

Pathetically or not, the "Pak" portion of Afpak depends upon the Pakistanis awakening to the reality that Sharia in the hands of Taliban and those of similar Islamist jihadist belief may bring peace. The peace of silent fear. Or the graveyard.

How Much Change Is Too Much?

Prague is a wonderfully romantic city. It is a place where one feels free to pursue ideals. It is, in fact, a place where ideals propelled people to make a genuine challenge to the Soviet Union. Not once in 1968 but again twenty years ago.

Perhaps it is the mood and history of Prague which inclined President Obama to have his speech writers craft a fine paean to ideals. And, in the process stick the president's fingers into an electric socket.

The more idealistic and, paradoxically perhaps, less difficulty producing portion of the president's speech dealt with the need to end nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, eliminate the current nuclear weapons stockpiles. Obama was appropriately conservative about a time line for the eradication of nukes from the world, saying, "It may not occur in my lifetime."

The speech served to confirm the earlier reports that Russia and the US would proceed to negotiate a reduction of nuclear charges to 1,500 each. This would constitute a necessary first step to achieving the finite deterrent level of roughly five hundred warheads each. As noted in an earlier post MAD would continue to exist giving an appropriate "comfort level" to two nations which will never be "friends" but will continue to be (using a delightfully ambiguous Vietnamese term) "partners in struggle."

President Obama called for the US to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Doing such would not harm US interests. Improvements in the US weapons would not require testing of the physics packages. Whether or not the CNTBT would then be ratified by China, India, Pakistan, Israel or Iran is open to question. Further it should be noted that decoupled underground tests of low yield devices are not susceptible to definitive detection since the Earth is a restless place with seismic shocks occurring as a form of geological background noise.

The North Koreans flipped the bird in the general direction of the "international community" (whatever that might be) with their launch of a prototype ICBM. This act calls into serious question the relevance of international agreements as it did Security Council resolutions. It's fine to talk of "breaking the rules" as the president did, but it also irrelevant.

There is no credible means of enforcing the will of the Security Council or the "international community" (which the Geek takes to be the equivalent of the bumper sticker, "We are all passengers on spaceship Earth") against the Hermit Kingdom of the North. As has been argued in previous posts, economic sanctions will not prove any more efficacious in the future than they have in the past. War is not an option. Only bribery might work. And, Pyongyang is unlikely to stay bribed for long. For Dear Leader and company, blackmail is an unending enterprise.

Unfortunately President Obama and his speech writers demonstrated a lamentable ignorance of historical reality when the Nice Young Man From Chicago beat his breast on behalf of the US. He averred that the US had a "moral responsibility" to take the lead in seeking total nuclear disarmament. He linked this alleged "moral" load to the US having employed two nuclear bombs against Japan in World War II.

Morality is not involved either then or now. There is and never has been any requirement for the US to enter a mea culpa in its nuclear usage. A nation at war has the goal of ending the war as quickly as possible at the lowest cost in friendly lives compatible with its political demands. The bombings of two Japanese cities accomplished this goal. (And, saved Japanese as well as American lives in the process.)

It is in American national and strategic interest to lower the levels of nuclear weapons extant today. It is in our national and strategic interests to end proliferation. To control nuclear materials so as to prevent their drifting into the hands of rogue states and non-state actors. These are matters of realpolitick. Morality has nothing to do with it.

There is no objection to using moral terms to cover the naked flesh of national interest. But, (as usual here is the big "but") it is critical that morality not become the engine of policy. As we should have learned from the disaster of Woodrow Wilson's moral based approach to foreign affairs, the adoption of the high moral tone is the road to failure. Similarly, the moral stance adopted by the US in its assorted "non-recognition" moves directed against the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Iran and Cuba dragged failure in their train.

Perhaps it was morality more than ideals which caused President Obama to stick his wet fingers into a particularly dangerous electric socket. At the European Union meeting in Prague Obama told the assembly, "The United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our firends, neighbors and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence, forging a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual interests."

Nothing wrong with those words. Glittering generalities are a politician's stock in trade. Then the president bore down on a specific. "Moving forward toward Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe."

Nothing like sticking your face in a fan, is there, Mr President? Turkish membership in the EU is not a popular concept in France or Germany.

Nicholas Sarkozy, perhaps regretting the Gallic bouquets he had verbally heaved at Obama earlier in Strasbourg, was quick to respond. He stated on French TV, "I have always been opposed to this entry." In case there was any doubt in anyone's mind, he added,"I still am and I think I can say that the immense majority of member states shares the position of France."

Sarkozy was quick to toss some rhetorical flowers in the general direction of Ankara. He called Turkey an ally and stated it would remain what it has been, "a privledged partner." But, not a member of the EU.

Angela Merkel, German PM, took a similarly dim view of President Obama's advice. Being German she used fewer words. They were, however, Teuton-blunt. "It's clear there are different opinions." In other word, "Butt out, buster."

The US is concerned that Turkey will drift further and further into the Islamist camp. There is good reason for any such apprehension given the background of the ruling party and the growth of Islamism among the hinterland dwellers of Turkey. Beyond that, Turkey is an important energy nexus. The importance of Turkey in this role will grow in the near- to mid-term.

These reasons along with the potential of Turkey as an intermediary in Mideastern affairs as well as Central Asian gives the US powerful reasons to wish Turkey to be tied closer to the West through EU membership. It is in our national and strategic interests that this occur.

The critical question is not if Turkey's joining the EU is in American interests. That is a given. Is it in the national and strategic interests of the European states? That is the question. The US, as PM Merkel suggested, is not in a position to answer that question. Sarkozy took a more robust line. EU membership for Turkey is not in French national interest.

Sarko is probably correct in assessing that France is not alone in its rejectionist stance. Certainly other countries have reasons to keep Turkey out of the EU. There are many, but one remains the hippo in the bedroom.

That issue is immigration. EU rules provide for unrestricted movement between member states. Turkey as a member would be an open door for uncontrollable immigration of Muslims. The demographic, cultural and political effects of a Muslim "Open Door" are unpredicable as to scale but predictable as to effect. The effect would be negative.

Admittedly the multi-culti oh-so-sensitive elites of Europe do not want to openly acknowledge that Muslim populations in European cities have already caused social, cultural and political frictions which do not bode well for the structural integrity of these societies and polities in the future. The unemployment which has accompanied the present economic situation has provided a degree of cover in that one can oppose immigration now on the basis of protecting jobs.

The pleasant economic cover and concealment will not last forever. Looking ahead, the politically articulate elite of the EU member states have to decide if they really, really believe that their societies and political structures will survive a large, very large influx of Muslims through the Gates of Ankara. This elite has to decide how much change and how much rapid change the nations of Europe can accept and survive. They have to decide how much they want to see the far right of European politics empowered by the flood of Muslims.

The American president can afford to be High Minded and Lofty Thinking about Turkey, the EU and migration. It is, after all, not in our backyard.

It would be good if some blunt, bold European head of state would ask President Obama the following questions. "If NAFTA had provided for free migration between the US and Mexico, would the American Senate have approved it? The American president signed it? Would you?"

A Pair Of (At Least) Two Bowl Problems

As everyone familiar with the Master of Baker Street knows, the great detective was given to characterising his little problems by the number of bowls of shag which must be smoked before the correct solution might emerge. Those of the two bowl variety were above average in difficulty, sort of like a reverse two and a half with full twist in pike position off the low board.

Comes now North Korea and Afghanistan in unorchestrated symmetry each with a two bowler. (This must ruin the post-success celebration in the Erdogan Dictate Affair. NATO didn't blink and the Turkish PM received a face-saving way to back off.)

Actually, as the Geek thinks about it, the North Korean problem is closer to three bowls and the Afghan one closer to a single albeit very full bowl. Let's go with the tougher of the two first.

The Geek has to admit a more than sneaking admiration for the Commissars of Pongyang. No bunch, not even the mullahs of Tehran, have shown greater skill at sneering in the direction of the UN Security Council. The Dear Leader and his coterie have far surpassed all other regimes of whatsoever political stripe in pursuing national self-interest in the face of robust, continued opposition by the US and its associates, Japan and South Korea.

The US has drawn yet another line in the diplomatic sand. SecState Clinton and other members of the Obama administration have promised "consequences" after the Northerners launch their new, (hopefully) improved ICBM. The threatened "consequences" will undoubtedly follow the track blazed by the "consequences" imposed by the Security Council after the Pyongyang bunch pushed the Go-button on their nuclear test a few years back.

This means yet more economic sanctions.

The last time around the economic sanctions were as ineffective as pissing on a forest fire. The same crude judgement is appropriate even in advance as regards the next Security Council turn to bat.

The last time the implementation of the sanctions was left up to the individual member-states. This sort of non-enforced enforcement was the best which would sneak past Russia and China. Even if Russia continues in its current charm offensive, not much more can be expected in the near future.

The Chinese have a realistic view of the North Korean regime. In the informed view from Beijing harsh measures are ineffective in altering North Korean behavior. Certainly the historical record extending back to 1950 bears that out.

The Chinese believe, rightly or not, that they continue to have influence in Pyongyang. Beyond that, the integrity of North Korea as a buffer state is important to Beijing. That was true in the early Fall of 1950 and remains such today.

The two countries have been in a formal alliance for just shy of sixty years now. It is slightly possible that Beijing will be able to use that symbolic anniversary as a platform to nudge Pyongyang into a more cooperative stance in the Six Power Talks.

The Six Power Talks, particularly the verification of the North Korean nuclear declaration given last year, is far more important to the Chinese (and in highest probability the Americans) than the launch of an ICBM test bed. While even the most optimistic prediction for the Six Power Talks does not include Pyongyang relinquishing its current plutonium stockpile, it is not illegitimate to expect an accurate accounting of the amount of plutonium made and that on hand currently so as to assuage proliferation anxieties.

The Six Power Talks are not worth sacrificing on the alter of Security Council resolutions. The Chinese have taken this view. In all probability Russia has as well. It is debatable at best that the Kremlin is willing to fritter away the last of its diminishing influence on the Hermit Kingdom of the North in pursuit of the delusion of "punishing" Pyongyang.

If that mythical beast, a regime of tough, enforceable economic sanctions, is off the table of reality, what is left?

Military action? That's a real non-starter. And, the Denizens-in-Charge of the Hermit Kingdom know it. The issue at hand is not worth going to war over. No one is eager for a war, looking for an excuse a la Jenkin's Ear to start one.

It has been suggested that the US simply shoot the missile down. This could be done hypothetically as being a measure taken to "enforce" earlier Security Council measures. Such an action might have been in the world view of the W. Bush administration but would not comport in the slightest with the new policy matrix of the Obama administration. Dear Leader and his crew undoubtedly understand this.

Realistically, the probability for negative consequences, particularly any of a truly painful nature, range between nil and none. The probability of positive consequences coming is, regrettably, rather high.

Caught with no credible capacity to coerce, the US and its partners, Japan and South Korea, as well as its sometimes collaborators, China and Russia, have only inducements to offer. Bribery under whatever euphemism you prefer has a long and not completely dishonorable history in the practice of diplomacy.

In an important matter--and getting an accurate handle on the degree of intellectual or material proliferation the Northerners have or can engage in is important--the ends justify the means. A bribe, if it works to gain the necessary end, is completely justifiable. If the bribe does not work or if the recipient does not stay bribed, then the effort has failed. The other side has been more canny or resolute than our team.

So it goes in the whacky world of international politics.

Now for Article 132 of a draft law passed by the Afghan parliament. The language in question has effect only on the Shia minority of the population. That minority constitutes somewhere between fifteen and twenty percent. It is important to the electoral chances of President Karzai when the polls open next August.

Stripped to its essentials it requires that women unless ill in a way which would be exacerbated by the act of intercourse must provide sexual services to their husbands no less than once every four days. To Western eyes and ears this constitutes a species of marital rape.

Not that many years ago, less than twenty to err on the side of accuracy, there was scarcely a jurisdiction in the US where a man could be charged with spousal rape--even if the couple were living separately. The same legal context prevailed generally throughout the West.

Norms and the law have changed in the US as they have elsewhere to give due and proper regard to the autonomy and prerogatives of the wife even when sharing a bed with the guy. It is not surprising that reaction to Article 132 has been rapid, negative and virtually universal in Western countries.

The Article and the reaction bring into a very sharp focus the fundamental fissures in current policy for our efforts in Afghanistan. There are two in particular which have been highlighted in the past forty-eight hours.

The first, stated as a question is this: Is Afghanistan a sovereign country or not?

The second, also stated as a question is this: Is the mission of our and allied forces in Afghanistan one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda as a potential short term threat to our interests or is it building a modern nation-state with liberal institutions?

Both are digital questions. Each must be answered such that one and only one alternative is operative. Choosing one absolutely disallows the other. It's either zero or one, on or off.

Afghanistan is sovereign. Even Canadian Prime Minister Harper, who is High Minded even by the standards of High Minded Canada acknowledges that. Even Mr Harper admits that being sovereign means that the Afghan parliament can pass whatever legislation it wants and the president can sign it if he is of such a mind.

PM Harper qualified his admission with a statement to the effect that the Karzai government must understand that the assorted foreign assistance forces are present in Afghanistan because there are certain underlying and presumably shared understandings of human rights and kindred subjects. This position has been echoed without the bluntness of Harper's remarks by other Western leaders and highly placed officials.

The nature and extent of these presumptively shared assumptions is intimately connected with the second question: what is the goal of the war? As the Geek has argued in previous posts, a critical key to success in counterinsurgency is the existential and functional legitimacy of the government under attack. Intervenors, and keep a grip on the fact that we and our allies are just that, must refrain from any actions which serve or might serve to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the government. At the best the intervenors must take actions which serve to support the perceived legitimacy of the government.

If our goal is, as the Obama Strategy maintains, the limited one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda, then we must support (or at least appear to do so) the government even when it takes actions which are repugnant to some extent. This does not mean that we cannot argue to Karzai and the parliament that Article 132 may impair their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. But, if we do that, the basis must be factual not artificial. It must be documentable that the Article hurts the government with the majority to an extent which outweighs the help it may provide with the minority.

Beyond making that argument, any huffing, puffing and hyperventilating from the outsiders will simply undercut the government and hand the old but highly effective tool of linking the government to the "foreign occupiers" as a present to Taliban. Making threats, no matter how couched, how muted, how indirect to the effect that obnoxious measures such as Article 132 will result in a slackening of support for the government is a counterproductive measure.

If the American and allied forces mission in Afghanistan is more expansive than the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda and includes the end of nation-building with the goal of creating a liberal, pluralistic, democratic state from the congeries of ethno-linguistic groups collectively constituting the Afghan population, then Article 132 is irrelevant. We have failed already. It is time for buying a mass of one-way tickets back to the world.

From any real world perspective the only task for the US and its allies in Afghanistan is the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda. Any other task is doomed to failure. And, the attempt to add on tasks to the main mission assures the main mission will fail.

If our goal is what President Obama announced it to be: securing the US and the West from future terror attacks launched from Afghanistan, then get on with it.

The rights of Afghan women are important. So is the security of the United States and the West generally. Even the High Minded have to make a choice as to which has the greater priority.

Cartoons And NATO And (Muslim) Sensitivities

President Obama said in Strasbourg that the policy of his administration will show "greater respect" for Muslim sensitivities. Now it looks as though push is going to come to shove over these sensitivities in the choosing of the new General Secretary for NATO.

At issue is the candidacy of Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan is against Rasmussen. With the boldness which once brought the Turks to the gates of Vienna, Erdogan has pronounced Rasmussen as unacceptable to the "Muslim world." The sweeping rejection may have some validity considering that another Turk is the capo of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

Even if every Muslim on the planet holds his or her breath until blueness of the face ensues, the Erdogen Dictate is both unsupportable and irrelevant.

"Wait one, Geek!" You exclaim, continuing, "NATO is part of the not particularly successful war in Afghanistan. We can't piss off the Muslims."

Sure, the Geek replies. Can't hack off the Muslims. Everybody's favorite cop-out. But, let's try getting a grip on reality here.

The NATO SecGen is not a war fighter. He is not the chief policy maker for the alliance. He is not in charge of military strategy. There is little if any need for him to directly deal with the Muslims of Afghanistan, Turkey or Europe.

The NATO SecGen is the handholder-in-chief, the man who cozens, schmoozes and cajoles member states into some semblance of effective cooperation over time. To this end he may have to engage is person-to-person diplomacy with the Defense Ministers, Foreign Ministers and heads-of-state of the members. This implies rather strongly that he must have the support of critical countries before as well as after taking office.

Rasmussen has support. Throughout the alliance. Most notably, and perhaps most critically, he has the vocal and high-vis support of Germany. Ms Merkel has not been at all coy about that. The French and British have offered no public objections. Nor should they. Rasmussen meets or surpasses the tacitly defined requirements for a NATO SecGen. So far the US has maintained a low public profile. If the US does not support Rasmussen, if it bows to "Muslim sensitivities" as represented by Erdogan, it will be a significant self-inflicted defeat.

How's that, you ask?

De facto it gives an Islamist leaning Turkish government a totally undeserved, inappropriate and NATO Charter violating veto over selecting a SecGen. It would also hype the "Muslim sensitivities" to an unwarranted diplomatic importance. This would redound to American (and Western) disadvantage repeatedly in the future.

Consider the basis of Erdogan's disapproval of Rasmussen. The (in)famous Cartoon Contretemps of a few years back. You remember it? The cartoons published in assorted Danish media outlets and then around the world which were directed against Islamist rooted terrorism.

At the time Erdogan was one who demanded that the Danish government suppress the cartoons. It mattered not that such an action would violate such technicalities as the constitution of Denmark to say nothing of the long and honorable tradition of free expression which has marked the Kingdom. Showing the self-control and commitment to tolerance and diversity which has so long marked Islam, there were riots, street demos replete with shouts of, "Death to..." and ultimately boycotts and terror bombings directed against Denmark and its government.

The Cartoon Contretemps also kick started the global Muslim campaign against free expression which has been muscled through the UN Human Rights Council by the OIC. Erdogan hopes to expand the power of political Islam by barring the appointment of Rasmussen.

Traditionally the NATO SecGen has been chosen by consensus. As Merkel put it, the choice has "to be made unanimously."

There are other men under consideration who meet the minima, Canadian ForMin MacKay, the Norwegian ForMin Gahr Stoere, Polish ForMin Sikoriski and Bulgarian former ForMin Passy. All these men and probably many others would do as good a job as SecGen as Rasmussen.

The problem comes in that the selection of any candidate other than Rasmussen would appear to be a NATO cave in. If Erdogan had demonstrated even the slightest hint of diplomatic skill, he would have worked in deep cover to marshal support for one of the other possible selectees.

But, showing the propensity for highly public bluster and proclamation which seems to be a characteristic of Muslim foreign and domestic politics, Erdogan has put NATO in a position which is lose-lose.

If it elects someone other than Rasmussen, the odor of surrender to Islamist demands based upon the flimsy platform of "sensitivities" will erode the credibility of the alliance before it reaches its sixty-first anniversary. If it elects Rasmussen, Erdogan and his cronies will use that "unfriendly" act as cover for doing whatever they wanted to do before artificially creating the crisis.

This implies that Erdogan's objections may be carefully calculated. It may be that the agenda of the Turkish Islamists as well as those of OIC have nothing to do with NATO or free expression. Rather they have everything to do with naked power, its acquisition and expansion.

The US and Western European elites have handed the Islamists of Turkey, the OIC and others a potent weapon with their sensitivity to "sensitivities." We can't blame them for using the weapon we handed them.

Obama In Europe--Substance Or Show?

Like Yogi Berra was reputed to have said, "It's deja vue all over again." So it is with the Obama Rave and Diplomatic Extravaganza.

While the Geek isn't quite old enough to remember the news reports of the hosannas ringing all over Europe when Woodrow Wilson made his triumphal tour prior to the Versailles Peace Conference, he can remember the outpourings which greeted JFK and reached a decibel peak with the Ich bin ein Berliner speech. Journalists reported all the noise and celebration surrounding both Wilson and JFK.

But, only historians, masters of the dry dust of the morning after, take note of what happened afterwards. When one considers the disdain with which Americans treat the small whining voice of history, it is not surprising that the thrill of the victorious moment will be noted while the agony of any succeeding defeat will be ignored.

The lesson of the Wilson and Kennedy visits was simple. The fun of the party must not be recalled at the expense of remembering the vomiting and hangover which came afterwards.

None of this is intended to undercut the validity of President Obama's public diplomacy. It is what he is best at as last year's campaign demonstrated. He can work a crowd rhetorically with an uncanny skill. The halo effect may extend past the moment and the personality to include new American foreign policy initiatives.

It is the policy which matters. It is the policy which will bring long term success or failure to the US, not the personality du jour.

To use the negative example currently so beloved of the cheering Europeans ranging from high school students to heads of government, George W. Bush may have been an annoying person but it was US policy developed and implemented on his watch which degraded America's image and influence in Europe and throughout the world. Had George W. not pushed unilaterialism, rejection of Russia as a Great Power and given a thumbs-up to the invasion of Iraq, his personality and personal attributes would not have equalled a gnat's ass in impact on European political leaders or public.

Importantly, it is the policy stance of the Bush administration which forms the context in which Obama is viewed and cheered. If and only if the policies of his administration are seen as beneficial not only to the US but to Europe as well will the cheering continue and the hangover delayed.

Public opinion is notoriously fickle. This truism applies as well to Europe as it does in the US. The views, opinions and actions of political leaders are no more stable and long lasting.

Nicholas Sarkozy might have emoted and effused over Obama as the greatest thing since the invention of the croissant yesterday, but if the Obama administration policies fail to meet the what's-in-it-for-us test, the French and their president may see Obama as vinegar laced wine in a couple of months. Medvedev may hail the American president as his "new comrade" now, but that is subject to change without notice if the Kremlin decides its latest charm offensive has not paid off sufficiently.

American observers may, as did Politico, applaud Obama for his having delivered a message of "tough love" at the Strasbourg "Town Meeting." Yes, the Geek agrees, it was refreshing to hear an American president call upon the Europeans to end their "casual" and endemic anti American words and actions. To remember that al-Qaeda was not a threat to the US alone. To bear in mind that the US public, regardless of the arrogance and indifference to European sensibilities of the previous administration, was not anti-European.

These remarks were public diplomacy at its best. Not simply mouthing an apology for past "bad" American behavior. No. Doing that to be sure, but also letting the folks of Europe and the world know that we were not alone on the sinners' bench.

Leaving aside the financial matters which constituted the critical, necessary core of the G-20 meeting as the Geek is not qualified to offer more than the opinion of ignorance, at least one very substantial matter of policy emerged from London. It came in the context of the bilateral discussions between Obama and Medvedev.

While acknowledging that the Russians have a long tradition of launching peace-and-charm offensives in the midst of saber-clanking and more-or-less shrill outpourings of It's-All-The-American-Capitalist-Camp's-Fault, the hints of a new round of nuclear weapons reduction talks may prove to be a genuine basis for a real policy shift. Even the consideration of a new round of talks on the subject represents a welcome break from the policy of the neocon ninny laden Bush II administration.

But, the shift has to go far beyond that of the merely comparative.

The Geek has been a supporter of the Finite Deterrent school of nuclear doctrine for over forty years. (OMG! Forty years! Where has time and youth gone?) The US and Russia would have more than sufficient capacity to inflict unsurvivable damage on each other with as few as five hundred high kiloton to low megaton yield warheads (or in the old and delightful Soviet terminology, "nuclear charges.") Similarly either would have the capacity to effectively green glass any third party who was so bold as to initiate a nuclear attack. That includes the Peoples Republic of China (pace Mao.)

A reduction in current stockpiles to no more than 1,500 nuclear charges would be an excellent and long overdue course of action. Given the improvements in delivery technology as well as terminal guidance, the survivability of retaliatory force sufficient to assure the effective counter-value targeting of a second strike is now highly probable. Thus, mutually assured destruction (MAD) which has served us well for a half-century would be unimpaired.

Nuclear weapons systems including delivery vehicles are very, very expensive. The stockpiles of both the US and Russia are aging and in need of upgrading in numerous ways. This upgrading as indicated by the American Reliable Warhead Program are hugely capital intensive.

By reducing the current suite of nuclear systems, both countries could afford (literally) the necessary upgrading. Each would also have the wherewithal to engage in critical programs of nuclear materials control and denaturing.

By reducing stockpiles to an effective level, both countries would also gain a measure of moral authority in the common effort to inhibit proliferation and to take (perhaps joint) action against unseemly proliferaters such as North Korea and Iran. A reduction would also have some real potential to defuse the annoyingly accurate argument presented by a number of second and third tier countries that the Original Nuclear Club uses the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as a means of securing a monopoly on the instruments of mass murder.

If the hints have any substance, the grunts of the diplomatic and defense communities in both Moscow and Washington will get to work shortly. They will work without cheers. Without screaming kids hoping to get a look, get a listen. Without the media panting after them.

Theirs is the substance which works behind the show of summits, of international gatherings, of public diplomacy. Only time will show if there is substance behind the spectacle.

If a year or so down the line, Medvedev and Obama meet, greet and sign a treaty reducing nuclear charges on each side to a number approaching that of a finite deterrent, there will be ample time and reason to applaud. To cheer. For, when--and if--that were to occur, there will have been at least one genuine, positive outcome from the Big Traveling Show in Europe.

A Change That Might Be For The Good

The recent announcement that the Obama Administration has reversed one of George W. Bush's ill-advised decisions is more than welcome. In a move that defies rationality (that is to say one which is based on ideology) the previous neocon crew dropped US participation in the UN Human Rights Council. The Obama-ites have reversed this.

The US must be in the fray at the Human Rights Council. To do anything else is to surrender the field to the opposition. To those such as the members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference who seek to repress freedom of expression. To those such as China, Cuba and, yes, Russia, which define "human rights" in a notably narrow and self-serving fashion.

Now, for the critical caveat. The inevitable, "but."

Whether this change of policy will be good for the US and all other countries in the world with an expansive understanding of the term "human rights" or not depends upon the details of implementation. The outcome will be good, bad or indifferent depending upon the stance taken by the US in the Council as well as the personality and dynamic of the person appointed to sit in the chair behind the sign reading, "United States of America."

The UN Human Rights Council is not a place for a tender minded, ever-so-sensitive person who frets about how empathic the US is with the customs, traditions and religious sensibilities of other governments. The UNHRC is a venue in which a tough, persistent and hard-driving representative of American (and Western) values of human dignity and liberties must wage a constant fight on behalf of the ideals and their expression which are the legacy of generations of war with repression.

If the High Minded of our society are correct, if the bumper sticker philosophy of "We are all passengers on space ship Earth," is to have any significance beyond some warm fuzziness, then all of us, all members of the Order of the Belly Button must have the same rights, the same privileges, the same dignity and the same responsibilities. Further these must be defined and construed in the broadest possible way. There can be no levelling down of these aspects of human life and the human condition.

The Geek is neither High Minded nor Lofty Thinking. The study of history precludes such. He is a realpolitiker. Nonetheless both the lessons of history and the dictates of realpolitik demand that human rights are real and very broad. Anything less opens the door wide to brutal authoritarianism. The pervasiveness of great fear. The snuffing out of technological, social and political progress. It degrades life and makes for mere biological existence.

An environment in which human rights are curtailed, in which the individual is degraded, in which expression is repressed is one rife with the potential for war and all the attendant features of that all-too-common aspect of the human experience. Over the sweep of recent history the vast majority of wars, and certainly all the most devastating ones, were started by regimes which were both authoritarian and of necessity suppressive of the rights of the individual.

The US and other countries are rather good at protecting and expanding the rights of the individual in their domestic contexts. The US is good, even very good at preaching to both the choir and those sitting far from the pulpit about human rights.

The US is not very good at fighting (rhetorically that is) for rights and against those governments which seek under whatsoever color to restrict them. Now, that may change.

It may change if, and only if, the Obama Administration follows through with a firm set of policies and a very determined representative at the UNHRC. We may have to fight a very long and very difficult diplomatic and oratorical contest in that venue, but it is something we must do for our own good. And the good of the oppressed throughout the world.