As the Geek has posted previously, no one ought to underestimate Gaddafi (or Khadafi, or whichever alternative you prefer.) The man is a very clever person--and never more clever than when his survival is threatened. His response to the UN Security Council "all necessary means" vote demonstrates that--in spades.
His tone turned from flaming defiance--all air and maritime traffic in the Mediterranean will become a target--to one of pure peace and transparency--all military operations will be stopped and, why don't you all come by and see the situation for yourselves--in a matter of hours. The change was so fast and hard that observers may have gotten whiplash as a result.
Gaddafi will do whatever is necessary to keep himself in power. Even if his power is limited effectively to those towns where his troops are in unquestioned control, it is Gaddafi power. Even if his tenure in office seems to be limited by the ongoing sanctions, he has, at the very least, bought some of that most precious commodity--time. He is of the view that time must be on his side.
Time gives opportunity. In Gaddafi's case the opportunity being sought for exploitation is the split between the major powers of the European Union as well as the chasm separating the stance of the most bellicose governments from the support of the majority of their populations. There is already a yawning gulf between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other. There is already a palpable lack of enthusiasm within the French (and other people) for any more war within a Muslim state. Even in the UK, which has hung longest and toughest in the Afghanistan effort, one sees a notable dearth of let's-get-the-bastard-out sentiment among the Brits generally.
Time also provides an opportunity to develop mechanisms to evade the sanctions so far imposed. Time provides Gaddafi with the opportunity to explore inviting Russian and Chinese interests to take over the oilfield operations from the European companies whose governments have "betrayed" Gaddafi's faith.
Time allows for the erosion of support for the insurgent forces. It allows for divisions within the insurgents to emerge, to weaken political will in that quarter. The passage of days, weeks, and, ultimately, months, will allow Gaddafi to use indirect means to foster discontent within rebel ranks, to bend the uncommitted increasingly in his direction. And, time's slow passage provides for the opportunity for Gaddafi to strengthen his own forces and gain more support from regimes hostile to the West.
The hands of time also strangle any real commitment on the part of President Obama to the insurgents to fade. The same applies to any American indignation or revulsion over the acts of Gaddafi's killers. He is betting that We the People will lose interest in Libya and wander off--with the American president at the head of the parade. Gaddafi knows that the shelf life of even the toughest of Obama tough talk is short.
Gaddafi's act of apparent preemptive surrender will go a long way to assuring that the world is stuck with his noxious presence for some time to come. Should he be successful in consolidating his territory and even in extending his sway deeper into the insurgent heartland around Benghazi, the probability of the reemergence of Gaddafi 1.0 grows high. A slow, incremental victory, even a victory so gradual in coming as to be insensible, is nonetheless a victory. With victory comes the aftermath--the scores to be settled. And, it scarcely needs mentioning, Gaddafi believes he has a number of scores to settle.
So, the game in Libya will go on.
So also will the game in Bahrain.
The situation in Bahrain is looking more and more dismal by the day. Underneath the cosmetic changes, the most dramatic of which was the demolition of the Pearl Roundabout's iconic image, the reality of the violent cleavage between the Shiite majority and the ruling Sunni minority continues. Also continuing is the direct presence of Saudi Arabian armed forces and the indirect involvement of Iranian agents of influence.
The great Saudi-Iranian cold war has taken on a definitely warmish aspect. The Iranian press has been loudly playing the ancient claim that Bahrain is a former province of Iran in a manner which reminds one of the mood music played by Saddam Hussein regarding Kuwait as Iraq's thirteenth province. The Saudis are becoming increasingly anxious over the role played by Iranian agents in fomenting unrest not only among Bahrain's Shiite population but that five percent of Saudi Arabia's which is both Shiite and living in the oil rich Eastern Province.
While always couched in religious terms the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran is purely secular in both its motivation and goal. Each sees itself in the role of regional hegemon. Each defines its role as regional hegemon in terms of nationalism. This conflict has as little to do with theology, with the doctrinal split separating Shia from Wahhibist Sunni as earlier contests for regional hegemonic status. Religion is invoked as a justification or as a weapon of psychological warfare, but is not at the center of the contest.
The US is caught between the two regional millstones. Saudi Arabia is obviously the better candidate for regional hegemonic status from our perspective. Bahrain is not simply a client of Saudi Arabia, it hosts an important (albeit not critical) base of US naval operations. Further, the future of Bahrain has strong implications for other Gulf states, all of which are important to either US economic or strategic interests.
There are a couple of ground rules in the Game of Bahrain which are evident already. The first is simply that there is no way the Sunni rulers of either Bahrain or Saudi Arabia will allow more than token, symbolic power sharing with the Shiite majority. There is too much fear of Tehran inspired or facilitated subversion to permit any genuine sharing of political authority, at least in the short- to mid-term. The second is that neither the Saudi nor the Bahraini king will be satisfied with anything less than total and high profile American support. Our influence is directly proportionate to the openness of administration support.
In contrast, the opposition in Bahrain takes us at our pro-reform, pro-democracy word. Any evident slackening in either area or any lessening of pressure on the government to end its suppression will serve to enhance the credibility of Tehran's agents. A misstep in dealing with the opponents of the current regime in Bahrain would give great advantage to Iran.
Obama's let-Europe-take-the-point approach worked in Libya--up to a point. A similar dilatory course of action will fail miserably in Bahrain.
That is a fact to keep in mind as the game goes on.
Friday, March 18, 2011
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Where Is The OIC?
Considering the most prevalent form of violent death for Muslims today is that of being killed by another Muslim, one might be forgiven for thinking that the Organization of the Islamic Council (OIC), which is the world's largest agglutination of Muslim majority states, would be taking action. Not merely expressing concern or regret but taking collective and forceful action to stop the killing.
It is not that the OIC lacks the means. Among the member states are the great oil kingdoms and theocracies of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. Turkey, which provided the current jefe grande of the outfit, has one of the largest armed forces in the world. Pakistan, another leading and ever-so-vocal member, is no slouch in the big army department. Saudi Arabia has one of the most well equipped armed forces on the planet. In short, the OIC has within its number the ways and means of imposing peace.
The OIC obviously lacks the political will to take action. Usually the OIC has political will dripping out its collective ying-yang. No problem attaining consensus on a UN measure which would gut Western norms and values regarding free inquiry and expression. No problem achieving unanimity for condemning Israel about anything and everything. There isn't ever a problem in gaining a majority for any proposal which would cast the US in the designated role of villain.
So, what's the problem?
One contributory factor is simply that Muslims have no particular hostility to the notion of Muslims killing Muslims. As events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have demonstrated beyond any doubt, Muslims have an unlimited capacity for outrage when an "infidel" kills a Muslim--even a Muslim gunslinger who has a fine record of killing his co-religionists. When the inevitable happens, a civilian non-combatant is killed, the Muslims go utterly ballistic accusing the "infidels" of "waging war on Islam," intentionally "murdering" the "innocent" and being motivated by some strange syndrome known as "Islamophobia."
Should non-Muslims kill Muslims as was the case in Bosnia the reaction from the Muslim community is to condemn any failure on the part of the "infidel" West to intervene immediately on the side of the endangered Muslims. If, again as in the case of Bosnia, there is any delay in intervening, Muslims and Muslim groups, including the OIC, will charge "Islamophobia" loudly, stridently, and repeatedly. Muslim spokesmen, once more including the OIC, will not tolerate any debate, admit that national political processes take time or that the "infidel" states may have interests not served by intervening. No. There is and can be no reason for an "infidel" country not to leap to the rescue of some purportedly threatened Muslim community beyond fear of and loathing for Islam.
When Muslims kill Muslims the reaction of the Ummah typically is a large, collective yawn. If the killing goes on long enough or involves a sufficiently large number of victims, the default response of massive indifference shifts to one of denunciation. Not denunciation of the Muslim killers. Oh no, that would be, shall we say, divisive. At this point it is worth recalling that one of the supreme duties placed upon all believers is the eschewing of any sort of division within the great nation of all Muslims.
Events in Libya have brought the three alternatives into sharp relief. The insurgents have made it clear that they do not want "infidel" combatants to enter the war on their side. At the same time they have demanded the "infidels" use air attacks against Gaddafi's forces even though this would mean Muslim deaths. And, most recently, the insurgents and their supporters have been alleging the West--particularly the US--has been delaying taking action because the people of the West are unconcerned by Muslims slaughtering Muslims. It's that old devil "Islamophobia" striking again.
Of course should an air campaign result in non-combatant fatalities, the same voices will scream (literally) bloody murder. Bloody murder because of--you guessed it--"Islamophobia." Return of the Crusaders and all that rot.
There is only one reason for the US or any Western country to intervene in any manner in Libya. That is to prevent a Gaddafi victory. Gaddafi staying in power after crushing the insurgency will mean a world of hurt for the West. Even if the combination of sanctions and isolation weakens the Gaddafi hold on power, that process will take time. Time which Gaddafi can and will use to hurt his antagonists to the greatest extent possible.
Yes, other, less pragmatic, less national interest oriented, reasons can be adduced for intervention. But the power of these reasons is attenuated severely by the inevitable, negative reactions of Muslims, including Libyan Muslims, to the unfortunate fact that "infidel" weapons will kill Muslims. The repercussions of this aspect of military reality will echo widely and for some time. They will be amplified by entities and states hostile to the West. Muslims dead as the result of even the most well-intentioned Western interventions will become part of the narrative holding that the West is waging war on Islam and kills Muslims because of "Islamophobia."
Unless the national interest of assuring it is rid of Gaddafi for once and all prevails, no Western state should intervene in the Libyan insurgency. The full consequences will prove far more negative than positive. This may well mean watching Benghazi turned into a slaughterhouse of Biblical proportions.
When and if that happens there will be no need for Western guilt feelings. There will be no requirement for self-recrimination. The responsibility will rest not with the US or the West, but with the Arab League, and, even more, the OIC. The latter group should be the upholder of humanitarian considerations, the staunch supporter of the gentle virtues contained within the Koran, the maintainer of community unity. The OIC is the collective representative of the Ummah in international politics. Let it act in the best interests of threatened Muslims rather than seeking to offload the burden and the blame to the "infidels."
The OIC has been surpassingly solicitous of Muslim sensibilities as it has sought the UN imposition of a global gag order on any mention of Islam that is other than uniformly laudatory. It has been lovingly concerned with the wellbeing of Muslims living in fear of persecution due to "Islamophobia." Is it not time the OIC show some consideration for Libyan Muslims facing extermination at the hands of the Gaddafi Killers?
As push-comes-to-shove time has occurred in Libya, the statesmen of the West might consider publicly tossing the ball to the OIC. The Arab League has already taken a half-way measure toward an All Muslim solution with its support of a no-fly zone. The almost certain failure of the UN Security Council to act in a timely and appropriate way backs the notion of handing over the problem presented by the Libyan insurgency to the OIC.
Should the OIC not pick up the ball and run, hard and fast, to the goal line, then it will have demonstrated to the entire world not only its institutional bankruptcy but also the sheer fraudulence of the Great Muslim Ummah. If the OIC does act quickly and effectively to end the Muslim on Muslim killing in Libya, it will have provided a genuine service not only to that country but established the important precedent of serving as an All Muslim peace imposition force suitable for conflicts in any Muslim majority state.
Either outcome would constitute a major diplomatic success for the West generally and the US in particular. So, Deep Thinkers, why not give it a test spin?
It is not that the OIC lacks the means. Among the member states are the great oil kingdoms and theocracies of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. Turkey, which provided the current jefe grande of the outfit, has one of the largest armed forces in the world. Pakistan, another leading and ever-so-vocal member, is no slouch in the big army department. Saudi Arabia has one of the most well equipped armed forces on the planet. In short, the OIC has within its number the ways and means of imposing peace.
The OIC obviously lacks the political will to take action. Usually the OIC has political will dripping out its collective ying-yang. No problem attaining consensus on a UN measure which would gut Western norms and values regarding free inquiry and expression. No problem achieving unanimity for condemning Israel about anything and everything. There isn't ever a problem in gaining a majority for any proposal which would cast the US in the designated role of villain.
So, what's the problem?
One contributory factor is simply that Muslims have no particular hostility to the notion of Muslims killing Muslims. As events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have demonstrated beyond any doubt, Muslims have an unlimited capacity for outrage when an "infidel" kills a Muslim--even a Muslim gunslinger who has a fine record of killing his co-religionists. When the inevitable happens, a civilian non-combatant is killed, the Muslims go utterly ballistic accusing the "infidels" of "waging war on Islam," intentionally "murdering" the "innocent" and being motivated by some strange syndrome known as "Islamophobia."
Should non-Muslims kill Muslims as was the case in Bosnia the reaction from the Muslim community is to condemn any failure on the part of the "infidel" West to intervene immediately on the side of the endangered Muslims. If, again as in the case of Bosnia, there is any delay in intervening, Muslims and Muslim groups, including the OIC, will charge "Islamophobia" loudly, stridently, and repeatedly. Muslim spokesmen, once more including the OIC, will not tolerate any debate, admit that national political processes take time or that the "infidel" states may have interests not served by intervening. No. There is and can be no reason for an "infidel" country not to leap to the rescue of some purportedly threatened Muslim community beyond fear of and loathing for Islam.
When Muslims kill Muslims the reaction of the Ummah typically is a large, collective yawn. If the killing goes on long enough or involves a sufficiently large number of victims, the default response of massive indifference shifts to one of denunciation. Not denunciation of the Muslim killers. Oh no, that would be, shall we say, divisive. At this point it is worth recalling that one of the supreme duties placed upon all believers is the eschewing of any sort of division within the great nation of all Muslims.
Events in Libya have brought the three alternatives into sharp relief. The insurgents have made it clear that they do not want "infidel" combatants to enter the war on their side. At the same time they have demanded the "infidels" use air attacks against Gaddafi's forces even though this would mean Muslim deaths. And, most recently, the insurgents and their supporters have been alleging the West--particularly the US--has been delaying taking action because the people of the West are unconcerned by Muslims slaughtering Muslims. It's that old devil "Islamophobia" striking again.
Of course should an air campaign result in non-combatant fatalities, the same voices will scream (literally) bloody murder. Bloody murder because of--you guessed it--"Islamophobia." Return of the Crusaders and all that rot.
There is only one reason for the US or any Western country to intervene in any manner in Libya. That is to prevent a Gaddafi victory. Gaddafi staying in power after crushing the insurgency will mean a world of hurt for the West. Even if the combination of sanctions and isolation weakens the Gaddafi hold on power, that process will take time. Time which Gaddafi can and will use to hurt his antagonists to the greatest extent possible.
Yes, other, less pragmatic, less national interest oriented, reasons can be adduced for intervention. But the power of these reasons is attenuated severely by the inevitable, negative reactions of Muslims, including Libyan Muslims, to the unfortunate fact that "infidel" weapons will kill Muslims. The repercussions of this aspect of military reality will echo widely and for some time. They will be amplified by entities and states hostile to the West. Muslims dead as the result of even the most well-intentioned Western interventions will become part of the narrative holding that the West is waging war on Islam and kills Muslims because of "Islamophobia."
Unless the national interest of assuring it is rid of Gaddafi for once and all prevails, no Western state should intervene in the Libyan insurgency. The full consequences will prove far more negative than positive. This may well mean watching Benghazi turned into a slaughterhouse of Biblical proportions.
When and if that happens there will be no need for Western guilt feelings. There will be no requirement for self-recrimination. The responsibility will rest not with the US or the West, but with the Arab League, and, even more, the OIC. The latter group should be the upholder of humanitarian considerations, the staunch supporter of the gentle virtues contained within the Koran, the maintainer of community unity. The OIC is the collective representative of the Ummah in international politics. Let it act in the best interests of threatened Muslims rather than seeking to offload the burden and the blame to the "infidels."
The OIC has been surpassingly solicitous of Muslim sensibilities as it has sought the UN imposition of a global gag order on any mention of Islam that is other than uniformly laudatory. It has been lovingly concerned with the wellbeing of Muslims living in fear of persecution due to "Islamophobia." Is it not time the OIC show some consideration for Libyan Muslims facing extermination at the hands of the Gaddafi Killers?
As push-comes-to-shove time has occurred in Libya, the statesmen of the West might consider publicly tossing the ball to the OIC. The Arab League has already taken a half-way measure toward an All Muslim solution with its support of a no-fly zone. The almost certain failure of the UN Security Council to act in a timely and appropriate way backs the notion of handing over the problem presented by the Libyan insurgency to the OIC.
Should the OIC not pick up the ball and run, hard and fast, to the goal line, then it will have demonstrated to the entire world not only its institutional bankruptcy but also the sheer fraudulence of the Great Muslim Ummah. If the OIC does act quickly and effectively to end the Muslim on Muslim killing in Libya, it will have provided a genuine service not only to that country but established the important precedent of serving as an All Muslim peace imposition force suitable for conflicts in any Muslim majority state.
Either outcome would constitute a major diplomatic success for the West generally and the US in particular. So, Deep Thinkers, why not give it a test spin?
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Once Again It's Escalation Time In Bahrain
When the Saudi troops and armor moved down the causeway to Bahrain, any observer well oriented in time and place would have concluded that the countdown to a crackdown had commenced. The observer might also have mused that the number of hours on the clock was not great.
The troops have moved. The protest encampment in Pearl Square has been cleared. People have been wounded. Some have been killed. The ante in this particular game of bluff has been raised. So have the stakes for all players: the royal family and its Sunni minority supporters, the Shiite majority protesters, the backroom crowd from Tehran and, not least, the US for whom Bahrain is an important strategic outpost.
The Obama folks responded to the most recent clearing operation as they did the previous one. All the right boilerplate phrases have been pulled out of the word processors, "urge restraint," "deplore violence," "need for dialogue" and all the other routine yabba, yabba, dabba, dabba, yadda, yadda.
On the other side of the hill, the side occupied by the royal family of Bahrain, matters are seen differently. The Bahraini royals and their supporters see a strong probability that Obama is going to pull the plug on them as they believe was the case with Hosni Mubarak. There is a strong perception not only in Bahrain but also in Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Coordination Council to the effect that President Obama either though inertia and indifference or under the pressure of personal ideology allowed the overthrow of Mubarak and is likely to do the same with the assorted royals of the Gulf states.
The same perception, or one so close as to be operationally identical, must run through the minds of the Mullahs and their frontmen in Iran, Syria, and within Hezbollah. The vacillating stances of Obama and his secretary of state during the "Lotus Revolution" were seen not only in Egypt but elsewhere as the product of a weak person with no political will. This would embolden the adversaries of the status quo (including Iran) and force the current governments under threat to take more robust actions more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary, let alone desirable.
This analytical stance must lead to the conclusion that the Obama administration and the president himself bear a direct responsibility for the deaths in Bahrain. It also means the same applies with respect to the inevitable deterioration of political stability in Bahrain.
It doesn't matter that the authoritarian regimes have lasted so long in the region in largest measure due to American support. The reasons for that support matter even less. The reality that the US policy of supporting dictators and semi-dictators regardless of the rhetoric favoring democracy was fully justified considering American national and strategic interests as well as the threats presented to them matters least of all.
In Bahrain currently as in Egypt a couple of weeks ago, the US was caught between the two primary pillars of its foreign policy: the idealistic long term commitment to democracy and other political, social, and cultural values and norms on the one hand and the pragmatically sanctioned realistic need to defend and advance certain short term national and strategic interests against clear threats. This dynamic of contradictory policy imperatives both hamstrings and brands as hypocritical whatever the US seeks to do when confronted by a sudden political change as rapid and devastating of the old order as a tsunami.
Worsening the situation has been the chronic administration focus upon splitting the difference and postponing decision making under the transparent cover of appearing to be deliberate and prudent. A nice show which may play in Peoria, but one which falls on its flabby rear end in the streets and squares where the political battles are fought.
As a result no ruler in the Mideast can be sure the US will support him when doing such might require actions running contrary to the myth of constant American upholding of truth, democracy, and the American Way. King Hamid cannot trust Obama to remain a consistent supporter even if the current regime does enter into legitimate negotiations with the dissident Shiites. The same applies to King Abdullah next door in Saudi Arabia. Ditto for all the other feudal rulers of the GCC states.
Can you blame them for concluding they are on their own? Can they be blamed for taking robust action in the hope (perhaps forlorn) that by doing such enough order to allow minimal concessions might be achieved? And, can anyone blame these endangered rulers facing not only domestic threats but the machinations of Iran for ignoring the fine words of the Obama folks?
The answer to each and all these questions is simple: Of course not.
The sorry record of the Obama administration compels the local rulers to ignore Washington completely. The indecisive nature of the administration, its reliance on speeches and verbal lines in the sand never backed by actions which might be effective in the short term, the inability of Mr Obama and his "team" even to come to terms with the realities in Libya, all of these combine to reduce American influence in the region to zero. Even if the local kings and sheiks had been so tone deaf as to miss the significance of Obama reversing decades of US policy toward Israel, they could scarcely overlook the lack of resolute or even visible policy in Egypt.
The King of Bahrain and his peers throughout the Gulf region have no one to look to except each other and themselves. The US is worse than a mere nonentity. It has become a distrusted player, a potential enemy who claims to be a friend. So they act reflexively, violently, coercively in the hopes it might bring a time out during which some sort of internal deal might be brokered.
The reliance on coercion may well be misplaced, fatally so. But in that event at the least the current governments will have been stabbed in the chest. That, the rulers must believe, is better by far than waiting for Mr Obama to plunge the deadly knife into their backs.
Mr Obama and his adherents may convince themselves that the President is a perfect model of statesmanship: cool, deliberative, refusing to act precipitously. This is an illusion. In sharpest point of fact, the Obama "team" is assuring more unrest, longer unrest, and an ever growing mound of corpses. In the final analysis the blood must be seen as staining the hands of the Deep Thinkers of Washington far more than it does the hands of the locals.
The troops have moved. The protest encampment in Pearl Square has been cleared. People have been wounded. Some have been killed. The ante in this particular game of bluff has been raised. So have the stakes for all players: the royal family and its Sunni minority supporters, the Shiite majority protesters, the backroom crowd from Tehran and, not least, the US for whom Bahrain is an important strategic outpost.
The Obama folks responded to the most recent clearing operation as they did the previous one. All the right boilerplate phrases have been pulled out of the word processors, "urge restraint," "deplore violence," "need for dialogue" and all the other routine yabba, yabba, dabba, dabba, yadda, yadda.
On the other side of the hill, the side occupied by the royal family of Bahrain, matters are seen differently. The Bahraini royals and their supporters see a strong probability that Obama is going to pull the plug on them as they believe was the case with Hosni Mubarak. There is a strong perception not only in Bahrain but also in Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Coordination Council to the effect that President Obama either though inertia and indifference or under the pressure of personal ideology allowed the overthrow of Mubarak and is likely to do the same with the assorted royals of the Gulf states.
The same perception, or one so close as to be operationally identical, must run through the minds of the Mullahs and their frontmen in Iran, Syria, and within Hezbollah. The vacillating stances of Obama and his secretary of state during the "Lotus Revolution" were seen not only in Egypt but elsewhere as the product of a weak person with no political will. This would embolden the adversaries of the status quo (including Iran) and force the current governments under threat to take more robust actions more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary, let alone desirable.
This analytical stance must lead to the conclusion that the Obama administration and the president himself bear a direct responsibility for the deaths in Bahrain. It also means the same applies with respect to the inevitable deterioration of political stability in Bahrain.
It doesn't matter that the authoritarian regimes have lasted so long in the region in largest measure due to American support. The reasons for that support matter even less. The reality that the US policy of supporting dictators and semi-dictators regardless of the rhetoric favoring democracy was fully justified considering American national and strategic interests as well as the threats presented to them matters least of all.
In Bahrain currently as in Egypt a couple of weeks ago, the US was caught between the two primary pillars of its foreign policy: the idealistic long term commitment to democracy and other political, social, and cultural values and norms on the one hand and the pragmatically sanctioned realistic need to defend and advance certain short term national and strategic interests against clear threats. This dynamic of contradictory policy imperatives both hamstrings and brands as hypocritical whatever the US seeks to do when confronted by a sudden political change as rapid and devastating of the old order as a tsunami.
Worsening the situation has been the chronic administration focus upon splitting the difference and postponing decision making under the transparent cover of appearing to be deliberate and prudent. A nice show which may play in Peoria, but one which falls on its flabby rear end in the streets and squares where the political battles are fought.
As a result no ruler in the Mideast can be sure the US will support him when doing such might require actions running contrary to the myth of constant American upholding of truth, democracy, and the American Way. King Hamid cannot trust Obama to remain a consistent supporter even if the current regime does enter into legitimate negotiations with the dissident Shiites. The same applies to King Abdullah next door in Saudi Arabia. Ditto for all the other feudal rulers of the GCC states.
Can you blame them for concluding they are on their own? Can they be blamed for taking robust action in the hope (perhaps forlorn) that by doing such enough order to allow minimal concessions might be achieved? And, can anyone blame these endangered rulers facing not only domestic threats but the machinations of Iran for ignoring the fine words of the Obama folks?
The answer to each and all these questions is simple: Of course not.
The sorry record of the Obama administration compels the local rulers to ignore Washington completely. The indecisive nature of the administration, its reliance on speeches and verbal lines in the sand never backed by actions which might be effective in the short term, the inability of Mr Obama and his "team" even to come to terms with the realities in Libya, all of these combine to reduce American influence in the region to zero. Even if the local kings and sheiks had been so tone deaf as to miss the significance of Obama reversing decades of US policy toward Israel, they could scarcely overlook the lack of resolute or even visible policy in Egypt.
The King of Bahrain and his peers throughout the Gulf region have no one to look to except each other and themselves. The US is worse than a mere nonentity. It has become a distrusted player, a potential enemy who claims to be a friend. So they act reflexively, violently, coercively in the hopes it might bring a time out during which some sort of internal deal might be brokered.
The reliance on coercion may well be misplaced, fatally so. But in that event at the least the current governments will have been stabbed in the chest. That, the rulers must believe, is better by far than waiting for Mr Obama to plunge the deadly knife into their backs.
Mr Obama and his adherents may convince themselves that the President is a perfect model of statesmanship: cool, deliberative, refusing to act precipitously. This is an illusion. In sharpest point of fact, the Obama "team" is assuring more unrest, longer unrest, and an ever growing mound of corpses. In the final analysis the blood must be seen as staining the hands of the Deep Thinkers of Washington far more than it does the hands of the locals.
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
The Libyan "Moment" Has Come--And Gone
Not that many years ago the phrase "cheese eating surrender monkeys" was applied by crotch-grabbing, red blooded, red meat eating, American hyperpatriots to the French. The French government of the day had refused to go along with the Bush/Cheney Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq. As a result, some of We the People were not only unimpressed, they wanted to rename French fries something more suitable.
Now the term can be applied to the West generally--provided the French and British are specifically exempted. In diametric opposition to the stance adopted by President Obama and his "foreign policy team," the French have moved quickly to recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya. In conjunction with David Cameron, President Nicholas Sarkozy called for the immediate imposition of a no-fly zone days ago.
In short, the French are waving the banner of defiance in the face of the American surrender monkeys who evidently prefer to chomp political cheese while Gaddafi moves closer to victory. In a stunning show of total indifference not only to the upcoming slaughter in Libya but core interests of the US and its allies, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton rejected a no-fly zone after having met with insurgent leaders in Paris.
The secretary waved the White House's white flag with the usual blather about the necessity of the UN Security Council authorizing any such action. Ms Clinton knows that at least China will veto the idea. The Russians are inclined in that direction as well but have preferred to use the stall approach demanding operational details before considering any resolution.
Any invocation of the Security Council in the context of the Libyan Question is akin to imploring the Great Ju-Ju with sacrificial maidens in order to avert a total meltdown of the incandescent reactor cores in Japan. Ms Clinton knows this. So does President Obama. Both are simply looking for the safest way out of a very real dilemma. They want the Libyan Question to answer itself so that Mr Obama will not have to abandon his successful political posture as being anything and everything George W. Bush was not.
The fear of losing his identity as I-Am-Not-George-Bush, the Clueless Guy in the Oval is quite willing to see Libyans die. Worse, he is willing to place the present and future national and strategic interests of the US in peril--great peril.
There is no doubt but Mr Obama and the rest of his "team" will soon embrace the new narrative being written rapidly by assorted members of the American and European "elites." The new version of life in Libya has the Colonel "winning" so quickly and convincingly that the imposition of a no-fly zone would be too little and too late to be of value to the insurgents.
There is a good deal of truth to the "new" narrative. As the Geek has noted in several previous posts, the insurgents' initial buoyant optimism was unwarranted in the extreme. Their attempt at victory through a rapid escalade were doomed to fail and then time would be on the side of Gaddafi and company. As has been obvious from the beginning, Brother Leader's forces had better organization, better training, better equipment, and a high degree of motivation which extended from the top down. In comparison, the insurgents were a disorganized, badly equipped mob with an attitude.
Gaddifi may speak and act like a nut job, but he falls in the old cliche of "crazy like a fox." He has shown a very real talent for manipulating perceptions in the West as well as playing the divide and conquer game domestically. As he has a total disregard for the lives and well being of the Libyan people, there has never been any doubt about his willingness and ability to keep power while standing on a mountain of bodies. In short, he can kill his way to victory--at least a temporary victory.
Even if his continued tenure in office is measured in months, or a couple of years at most, his capacity to do damage, even create havoc should and must not be underestimated. At present--in largest measure due to the need of President Obama and many other Western leaders such as Ms Merkel for a spine transplant--the Colonel is going to emerge victorious.
Over the longer haul the combination of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation will fatally weaken the Gaddafi family enterprise. The weakening will occur faster if the insurgents are able to switch to a guerrilla war operational doctrine. Assorted Western analysts have concluded this is what the future bodes.
Perhaps. The Libyans of the western region have a history of effective and prolonged guerrilla war. The campaign against the Italian occupiers was centered in the region surrounding Benghazi, Cyrenaica. In the end, of course, the Italians prevailed, largely because they were willing and able to kill their way to victory. Given the resources available to the Gaddafi regime, there are good reasons to assert the government today can do the same only much faster.
This is not to say the insurgents cannot successfully attack the overextended government forces and their very long and highly vulnerable land line of communication. They can mount attacks. They can inflict damage and casualties on the Gaddafi loyalists. They can prevent the Colonel's killers from enjoying unquestioned success, of sleeping soundly after the victory party. Still, the probability of toppling the Gaddafi regime by means of guerrilla war is slim.
No matter how the cake is cut, the result is the same. Without foreign assistance, the insurgents will lose. This means Gaddafi will be back--bigger and badder than ever. He may not last that many months, but he can make those months pure hell for Libyans--and others as well.
This implies with strength and vigor that some country among the civilized states must take the lead. It is no use invoking the magic of the United Nations. The UN Security Council due to the domestic policy considerations so critical to both China and Russia will remain the "god that failed." NATO is also a non-starter given the position adopted by the Merkel government and supported in principle by other countries as well. The same applies to the European Union.
Nor can the Libyans and the world look to the US. President Obama is a genuine "cheese eating surrender monkey" quite willing to sacrifice the national interests of the US on the alter of personal ambition and before the totem of fearing to be seen as one more George W. Bush.
And so the world spins. Downward--at least from the perspective of the US and other civilized states.
Now the term can be applied to the West generally--provided the French and British are specifically exempted. In diametric opposition to the stance adopted by President Obama and his "foreign policy team," the French have moved quickly to recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya. In conjunction with David Cameron, President Nicholas Sarkozy called for the immediate imposition of a no-fly zone days ago.
In short, the French are waving the banner of defiance in the face of the American surrender monkeys who evidently prefer to chomp political cheese while Gaddafi moves closer to victory. In a stunning show of total indifference not only to the upcoming slaughter in Libya but core interests of the US and its allies, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton rejected a no-fly zone after having met with insurgent leaders in Paris.
The secretary waved the White House's white flag with the usual blather about the necessity of the UN Security Council authorizing any such action. Ms Clinton knows that at least China will veto the idea. The Russians are inclined in that direction as well but have preferred to use the stall approach demanding operational details before considering any resolution.
Any invocation of the Security Council in the context of the Libyan Question is akin to imploring the Great Ju-Ju with sacrificial maidens in order to avert a total meltdown of the incandescent reactor cores in Japan. Ms Clinton knows this. So does President Obama. Both are simply looking for the safest way out of a very real dilemma. They want the Libyan Question to answer itself so that Mr Obama will not have to abandon his successful political posture as being anything and everything George W. Bush was not.
The fear of losing his identity as I-Am-Not-George-Bush, the Clueless Guy in the Oval is quite willing to see Libyans die. Worse, he is willing to place the present and future national and strategic interests of the US in peril--great peril.
There is no doubt but Mr Obama and the rest of his "team" will soon embrace the new narrative being written rapidly by assorted members of the American and European "elites." The new version of life in Libya has the Colonel "winning" so quickly and convincingly that the imposition of a no-fly zone would be too little and too late to be of value to the insurgents.
There is a good deal of truth to the "new" narrative. As the Geek has noted in several previous posts, the insurgents' initial buoyant optimism was unwarranted in the extreme. Their attempt at victory through a rapid escalade were doomed to fail and then time would be on the side of Gaddafi and company. As has been obvious from the beginning, Brother Leader's forces had better organization, better training, better equipment, and a high degree of motivation which extended from the top down. In comparison, the insurgents were a disorganized, badly equipped mob with an attitude.
Gaddifi may speak and act like a nut job, but he falls in the old cliche of "crazy like a fox." He has shown a very real talent for manipulating perceptions in the West as well as playing the divide and conquer game domestically. As he has a total disregard for the lives and well being of the Libyan people, there has never been any doubt about his willingness and ability to keep power while standing on a mountain of bodies. In short, he can kill his way to victory--at least a temporary victory.
Even if his continued tenure in office is measured in months, or a couple of years at most, his capacity to do damage, even create havoc should and must not be underestimated. At present--in largest measure due to the need of President Obama and many other Western leaders such as Ms Merkel for a spine transplant--the Colonel is going to emerge victorious.
Over the longer haul the combination of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation will fatally weaken the Gaddafi family enterprise. The weakening will occur faster if the insurgents are able to switch to a guerrilla war operational doctrine. Assorted Western analysts have concluded this is what the future bodes.
Perhaps. The Libyans of the western region have a history of effective and prolonged guerrilla war. The campaign against the Italian occupiers was centered in the region surrounding Benghazi, Cyrenaica. In the end, of course, the Italians prevailed, largely because they were willing and able to kill their way to victory. Given the resources available to the Gaddafi regime, there are good reasons to assert the government today can do the same only much faster.
This is not to say the insurgents cannot successfully attack the overextended government forces and their very long and highly vulnerable land line of communication. They can mount attacks. They can inflict damage and casualties on the Gaddafi loyalists. They can prevent the Colonel's killers from enjoying unquestioned success, of sleeping soundly after the victory party. Still, the probability of toppling the Gaddafi regime by means of guerrilla war is slim.
No matter how the cake is cut, the result is the same. Without foreign assistance, the insurgents will lose. This means Gaddafi will be back--bigger and badder than ever. He may not last that many months, but he can make those months pure hell for Libyans--and others as well.
This implies with strength and vigor that some country among the civilized states must take the lead. It is no use invoking the magic of the United Nations. The UN Security Council due to the domestic policy considerations so critical to both China and Russia will remain the "god that failed." NATO is also a non-starter given the position adopted by the Merkel government and supported in principle by other countries as well. The same applies to the European Union.
Nor can the Libyans and the world look to the US. President Obama is a genuine "cheese eating surrender monkey" quite willing to sacrifice the national interests of the US on the alter of personal ambition and before the totem of fearing to be seen as one more George W. Bush.
And so the world spins. Downward--at least from the perspective of the US and other civilized states.
Monday, March 14, 2011
Oh Boy! Does Fear Ever Rule The World
More than usual today the news is filled with proof that fear is the dominant emotion in the human mind. Fear is so prevalent, so pervasive that often we are as unaware of it as the fish is the water in which it swims. But events of the past few days and weeks have so highlighted the power and universal presence of fear that it cannot be ignored as a motivator of political decisions.
Pakistan is ruled by fear. The corrosive effects of fear, fear arising from a religious belief system which itself is predicated on fear, are clearly seen in the indecisive nature of the civilian government. The government of Pakistan has been hollowed out by fear. The civilian leadership has been rendered the next thing to powerless by the fear created by Muslim clerics espousing the line of violent political Islam.
These clerics and their followers cannot win more than a microscopic percentage of the votes in anything approaching an open and fair election, admittedly a broadly defined thing given Pakistan's "democratic" history. The clerics and their thuggish mobs can, however, make for impressive street demonstrations. More saliently the clerics have the capacity to motivate their zombies to commit murder. Nothing attracts the full and undivided attention of a politician more completely than the prospect of ending up on the wrong end of a gun held by a hollow minded man convinced by his neighborhood preacher that pulling the trigger is an act of obedience by the good slave of Allah.
President Zardiri and the rest of his "democratically" elected government as well as the equally "democratic" parliament have been rendered both irrelevant to the future of their country as well as impotent in its current policies and actions by their surrender to fear. As a result, Pakistan is becoming a hollow state with great rapidity. The government has no genuine authority in any area of activity more important than assuring paychecks are distributed to government workers on time. The real power, the genuine authority over important matters such as stability both present and future or foreign policy or the status of minorities and women or the availability of eduction have been de facto granted to the clerics and their zombie legions.
The fear engendered by the clerics, the religion they purport to interpret, and the zombies has reached such a magnitude that even the army has been marginalized. Whether due to Islamist subornation or because of a tacit agreement with the clerical position based upon the sense of duty, the absolute duty of slave to master repeatedly explicit in Islam, or fear of dying at the hands of a zombie, the army has backed away from confronting the danger within, the internal threat which bodes well to destroy Pakistan as a functioning state.
The army is on the sidelines. The government is hollow. The voters of Pakistan are massively irrelevant. The only power in the country is that of the clerics. They exercise the power of fear in a way which is, today, all but unchallenged.
But the power of fear is not limited to Pakistan. Nor is it limited to clerics with an agenda of violent political Islam.
Since the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the anti-nuclear forces throughout the West have come roaring out of the woodwork where they have been lurking. The loss of cooling incident in the three reactors flooded by the tsunami is one of potentially catastrophic proportions to be sure. Even if a worst case outcome results--a total meltdown of the core which breaches containment so that massive levels of radiation hit the external environment--this is not a reason to drop the flag on the use of nuclear energy to provide electricity either in the US or Europe.
The cause of the loss of coolant is both easy to understand and holds few if any lessons for nuclear power stations located in areas where tsunamis are not to be expected. This is what makes the precipitant actions by Swiss and German authorities risible in the extreme. Not only is neither country noted for its exposure to tsunamis, neither is prone to earthquakes.
Given that the proximate cause of the loss of coolant was the improper siting of the backup generators in a low point on the power station, the reaction of the Swiss, the Germans, American politicians such as Representative Markey, and all the others of the anti-nuclear neo-Luddite crowd is hilariously incorrect and tragically misguided. The Tokyo Electric Power Company made a world class blunder when it was decided the expensive seawall would provide ample protection against tsunamis and allowed the backup generators to be located at a topographic low point. An abundance of prudence would have dictated placing the generators at the highest possible location--just in case. That is the principle behind redundancy in safety systems.
Had the generators not been flooded by the tsunami, the reactor scram triggered by the earthquake would have proceeded nominally. There would have been no core exposure. No hydrogen bubbles. No explosions. No radiation release. No fear.
But, one bad error. One over reliance on a single protective system had totally non-linear consequences. In a way the outcome of the Japanese experience is understandable. People are very afraid of radiation. For more than fifty years, ever since the fallout scares of the Eisenhower years, there has been a deep and often quite unreasoning ever expanding fear of ionizing radiation. The reaction of the Germans, the Swiss, the American greens is an emblem of that.
Ionizing radiation deserves the utmost of respect. It is dangerous. Very dangerous. But, so is much of life. The big difference separating ionizing radiation from other forms of equally dangerous realities of life is the nature of the beast--not detectable by the natural senses, capable of inflicting painful and fatal injuries which might not be evident for some months or years, the inability of medical science to offer more than palliative or supportive treatment. Ionizing radiation even more than toxic chemicals or deadly microbes is the perfect metaphor for technology run amok, the mad scientist and his evil creation.
It is noteworthy that the forty year old reactors, reactors which were scheduled for decommission until a recent decision to extend their service life, have so far resisted the forces liberated within their containment vessels. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the siting decision from hell regarding the backup generators, the scram procedures worked correctly and as planned. It is also noteworthy that safety systems have not been stationary over the past four decades but, like reactor design generally, have been improved greatly.
Not that boring considerations from the realm of reality matter in the face of fear and those whose success in achieving their agenda demands magnifying fear. Not even the mundane reality that the advanced economies of the world must have access to nuclear generated electricity can prevail in the minds of the most fearful--and those who desire to succeed on the wave of fear.
As the members of the Pakistani government are willing and ready to sacrifice the future of their country on the alter of fear so also are the "deep greens" and others of the vast neo-Luddite movement who distrust technology and fear its consequences. To these people the sacrifice of the American and other economies on the alter of fear is both necessary and laudable. To the True Believers of Greenism, lowering the American standard of living through a gospel of "conservation" and "renewable energy" is as obligatory as is the duty of the good slave to Allah for a Muslim. Damn the consequences! I'm fulfilling my duty is the motto of both the Greens of anti-technology and the Green Flag Wavers of Islam.
Fear is even a controlling factor in the Oval. President Obama is loath to act properly regarding Libya due to fear. He and his ever-so-small group of foreign policy advisors are frightened of possible negative reactions by Arabs and Muslims generally should the US act to defend not only its national interests but those of other countries to say nothing of the Libyan insurgents. And, the Nice Young Man From Chicago is afraid of being seen as another George W. Bush, a humiliating proposition for a man whose career has been based on running against George W. And, he may well be afraid of losing the next election. Fear as a motivator is strong but rarely right.
There are so many other examples lurking in the pages of the MSM of the world. But the Geek is a sensitive and tender soul. He can take only so many depressing thoughts in any one day. He has reached his limit. But, feel free to add your own examples; they sure as hell aren't hard to find.
Pakistan is ruled by fear. The corrosive effects of fear, fear arising from a religious belief system which itself is predicated on fear, are clearly seen in the indecisive nature of the civilian government. The government of Pakistan has been hollowed out by fear. The civilian leadership has been rendered the next thing to powerless by the fear created by Muslim clerics espousing the line of violent political Islam.
These clerics and their followers cannot win more than a microscopic percentage of the votes in anything approaching an open and fair election, admittedly a broadly defined thing given Pakistan's "democratic" history. The clerics and their thuggish mobs can, however, make for impressive street demonstrations. More saliently the clerics have the capacity to motivate their zombies to commit murder. Nothing attracts the full and undivided attention of a politician more completely than the prospect of ending up on the wrong end of a gun held by a hollow minded man convinced by his neighborhood preacher that pulling the trigger is an act of obedience by the good slave of Allah.
President Zardiri and the rest of his "democratically" elected government as well as the equally "democratic" parliament have been rendered both irrelevant to the future of their country as well as impotent in its current policies and actions by their surrender to fear. As a result, Pakistan is becoming a hollow state with great rapidity. The government has no genuine authority in any area of activity more important than assuring paychecks are distributed to government workers on time. The real power, the genuine authority over important matters such as stability both present and future or foreign policy or the status of minorities and women or the availability of eduction have been de facto granted to the clerics and their zombie legions.
The fear engendered by the clerics, the religion they purport to interpret, and the zombies has reached such a magnitude that even the army has been marginalized. Whether due to Islamist subornation or because of a tacit agreement with the clerical position based upon the sense of duty, the absolute duty of slave to master repeatedly explicit in Islam, or fear of dying at the hands of a zombie, the army has backed away from confronting the danger within, the internal threat which bodes well to destroy Pakistan as a functioning state.
The army is on the sidelines. The government is hollow. The voters of Pakistan are massively irrelevant. The only power in the country is that of the clerics. They exercise the power of fear in a way which is, today, all but unchallenged.
But the power of fear is not limited to Pakistan. Nor is it limited to clerics with an agenda of violent political Islam.
Since the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the anti-nuclear forces throughout the West have come roaring out of the woodwork where they have been lurking. The loss of cooling incident in the three reactors flooded by the tsunami is one of potentially catastrophic proportions to be sure. Even if a worst case outcome results--a total meltdown of the core which breaches containment so that massive levels of radiation hit the external environment--this is not a reason to drop the flag on the use of nuclear energy to provide electricity either in the US or Europe.
The cause of the loss of coolant is both easy to understand and holds few if any lessons for nuclear power stations located in areas where tsunamis are not to be expected. This is what makes the precipitant actions by Swiss and German authorities risible in the extreme. Not only is neither country noted for its exposure to tsunamis, neither is prone to earthquakes.
Given that the proximate cause of the loss of coolant was the improper siting of the backup generators in a low point on the power station, the reaction of the Swiss, the Germans, American politicians such as Representative Markey, and all the others of the anti-nuclear neo-Luddite crowd is hilariously incorrect and tragically misguided. The Tokyo Electric Power Company made a world class blunder when it was decided the expensive seawall would provide ample protection against tsunamis and allowed the backup generators to be located at a topographic low point. An abundance of prudence would have dictated placing the generators at the highest possible location--just in case. That is the principle behind redundancy in safety systems.
Had the generators not been flooded by the tsunami, the reactor scram triggered by the earthquake would have proceeded nominally. There would have been no core exposure. No hydrogen bubbles. No explosions. No radiation release. No fear.
But, one bad error. One over reliance on a single protective system had totally non-linear consequences. In a way the outcome of the Japanese experience is understandable. People are very afraid of radiation. For more than fifty years, ever since the fallout scares of the Eisenhower years, there has been a deep and often quite unreasoning ever expanding fear of ionizing radiation. The reaction of the Germans, the Swiss, the American greens is an emblem of that.
Ionizing radiation deserves the utmost of respect. It is dangerous. Very dangerous. But, so is much of life. The big difference separating ionizing radiation from other forms of equally dangerous realities of life is the nature of the beast--not detectable by the natural senses, capable of inflicting painful and fatal injuries which might not be evident for some months or years, the inability of medical science to offer more than palliative or supportive treatment. Ionizing radiation even more than toxic chemicals or deadly microbes is the perfect metaphor for technology run amok, the mad scientist and his evil creation.
It is noteworthy that the forty year old reactors, reactors which were scheduled for decommission until a recent decision to extend their service life, have so far resisted the forces liberated within their containment vessels. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the siting decision from hell regarding the backup generators, the scram procedures worked correctly and as planned. It is also noteworthy that safety systems have not been stationary over the past four decades but, like reactor design generally, have been improved greatly.
Not that boring considerations from the realm of reality matter in the face of fear and those whose success in achieving their agenda demands magnifying fear. Not even the mundane reality that the advanced economies of the world must have access to nuclear generated electricity can prevail in the minds of the most fearful--and those who desire to succeed on the wave of fear.
As the members of the Pakistani government are willing and ready to sacrifice the future of their country on the alter of fear so also are the "deep greens" and others of the vast neo-Luddite movement who distrust technology and fear its consequences. To these people the sacrifice of the American and other economies on the alter of fear is both necessary and laudable. To the True Believers of Greenism, lowering the American standard of living through a gospel of "conservation" and "renewable energy" is as obligatory as is the duty of the good slave to Allah for a Muslim. Damn the consequences! I'm fulfilling my duty is the motto of both the Greens of anti-technology and the Green Flag Wavers of Islam.
Fear is even a controlling factor in the Oval. President Obama is loath to act properly regarding Libya due to fear. He and his ever-so-small group of foreign policy advisors are frightened of possible negative reactions by Arabs and Muslims generally should the US act to defend not only its national interests but those of other countries to say nothing of the Libyan insurgents. And, the Nice Young Man From Chicago is afraid of being seen as another George W. Bush, a humiliating proposition for a man whose career has been based on running against George W. And, he may well be afraid of losing the next election. Fear as a motivator is strong but rarely right.
There are so many other examples lurking in the pages of the MSM of the world. But the Geek is a sensitive and tender soul. He can take only so many depressing thoughts in any one day. He has reached his limit. But, feel free to add your own examples; they sure as hell aren't hard to find.
Sunday, March 13, 2011
Sic 'Em, Dave, Sarko
David Cameron continues to take the hardline regarding the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya. Reportedly he has told his cabinet that there is no need for a UN Security Council resolution in order for the UK or any other country to place Libya under aerial interdict. In this view Cameron has been joined by Nicholas Sarkozy. The rather mercurial French president has gone so far as to recognize the rebel national committee as the legitimate government of Libya.
While the UK lacks the resources to do the no-fly job on its own, the British could do so in conjunction with the French. Considering the recent agreement regarding joint military operations, the possibility of this happening moves up the list of likelihood.
If Cameron continues to feel muscular on the Libyan Question, President Obama will be more isolated in his calculated posture of apparent prudence and cautious statesmanship behind which lurks the fear of being seen as George W. Bush reincarnate. The pressure ramped up ever so slightly yesterday when Secretary Gates clarified his earlier remarks on the difficulty of imposing a no-fly zone. The secretary allowed in Manama that the US could do the job all on its lonesome should "President Obama so order."
With the Arab League having unanimously passed a resolution approving a no-fly zone and demanding that the Security Council act accordingly, the assorted member states have picked up a good measure of the political consequences which would ensue should the no-fly zone result in civilian casualties. This move will reduce, albeit marginally, the negative narrative which will be written by anti-Western elements in the Arab and Muslim majority states generally in the wake of even a very pacifistic airspace denial effort.
The real questions do not involve the ability of the US or the Anglo-French duo or any other major power to impose and maintain a no-fly zone. The most trenchant question is: Will a no-fly zone actually benefit the insurgents in a significant manner? As important is this: What actions will follow the imposition of an unproductive no-fly zone. And, of course, there is the most fundamental question of all: What is the goal of the exercise?
To take the last question first: The actual goal of any intervention either by air or ground must be that of utterly defeating the current regime. The US and the rest of the West cannot afford a Gaddafi in power after his crushing of the insurgency. It would not be a return to the status quo ante. A victorious Gaddafi at best would be the Gaddafi of the worst of the bad old days. You know, the Gaddafi of PanAm 103. The Gaddafi who supported any and every movement or regime which opposed the West. The Gaddafi who sought weapons of mass destruction with an ardor which surpassed that demonstrated by Saddam Hussein.
Preventing this version of Gaddafi, the basic Gaddafi 1.0 who strutted and terrified in the years before the US invaded Iraq, must be the highest priority of any and every responsible Western government, our own included. All other goals pale into insignificance in comparison.
Now as to the first question: Would a no-fly zone really matter? Would it preclude a Gaddafi victory? The answer is simple, blunt, and unpleasant. The answer is: No! It is possible that Gaddafi would not even challenge the zone. He has no need to do so.
The air attacks may scare the untrained, inexperienced people down range, but so far the effect of the attacks has been negligible. The pilots--whether Libyan or hired hands from Syria or Sudan--have not shown the ability to hit targets. As a consequence, the strikes have been acoustically and visually impressive but militarily useless.
The winning weapons for the Gaddafi forces have been of the indirect fire sort. Unguided rockets, tube artillery, the backbones of standoff warfare have done the heavy lifting for the Colonel's killers. Only after extensive preparatory fire has the armor moved forward to finish the job.
The untrained, poorly organized, massively inexperienced insurgent fighters lack all the basic wherewithal to withstand the physical and morale effects of standoff, indirect fire weaponry. The same applies to facing down armor, even antiquated main battle tanks and similar vintage infantry fighting vehicles.
In a combat between a small but well equipped force such as the four or so battalions commanded by Gaddafi's kids and a mob, the small force will win. To put it a slightly different way, the Gaddafi forces enjoy the bravery of being out of range. Their possession of standoff weapons allows the Colonel's thugs to kill without the risk of being killed. Any number of wounded insurgents quoted in Western MSM have moaned about the melancholy reality that the Gaddafi troops are never seen let alone shot at but stay safely out of AK-47 or RPG range and pound the holy hell out of the rebel positions.
Conclusion? A no-fly zone will not tilt the battle in favor of the insurgents. They are doomed as long as Gaddafi's forces can continue to move slowly along the one road, stopping to shell any insurgent held area into powder until they finally fetch up at the center of resistance, Benghazi. At that moment it is all over for the insurgents. Those who can run will fast step to the Egyptian border; those who can't will stay and be blown into small bloody fragments by the Colonel's artillery, rockets, and armor.
(At this point a no-fly zone would benefit the refugee stream heading for Egypt by assuring it would not be decimated by air attack. That would be a humanitarian good deed, but is not a war winner. It is not a way of achieving the goal of a Gaddafi free Earth.)
This leaves the second material question: What happens after the no-fly zone proves nugatory? Assuming that the leaders of Western governments, including the Clueless Guy in the Oval, concur that the ongoing presence of Gaddafi constitutes everybody's worst nightmare, there is only one option. The last option standing is the introduction of ground combat units.
There is much fear over doing such. Some anxiety is merited by factual, historical experience; some, even most, is not. Drawing on the historical record it is safe to conclude that an operation limited to one discrete goal--the halting of the Gaddafi advance on a predetermined line, for example--markedly reduces the probability of "mission leap" along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan.
The difficulty in employing military intervention is not that of tactics. Nor is it one at the operational level. The only real problem is that which comes at the political level--defining in a properly limited way the goal to which the use of force is directed. Provided that the goal consensually achieved by the major Western powers is that of enforcing a stop line, there is no requirement for "nation-building," no taking of overall responsibility for the future of Libya.
Admittedly, this limited a mission would leave the Gaddafi regime in charge of a truncated Libya. On the upside, this truncated version of his previous domain coupled with the long term impact of sanctions would serve to erode Brother Leader's material capacity to continue in power. It would also serve to curtail Gaddafi's potential for international mischief making most gratifyingly.
There is a very unfortunate but very real temptation for political leaders not to leave well enough alone. They seem to be constitutionally disinclined to accept a half loaf when the full loaf seems to be so much more attractive. Here the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most important object lessons. Had the neocon ninnies of the Bush-Cheney years been at all able to restrain their unlimited ambitions, the effort in Afghanistan would have been restricted to a highly doable punitive expedition and the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq would have been limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein.
The US should have rejected any responsibility for doing anything beyond removing two odious regimes, assuring that al-Qaeda was destroyed and eliminating any residual capability in Iraq for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. All the rest, all the follow-ons of "nation-building" or the constitution of new governments would have been passed on to the indigenous populations with the assistance of those members of the "international community" which cared to offer such.
The goal of any ground intervention must be restricted to the establishment of a stop line beyond which the Gaddafi units would not be allowed. Taken in conjunction with the existence of an alternative, legitimate government and the assorted international sanctions, the result would be the ejection of Gaddafi from power. This would be facilitated if the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity were to be lowered even if not removed totally. It must be recalled that the Taylor prosecution served as the single greatest spine stiffener provided to Gaddafi and family.
At the moment both Cameron and Sarkozy have shown both greater insight and courage than has Mr Obama. Having written that, the Geek is constrained to add that neither man has been honest--at least in public. Their military advice must have emphasized the irrelevance of the no-fly zone. Their political and diplomatic advisors must have pointed out the array of negative consequences which would attend a Gaddafi victory. These factors imply that each man must be aware that when night falls, only a ground intervention would prevent the Colonel from emerging triumphant and emboldened.
Since the British and French leaders have led on the Libyan Question, it is now incumbent upon them to tell it like it is. They must prepare themselves, their publics, and the rest of the world for the necessity of a ground intervention in the very near future. This also means they and their military and diplomatic high command must design a properly limited mission definition. And, they have to drag Obama kicking and screaming in their wake.
So, Dave and Sarko, sic 'em!
While the UK lacks the resources to do the no-fly job on its own, the British could do so in conjunction with the French. Considering the recent agreement regarding joint military operations, the possibility of this happening moves up the list of likelihood.
If Cameron continues to feel muscular on the Libyan Question, President Obama will be more isolated in his calculated posture of apparent prudence and cautious statesmanship behind which lurks the fear of being seen as George W. Bush reincarnate. The pressure ramped up ever so slightly yesterday when Secretary Gates clarified his earlier remarks on the difficulty of imposing a no-fly zone. The secretary allowed in Manama that the US could do the job all on its lonesome should "President Obama so order."
With the Arab League having unanimously passed a resolution approving a no-fly zone and demanding that the Security Council act accordingly, the assorted member states have picked up a good measure of the political consequences which would ensue should the no-fly zone result in civilian casualties. This move will reduce, albeit marginally, the negative narrative which will be written by anti-Western elements in the Arab and Muslim majority states generally in the wake of even a very pacifistic airspace denial effort.
The real questions do not involve the ability of the US or the Anglo-French duo or any other major power to impose and maintain a no-fly zone. The most trenchant question is: Will a no-fly zone actually benefit the insurgents in a significant manner? As important is this: What actions will follow the imposition of an unproductive no-fly zone. And, of course, there is the most fundamental question of all: What is the goal of the exercise?
To take the last question first: The actual goal of any intervention either by air or ground must be that of utterly defeating the current regime. The US and the rest of the West cannot afford a Gaddafi in power after his crushing of the insurgency. It would not be a return to the status quo ante. A victorious Gaddafi at best would be the Gaddafi of the worst of the bad old days. You know, the Gaddafi of PanAm 103. The Gaddafi who supported any and every movement or regime which opposed the West. The Gaddafi who sought weapons of mass destruction with an ardor which surpassed that demonstrated by Saddam Hussein.
Preventing this version of Gaddafi, the basic Gaddafi 1.0 who strutted and terrified in the years before the US invaded Iraq, must be the highest priority of any and every responsible Western government, our own included. All other goals pale into insignificance in comparison.
Now as to the first question: Would a no-fly zone really matter? Would it preclude a Gaddafi victory? The answer is simple, blunt, and unpleasant. The answer is: No! It is possible that Gaddafi would not even challenge the zone. He has no need to do so.
The air attacks may scare the untrained, inexperienced people down range, but so far the effect of the attacks has been negligible. The pilots--whether Libyan or hired hands from Syria or Sudan--have not shown the ability to hit targets. As a consequence, the strikes have been acoustically and visually impressive but militarily useless.
The winning weapons for the Gaddafi forces have been of the indirect fire sort. Unguided rockets, tube artillery, the backbones of standoff warfare have done the heavy lifting for the Colonel's killers. Only after extensive preparatory fire has the armor moved forward to finish the job.
The untrained, poorly organized, massively inexperienced insurgent fighters lack all the basic wherewithal to withstand the physical and morale effects of standoff, indirect fire weaponry. The same applies to facing down armor, even antiquated main battle tanks and similar vintage infantry fighting vehicles.
In a combat between a small but well equipped force such as the four or so battalions commanded by Gaddafi's kids and a mob, the small force will win. To put it a slightly different way, the Gaddafi forces enjoy the bravery of being out of range. Their possession of standoff weapons allows the Colonel's thugs to kill without the risk of being killed. Any number of wounded insurgents quoted in Western MSM have moaned about the melancholy reality that the Gaddafi troops are never seen let alone shot at but stay safely out of AK-47 or RPG range and pound the holy hell out of the rebel positions.
Conclusion? A no-fly zone will not tilt the battle in favor of the insurgents. They are doomed as long as Gaddafi's forces can continue to move slowly along the one road, stopping to shell any insurgent held area into powder until they finally fetch up at the center of resistance, Benghazi. At that moment it is all over for the insurgents. Those who can run will fast step to the Egyptian border; those who can't will stay and be blown into small bloody fragments by the Colonel's artillery, rockets, and armor.
(At this point a no-fly zone would benefit the refugee stream heading for Egypt by assuring it would not be decimated by air attack. That would be a humanitarian good deed, but is not a war winner. It is not a way of achieving the goal of a Gaddafi free Earth.)
This leaves the second material question: What happens after the no-fly zone proves nugatory? Assuming that the leaders of Western governments, including the Clueless Guy in the Oval, concur that the ongoing presence of Gaddafi constitutes everybody's worst nightmare, there is only one option. The last option standing is the introduction of ground combat units.
There is much fear over doing such. Some anxiety is merited by factual, historical experience; some, even most, is not. Drawing on the historical record it is safe to conclude that an operation limited to one discrete goal--the halting of the Gaddafi advance on a predetermined line, for example--markedly reduces the probability of "mission leap" along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan.
The difficulty in employing military intervention is not that of tactics. Nor is it one at the operational level. The only real problem is that which comes at the political level--defining in a properly limited way the goal to which the use of force is directed. Provided that the goal consensually achieved by the major Western powers is that of enforcing a stop line, there is no requirement for "nation-building," no taking of overall responsibility for the future of Libya.
Admittedly, this limited a mission would leave the Gaddafi regime in charge of a truncated Libya. On the upside, this truncated version of his previous domain coupled with the long term impact of sanctions would serve to erode Brother Leader's material capacity to continue in power. It would also serve to curtail Gaddafi's potential for international mischief making most gratifyingly.
There is a very unfortunate but very real temptation for political leaders not to leave well enough alone. They seem to be constitutionally disinclined to accept a half loaf when the full loaf seems to be so much more attractive. Here the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most important object lessons. Had the neocon ninnies of the Bush-Cheney years been at all able to restrain their unlimited ambitions, the effort in Afghanistan would have been restricted to a highly doable punitive expedition and the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq would have been limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein.
The US should have rejected any responsibility for doing anything beyond removing two odious regimes, assuring that al-Qaeda was destroyed and eliminating any residual capability in Iraq for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. All the rest, all the follow-ons of "nation-building" or the constitution of new governments would have been passed on to the indigenous populations with the assistance of those members of the "international community" which cared to offer such.
The goal of any ground intervention must be restricted to the establishment of a stop line beyond which the Gaddafi units would not be allowed. Taken in conjunction with the existence of an alternative, legitimate government and the assorted international sanctions, the result would be the ejection of Gaddafi from power. This would be facilitated if the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity were to be lowered even if not removed totally. It must be recalled that the Taylor prosecution served as the single greatest spine stiffener provided to Gaddafi and family.
At the moment both Cameron and Sarkozy have shown both greater insight and courage than has Mr Obama. Having written that, the Geek is constrained to add that neither man has been honest--at least in public. Their military advice must have emphasized the irrelevance of the no-fly zone. Their political and diplomatic advisors must have pointed out the array of negative consequences which would attend a Gaddafi victory. These factors imply that each man must be aware that when night falls, only a ground intervention would prevent the Colonel from emerging triumphant and emboldened.
Since the British and French leaders have led on the Libyan Question, it is now incumbent upon them to tell it like it is. They must prepare themselves, their publics, and the rest of the world for the necessity of a ground intervention in the very near future. This also means they and their military and diplomatic high command must design a properly limited mission definition. And, they have to drag Obama kicking and screaming in their wake.
So, Dave and Sarko, sic 'em!
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Cowardice And Appeasement Masquerade As Statesmanship
As expected when the Libyan insurgents failed to topple the Gaddafi regime by escalade, time has favored the Colonel's side. His troops and militia are better equipped and trained than the rebels. The latter are long on spirit but very short on capabilities.
The utter ineptitude of the amateurs which constitute the majority of the insurgent fighters is pathetically evident in pictures showing recoilless rifles mounted without any protection alongside the paved road which is the only sure line of communication east to west. It is equally obvious in pictures showing fighters waving weapons but not digging individual fighting positions, shooting into the air while piles of ammunition spill out of boxes out in the open. It is seen as well in the shooting of light antiaircraft cannon against aircraft hopelessly out of range.
The fighters interviewed by Western mainstream media all cheerfully acknowledge their lack of military training of even the most rudimentary sort. (The Geek's personal favorite is, "I'm not trained but I've seen a lot of action movies.") They also profess a willingness to die, a sentiment which seems to be well neigh onto universal among Muslim men.
The problem comes in the whole idea of war as summarized by General George S. Patton, Jr., a man who both knew a thing or two about war and loved the thrill of combat. "You don't win by dying for your country. You win by making the other sonofabitch die for his." The mere willingness to die for the "cause" has the utility of mammary glands on a bull.
The combination of aircraft, armor, better training and leadership and a total willingness to kill any and all who might be opponents of the regime conspires to assure the Colonel has gained the upper hand in the ongoing insurgency. With every passing day his forces will grow stronger and the rebels weaker--at least in manpower and materiel. It is different in the critical consideration of political will.
Gaddafi's political will was assured by the institution of International Criminal Court proceedings against him, his family, and closest associates. Way back when the deposed dictator of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was arrested in his exile refuge of Nigeria and sent to stand trial in the Netherlands, Gaddafi branded the action "unacceptable." He saw the handwriting on the wall with the arrest and trial of his onetime surrogate. He is not going to suffer the same fate. Nor will he allow it to befall those closest to him. The result is a high political will either to prevail or to die in Libya.
The political will of the insurgents is bound up with the certainty of brutal reprisals by Gaddafi should he win. The rebels are not going to submit easily or meekly to forces which will kill them out of hand in the best of cases or deliver them to the mercies of Gaddafi's torture specialists in the most likely event. The insurgents have very few choices: win, beat feet to the nearest border, or die miserably.
The correlation of forces is such that the war will continue and grow more bloody as the implacable Gaddafi pushes harder and deeper into the Land of the Insurgents. If the West thinks it has seen a "humanitarian crisis," all that can be written in reply is, "You ain't seen nothing yet."
The insurgents are demanding a no-fly zone and would greatly prefer airstrikes against Gaddafis' bases of operation and field forces. The opinion on the street in Benghazi is still opposed to the introduction of foreign ground forces, but that is subject to change as the government Masters of Massacre move closer.
The Arab League unanimously approved of a no-fly zone and called upon the UN Security Council to order the imposition of one. Of course, asking the Security Council to do this is rather like masturbating with steel wool--both unproductive and unpleasant. Russia and China have made it clear that each would exercise a veto over any such resolution in keeping with their view of the sanctity of internal affairs of a nation-state.
Any benefit from the Arab League move is most likely to be more indirect. Both the European Union and NATO have specified that the Arab states must carry the substantial political burden of seeking a no-fly zone. And, it must be noted that the EU with Germany at the lead has made it clear that it views any such action with great distaste. The slapping down of the Cameron-Sarkozy endorsed no-fly zone plan was both quick and brutal. NATO is not appreciably more excited about the prospect of executing any no-fly scheme.
Then there is the United States. President Obama has denounced the Libyan regime in ringing tones but other than the exercise in fine sounding rhetoric has been tepid at best in supporting the insurgent movement. He has deferred to the "international community" as part of his ongoing campaign to demonstrate that under his version of leadership the US is not going to be unilateral, particularly regarding Muslim majority states. In this he is probably supported by most of We the People who have become sick, sore, and tired of long, expensive, bloody, and very unsatisfying wars in distant Muslim countries. There are very few among us who want to see the Marines once more land on "the shores of Tripoli."
The big question is simply this: Will the views of We the People and our equivalents in Europe change as the Gaddifi forces butcher their way to and through Benghazi? Will we remain indifferent and allow our governments to keep their detached attitude as the slaughter grows and the refugees crowd across the Egyptian border?
A slightly smaller question is will the Arab League keep their collective hands out of the Libyan cauldron if the body count escalates markedly? At what point--if any--will their members say enough is enough and move to enforce the no-fly zone or provide ground forces in a peace imposition role? It is difficult to see circumstances in which authoritarian regimes with large military forces at their disposal--think Syria or Saudi Arabia--send forces to protect rebels against a fellow authoritarian, even one as cordially despised as the Colonel. It is equally hard to envision the Egyptian army moving into Libya given the politically unstable environment at home.
In short, it is difficult to see the Arab states dirtying their hands in Libya. They have too much to fear at home to allow such a precipitant action. There is too much danger of further unrest throughout the region for the local ground and air forces to engage in a bit of peace imposition. The danger of inciting "radical extremists" within their Muslims looms too large in the minds of Arab leaders to take any risks.
Absent irresistible political pressure from the population it is equally unlikely that Western states will do other than provide humanitarian assistance regardless of tough talk from assorted capitals. There is too much of the odor of appeasement present throughout the EU for that to happen. Too much fear of upsetting the local "radical extremists" to allow the use of force. To much fear of exciting the animosity of former colonial subjects to permit firm action.
This leaves the US. As the broad guage negative reaction to the King subcommittee hearings on homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalization have demonstrated, the stench of appeasement and fear can clog the nostrils of Americans as well. At the same time the US has a president who exists by virtue of defining himself as being anti-George W. Bush. He has already taken heavy hits from his own base for having extended Bush era policies after having promised to jettison them. And, with a firm eye on next year's election, the last thing he is eager to do is commit the US to another war in a Muslim majority country. It is no way for a Nobel Peace Prize winner to operate, is it?
There are good reasons that might be adduced in support of a decision to stay out of Libya. The reasons taken in aggregate make the no-go choice appear to be an act of wise statesmanship. Still, one has to wonder what will the decision of future historians be if and when the Colonel's killers prevail and stand triumphantly on mounds of corpses. Will the estimate of these hypothetical historians of tomorrow be one of praise for wise statesmanship or condemnation for ethical failure of the highest sort?
The Geek has his conclusions. Time will prove if he is correct.
The utter ineptitude of the amateurs which constitute the majority of the insurgent fighters is pathetically evident in pictures showing recoilless rifles mounted without any protection alongside the paved road which is the only sure line of communication east to west. It is equally obvious in pictures showing fighters waving weapons but not digging individual fighting positions, shooting into the air while piles of ammunition spill out of boxes out in the open. It is seen as well in the shooting of light antiaircraft cannon against aircraft hopelessly out of range.
The fighters interviewed by Western mainstream media all cheerfully acknowledge their lack of military training of even the most rudimentary sort. (The Geek's personal favorite is, "I'm not trained but I've seen a lot of action movies.") They also profess a willingness to die, a sentiment which seems to be well neigh onto universal among Muslim men.
The problem comes in the whole idea of war as summarized by General George S. Patton, Jr., a man who both knew a thing or two about war and loved the thrill of combat. "You don't win by dying for your country. You win by making the other sonofabitch die for his." The mere willingness to die for the "cause" has the utility of mammary glands on a bull.
The combination of aircraft, armor, better training and leadership and a total willingness to kill any and all who might be opponents of the regime conspires to assure the Colonel has gained the upper hand in the ongoing insurgency. With every passing day his forces will grow stronger and the rebels weaker--at least in manpower and materiel. It is different in the critical consideration of political will.
Gaddafi's political will was assured by the institution of International Criminal Court proceedings against him, his family, and closest associates. Way back when the deposed dictator of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was arrested in his exile refuge of Nigeria and sent to stand trial in the Netherlands, Gaddafi branded the action "unacceptable." He saw the handwriting on the wall with the arrest and trial of his onetime surrogate. He is not going to suffer the same fate. Nor will he allow it to befall those closest to him. The result is a high political will either to prevail or to die in Libya.
The political will of the insurgents is bound up with the certainty of brutal reprisals by Gaddafi should he win. The rebels are not going to submit easily or meekly to forces which will kill them out of hand in the best of cases or deliver them to the mercies of Gaddafi's torture specialists in the most likely event. The insurgents have very few choices: win, beat feet to the nearest border, or die miserably.
The correlation of forces is such that the war will continue and grow more bloody as the implacable Gaddafi pushes harder and deeper into the Land of the Insurgents. If the West thinks it has seen a "humanitarian crisis," all that can be written in reply is, "You ain't seen nothing yet."
The insurgents are demanding a no-fly zone and would greatly prefer airstrikes against Gaddafis' bases of operation and field forces. The opinion on the street in Benghazi is still opposed to the introduction of foreign ground forces, but that is subject to change as the government Masters of Massacre move closer.
The Arab League unanimously approved of a no-fly zone and called upon the UN Security Council to order the imposition of one. Of course, asking the Security Council to do this is rather like masturbating with steel wool--both unproductive and unpleasant. Russia and China have made it clear that each would exercise a veto over any such resolution in keeping with their view of the sanctity of internal affairs of a nation-state.
Any benefit from the Arab League move is most likely to be more indirect. Both the European Union and NATO have specified that the Arab states must carry the substantial political burden of seeking a no-fly zone. And, it must be noted that the EU with Germany at the lead has made it clear that it views any such action with great distaste. The slapping down of the Cameron-Sarkozy endorsed no-fly zone plan was both quick and brutal. NATO is not appreciably more excited about the prospect of executing any no-fly scheme.
Then there is the United States. President Obama has denounced the Libyan regime in ringing tones but other than the exercise in fine sounding rhetoric has been tepid at best in supporting the insurgent movement. He has deferred to the "international community" as part of his ongoing campaign to demonstrate that under his version of leadership the US is not going to be unilateral, particularly regarding Muslim majority states. In this he is probably supported by most of We the People who have become sick, sore, and tired of long, expensive, bloody, and very unsatisfying wars in distant Muslim countries. There are very few among us who want to see the Marines once more land on "the shores of Tripoli."
The big question is simply this: Will the views of We the People and our equivalents in Europe change as the Gaddifi forces butcher their way to and through Benghazi? Will we remain indifferent and allow our governments to keep their detached attitude as the slaughter grows and the refugees crowd across the Egyptian border?
A slightly smaller question is will the Arab League keep their collective hands out of the Libyan cauldron if the body count escalates markedly? At what point--if any--will their members say enough is enough and move to enforce the no-fly zone or provide ground forces in a peace imposition role? It is difficult to see circumstances in which authoritarian regimes with large military forces at their disposal--think Syria or Saudi Arabia--send forces to protect rebels against a fellow authoritarian, even one as cordially despised as the Colonel. It is equally hard to envision the Egyptian army moving into Libya given the politically unstable environment at home.
In short, it is difficult to see the Arab states dirtying their hands in Libya. They have too much to fear at home to allow such a precipitant action. There is too much danger of further unrest throughout the region for the local ground and air forces to engage in a bit of peace imposition. The danger of inciting "radical extremists" within their Muslims looms too large in the minds of Arab leaders to take any risks.
Absent irresistible political pressure from the population it is equally unlikely that Western states will do other than provide humanitarian assistance regardless of tough talk from assorted capitals. There is too much of the odor of appeasement present throughout the EU for that to happen. Too much fear of upsetting the local "radical extremists" to allow the use of force. To much fear of exciting the animosity of former colonial subjects to permit firm action.
This leaves the US. As the broad guage negative reaction to the King subcommittee hearings on homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalization have demonstrated, the stench of appeasement and fear can clog the nostrils of Americans as well. At the same time the US has a president who exists by virtue of defining himself as being anti-George W. Bush. He has already taken heavy hits from his own base for having extended Bush era policies after having promised to jettison them. And, with a firm eye on next year's election, the last thing he is eager to do is commit the US to another war in a Muslim majority country. It is no way for a Nobel Peace Prize winner to operate, is it?
There are good reasons that might be adduced in support of a decision to stay out of Libya. The reasons taken in aggregate make the no-go choice appear to be an act of wise statesmanship. Still, one has to wonder what will the decision of future historians be if and when the Colonel's killers prevail and stand triumphantly on mounds of corpses. Will the estimate of these hypothetical historians of tomorrow be one of praise for wise statesmanship or condemnation for ethical failure of the highest sort?
The Geek has his conclusions. Time will prove if he is correct.
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