Let the Tribesmen Handle It and Leave Iraqi Government Alone

A Covenant With Death or A Contract With Defeat, Pt 4.


In Afghanistan the reality of the human terrain on which we and our allies are fighting about which we must get a grip is simple and basic. There is no single, Afghan people. Not now. Not ever.

The Afghans are deeply divided. Divided by language. Divided by culture. Divided by history. They've never been unified. Not even when under extreme pressure from the outside. The British and Russians discovered this a century and a half ago when they fought over Afghanistan, invaded it, even occupied parts of it. Each side of the Great Game could find or buy partisans willing to sell out their fellow Afghans for power or gold.

Even during the Soviet occupation, not all Afghans resisted. Those who resisted were bitterly divided into more than a half dozen different groups. Originally, the Taliban was one of the--as our people called them--Seven Dwarfs. The Taliban was a late comer, a wannabe resistance group which had only one advantage. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency supported it.

The Taliban never got a firm grip on power. Even without the "shock and awe" efforts of the US, Taliban would have collapsed to internal opposition. All we did was hasten the process, give the Taliban a reason to regroup with greater cohesion and bounce the rubble which was and is Afghanistan a little higher.

In the past few months under the leadership? of the late and quite unlamented Mullah Dadullah the Taliban changed its tactics from rather conventional guerrilla war which was getting them nowhere slowly to one which was bringing about their defeat.

The change?

For reasons that died with him, Mullah Dadullah instituted a campaign of suicide bombings directed against the Afghan civilian population and kidnappings/murders directed against Afghans who cooperated with the foreign forces or the journalists covering the war.

The upshot of Dadullah's new approach was quick in coming. The uncommitted majority of the population, the mass of Afghans who simply wanted to be left alone to get on with their lives and perhaps benefit from the nationbuilding efforts of the US and NATO turned increasingly against the Taliban. Intelligence (and media) reports showed this clearly.

At this point all the US and the other outsiders had to do was step back and step down. Sure, the nationbuilding and people-to-people programs had to continue as did local security efforts. But, offensive combat except in the few areas near the Pakistani border where Taliban fighters and supplies infiltrated could be stopped without loss of momentum.

Afghan villagers have guns. Always have. Always will. They know how to use them. Every invader has discovered this fact. Afghan civilians like civilians everywhere don't enjoy being blown up, shot up or extorted.

All we had to do was look the other way as the locals abated nuisances. Oh, we could clean up afterwards, if necessary. Even provide intelligence concerning an incoming Taliban threat so as to enhance the local response. We might even have done something that worked quite well for a while in South Vietnam, embed an American infantry squad with the local defense volunteers.

We didn't do any of these things. Instead we have come close to snatching defeat away from the Taliban.

How'd we manage this?

Aircraft. Fast moving, high tech planes with big damn bombs and fast firing cannon. We like air power. We believe (rightly) that air delivered firepower saves lives on the ground. The lives of our troops. And, it does. I'm typing today because a Marine zoomie or two saved my butt once upon a time

There's a downside to air power, though. It kills everyone in its way. Black hat. Civilian. Makes no difference. Our use of air power killed Afghan civilians. Destroyed their homes. Plowed their crops into oblivion.

This hacked off the civilians. They don't understand "regrettable mistakes." All they understood was the dead bodies of family, neighbors, friends. Not surprisingly this resulted in the Afghan legislature showing annoyance. Annoyance which hurts the cause of defeating the Taliban.

What should we do now?

Accept the Covenant With Death. This means that for some time to come our troops will be at a slightly greater risk, but we must send the fighter-bombers home. At the same time we have to trust the Afghan's more.

They've got the guns. They have their homes, their lives, their families' lives at stake. They have a reason or two to eliminate the Taliban. Cooperate with them. Assist them to do their job of protecting their lives and property better.

Sure, the new central government won't like this approach. It means that over time it will be at greater risk from its own citizens. But, that's the way it has always been in Afghanistan. No government has gone to its collective bed at night in full security. It may not be a system that we Americans would like, but it is one with which the Afghans have been comfortable for a long, long time. (Anyway, why should a tax collector sleep the sleep of the just?)

Can you believe it? Now there is talk around Washington, particularly in Congress that it may be time for regime change in Baghdad. Change the regime that we invaded to change the regime to.

Wait one! I've seen this part of the movie before. In South Vietnam, time after time between November 1963 and a decade later. Man! I can't take it. It'll have to wait for a later post.