How It Goes--Good, Bad And Worse

Iraq has gotten a lot of msm coverage the past few days as the all-but-defeated insurgents sent the usual crew of martyrdom seekers with exploding belts and vehicles after the usual targets in the hopes of proving something.

"What?" You ask/exclaim.

One of the historical realities with on-the-ropes insurgent groups is the need to prove several things. All at once. Via high visibility attacks.

The first is the most obvious. The insurgents need to demonstrate that they still exist as credible forces with real bite left. This is the only way in which they can continue the absolutely central strategic task of demonstrating political will along with necessary collaterals including goosing up the flagging will of weakening supporters and hoping to strengthen the hand of those within the opposition who oppose a continuation of the counterinsurgency.

The second links closely with the first. By staging high profile attacks against predominantly non-military targets the blackhats hope to stir further war weariness among the uncommitted majority of the population which in turn will cause pressure on the government to end the fighting and dying.

The third is less a reason than a motive. By breaking things and killing people the insurgent leadership hopes to convince its own fighters that the fight is not lost. In short, to rebuild morale.

The recent spike in soft-target attacks by the Martyr Brigade reinforces the positive trajectories of other indicators regarding Iraq. The number of internal refugees is decreasing. Economic activity (of the legal sort) is increasing. Hostile initiated actions are decreasing. Baghdad's sway is growing.

The war isn't over by a long way and as commanders on the ground have noted, the increases of stability are tentative and fragile. This is what the insurgents hope to prove with the latest round of attacks: the stability is too fragile to continue.

Given that some of the insurgent leadership is anything but unaware of American domestic politics and considering that the external sponsor of at least some of the blackturbans (Iran, for those of you that like it spelled out) is quite au courant on US politics and politicians, it is not out of the question that there is some (realistic) hope that Iraq and the "failure" of the US in that country will resurface on the political scene. That reasoning is almost self-evident.

The question is not so much "if" but "when." When will enough coverage of enough suicide bombings stimulate the usual suspects in Congress and elsewhere to pronounce that the war has once more come a cropper and the only thing left for the US to do is put the troops on homeward bound flights.

Until at least some of the customary hand-wringers start the wail of "out now" the Geek is willing to bet hair that the bombings will continue. Ironically, Iraq is an example of a place and time where "news" is a powerful indicator of good policy results.

The msm have been unaccountably silent on a place where bad policy results are evident. The place is Syria. Well, to err on the side of accuracy the place is Lebanon-Syria.

Iran has been playing a crafty game with respect to its junior partner, Syria, as well as its more-or-less client, Hezbollah. Syria acting on both its own account and in tandem with Iran has maintained its military presence within Lebanon, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

There can be no disagreement with the contention that Syria has maintained and reinforced its ground combat units in Lebanon. Janes, the defense oriented British publisher, has the pictures to prove it. This link is to the Mideast Times which is free. Janes is pricey. http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/06/27/special_report_satellite_imagery_confirms_syrian_troops_in_lebanon/5047/1355~1214586002~1/

(It would be worth taking a walk around GoogleEarth to see if you can get the Janes' results. That's too much effort for the Geek.)

If Janes, using commercial satellite imagery, is able to find the Syrian Army facility, it is safe to assume that the US, Israel and other operators of advanced overhead systems are also aware that Damascus has been much less than forthcoming concerning its presence in and ambitions toward Lebanon.

It is an exercise in futility to debate whether the Syrians are in Lebanon as a counterweight to or a reinforcement of Hezbollah. Either way Syria stands ready, and in a good position, to pick up the chips if the once-upon-a-long-ago-time prosperous little region called Lebanon again dissolves into sectarian/political exsanguination.

It also gives Bashir Assad a nice bargaining chip in the off-chance that the US and/or Israel gets an attack of the serious regarding peace and prying Syria away from the Tehran orbit. There are several good reasons for the US to get off the neocon ninny deadstick of pretending Syria is too foul to talk with openly and candidly.

One reason is Iran. Is it in the better long-term interests of either the US or Israel or the region as a whole to allow, let alone invite, the unpleasant mullahocracy to establish a presence in Syria? A presence that once fully established will be harder to uproot than was that of the Soviet Union in Egypt.

It should be remembered that the building blown up first by the IAF and then by Syrian engineers was not a large indoor tennis court facility. Neither was it built with North Korean money. Follow the money. It leads to Tehran. Follow the interests in play. They lead to Tehran.

The second reason is Hezbollah. With outside backing from Tehran, Hezbollah has effectively taken over the government of Lebanon. It has also become the Iranian proxy director for another outpost of the mullahocracy. Hamas.

Hamas is a fact. An odious fact. It will not become less so unless and until its tie with Iran through Hezbollah is broken.

That is not the only reason that Hezbollah must be reduced in potency. It is a regional threat. Not simply a threat to Israel, but to Arab states. It should be noted that the Hezbollah Wallah In Charge of Foreign Affairs recently and not at all subtly threatened the life of the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon. Stop and consider the total lack of love lost between Iran and the House of Saud.

US policy toward Syria has been, charitably, bad. It may be too late for the current administration to mend its ways, but the next one had better take a long hard look at it.

Finally there is the matter of "worse." The name of the game is Afghanistan. Not to overstate the matter, Taliban is on a roll. A roll up victory hill.

It's not simply a matter of the friendly body count hitting a post-invasion peak. The problem is greater. Taliban is expanding its reach of operations into the eastern part of the country even as US, NATO and Afghan National Forces have penetrated successfully into southern and western regions previously dominated by Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The reasons for the great resurgence of Taliban are two. The first has been apparent since the failure of US forces in Tora Bora back in March 2002. Not enough boots on the ground.

The second reason has a name. Pakistan. As SecDef Gates noted pointedly yesterday, Pakistan has been (to put it as kindly as possible) deficient in its efforts to control the border areas--the FATA-- which provide ready hospitality and sanctuary to Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Of course there is a motive for the dilatory conduct of the Pakistani government both past and present. Islamists run the show. Not only are Islamists politically potent and willing to kill in pursuit of their political goals, the Army and intelligence service are riddled with them.

As there is no chance that the Pakistani government will take effective action to either control FATA or purge the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Islamists, there is little chance that Taliban and al-Qaeda will be looking for new quarters in the near future.

US policy with Pakistan has failed. The course of the "good" war in Afghanistan is not looking favorable. Since it is impossible to raise the bridge, we will have to lower the water.

This means that the current and next administration, with or without the help of NATO, will have to find the will and the means to put more boots on the ground. We will have to take the same risk of increasing the number of US personnel in body bags that we did in Iraq if we are going to retrieve the situation in Afghanistan.

Not pleasant. Not pleasant at all. But, as in Iraq, defeat is much, much worse.