Sometimes Ignorance Is Bliss

For the past five years the unenlightened in the world could rest more or less secure in the belief that the plans furnished by the A.Q.Khan Nuclear Technology Smuggling Group were for relatively elderly, comparatively inefficient weapons that used a lot of highly enriched uranium for a rather small (if nukes can ever be considered "small") bang. The A.Q. Khan state of the art seemed to be embodied in the Libyan designs derived from a late Fifties Chinese design.

Turns out that just wasn't true. Dang it!

Computers belonging to the A.Q. Khan network found in Switzerland, Bangkok and other places contained the electronic blueprints for designs of much greater efficiency. Greater efficiency means less HEU and more bang. Greater efficiency means a smaller throw-weight so a warhead could be mated more easily with small ballistic missiles such as the recently tested Iranian Shahab III. The Shahab III, it should be recalled, is based on a North Korean prototype.

The new information regarding the accomplishments of the A.Q. Khan network can be found at several sites including, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/world/asia/15nuke.html?em&ex=1213675200&en=7dae8fb60503ce92&ei=5087%0A, and from the associated press, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i8CzKrsV9Az2UJ81BzmjgA8Z2k4wD91ALK5O1. The AFP covers it as well, as does the BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7455249.stm, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j9hJbJWhcA7PMnBt0YGHZG7r5PxQ. (It is interesting to note that Google lists less than 120 outlets covering this revelation.)

The computers containing the electronic blueprints were discovered in 2006 in the possession of Swiss "businessmen." The data were recently destroyed under proper supervision. While those copies of the information are no longer with us, we are left with a very large question.

Where else did the designs go?

It has been well established that the Khan Nukes-For-Profit program sold information and technical expertise to the North Koreans, the Libyans and (in highest probability) the Iranians. That is a passel of bad actors.

But, it is not all the bad actors in the world. Not by a long way.

A closely linked question concerns the nature of the designs. Did they deal simply with HEU "gun type" weapons or did they include plutonium based implosion devices as well?

Justifiably most media and political attention has been focused on the matter of highly enriched uranium. The high profile Iranian effort is focused in that direction. Beyond that geopolitical reality lies a technological one.

The "gun type" weapons such as the one the US employed on Hiroshima are easier to build. Further they do not need to be tested. As long as the two subcritical masses of HEU are brought together hard enough and fast enough to initiate fission, a satisfactory bang will result.

(The Geek stipulates there are other important considerations such as the reflector, shielding and so on, but the basic fact remains: the damn things are easier to make.)

The plutonium or implosion bomb is harder to make. First one needs plutonium. The nice thing about plutonium is that it is made automatically in any nuclear reactor which contains slugs of the common uranium isotope, U-238. This is particularly true in reactors not intended for electric power production such as apparently was the case with the reactor under construction in Syria.

It is more difficult to extract the plutonium from the irradiated slugs than to produce it in the first place. All the separation operations, chemical and mechanical, must be carried out by remote control because of the fierce radioactivity of the raw materials.

Still, the technology for plutonium separation is well understood, at least in principle and has been practiced by the US since 1944 and other countries more recently.

More difficult than obtaining the plutonium is its machining into the correct shape for implosion. A task of equal magnitude is formulating and fabricating the mix of explosives into the proper configuration for the rapid application of equal implosive force to all portions of the plutonium sphere.

Again the process and design parameters are well understood in principle. The devil resides in the details of execution.

If the electronic blueprints found on the computers included those for an implosion device with requisite details as to the plutonium machining and the explosive lens fabrication, the nuclear threat facing the world from rogue and other irresponsible or unstable states as well as non-state actors grows appreciably.

By and large, implosion devices are smaller, lighter and far more powerful than gun type uranium weapons. Also, the plutonium weapon, unlike its less sophisticated uranium cousin, admits of "boosting" by the introduction of tritium into the hollow spot in the center of the plutonium core. Boosted fission weapons were common by the mid-sixties, so if the A.Q. Khan plans were, as stated, representative of that period, there is every possibility that they contain this feature.

Normally implosion weapons come with an automatic downside. They have to be tested. Reality has to confirm the math. That was why the US held its "Day of Trinity" in July 1945.

If, however, the Khan plans are either based on tested Chinese designs or were represented by the successful North Korean nudet (nuclear detonation), there would be no need to test a device made in strict accordance with the blueprints.

The seemingly fortuitous release of the new information regarding the Khan smuggling group does serve to reinforce the need to bring Iran in out of its self-imposed, arrogantly asserted shell. Whether the uranium enrichment facility which has so preoccupied the West for months or other aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, it is essential to assure us and the rest of the world that all portions of the nuclear fuel cycle are under the strictest possible supervision.

The possibilities brought to mind by the belated release and confirmation of information held by various national governments and international agencies for nearly two years are too serious to be either ignored or pushed aside. A.Q. and his associates have let the most evil of genies loose in the world.

We may not be able to put the cloud back in its bottle. But, we sure as hell have to try.