Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Iranians Are SO Boring

Here they come again! The bravos of bluster out of Tehran. Frothing threats and flailing with words, the talking heads of the mullahocracy are out to scare us--again.

(For the whole deal you can take a look at, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-24/0806254400112829.htm or the Fars News Agency (assuming you want to keep with the Iranian perspective at http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8704050745 or from the folks at CNN there is, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/25/iran.nuclear/)

The most recent blather is fired by Majlis Speaker (and former nuclear negotiator) Ali Larijani. His salvo of dire predictions included an echo of International Atomic Energy Authority chief Mohammed AlBaredi's warning that a military strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities would ignite a "ball of fire."

The hardline opponent of the current Orator-in-Chief went on with a dire warning. "There is little chance for interaction. You have reached the final minutes of your defeated game."

Oh, really?

There are problems galore in the US, in the West, but they ain't nothing compared to what you and your fellows in Tehran are facing. (In case these have eluded your keen eye, Speaker Larijani, they include hyper-inflation, negative growth, capital flight and an ever escalating unemployment rate.)

None of these difficulties will be solved by the new round of enhanced sanctions imposed by the European Union. Perhaps you know that Mr Larijani. Or, perhaps, like your political foe, Ahmendinejad, you think the Hidden Imam or the upcoming Mahdi will pull your collective nuts out of the fire of your making.

Consider this fine piece of thinking--
Larijani also criticized big powers for sending a package of proposals to Iran on one hand and imposing new financial restrictions against the country, on the other.
"If you are willing to hold talks with Iran over the proposed package then why you have adopted a confrontational approach before the package was studied."
Well, duh, maybe because the Iranian response to the P5+1 proposals reeked of taqiyya to say nothing of the fine old game of stall, stall, stall. Keep 'em talking while we keep our centrifuges spinning.

Speaker, it is simple. Even an ideologue such as yourself ought to be able to get a grip on this reality: If you don't grab at the carrot, you're going to get a bash from the stick.

The Speaker offered the Iranian version of carrot-and-stick. After nearly breaking his arm patting his back for the Iranian proposal to have wide ranging (that is to say completely unfocused) discussions on a lengthy list of issues, Larijani grabbed the stick. Waved it,

"Do not add to the cost you should pay with making wrong assessments." Or so IRNA quoted the Speaker. A few moments later, Larijani clarified his meaning. "You know that your wrong strategies in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan have borne not fruit, but hatred. The little chance for interaction with Iran requires rational and constructive signs."

Let's examine that statement for a second. The mullahocracy, as Larijani damn well knows, supported the US led take-down of Taliban. The mullahocracy, again as Larijana must personally remember, reacted to the US invasion of Iraq with an outreached hand proposing talks, cooperation and other goodies. He also must know from personal experience that the mullahs ordered a (temporary perhaps) stand-down of the nuclear weapons program as noted by the National Intelligence Estimate released late last year.

That leaves Lebanon. Considering that the primary mixers and troublemakers in that long unsettled country are Iran's good buddy, Syria, and client, Hezbollah, the question of success or failure, love or hatred can't be answered in the US or the EU but only in Tehran.

The US and Western view of Iran's nuclear ambitions has been "rational and constructive." The combinations of sanctions and offered inducements have been "rational and constructive."

The problem does not rest with the West, with the US, with the EU, or even with Israel. The problem comes with Iran. With Iran's actions. With Iran's rhetoric. With Iran's policies.

None of these are both "rational and constructive." All are, in the words of an early giant of the Cold War, George Kennan, "primitive and unconstructive."

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

Maybe we are looking at this all wrong - at least from a military (re: "Stick") approach. Everything is about us, or somebody else attacking Iran proper through what would have to be fairly large aerial assaults.

Why do it? Why not just do our best to seal them off economically from their trading partners?

I've seen maps of the Persian Gulf - why not just mine their ports and by doing so, seal off both their exports, and imports. We're not buying their oil anyway, and at the rate Iran is pissing on the EU, they're heading into the same level of confrontation with them that they have with the US.

Realize, recently the USAF ran a extensive drill with B-52's dropping inert (this time) MK-62 aerial mines off Guam. Worked out really well, and would certainly shut down all of their ports. Btw, those MK-62's are technological marvels, can easily be emplaced by any number of aircraft currently in the inventory, and are hideously difficult to deal with if you are trying to clear them.

Link: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk62.htm

I'd much rather shut down their imports/exports than start aerial attacks all over Iran proper. We do it right, and shut down their imports/exports, they'll really be in trouble.

I'd rather avoid military intervention if we can, but as they sometimes say down South, "Some folks just need killing".

I always remember that the Iranians used mine warfare against us last time, so why not return the favor (sometimes the weapon you use the most is also the one you are most vulnerable to). Besides, using aerial mines also takes those Iranian Kilo class subs out of the picture. Even subs have a difficult time dealing with mine warfare, particularly if your bases get sealed with QUICKSTRIKE mines.

You've still got all those small boat IRGC "swarms" to deal with, but Raptor-B's armed with Hellfires can really leave a mark (a/k/a "That's really got to hurt!").

Let's shut down their trade markets before we open up a giant aerial assault over all of Iran proper. Avoiding direct air assaults against Iran proper might even limit down some of the internal support that might otherwise build up for the current leadership (Yeah, I know, being the eternal optimist here).

Thoughts?

Btw, am not recommending or thinking it's even time yet to do so, but one has to "Never Say Never" and in doing so, keep your options open.

History Geek said...

The Geek always appreciates and enjoys a well reasoned comment. He has a strong predilection for discussion.

His view on the Iranian contretemps is simple and has been expressed in a number of posts stretching back over a year. The mullahocracy is a collection of ambitious, prevaricating, and generally not totally incompetent politicians seeking both security for their country (quite an acceptable goal) and a larger role for Iran on the international stage (an unacceptable goal.) Possession of an unambiguous nuclear capacity is one key to their strategy.

The US had an excellent chance to constructively engage the mullahocracy following the invasion of Iraq. For reasons that will become clear only when the archived materials are declassified (if that ever happens) the apparently boneheaded neocon ninny crew in Washington blew off the demarche from Tehran. While the American invasion of Iraq may have put the Iranian nuclear weapons program into hiatus as noted in the 2007 BIE, it also reinforced the mullahs' perception that Iran faced not only perpetual hostility from the US but also a highly probable existential threat from either the US or Israel. Thus, longer term, the impetus to gain a nuclear capability was reinforced.

The combination of sanctions and inducements as exemplified not only by the 2006 G5+1 offer but the more recent combine of offer plus enhanced sanctions has been paying off. Just not well enough or rapidly enough.

There is no doubt that Iran and the Iranians are hurting. Even that they are hurting badly. The noise machine in Tehran has been announcing the pain of the pitch as a sub-text to all their dreary repetitions of threats, warnings and pseudo-ultimata. Presumably, if the EU is actually serious about more robust enforcement of the sanctions, both old and new, the pain will grow. Perhaps quickly surpassing the combination of offshore remittances, front companies and smugglers to offset.

It is entirely too early to resort to a high-visibility action such as an airstrike which, while perhaps successful in delaying progress in the quest for nuclear weapons would not terminate it, necessarily would have the consequence of enhancing support for the Tehran regime within its people. It would also have a number of poorly predictable effects on global markets and the US position in the world. (Of course it might well bring another round of clandestine attacks on US interests both domestic and foreign.)

As you suggest there are a number of intermediate steps which might be taken before ground penetrating bombs are dropped in the event the sanction/inducement approach fails. Twenty years ago mine warfare did not have a "home" in the US Navy. Neither did mine counter-measures (MCM). Both have had a ramshackle and underfunded home in recent years with the result that mine predicated denial of Iranian coastal waters is a realistic proposition.

Realistic, provided that the potential ramifications under current international law could be satisfactorily addressed. (The Geek is a pessimist on this.) He is also a pessimist as to the impact of a semi-surreptitious or even completely open program of denial through mining upon both the global market and that fuzzy critter, international public opinion.

The use of armed UAV's against selected maritime targets is also a technically feasible proposition, provided the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan can be forced to part with this overstretched and quite useful adjunct. The international legal complications would be lessened but not obviated. The impact on global markets would also be less, even minimal.

Careful engagement of high value smuggling vessels could produce a large amount of pain at relatively low risk to the US. After all, everyone in maritime circles knows that the Persian Gulf is rife with pirates.

Eventually the US and its allies may leave themselves with no options other than the use of force, open and direct. As long as the consequences to the US and the world are understood and accepted by the politically articulate, and it is realised that a lengthy exercise in ground based "regime change" is not contemplated, the capacity exists to neutralise a large portion of the nuclear (and other) infrastructure of Iran. That reality is so well known globally that there is no need to make loud and boringly repetitious threats.

Anonymous said...

Looks like our best option may just be to wait Iran out, and see if they actually can get it together technologically to produce a functioning nuclear weapon.

But that then raises a valid, and serious question for both Iran and the EU. How is Iran going to put it out there as having a functional nuclear weapon? Do a nuclear test?

I have got to think that would be highly unlikely, because first off, it finishes their relationship with both the EU and the international community. The minute they do that, Iran just handed either/both Israel, or the US carte blanc to take whatever actions would be required.

Who's going to get in the way? - Russia? Remember, the Russians have been spending all this time reassuring everybody that Iran was mostly "misunderstood", and that it's really not as bad as we thought - except now their neighbor on the South has nuclear capability. Time to rethink...

China? Maybe, but that means China has just gotten pushed to the point (by Iran) of having to choose between the US or Iran. Choose wisely, guys.

The EU community? Not likely. Of everybody, they just got the pointy edge of a burning ember shoved into their face and being told to enjoy it. That will not sit well with EU governments, quite understandably.

Problem I see is that once Iran makes a nuclear test, we here in the West are going to have a situation which rewards the nation with a national interest which has the lowest boiling point regarding Iran. And that becomes a highly unstable environment.

One other point needing to be raised is that if Iran is substantially limited in being able to use their ports in the Persian Gulf, they have got serious problems. Their overland road/transportation network to the outside world through other nations is very, very tenuous, and Iran in effect uses the Persian Gulf as their "superhighway" for trade. Affect that, and they are in trouble.

As far as your comments "As long as the consequences to the US and the world are understood and accepted by the politically articulate...", it's far more likely that we will discover a herd of previously unnoticed tame internationalist Unicorns grazing on the White House lawn. In other words, not likely.

None of the current international players out there are going to be anywhere near close to ready to admit to the fact that they got "played" so badly by the Iranians. Just not going to happen.

Methinks that we'll probably end up with a rolling cluster where most, if not all of the players involved just throw up their hands and say to the US, "just do what you have to do, but find a way deal with Iran, and tell us afterward - so we can be properly shocked, shocked, and horrified at your unilateral actions".

It's not like we haven't been down that particular road once or twice before.... :(

History Geek said...

The Geek is no more given to the notion of realpolitikers cavorting on the White House lawn than he is to the idea of seeing whales flying over the nearby mountains. Th essence of realpolitik is an absence of true-belief level ideology of whatever stripe. (SecDef Gates is the only visible realpolitiker at the policy level currently.)

There is little doubt but that a number of countries both within and outside the region would like to see the US "abate the nuisance" which may soon emerge in Iran. There is equally little doubt but that all would imitate Inspector Renault in Casablanca, "I'm shocked! Shocked I tell you to find out there's gambling here," as another man hands over money and whispers, "Your winnings, Inspector."

Duplicity runs deep in the affairs of states. If the US government and We the People don't understand that yet, we all better damn well get a grip on reality.

Concerning the announcement of a nuclear capacity. The problem always reminds the Geek of a scene from Doctor Strangelove--
Question: What good is a deterrent if it's not known?
Answer: The Prime Minster was going to announce it next week. You know how he likes his little surprises.

Deterrents do not need to be announced. Israel is the prime (only) example to date. Even as far back as the Yom Kippur War all that was necessary to strongly influence US policy was to move warheads to airfields as US imaging satellites were overhead.

The ambiguous nature of the Israeli deterrent--known about, talked about, leaked about but not ever officially confirmed--has been a very real factor in regional dynamics for over thirty years. It provides a useful model particularly for a country which believes it faces an existential threat and wishes to be taken as a major global (or at least as THE regional)power.

The Geek has considered the matter of testing in previous posts. In summary, a highly enriched uranium (HEU) or gun-type bomb does not need to be tested. The mechanical assembly and the physics alike are so simple and straightforward that the US had no need to test a progenitor of the Hiroshima bomb. This type works first-time, every time provided there is enough HEU and the propellant charge is sufficient to hold the two sub-critical masses together for a microsecond or two.

The plutonium or implosion bomb does require testing unless, and this is the big unless, it is faithfully constructed to an already tested design. That is why the precise content of the "more modern designs" recovered in Switzerland from associates of A.Q Khan is so critical.

If the designs are of a tested Chinese or Pakistani bomb, or even if they are of the one test North Korean device, then it is possible to build with confidence and without testing.

The Geek agrees that for now the US and others should stand pat with the sanctions/inducement packages most recently placed on the table. A new indicator of the efficacy of the approach can be found at the following URL. http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=21927.

The article hints at some other ramifications of the current state of the Iranian economy. (Still, the Geek would be amused by adding some clandestine UAV hits on carefully targeted smuggling boats en route to Iran.)