Behind the advancing army the Pakistani government has been attempting to address the problems of (re)establishing effective government, gaining functional legitimacy, and providing basic services. So far the Army's part of the clear-hold-build operational concept has been working better than the government follow-on. However, the government must be given credit for making the attempt--and succeeding to some degree.
The success of the Army in South Waziristan more than its previous operations in Swat show that it is a more capable counterinsurgency force than most (including the Geek) thought it to be. It is possible, even probable, that the Army learned from Swat. That being the case it must be given credit for a very rapid assimilation of the lessons learned.
The readiness of the Army to maintain a presence in cleared territory resembles its previous behavior in Swat. The probability of a long term Army presence in South Waziristan has been boosted by the announcement by the Interior Minister ten days ago that additional forces are being deployed in the area. This decision will help assure that the local population believes that the government will stay and keep the Taliban survivors at bay. It will also provide an effective matrix for the development of an enhanced capacity local defense and constabulary force.
Powerfully assisting the success of the operation to date has been the local population's disenchantment with Taliban. Until two years ago the Taliban was very popular within South Waziristan. But, as was the case with the Afghanistan Taliban and the Islamist jihadists in Iraq, the Taliban in South Waziristan proved to be their own worst enemy. The excesses of repression, the love of flogging, stoning, maiming and killing people for "religious" malfeasances soured the locals. Also turning the locals against the jihadists and their expansive view of Shariah was the prohibition of fun.
So far the indications point to the Pakistani Army and, more importantly, Air Force having killed relatively few civilians. Care in targeting is part of the reason. Another, larger factor was the increased employment of foreign manufacture precision guided munitions. As a result of the smaller non-combatant butchers' bill, the locals have been very welcoming of the incoming Army and government personnel.
The intelligence collection and usage of the Inter-Services Intelligence and Army has also improved markedly over the Swat operation. The reasons are obscure but probably focus on two considerations. ISI has sources within Taliban. The Taliban command, control, and communications systems rely on cell phones including those with a "push to talk" capacity, and this means the commo is wide open to interception and exploitation.
While Path to Salvation is not to its end yet, the Pakistanis deserve a strong thumbs-up for their success to date. As long as the locals (and the larger Pakistani population) continue their support of the operation it is probable that the military and government will not quit before a reasonable approximation of suppressing Taliban in the Agency has been accomplished. Then, of course, it will be necessary to repeat the processes in other parts of the FATA.
One of the non-FATA places where the Army and government will have to employ their newly developed counterinsurgency skills is Balochistan. The sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped but resource rich area of Balochistan is currently the venue of a three way contest.
The belligerents are the Baloch separatists, Islamist jihadists including both al-Qaeda and Taliban, and, of course, the central government. While the Islamist jihadists are recent and not particularly welcome arrivals, the separatists have been active since the days in 1948 when the infant Pakistani Army conquered the previously independent Balochistan.
Since then, a sporadic, usually very low intensity defensive insurgency having the goal of establishing a (re)independent Balochistan has been underway. In recent years the insurgency has been chronic as well as having grown in intensity.
Over the past eight years the situation in Balochistan has grown increasingly perilous from the point of view of Islamabad. The turbulence surrounding the aftermath of the US led invasion of Afghanistan spilled heavily into Balochistan with results which both benefited the indigenous insurgents and brought the Islamist jihadists into the mix.
The provincial capital Quetta has become a vital center of support operations including the movement of drugs, arms, personnel, and money to and from Afghanistan. The US believes that assorted Taliban and al-Qaeda heavies have been hiding out in Quetta or nearby. The Pakistani government denies this, of course.
It is the US conviction that a number of "WANTED--Dead or Alive" figures are in Balochistan which propelled the recent request by Washington that Islamabad allow an expansion of our UAV shoot-to-kill operations into Balochistan. This request has perturbed the Pakistani government greatly as it suspects our long range intentions regarding the province.
A leading political figure in the Baloch separatist movement, Hyrbyair Marri, has stated publicly that the goal was an independent, secular Balochistan. He has noted rather pointedly that the secular orientation of a new state of Balochistan would fit well with the policy objectives of the US and other Western nations. He drew a sharp distinction between Islamic Pakistan and the nature of a secular state as is proposed for Balochistan.
Marri's position outraged the Islamist jihadists of Taliban and al-Qaeda with the result that violence of the Muslim on Muslim sort has increased. This has exacerbated further the ethnic and linguistic tension between the native Balochs and the Punjabi Pakistanis.
In any event the government is currently in third place in the race for supremacy between the three contestants. There is no real probability of this changing in the near- to mid-term. The ground truth is simply that the Islamabad government has neither functional nor existential legitimacy in the eyes of the Baloch population. While some Baloch adhere to the Islamist jihadists of Taliban, this will change if the Islamist jihadists continue to rely upon the attacking of soft, civilian targets or insisting on a version of Shariah which exceeds Baloch desires.
It is the presence of the Baloch insurgency which provides the best basis for a Pakistani alliance with Iran. The latter country has its own Baloch problems as was dramatically shown not that long ago with the attack on a meeting of Revolutionary Guard heavyweights.
It must not be overlooked that Afghanistan has a bull in the herd as well since the Baloch presence extends into that country--including Helmand province where the British and US Marines have been engaged in a prolonged and far-from-bloodless operation. When joined with new forces from the recently authorized Obama Surge, Helmand and other provinces adjacent to Balochistan will become more battle torn with the result that a refugee surge into Balochistan can be anticipated.
The further destabilizing of Balochistan is what bothers Islamabad most of all when the implications of the Obama Surge are considered. Any new turbulence will make the job of containing the insurgency all the more difficult, not to say impossible.
There is an irony in play which concerns Islamabad. Even as the Army suppresses Taliban and the government extends its writ into the FATA, the probability of losing the very rich area of Balochistan becomes more and more elevated. At the end of it all the Pakistani government faces the strong likelihood of exchanging the mountains of FATA for the oil and natural gas laden flatlands of Balochistan.
No wonder the lads in Islamabad are not really happy campers right now. There is no way in which a victory over Taliban in the FATA makes up for losing Balochistan.
Well, that's tough. History shows that the Pakistanis had their chance in Balochistan. And, that they blew it.
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