The Fiftieth Anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban Revolution will be upon us in a couple of days. In the spirit of New Year's Resolutions and the inevitable accompaniment of nostalgia, the Geek wants to take a retrospective view of US-Cuban relations and argue that the Cold War is over, the Cuban Revolution is a fact on the ground, and it's time for a change.
The Geek is ancient enough to remember the victorious entrance of Fidel Castro and the rest of his bearded crew into Havana on New Year's Day 1959. Like many of his age he had watched the progress of the rebels with supportive interest over the previous years.
Indeed many Americans cheered Castro and the 26th of July Movement as they fought rather romantically through the hills of the Sierra Madre against the inept forces of the corrupt and brutal dictator, Batista. The Eisenhower Administration had done much during 1958 to assure the success of Castro and Company. For example, the administration stopped the flow of military supplies and instructed our ambassador to suggest strongly that Batista and his cronies seek retirement somewhere (other than the United States.).
The Eisenhower Administration acknowledged both publicly and privately that there were good reasons to see Castro replace the kleptocracy of Batista and his buddies from the American organised crime syndicates. The Administration hoped but was never really sure that other, non-criminal investments and property in Cuba would be safe from expropriation. There were hints of an emerging consensus within the second tier of administration officials.
The consensus focused on the idea that should expropriation occur it would be accompanied by appropriate, fair compensation. Balancing this was the fear that the nature of the compensation, while actually fair, would be seen by interested parties as not being fair. The parallel was with events in Guatemala following the Arbenz government's seizure of United Fruit company property. The Guatemalan government had offered compensation based on the declarations of value made by United Fruit for tax purposes. Not surprisingly these artificially low evaluations were unacceptable to UF and the race was on to oust Arbenz as a "Communist Menace."
Virtually all Eisenhower hands who had bothered to scan the intelligence assessments of the 26th of July Movement leadership acknowledged that the Castro brothers, Che and others were Marxist. Some of the administration officials, again mainly those on the second and third tier, saw this as no barrier to normal relations. After all it could (and was) argued that the US had reasonably normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Tito's Yugoslavia.
In the opposing corner were memories of the "Who Lost China" attacks which had performed yeoman service to Republican Party political fortunes in the 1952 elections. How much worse it would be if the Democrats could in 1960 demand to know just who had let the commies into the Western Hemisphere.
The result was the Eisenhower administration's decision not to decide but rather to engage in a combination of watchful waiting and "correct" relations with the new Cuban government. The administration and the American public didn't have to wait and watch for long.
The Cuban Revolutionaries were a young, highly emotional bunch. But much more than mere boyish enthusiasm was at work as the firing squads plied their dreadful trade in the dry moat of Morro Castle as crowds yelled, "Parado! Parado! at informal open air trials of alleged Batista goon squad members The American public including many who had been pro-Castro were nauseated to say the least.
Firing squads were followed by the paper work of expropriation (with compensation in the form of Cuban government bonds) and waves of Cuban refugees. As the US found out in recent years from its experience in Iraq, refugees and expats, particularly those of the former elite, are piss poor providers of accurate and useful intelligence.
Goaded by the expropriations--or, to err on the side of accuracy, the mighty moans of those corporate and private entities whose financial bull had been gored by the Cubans and annoyed by the seemingly irresponsible actions of Castro during a visit to the United Nations, the Eisenhower Administration made a major error.
While the Ike boo-boo might not have been in the same league with that of George W. Bush and the neocon ninnies in 2003, it was nonetheless both large and long lasting in effect. The root cause of the blunder was the Administration's acceptance of Cuban refugee protestations to the effect that Castro was hated by the Cuban people and could be deposed. Easily deposed.
To make a long and very sad story short, the Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition, ended economic aid, and used its diplomatic muscle to isolate the revolutionary government. This masterstroke produced an easily predictable result. Cuba and Castro turned in the direction of the Kremlin. In turn the Russian bear hugged the island and its bearded, fatigue wearing leader to its warm and furry breast.
The 26th of July Movement and its Marxist leaders had not been some sort of syphilitic chancre on the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The American attempt at strangling the revolution in its crib made it one.
The first Eisenhower blunder had been bad enough. But, it got worse. Much worse. And, fast.
In a classic case of how not to run covert operations, the Administration ginned up a bloated CIA operated series of hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. This was followed by the planning for the landing of a guerrilla force recruited from the refugee stream with the goal of fostering an anti-Castro general uprising.
Lest one get the impression that only Republican Administrations are capable of committing world-class acts of stupidity consider the next tragic chapter. The Administration of JFK proved itself both more persistently idiotic than its predecessor and more robust in its ill-considered actions.
Instead of cancelling the planned insertion of exile "freedom fighters: before they were landed in the Bay of Pigs, the New Frontiersmen beefed the exercise up to the level of a minor amphibious forcible entry. Compounding the chaos of error, President Kennedy tried to abort the operation as it was underway, thus assuring that it failed in a highly visible and humiliating way.
Neither JFK nor his younger, even more testosterone driven brother, Robert were inclined to allow humiliation to pass unpunished. The Brothers Kennedy went after Castro hammer and tongs with (c)overt operations, assassination attempts and finally the plan for a full-bore, all-out US invasion of the island which was ended by the killing of JFK in Dallas only months before the scheduled D-day.
It should not be forgotten that the overly muscular and completely unjustified exercises in removing Castro nearly brought about a nuclear exchange between the US and USSR in October 1962. The Russians stood "eye ball to eye ball" with us and "blinked first." This sort of thing is not a tribute to rational statesmanship.
The Republicans played the Cuban card as part of the successful Nixon era "Southern strategy" in 1968, thus giving the Cuban exile communities of Florida and New Jersey a political power which they neither deserved nor earned. As a result Cuba became one more "third rail" in US politics so that no reevaluation of the failed US policy of isolation and confrontation was possible.
Cuba soldiered on. Dependant upon subsidies from the Soviet Union it became a less than totally reliable Soviet proxy but nonetheless proved itself capable of causing much mischief in both the Western Hemisphere and Africa.
The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Kremlin's dole, but Cuba and Castro continued on. The accomplishments of the Revolution were both real and secure enough to survive the years of economic deprivation which ensued. In the past decade Cuba has recovered economically to a sizable extent thanks to the rest of the world not being so politically fossilized as the US.
Fidel lingers on still making the occasional pronouncement. The Cuban people survive, even begin to prosper at least in some part. The Revolution has created, as the Israelis like to say, "facts on the ground." The time has come at long, long last for the US to get a grip on the facts.
It is time for a change. Without any preconditions or apologies, the next administration should enter into discussions with a view to normalising relations with Cuba quickly and completely.
Yes, the aging expat community as well as some of the children and grandchildren of the refugees will whine and moan. Yes, some of the Right will howl that the Obama Administration is "soft on Communism" or that it tolerates "human rights abusers" or some such irrelevant zaniness.
There are sizable benefits which might accrue to the US and its national interests by dropping the half century of lunacy regarding Cuba. Normalising relations would have the potential of impairing the new neo-Castroite regimes of Venezuela, and Bolivia. It would rock the born again Sandinistas of Nicaragua. It might even show the countries to our south that the US is capable of acknowledging and rectifying mistaken policy--a first.
Oh, for all those capitalists out there, Cuban waters cover sizable deposits of that much maligned but still quite necessary commodity--oil. And, there is one heck of a potential used car market down there. All those Fifties vintage pieces of good American iron are getting in real need of replacement.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Monday, December 29, 2008
Carlos Marighela Meets Hamas (And Iran)
Carlos Marighela lived and died as a theorist of urban insurgency. Forty years later his work soldiers on far from his native Brazil.
Marighela advocated terror as the principle weapon of the insurgent. His view was not the same as Lenin, who famously quipped, "The purpose of terror is to terrorise." No. Carlos Marighela had a far more focused understanding of terror. In his theory the utility of terror was found in its capacity to provoke the status quo power--the government in the case of the standard issue insurgency--or the occupying power in other situations. The goal was to force the status quo power into ill-advised and robust action.
Marighela held that under sufficient pressure from terrorist acts, the government would respond with harsh, repressive, even brutal and lethal actions. As a consequence of this the uncommitted majority of the target population would unite against the status quo.
Terror, Carlos argued, therefore must have two results. The first, more direct and short term was that of undercutting confidence in the government's capacity to protect lives and property. The second, less direct but ultimately more lasting and powerful, was the trajectory of government repression leading to radicalization of the population generally.
The leadership of Hamas may never have read Marighela's book, Mini-manual For The Urban Guerrilla, but that terrorist group turned de facto government of the Gaza Strip sure has been acting as though Marighela ranked with Mohammad as the prophet with the most honor. Since shooting their way to power in the Gaza some eighteen months ago, Hamas has been the active employer of terror against Israel.
In the eyes of Hamas (and other similarly inclined groups) Israel is the occupying power. This foreign presence must be eliminated. Since this often announced goal cannot be accomplished by military means, the alternative of terror must be employed.
The endless barrage of crude (but continuously improving) unguided, short-range rockets and mortar shells aimed at the quarter million Israelis living within range of the Gaza Strip is meant to terrorise. It is intended, as are the IED's and suicide bombers, to force the Government of Israel (GOI) into taking robust repressive measures against Hamas and, inevitably, the population of the Gaza Strip.
The calculation made by Hamas is both simple and predictable by anyone who has read the Mini-manual. The Israeli response would produce significant numbers of photogenic and emotional scenes of death, destruction, grief and suffering. More than the rockets which goaded or the IDF missiles and bombs, the images of death and grief, suffering and anger served as Hamas' weapons of choice.
Why is the calculus so simple, so obvious?
Because the West has changed sides in the long running Israeli-Arab war. After forty years of public opinion support for Israel, the elites and opinion moulders of the US, the UK, the EU switched during and in the aftermath of the First Intifada. While the Israel Lobby may remain virtually all-powerful in the US, Israel has lost the sympathy and support of the elites generally in the West.
What Israel lost as a result of emotionally powerful images which reflected neither credit nor glory on the GOI and the IDF as well as the apparently uncompromising nature of many of Israel's major political figures has been picked up by the Palestinians. It is not that the leaders of the several Palestinian groups are great at public relations. Certainly Hamas is a crude and blustering collection of highly motivated and terrifically lethal thugs, not a crew which would be at home on Madison Avenue.
But Hamas and other similar groups are quite willing to let their people die on camera. They are ever so willing to put their fellow Palestinians through the wringer of wretchedness as long as it gains attention and sympathy. Carlos would be proud.
Hamas hopes to leverage its way to the goal of destroying the "Zionist Entity," by using the long lever of world opinion. The fulcrum point is found on the pile of Palestian bodies. This mound of cadavers is the result, not of GOI/IDF action, but of Hamas employment of terror as a goad.
Hamas had an alternative. It could have allowed the "Lull" to continue. Hamas was warned by Egypt, by the Palestinian National Authority, by Israel that ending the "Lull" would be a fatal mistake. Hamas chose, repeat, chose not to heed the warnings.
Why?
One can only speculate given that Hamas is not a bunch noted for either candor or honesty. Two salient points deserve notation. The first is that Hamas is an Iranian proxy. The second is that the US is in a period of interregnum.
If Israel had any intention of unilateral action against Iranian nuclear sites, now would be an apposite time to exercise the option. George W. Bush is carrying his short-timer's stick. President-elect Obama is nearly a month from taking office and has a host of other matters on his (collective) mind.
A prudential move for the Iranian mullahocracy to make would be one of assuring that GOI and the IDF were preoccupied with matters closer to home than the nuclear weapons development plants in Iran. Hamas and (if necessary or desirable) Hezbollah were ready, willing and even eager to have another go at provoking Israel and garnering support from the High Minded of the world.
Another very real benefit from the perspective of Tehran is the potential of the conflict escalating at least horizontally. One immediate impact of such a horizontal escalation including terror attacks against Israeli and US targets throughout the world would be an abrupt hike in the price of oil. Not to put too fine a point on the matter--Iran needs money. Badly. Right now.
So, all the way around, cranking up Hamas is a low risk, high-payoff proposition for the Iranian regime. They protect themselves and have a shot at the money as well.
The only losers in the game are Israel and the civilians of the Gaza Strip. And, why are they losers? Because Hamas acts like Carlos Marighela on steroids.
But that wouldn't matter except for one other reality upon which we must get a grip.
The public opinion molding elites of the West are on the wrong side this time but there is no indication that they either recognise it or are ready to recant. The death, the destruction, the wretchedness and the grief are not being manufactured by the Israelis this time. This time these are all the intentional products of Hamas.
Hamas is guilty. Not Israel. Only if we in the US and the rest of the West get a grip on this fact will the death, destruction and grief come to an end. Only then will the theories of Carlos and the plans of Hamas and the ambitions of Iran be ended Only then will the terror stop. Only then will the dead of Gaza not have died for nothing.
Marighela advocated terror as the principle weapon of the insurgent. His view was not the same as Lenin, who famously quipped, "The purpose of terror is to terrorise." No. Carlos Marighela had a far more focused understanding of terror. In his theory the utility of terror was found in its capacity to provoke the status quo power--the government in the case of the standard issue insurgency--or the occupying power in other situations. The goal was to force the status quo power into ill-advised and robust action.
Marighela held that under sufficient pressure from terrorist acts, the government would respond with harsh, repressive, even brutal and lethal actions. As a consequence of this the uncommitted majority of the target population would unite against the status quo.
Terror, Carlos argued, therefore must have two results. The first, more direct and short term was that of undercutting confidence in the government's capacity to protect lives and property. The second, less direct but ultimately more lasting and powerful, was the trajectory of government repression leading to radicalization of the population generally.
The leadership of Hamas may never have read Marighela's book, Mini-manual For The Urban Guerrilla, but that terrorist group turned de facto government of the Gaza Strip sure has been acting as though Marighela ranked with Mohammad as the prophet with the most honor. Since shooting their way to power in the Gaza some eighteen months ago, Hamas has been the active employer of terror against Israel.
In the eyes of Hamas (and other similarly inclined groups) Israel is the occupying power. This foreign presence must be eliminated. Since this often announced goal cannot be accomplished by military means, the alternative of terror must be employed.
The endless barrage of crude (but continuously improving) unguided, short-range rockets and mortar shells aimed at the quarter million Israelis living within range of the Gaza Strip is meant to terrorise. It is intended, as are the IED's and suicide bombers, to force the Government of Israel (GOI) into taking robust repressive measures against Hamas and, inevitably, the population of the Gaza Strip.
The calculation made by Hamas is both simple and predictable by anyone who has read the Mini-manual. The Israeli response would produce significant numbers of photogenic and emotional scenes of death, destruction, grief and suffering. More than the rockets which goaded or the IDF missiles and bombs, the images of death and grief, suffering and anger served as Hamas' weapons of choice.
Why is the calculus so simple, so obvious?
Because the West has changed sides in the long running Israeli-Arab war. After forty years of public opinion support for Israel, the elites and opinion moulders of the US, the UK, the EU switched during and in the aftermath of the First Intifada. While the Israel Lobby may remain virtually all-powerful in the US, Israel has lost the sympathy and support of the elites generally in the West.
What Israel lost as a result of emotionally powerful images which reflected neither credit nor glory on the GOI and the IDF as well as the apparently uncompromising nature of many of Israel's major political figures has been picked up by the Palestinians. It is not that the leaders of the several Palestinian groups are great at public relations. Certainly Hamas is a crude and blustering collection of highly motivated and terrifically lethal thugs, not a crew which would be at home on Madison Avenue.
But Hamas and other similar groups are quite willing to let their people die on camera. They are ever so willing to put their fellow Palestinians through the wringer of wretchedness as long as it gains attention and sympathy. Carlos would be proud.
Hamas hopes to leverage its way to the goal of destroying the "Zionist Entity," by using the long lever of world opinion. The fulcrum point is found on the pile of Palestian bodies. This mound of cadavers is the result, not of GOI/IDF action, but of Hamas employment of terror as a goad.
Hamas had an alternative. It could have allowed the "Lull" to continue. Hamas was warned by Egypt, by the Palestinian National Authority, by Israel that ending the "Lull" would be a fatal mistake. Hamas chose, repeat, chose not to heed the warnings.
Why?
One can only speculate given that Hamas is not a bunch noted for either candor or honesty. Two salient points deserve notation. The first is that Hamas is an Iranian proxy. The second is that the US is in a period of interregnum.
If Israel had any intention of unilateral action against Iranian nuclear sites, now would be an apposite time to exercise the option. George W. Bush is carrying his short-timer's stick. President-elect Obama is nearly a month from taking office and has a host of other matters on his (collective) mind.
A prudential move for the Iranian mullahocracy to make would be one of assuring that GOI and the IDF were preoccupied with matters closer to home than the nuclear weapons development plants in Iran. Hamas and (if necessary or desirable) Hezbollah were ready, willing and even eager to have another go at provoking Israel and garnering support from the High Minded of the world.
Another very real benefit from the perspective of Tehran is the potential of the conflict escalating at least horizontally. One immediate impact of such a horizontal escalation including terror attacks against Israeli and US targets throughout the world would be an abrupt hike in the price of oil. Not to put too fine a point on the matter--Iran needs money. Badly. Right now.
So, all the way around, cranking up Hamas is a low risk, high-payoff proposition for the Iranian regime. They protect themselves and have a shot at the money as well.
The only losers in the game are Israel and the civilians of the Gaza Strip. And, why are they losers? Because Hamas acts like Carlos Marighela on steroids.
But that wouldn't matter except for one other reality upon which we must get a grip.
The public opinion molding elites of the West are on the wrong side this time but there is no indication that they either recognise it or are ready to recant. The death, the destruction, the wretchedness and the grief are not being manufactured by the Israelis this time. This time these are all the intentional products of Hamas.
Hamas is guilty. Not Israel. Only if we in the US and the rest of the West get a grip on this fact will the death, destruction and grief come to an end. Only then will the theories of Carlos and the plans of Hamas and the ambitions of Iran be ended Only then will the terror stop. Only then will the dead of Gaza not have died for nothing.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Mexico, Dope and Us
Ninety years ago Mexico was in the final phase of a decade of multi-party internal war. As the wars wound down into a fair semblance of peace, the final bloody year saw approximately 5,000 people die, including a small number of Americans.
As 2008 enters its final days, Mexico is concluding a year in which over 5,300 have died in the fighting between government and drug cartels as well as the inter-cartel violence. It is the worst year for Mexico since the end of the wars of succession.
Now, as ninety years ago, the damage to the Mexican commonweal extends far beyond the deaths, far beyond the wounds, even far beyond the fear of death. Now, perhaps even more than in the wake of the round of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and banditry in the guise of revolution, Mexico faces problems not of its own making as well as those most definitely hecho in Mexico.
Faith in the government was non-existent in 1918. It is almost non-existence today. The ability of the government to keep the peace is in doubt. The capacity of the government to assure both economic and political justice is also a debatable proposition. Indeed, as revelations of drug cartel penetration of judicial, police, army, and central governmental offices generally follow with machine gun rapidity, more and more Mexicans doubt the very integrity of the government.
The rampant corruption which is being exposed day after day in the Mexican press is a legacy of the decade of internal bloodshed with which the Twentieth Century opened. So also is the comparative inefficiency of the federal government. Even the violence of the "drug war" is derived from the killing fields of the Wars of Succession.
Not quite a century ago, residents of El Paso had ringside seats for the fighting across the muddy ditch called the Rio Grande. Bullets and the occasional artillery shell went over the heads of the American observers. (And, periodically were stopped by an unlucky American body.)
In the US Senate one of New Mexico's senators, Albert Fall, kept up an incessant rhetorical fusillade demanding that our government take action to halt the violence, protect American lives, and bring Mexicans the peace they deserved. I
In the White House President Wilson did take action, direct action, robust action. The US launched two invasions of Mexico. One was intended to, in Wilson's words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The other had the aim of bringing a terrorist who had launched an attack on American soil to justice;
Both failed. Arguably, both were counterproductive.
No one would counsel invasion today. Still, the US cannot sit by and watch Mexico slide any closer to collapse. Indeed, the US must recognise that it is in part, even a large part, responsible for what is occurring in Mexico.
The American recession has caused a large down tick in money remitted by illegal workers. This money has been a major cushion for the deeply flawed Mexican economy. (Another legacy of the Wars of Succession and the dictatorial aftermath embodied in the Institutional Revolutionary Party.) The return of illegal workers from the US is placing ever increasing demands upon the Mexican government and economy--demands which if not effectively met will enhance the tumult in the country.
Then there is the matter of drugs. The drugs coming out of Mexico, the drugs which fuel so much of the killing and corruption, are not destined for Canada, they are not on their way to Europe. No. The drugs are headed for the Estados Unidos.
The American market for coke, smack, and pot is the largest, richest in the world. Just as we are the most desired market for other commodities and goods, we are the drug destination of choice, the land of golden opportunity.
Unless and until the US can stop the demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason that Mexico will become less violent, less corrupt. Unless and until the US can stop its demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason to believe that Mexico can focus sufficient attention on such urgent problems as infrastructure improvement, educational improvement, industrialisation, and demographic stresses.
There is only one way in which the US can end the demand for illegal drugs, end the immense profits which drive the corruption and violence, halt the slide to collapse. The time has come for a change.
We have to get a grip on a fact of life that many find unpleasant. Doing the same old same old of more cops, more prisons is a continued march on the treadmill of failure. Searching for psychological, sociological, economic causes and cures may make some do-gooders, agenda writers and academics happy (and employed,) but it won't solve the problem.
There is only one avenue which will help both Mexico and us. Make the drugs legal. Take away the risks and profits of an illegal trade. That is the only answer.
That is the change we must make--like it or not. It is the change reality demands.
As 2008 enters its final days, Mexico is concluding a year in which over 5,300 have died in the fighting between government and drug cartels as well as the inter-cartel violence. It is the worst year for Mexico since the end of the wars of succession.
Now, as ninety years ago, the damage to the Mexican commonweal extends far beyond the deaths, far beyond the wounds, even far beyond the fear of death. Now, perhaps even more than in the wake of the round of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and banditry in the guise of revolution, Mexico faces problems not of its own making as well as those most definitely hecho in Mexico.
Faith in the government was non-existent in 1918. It is almost non-existence today. The ability of the government to keep the peace is in doubt. The capacity of the government to assure both economic and political justice is also a debatable proposition. Indeed, as revelations of drug cartel penetration of judicial, police, army, and central governmental offices generally follow with machine gun rapidity, more and more Mexicans doubt the very integrity of the government.
The rampant corruption which is being exposed day after day in the Mexican press is a legacy of the decade of internal bloodshed with which the Twentieth Century opened. So also is the comparative inefficiency of the federal government. Even the violence of the "drug war" is derived from the killing fields of the Wars of Succession.
Not quite a century ago, residents of El Paso had ringside seats for the fighting across the muddy ditch called the Rio Grande. Bullets and the occasional artillery shell went over the heads of the American observers. (And, periodically were stopped by an unlucky American body.)
In the US Senate one of New Mexico's senators, Albert Fall, kept up an incessant rhetorical fusillade demanding that our government take action to halt the violence, protect American lives, and bring Mexicans the peace they deserved. I
In the White House President Wilson did take action, direct action, robust action. The US launched two invasions of Mexico. One was intended to, in Wilson's words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The other had the aim of bringing a terrorist who had launched an attack on American soil to justice;
Both failed. Arguably, both were counterproductive.
No one would counsel invasion today. Still, the US cannot sit by and watch Mexico slide any closer to collapse. Indeed, the US must recognise that it is in part, even a large part, responsible for what is occurring in Mexico.
The American recession has caused a large down tick in money remitted by illegal workers. This money has been a major cushion for the deeply flawed Mexican economy. (Another legacy of the Wars of Succession and the dictatorial aftermath embodied in the Institutional Revolutionary Party.) The return of illegal workers from the US is placing ever increasing demands upon the Mexican government and economy--demands which if not effectively met will enhance the tumult in the country.
Then there is the matter of drugs. The drugs coming out of Mexico, the drugs which fuel so much of the killing and corruption, are not destined for Canada, they are not on their way to Europe. No. The drugs are headed for the Estados Unidos.
The American market for coke, smack, and pot is the largest, richest in the world. Just as we are the most desired market for other commodities and goods, we are the drug destination of choice, the land of golden opportunity.
Unless and until the US can stop the demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason that Mexico will become less violent, less corrupt. Unless and until the US can stop its demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason to believe that Mexico can focus sufficient attention on such urgent problems as infrastructure improvement, educational improvement, industrialisation, and demographic stresses.
There is only one way in which the US can end the demand for illegal drugs, end the immense profits which drive the corruption and violence, halt the slide to collapse. The time has come for a change.
We have to get a grip on a fact of life that many find unpleasant. Doing the same old same old of more cops, more prisons is a continued march on the treadmill of failure. Searching for psychological, sociological, economic causes and cures may make some do-gooders, agenda writers and academics happy (and employed,) but it won't solve the problem.
There is only one avenue which will help both Mexico and us. Make the drugs legal. Take away the risks and profits of an illegal trade. That is the only answer.
That is the change we must make--like it or not. It is the change reality demands.
Labels:
drug violence,
Drugs,
Mexican Revolution,
Mexico
Here They Go Again!
History doesn't repeat itself--but it can sure seem that way. Last week Hamas went for yet another round of rocket induced coercion with the goal of forcing Israel to back down from its closure of the landlines of communication. Big shock! The action was counterproductive. Despite Hamas' fond hope that the upcoming elections would paralyse Israel's capacity to react with force, the IDF has proven otherwise.
All the usual actors--the UN, the EU, the Arab League, the Pope--have performed the expectable stereotyped roles. Violence has been deplored. Humanitarian crisis has been declared.
Of course the majority of condemnation has fallen on Israel. That's the line that has been routinely taken ever since the First Intifada started nearly twenty years ago. Israel went from champ to chump as cameras caught footage of tanks rolling through houses and grunts shooting at rock tossing kids.
The reflexive reprobation of Israel ignores several fundamental realities resident in the present situation. The first, most glaring, is that Hamas is the effective government in the Gaza Strip. As the government the Hamas terrorists have the duty of protecting the civilian population.
Far from meeting even the basic requirements of this duty Hamas has deliberately and repeatedly put the civilian population at great risk. Not only the risk of becoming collateral damage from IDF reposts to Hamas terror attacks, but also assuring that civilians would lack the basics of life including food, medical supplies, and potable water.
Yes, there is violence to be deplored. But the violence was begun and continued by Hamas--as a matter of deliberate and continually enunciated policy.
Yes, there is a humanitarian crisis. But the crisis is the deliberate product of Hamas' actions and policies. It is a creation of Hamas. Period.
What this means in practice is simply that Israel is not under a specific duty to assure that no civilians die in the Gaza. It is not Israel's duty to assure that each and every civilian in Gaza has adequate supplies of the necessities of life. It is not Israel's duty to assure that Gaza has a functioning economy.
These are no more Israel's obligation than they were the duty of the US and other Allied nations to assure an absence of civilian casualties or suffering in Germany or Japan during World War II. The protection and maintenance of civilian life is the responsibility--the sole responsibility of the government having power over the civilian population. In Gaza that is Hamas.
The hand wringing High Minded of the EU, the UN, and the Vatican had best get a grip on that reality. So should those of We the People who have joined the chorus of criticism.
There is a second, more basic reality in play. It involves dissecting the motivation behind the policies and actions of Hamas. One superficial reason is self-evident. Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
That is not the only nor even the most basic motive. Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist who outlined the "Clash of Civilizations" over a decade ago, got it right. Wherever and whenever Islam meets a culture based on another religion, it does so with intolerant violence.
The authoritarian and death oriented nature of Islam, particularly Islam of the Islamist/jihadist sort, is no more concerned about the suffering and death of its own population than it is the misery and fatalities of the opponent's civilians. The record of Islam's conquests and defeats is marked with blood of its own as well as that of the "infidel."
In recent years the lack of Islamist/jihadist concern for the well being of Muslims is seen not only by the Hamas policy of seeing the non-combatants of Gaza live in misery, fear and under the threat of death. It is seen as well in the vast number of Muslims killed by suicide bombers and IED's in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.
Hamas is following the normal course of Islamist affairs and Muslim history when it willingly, even eagerly, uses the bodies of the people under its rule as pavement on the road of policy. As long as the High Minded, Lofty Thinkers of the West fail to see what precisely Hamas is doing, it will continue to do everything possible to show the world pictures of bleeding and dying Gazans. This hardened, cynical, religously mandated practice will continue until and unless the governments and opinion molders of the US, of the West get a grip on the realities extant not only today but over the span of centuries.
Failure to get a grip on these unpleasant but easily seen realities makes the US, the EU, the UN facilitators, enablers of the atrocities committed against the people of Gaza. Atrocities which are inflicted not by Israel but by the government called Hamas.
All the usual actors--the UN, the EU, the Arab League, the Pope--have performed the expectable stereotyped roles. Violence has been deplored. Humanitarian crisis has been declared.
Of course the majority of condemnation has fallen on Israel. That's the line that has been routinely taken ever since the First Intifada started nearly twenty years ago. Israel went from champ to chump as cameras caught footage of tanks rolling through houses and grunts shooting at rock tossing kids.
The reflexive reprobation of Israel ignores several fundamental realities resident in the present situation. The first, most glaring, is that Hamas is the effective government in the Gaza Strip. As the government the Hamas terrorists have the duty of protecting the civilian population.
Far from meeting even the basic requirements of this duty Hamas has deliberately and repeatedly put the civilian population at great risk. Not only the risk of becoming collateral damage from IDF reposts to Hamas terror attacks, but also assuring that civilians would lack the basics of life including food, medical supplies, and potable water.
Yes, there is violence to be deplored. But the violence was begun and continued by Hamas--as a matter of deliberate and continually enunciated policy.
Yes, there is a humanitarian crisis. But the crisis is the deliberate product of Hamas' actions and policies. It is a creation of Hamas. Period.
What this means in practice is simply that Israel is not under a specific duty to assure that no civilians die in the Gaza. It is not Israel's duty to assure that each and every civilian in Gaza has adequate supplies of the necessities of life. It is not Israel's duty to assure that Gaza has a functioning economy.
These are no more Israel's obligation than they were the duty of the US and other Allied nations to assure an absence of civilian casualties or suffering in Germany or Japan during World War II. The protection and maintenance of civilian life is the responsibility--the sole responsibility of the government having power over the civilian population. In Gaza that is Hamas.
The hand wringing High Minded of the EU, the UN, and the Vatican had best get a grip on that reality. So should those of We the People who have joined the chorus of criticism.
There is a second, more basic reality in play. It involves dissecting the motivation behind the policies and actions of Hamas. One superficial reason is self-evident. Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
That is not the only nor even the most basic motive. Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist who outlined the "Clash of Civilizations" over a decade ago, got it right. Wherever and whenever Islam meets a culture based on another religion, it does so with intolerant violence.
The authoritarian and death oriented nature of Islam, particularly Islam of the Islamist/jihadist sort, is no more concerned about the suffering and death of its own population than it is the misery and fatalities of the opponent's civilians. The record of Islam's conquests and defeats is marked with blood of its own as well as that of the "infidel."
In recent years the lack of Islamist/jihadist concern for the well being of Muslims is seen not only by the Hamas policy of seeing the non-combatants of Gaza live in misery, fear and under the threat of death. It is seen as well in the vast number of Muslims killed by suicide bombers and IED's in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.
Hamas is following the normal course of Islamist affairs and Muslim history when it willingly, even eagerly, uses the bodies of the people under its rule as pavement on the road of policy. As long as the High Minded, Lofty Thinkers of the West fail to see what precisely Hamas is doing, it will continue to do everything possible to show the world pictures of bleeding and dying Gazans. This hardened, cynical, religously mandated practice will continue until and unless the governments and opinion molders of the US, of the West get a grip on the realities extant not only today but over the span of centuries.
Failure to get a grip on these unpleasant but easily seen realities makes the US, the EU, the UN facilitators, enablers of the atrocities committed against the people of Gaza. Atrocities which are inflicted not by Israel but by the government called Hamas.
Sunday, December 21, 2008
Hezbollah Defines The Latest Threat--Or Not
Two and a half years ago Hezbollah opened a can of Whupass on the IDF. The Israelis entered Lebanon in an ill-considered operation which may have been intended to serve as a re-heated version of the less-than-spectacularly-successful Operation Peace for Galilee a quarter century earlier.
The IDF was in for a big surprise, perhaps because the Government of Israel and the military high command had a very bad case of overconfidence. In any event, the much despised, so-called "terrorist" gang, Hezbollah, fought the Israelis to a stop, inflicting high casualties in the process.
Apologists for the GOI and IDF have argued that Hezbollah did not fight fair. That the Party of God trigger pullers and mortar humpers concealed themselves in the midst of civilian populations so the Israelis had to pull their punch. Many of the same commentators aver that the international media so wrongly portrayed the IDF that Hezbollah had a public relations victory even though the IDF had defeated the terrorists in the field.
There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought very well. For the first time since Jordan's Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha has an Arab force fought so well in conventional combat. The Party of God fighters inflicted more casualties for the losses sustained than any of the conventional Arab armies in any of the many wars they have waged against Israel.
In their use of terrain, use of supporting and indirect fires as well as their willingness to stand, fight, and hold territory Hezbollah troops showed themselves to be better than the Iraqis in either 1991 or 2003. Overall, except in a few areas such as maneuvering separate forces over distance, the much maligned terrorists of Allah performed at least as well as the conventional Arab armies over the past half century.
Comes now a pair of Deep Thinkers at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute with a lengthy paper dissecting the 2006 IDF debacle with a particular focus on the skills, strengths, and weaknesses of Hezbollah. The study contains no surprises for anyone who followed the exercise two plus years ago with a close and critical eye.
The intention of the authors seems to be that of giving comfort to those in the American defense community who oppose proposals to reconfigure US ground combat forces for maximum effectiveness in asymmetrical conflicts, those of interventionary operations including counter insurgency and peace keeping. The writers of this analysis seem to be of the view that the Army and Marine Corps have taken the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan too much to heart and as a result they will not be able to fight opponents of greater conventional warfare abilities including non-state actors such as Hezbollah.
There is no argument concerning the initial poor performance of our ground combat forces following the misleadingly successful invasion of Iraq. The same might be said of Afghanistan except for the reality that failure following seeming victory was assured by the "mission leap" and insufficient manpower dictated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his superiors in the neocon ninnie riddled administration.
The Army in particular, but the Marine Corps as well, had been drinking too long of the mythic waters of conventional war. Wide sweeping armored maneuvers and amphibious operations such as those undertaken or planned in the 1991 Gulf War were the standard not simply the Ideal. Even without the Crimson Tide pawing the ground eager to race through the Fulda Gap, the wet dreams of senior American commanders were those of conventional firepower, movement, and logistics heavy war.
The unspoken mantra of most in senior billets was, "No More Vietnams!"
This is the height of irony since the ground combat forces of the United States demonstrated very high competence in fighting the "mixed state" war which developed in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1967. While the American doctrine of "shoot, move, communicate" so as "to find, fix, and destroy the enemy" was not sufficient to assure victory in the overall conflict of political wills, it was necessary to defeat the enemy in the field.
Defeating the enemy in the field was precisely what the US forces did. Time after bloody time. If the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) or Viet Cong main force units stood and fought in place, the Americans won. That this was irrelevant ultimately is not important in the present context.
What is relevant is that the PAVN and VC main force units were better in conventional and semi-conventional operations than Hezbollah during the 2006 operation. In all respects PAVN and VC main force formations were very, very good. However, the firepower, movement, and logistics heavy US forces were better--much, much better. At the conventional end of the mixed state spectrum in Vietnam, the US was the ass kicker of the century.
It was at the other end of the mixed state spectrum, the end where psyops, civil affairs, presence oriented patrolling, stability enhancement operations, and assorted not-very-nice special operations rule, that the US forces were not as good. It was at this end of the spectrum, the end where politics, psychology, and constrained lethality military operations come together that the most and the greatest deficiencies of American doctrine, tactics, and operational skill can be found.
The authors of this Strategic Studies Institute study, like senior American commanders over the past several years, chose to ignore the body of experience, successful experience racked up by the US Army and Marine Corps in order to make the case that Hezbollah's competence in semi-conventional war means the US should not bias itself to the low end of asymmetrical conflict. While it is interesting to see how good Hezbollah has become at conventional operations, there is nothing new or very instructive to be gained by the exercise.
No one has proposed that US interests will be best served by turning the Army and Marine Corps into a collection of barely armed social workers and door-to-door salesmen of democracy. Rather, the suggestion has been made that wars of the next decade or two will be either totally asymmetrical or of the mixed state variety combining conventional, semi-conventional, and unconventional aspects.
The US defense establishment is already very good at breaking things and killing people. If the enemy chooses to stand and fight, they will be killed. If the enemy concentrates, it will be obliterated.
What we and our forces have only recently begun to master are the arts of unconventional war. Only recently have we relearned the lessons relevant to what must be done when the opponent does not stand and fight or concentrate in order to fight. Only recently has our doctrine rediscovered lessons learned and re-learned during our less-than-war wars of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries--including Vietnam.
While our forces have been re-mastering the requirements of successful asymmetrical warfare, the American people and government have not yet learned the single most important lesson of all asymmetrical conflicts no matter by what name they are fought. It is the same lesson which was ignored or never learned by the people and government of Israel in 2006.
The lesson?
Simple to state and hard to get a lasting grip on. All asymmetrical wars, those of peace keeping, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, humanitarian intervention, are at their root contests of political will. The political will of the two peoples involved is tested and re-tested until one or the other cracks, breaks, and evaporates.
Killing and being killed is only the means by which political will is tested. In this area the US has come up short time and time again over the past fifty plus years. It was in this area as well that the Israeli public and government came up short in 2006.
Unless and until the American people and government take a firm grip on the nature of asymmetrical warfare, the capacity of our military to fight is of little relevance.
The IDF was in for a big surprise, perhaps because the Government of Israel and the military high command had a very bad case of overconfidence. In any event, the much despised, so-called "terrorist" gang, Hezbollah, fought the Israelis to a stop, inflicting high casualties in the process.
Apologists for the GOI and IDF have argued that Hezbollah did not fight fair. That the Party of God trigger pullers and mortar humpers concealed themselves in the midst of civilian populations so the Israelis had to pull their punch. Many of the same commentators aver that the international media so wrongly portrayed the IDF that Hezbollah had a public relations victory even though the IDF had defeated the terrorists in the field.
There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought very well. For the first time since Jordan's Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha has an Arab force fought so well in conventional combat. The Party of God fighters inflicted more casualties for the losses sustained than any of the conventional Arab armies in any of the many wars they have waged against Israel.
In their use of terrain, use of supporting and indirect fires as well as their willingness to stand, fight, and hold territory Hezbollah troops showed themselves to be better than the Iraqis in either 1991 or 2003. Overall, except in a few areas such as maneuvering separate forces over distance, the much maligned terrorists of Allah performed at least as well as the conventional Arab armies over the past half century.
Comes now a pair of Deep Thinkers at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute with a lengthy paper dissecting the 2006 IDF debacle with a particular focus on the skills, strengths, and weaknesses of Hezbollah. The study contains no surprises for anyone who followed the exercise two plus years ago with a close and critical eye.
The intention of the authors seems to be that of giving comfort to those in the American defense community who oppose proposals to reconfigure US ground combat forces for maximum effectiveness in asymmetrical conflicts, those of interventionary operations including counter insurgency and peace keeping. The writers of this analysis seem to be of the view that the Army and Marine Corps have taken the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan too much to heart and as a result they will not be able to fight opponents of greater conventional warfare abilities including non-state actors such as Hezbollah.
There is no argument concerning the initial poor performance of our ground combat forces following the misleadingly successful invasion of Iraq. The same might be said of Afghanistan except for the reality that failure following seeming victory was assured by the "mission leap" and insufficient manpower dictated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his superiors in the neocon ninnie riddled administration.
The Army in particular, but the Marine Corps as well, had been drinking too long of the mythic waters of conventional war. Wide sweeping armored maneuvers and amphibious operations such as those undertaken or planned in the 1991 Gulf War were the standard not simply the Ideal. Even without the Crimson Tide pawing the ground eager to race through the Fulda Gap, the wet dreams of senior American commanders were those of conventional firepower, movement, and logistics heavy war.
The unspoken mantra of most in senior billets was, "No More Vietnams!"
This is the height of irony since the ground combat forces of the United States demonstrated very high competence in fighting the "mixed state" war which developed in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1967. While the American doctrine of "shoot, move, communicate" so as "to find, fix, and destroy the enemy" was not sufficient to assure victory in the overall conflict of political wills, it was necessary to defeat the enemy in the field.
Defeating the enemy in the field was precisely what the US forces did. Time after bloody time. If the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) or Viet Cong main force units stood and fought in place, the Americans won. That this was irrelevant ultimately is not important in the present context.
What is relevant is that the PAVN and VC main force units were better in conventional and semi-conventional operations than Hezbollah during the 2006 operation. In all respects PAVN and VC main force formations were very, very good. However, the firepower, movement, and logistics heavy US forces were better--much, much better. At the conventional end of the mixed state spectrum in Vietnam, the US was the ass kicker of the century.
It was at the other end of the mixed state spectrum, the end where psyops, civil affairs, presence oriented patrolling, stability enhancement operations, and assorted not-very-nice special operations rule, that the US forces were not as good. It was at this end of the spectrum, the end where politics, psychology, and constrained lethality military operations come together that the most and the greatest deficiencies of American doctrine, tactics, and operational skill can be found.
The authors of this Strategic Studies Institute study, like senior American commanders over the past several years, chose to ignore the body of experience, successful experience racked up by the US Army and Marine Corps in order to make the case that Hezbollah's competence in semi-conventional war means the US should not bias itself to the low end of asymmetrical conflict. While it is interesting to see how good Hezbollah has become at conventional operations, there is nothing new or very instructive to be gained by the exercise.
No one has proposed that US interests will be best served by turning the Army and Marine Corps into a collection of barely armed social workers and door-to-door salesmen of democracy. Rather, the suggestion has been made that wars of the next decade or two will be either totally asymmetrical or of the mixed state variety combining conventional, semi-conventional, and unconventional aspects.
The US defense establishment is already very good at breaking things and killing people. If the enemy chooses to stand and fight, they will be killed. If the enemy concentrates, it will be obliterated.
What we and our forces have only recently begun to master are the arts of unconventional war. Only recently have we relearned the lessons relevant to what must be done when the opponent does not stand and fight or concentrate in order to fight. Only recently has our doctrine rediscovered lessons learned and re-learned during our less-than-war wars of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries--including Vietnam.
While our forces have been re-mastering the requirements of successful asymmetrical warfare, the American people and government have not yet learned the single most important lesson of all asymmetrical conflicts no matter by what name they are fought. It is the same lesson which was ignored or never learned by the people and government of Israel in 2006.
The lesson?
Simple to state and hard to get a lasting grip on. All asymmetrical wars, those of peace keeping, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, humanitarian intervention, are at their root contests of political will. The political will of the two peoples involved is tested and re-tested until one or the other cracks, breaks, and evaporates.
Killing and being killed is only the means by which political will is tested. In this area the US has come up short time and time again over the past fifty plus years. It was in this area as well that the Israeli public and government came up short in 2006.
Unless and until the American people and government take a firm grip on the nature of asymmetrical warfare, the capacity of our military to fight is of little relevance.
Saturday, December 20, 2008
Human Rights And Government Duties
The other day a coalition of nations led by those of the EU but including a number of Latin American and Asian countries as well introduced a non-binding resolution in the UN General Assembly. The measure called for the decriminalising of homosexual conduct and the securing of basic human rights regardless of gender identification or sexual orientation.
The resolution was opposed by the United States on the grounds that the national government could not take a position on a matter which, under the federal system, resided solely with the several states. This argument was disingenuous at best.
The initiative was also opposed by the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as being contrary to the feudal dogmas of Islam. (It might be noted that the seven countries which impose the death penalty for homosexual conduct are all members of the OIC.) A speaker denounced the proposed measure as leading to pedophilia. This was an interesting stance considering the legitimacy of pedophilic marriage in Islam and its practice in many of the OIC's member countries.
The raising of the "human rights for gays" matter is one more example of a long standing tendency not only in the UN but throughout the world generally which is inherently both wrongheaded and ultimately not very productive. The primary consequence of the decades long emphasis on "rights" has done little beyond the promotion of a pervasive culture of "victimhood."
The problem with calling for "rights" particularly in resolutions or conventions intended to have international applicability resides in two paramount characteristics inherent to the concept. The first is that any and all "rights" can be defined only in hazy, ambiguous fashion. This means that the extent and nature of any particular "right" is subject to manifold interpretations and endless wrangling.
"Rights," it appears from the historical record are slippery critters. A "right" changes its shape and form with the passage of time and shifting of political winds or social currents.
The second problem with "rights" is their inevitable erosion by government. The government invariably adduces some "for-the-good-of-all" reason. Typically the government abridges a "right" with the tacit support of the citizenry--or at least the politically dominant portion of that society.
The historical record as well as contemporary reality shows that not only are "rights" shape shifters but that they are very fragile beasties as well. A soap bubble in a hurricane has a better chance of longevity than a "right" in the face of government ambition.
Governments, like all practitioners of politics are after power. Governments seek to acquire or at least maintain a level of direct, material and substantial control over the perceptions, beliefs and, therefore, actions of those living under their jurisdiction. Governments, regardless of their nature, are all about power. Power and coercion. "Rights" are the frailest of opponents. A "right" can be crushed easily under a jackboot. Or, a "right" can be modified unto death by a lawyer's pen.
It would be far better--and far more cynically realistic--if institutions, particularly those which aspire to a global sweep spoke of "duties." If they addressed the duties of a government, any government, all governments to their citizens.
The concept "duty" places a specific, well defined obligation for an affirmative action upon an individual or entity. That includes governments. The notion "duty" imposes a definite responsibility on an entity--including a government--to take a necessary action or to refrain from a specific action.
The concept "duty" gains even more salience when it is recalled that the sole justification for the existence of any government is its responsibility to protect and advance the interests and well-being of those individuals which live within the scope of its writ. The only way in which a government can meet the test of legitimacy is through its willingness and ability to shoulder specific responsibilities for the overall commonweal.
Because of their definable nature it is easier to demonstrate that a government has failed in its duty to the citizens under its authority. This implies that it is easier for a multi-national organization to both allege and prove that a particular government has violated international norms of "duty" than it is to do the same with respect to "rights."
To say that there is an inherent "human right" to freedom of speech or conscience is to say nothing. It is a High Minded, Lofty Thinking mouthing of feel-good ambiguity.
If an international convention instead were to impose a duty upon all governments to act affirmatively so as to assure that all citizens were free to write, to speak on any subject without punishment or interference, official or otherwise, is a different matter. It is a requirement, the breech of which can be easily observed and negatively sanctioned. To require that a government must take no action to impede its citizens from following the dictates of conscience and further must take action to assure that no impediments, legal or otherwise be placed in the way of such exercise is to assure that any violation is observable and open to collective expressions of international disapproval.
The same paradigm exists with respect to all the many "rights" enshrined in the sixty year old Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead of hazy sentiments such as those expressing the "rights" to adequate housing, proper nutrition, education and remunerative employment would it not have been better had "duties" been placed upon the signatory states to take all necessary actions to provide these fundamentals of life?
International norms which are expressed in terms of governmental "duties" rather than "human rights" would make it far easier to gain popular support for collective action against those regimes which fail in their "duties." It would be far easier to gain political support and maintain political will in the US and other nations for action against the regimes of kleptocrats, dictators and theocrats who pursue personal power or the dictates of some ideology or theological dogma to the disadvantage of their citizens.
"Rights" are wonderful. We're all for them. They make for a whole lot of feeling good. They are, unfortunately, impossible to define with precision or permanence. They are, unfortunately, impossible to enforce with effectiveness and consistency. Particularly on the international level.
"Duties" are made of sterner stuff. They can be listed with specificity. They are less subject to differing interpretation. Their violation is observable. And, they can be enforced. Even on the global level.
It's time for a change. It's time to replace "human rights" with "governmental duties." It's time for the UN and other international bodies to really work to make life better for the peoples of the world instead of simply doing things that make a few High Minded folks feel better for a day or two.
The resolution was opposed by the United States on the grounds that the national government could not take a position on a matter which, under the federal system, resided solely with the several states. This argument was disingenuous at best.
The initiative was also opposed by the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as being contrary to the feudal dogmas of Islam. (It might be noted that the seven countries which impose the death penalty for homosexual conduct are all members of the OIC.) A speaker denounced the proposed measure as leading to pedophilia. This was an interesting stance considering the legitimacy of pedophilic marriage in Islam and its practice in many of the OIC's member countries.
The raising of the "human rights for gays" matter is one more example of a long standing tendency not only in the UN but throughout the world generally which is inherently both wrongheaded and ultimately not very productive. The primary consequence of the decades long emphasis on "rights" has done little beyond the promotion of a pervasive culture of "victimhood."
The problem with calling for "rights" particularly in resolutions or conventions intended to have international applicability resides in two paramount characteristics inherent to the concept. The first is that any and all "rights" can be defined only in hazy, ambiguous fashion. This means that the extent and nature of any particular "right" is subject to manifold interpretations and endless wrangling.
"Rights," it appears from the historical record are slippery critters. A "right" changes its shape and form with the passage of time and shifting of political winds or social currents.
The second problem with "rights" is their inevitable erosion by government. The government invariably adduces some "for-the-good-of-all" reason. Typically the government abridges a "right" with the tacit support of the citizenry--or at least the politically dominant portion of that society.
The historical record as well as contemporary reality shows that not only are "rights" shape shifters but that they are very fragile beasties as well. A soap bubble in a hurricane has a better chance of longevity than a "right" in the face of government ambition.
Governments, like all practitioners of politics are after power. Governments seek to acquire or at least maintain a level of direct, material and substantial control over the perceptions, beliefs and, therefore, actions of those living under their jurisdiction. Governments, regardless of their nature, are all about power. Power and coercion. "Rights" are the frailest of opponents. A "right" can be crushed easily under a jackboot. Or, a "right" can be modified unto death by a lawyer's pen.
It would be far better--and far more cynically realistic--if institutions, particularly those which aspire to a global sweep spoke of "duties." If they addressed the duties of a government, any government, all governments to their citizens.
The concept "duty" places a specific, well defined obligation for an affirmative action upon an individual or entity. That includes governments. The notion "duty" imposes a definite responsibility on an entity--including a government--to take a necessary action or to refrain from a specific action.
The concept "duty" gains even more salience when it is recalled that the sole justification for the existence of any government is its responsibility to protect and advance the interests and well-being of those individuals which live within the scope of its writ. The only way in which a government can meet the test of legitimacy is through its willingness and ability to shoulder specific responsibilities for the overall commonweal.
Because of their definable nature it is easier to demonstrate that a government has failed in its duty to the citizens under its authority. This implies that it is easier for a multi-national organization to both allege and prove that a particular government has violated international norms of "duty" than it is to do the same with respect to "rights."
To say that there is an inherent "human right" to freedom of speech or conscience is to say nothing. It is a High Minded, Lofty Thinking mouthing of feel-good ambiguity.
If an international convention instead were to impose a duty upon all governments to act affirmatively so as to assure that all citizens were free to write, to speak on any subject without punishment or interference, official or otherwise, is a different matter. It is a requirement, the breech of which can be easily observed and negatively sanctioned. To require that a government must take no action to impede its citizens from following the dictates of conscience and further must take action to assure that no impediments, legal or otherwise be placed in the way of such exercise is to assure that any violation is observable and open to collective expressions of international disapproval.
The same paradigm exists with respect to all the many "rights" enshrined in the sixty year old Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead of hazy sentiments such as those expressing the "rights" to adequate housing, proper nutrition, education and remunerative employment would it not have been better had "duties" been placed upon the signatory states to take all necessary actions to provide these fundamentals of life?
International norms which are expressed in terms of governmental "duties" rather than "human rights" would make it far easier to gain popular support for collective action against those regimes which fail in their "duties." It would be far easier to gain political support and maintain political will in the US and other nations for action against the regimes of kleptocrats, dictators and theocrats who pursue personal power or the dictates of some ideology or theological dogma to the disadvantage of their citizens.
"Rights" are wonderful. We're all for them. They make for a whole lot of feeling good. They are, unfortunately, impossible to define with precision or permanence. They are, unfortunately, impossible to enforce with effectiveness and consistency. Particularly on the international level.
"Duties" are made of sterner stuff. They can be listed with specificity. They are less subject to differing interpretation. Their violation is observable. And, they can be enforced. Even on the global level.
It's time for a change. It's time to replace "human rights" with "governmental duties." It's time for the UN and other international bodies to really work to make life better for the peoples of the world instead of simply doing things that make a few High Minded folks feel better for a day or two.
Labels:
human rights,
international law,
UN General Assembly
Friday, December 19, 2008
Time For South Africa To Play Up!
Zimbabwe's Kleptocrat-in-Chief, Robert Mugabe, is at it again! He is now on record saying that "Zimbabwe is mine."
Hey! At least the dude is honest. Not since Louis the Whatever who famously declared of France, "I am the state," has a boss of all the bosses been so up front and blunt.
Of course, who in their right mind would want Zimbabwe? Not only is the economy beyond mere disaster, the place has become Cholera Central. Malnutrition is standard (unless a person is in the army or one of the Kleptocrat's Thug Squads.)
Mugabe appended a challenge to his Declaration of Sole Ownership. He averred that no African country had courage enough to topple him.
His estimate of the situation seems bang on. With the exception of Botswana, which is a military Pygmy, none of the South African Development Conference states has made peep one about the necessity of ridding the world of Mugabe.
In part, Mugabe is depending upon his long tarnished reputation as the premier "Freedom Fighter" in southern Africa. He is willing to bet that no other African leader will risk the consequences of seeking his overthrow by force of arms.
There is another, more realistic, explanation for the unwillingness of South Africa and other countries to enter the cockpit of Zimbabwe. The place is such a mess that an involvement (read occupation) would be a very lengthy and expensive effort. The probability of failure would be high. So would the possibility of blowback.
The reluctance of South Africa (and the African Union) to rise to the challenge of imposing stability on Zimbabwe may be overtaken by events. Cholera is not noted for respecting international borders. The stream of refugees from pestilence, poverty, and murder is going to grow in the days and weeks to come.
The combination of a folk migration and disease against the backdrop of a global economic crisis will give neighboring countries few choices. Self-interest will compel intervention regardless of longer term risks.
It is not improbable that Mugabe and the SADC countries are playing a game of chicken. Each is betting that external actors either will or will not take on the burden of intervention under the color of "humanitarian crisis." The humanitarian crisis is real.
That reality does not imply that external entities such as the UN, the EU, or the US are or will be willing to send (in the words of Warren Zevon) "lawyers, guns, and money." The proof of reluctance is found in the Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.
The UN "peacekeeping" effort in Congo is less than noteworthy in its effectiveness. The EU has jawed about sending troops but has taken no action. Nor is it likely to. The US is overstretched militarily, and the public appears to be disinclined to take on more "nation building" missionary efforts. Current global economic realities also serve as a strong disincentive for adventures in healing the sick, feeding the hungry, and planting democracy in foreign, hostile soil.
What this all means is simple. South Africa has to take the lead. It has to, in cricket terms, "play up."
The alternative is for that country to accept the refugees, the spread of disease, and other unfortunate consequences of the further collapse of Zimbabwe. The leaders of that country (and the rest of Zimbabwe's neighbors) have to get a grip on a basic fact.
Zimbabwe is not the "White Man's Burden." This time around, the load has to be carried by the Africans themselves, even if they carry it alone, uncompensated, and unappreciated.
It's time for South Africa and other countries to call Mugabe's bluff. They, and only they, can save the people of Zimbabwe.
Hey! At least the dude is honest. Not since Louis the Whatever who famously declared of France, "I am the state," has a boss of all the bosses been so up front and blunt.
Of course, who in their right mind would want Zimbabwe? Not only is the economy beyond mere disaster, the place has become Cholera Central. Malnutrition is standard (unless a person is in the army or one of the Kleptocrat's Thug Squads.)
Mugabe appended a challenge to his Declaration of Sole Ownership. He averred that no African country had courage enough to topple him.
His estimate of the situation seems bang on. With the exception of Botswana, which is a military Pygmy, none of the South African Development Conference states has made peep one about the necessity of ridding the world of Mugabe.
In part, Mugabe is depending upon his long tarnished reputation as the premier "Freedom Fighter" in southern Africa. He is willing to bet that no other African leader will risk the consequences of seeking his overthrow by force of arms.
There is another, more realistic, explanation for the unwillingness of South Africa and other countries to enter the cockpit of Zimbabwe. The place is such a mess that an involvement (read occupation) would be a very lengthy and expensive effort. The probability of failure would be high. So would the possibility of blowback.
The reluctance of South Africa (and the African Union) to rise to the challenge of imposing stability on Zimbabwe may be overtaken by events. Cholera is not noted for respecting international borders. The stream of refugees from pestilence, poverty, and murder is going to grow in the days and weeks to come.
The combination of a folk migration and disease against the backdrop of a global economic crisis will give neighboring countries few choices. Self-interest will compel intervention regardless of longer term risks.
It is not improbable that Mugabe and the SADC countries are playing a game of chicken. Each is betting that external actors either will or will not take on the burden of intervention under the color of "humanitarian crisis." The humanitarian crisis is real.
That reality does not imply that external entities such as the UN, the EU, or the US are or will be willing to send (in the words of Warren Zevon) "lawyers, guns, and money." The proof of reluctance is found in the Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.
The UN "peacekeeping" effort in Congo is less than noteworthy in its effectiveness. The EU has jawed about sending troops but has taken no action. Nor is it likely to. The US is overstretched militarily, and the public appears to be disinclined to take on more "nation building" missionary efforts. Current global economic realities also serve as a strong disincentive for adventures in healing the sick, feeding the hungry, and planting democracy in foreign, hostile soil.
What this all means is simple. South Africa has to take the lead. It has to, in cricket terms, "play up."
The alternative is for that country to accept the refugees, the spread of disease, and other unfortunate consequences of the further collapse of Zimbabwe. The leaders of that country (and the rest of Zimbabwe's neighbors) have to get a grip on a basic fact.
Zimbabwe is not the "White Man's Burden." This time around, the load has to be carried by the Africans themselves, even if they carry it alone, uncompensated, and unappreciated.
It's time for South Africa and other countries to call Mugabe's bluff. They, and only they, can save the people of Zimbabwe.
Labels:
African Union,
European Union,
Robert Mugabe,
South Africa,
UN,
Zimbabwe
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