How Do We Know If We're Winning?

Or, to err on the side of accuracy, how do we know if we're not losing in Iraq?

Back in the Vietnam War the single best indicator seemed to be the number of actions initiated by the enemy. There is no doubt that it was a better wet finger in the wind than the body counts so loved by the media (and increasingly by ill advised military commanders.) The problem was one of interpretation.

Was the decrease in enemy initiated actions due to our successful efforts?

Or, was it a deliberate choice by the enemy, perhaps as a prelude to a major offensive?

In 1967 and very early 1968 the two shop of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and CIA disagreed. The military spooks concluded that the lessening of enemy initiated actions was the result of our successes on the ground. This is what the public, Congress, and the White House wanted to hear when our commander, General William Westmoreland, reported in person to the nation.

The civilian spooks thought it was a deliberate enemy effort, a preparation for a very large set of attacks. This is not what the public, Congress, or the White House wanted to hear. So, it wasn't mentioned.

The truth came shortly after Westmoreland's optimistic reading of the intelligence tea leaves. It was called the Tet Offensive, and it knocked American confidence in victory straight out of the ring.

Because conflict between interpretations of intelligence information is endemic to the process, the problem today in Iraq is the same as it was in Vietnam. Different agencies see the same information differently.

As a result, the best single hot wash metric developed in Vietnam is useless in Iraq. The milestone concept is even worse. It seeks to establish measurements of the irrelevant that are even more subject to purely subjective interpretation than the enemy initiated actions approach.

What does that leave?

There are two very good indicators. At least they are indicators which the Geek has always found reliable. They are the indicators that he has been using in assessing Iraq.

The first is the amount of reliable tactical intelligence furnished by indigenous civilians. How many caches do they lead our forces to? How many insurgents do the locals drop a dime on? These are critical indicators as civilians caught in the tide of insurgency want to be left out of the crossfire. As a result they only cooperate when it is both safe and in their own best interests to do so.

Working from a number of open sources, the Geek has seen a very encouraging trend. In the last ninety days the amount of high quality tactical intelligence from local civilians has increased by several orders of magnitude. Some have been real life savers such as pointing out where the roadside mines have been emplaced. Others have resulted in the capture or death of hostile cadre members.

The second indicator used by the Geek is the number of refugees. This weather vane is not as encouraging as the first. The number of refugees both seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries and searching for safety within Iraq is large, very large, alarmingly large.

On the up-side, the flow seems to have been slowing the past two or three weeks. If this trend continues for another four or six weeks, the Geek will almost feel a sigh of relief. When people vote with their feet you can believe the election.

Finally, the Geek still takes a hard look at the number of enemy initiated actions, which in Iraq includes not only suicide and vehicle bombers but the ever popular and ever-so-lethal roadside mine. Because the insurgents in Iraq do not fight as "conventional" irregular forces but prefer the single man operation, such as the bomber or the stand-off system such as the mine, it is a lot harder to get a grip on trends.

Even when a sense of the trend is gained, no hasty judgments can be made. A ramping down of enemy initiated actions must persist for at least four months to have any value whatsoever.

The bottom line?

One indicator is looking good, even very good since the surge forces came on-line. The locals are of ever greater assistance.

One indicator is neutral. The number of refugees may, repeat may, be stabilizing.

The third indicator is not yet relevant.

However, there are some other reasonably encouraging hints. The Iraqi security forces are carrying more and more of their end of the log and they are doing it with greater skill. The Americans are showing a greater willingness and ability to work with local defense force volunteers, particularly the tribals, even though this makes the Iraqi government nervous.

(Hint to American decider guys. Take a good look at the Quang Ngai Special Platoon program and the Marine Combined Action Platoon program in Vietnam. Limit your study to the earlier years of both, before they were pumped up to unmanageable size.)

There are even some faint signs that at least some of the insurgents may be becoming too dependent on Iran. This is sign of desperation. As the old Iraqi saying goes: A man always thinks the fruits of his own fields are the best.

There you have it. The Geek's critique and alternatives. Remember that the Geek never believes he is an expert. He'll leave that honor to academics and journalists and politicians, to all the people who are comfortable making false claims.