His Name Is Petraeus--Not Westmoreland!

Just short of forty years ago, the US was in the midst of another unpopular, seemingly unwinnable war. The commander of American forces, General William Westmoreland, reported to Congress and the public on the progress made by our effort during the previous five years.

In his pitch to Congress as well as numerous appearances on talking heads TV, the General gave a constantly positive portrayal of the war. In so doing he often relied on such statistics as the trends in enemy initiated attacks on either military or civilian targets as well as trends in the number of combat operations successfully undertaken by South Vietnamese security forces and other, similar "indicators."

All in all, the Westmoreland show was what President Johnson wanted (and needed considering the upcoming election). The show knocked the socks off the congresswallahs and some of the steam out of the anti-war movement.

Why?

Simple. Americans like to win. Westmoreland's picture was of a winning team.

Not that many weeks after the General's Portrait of a Winner show, the bottom fell out. At the behest of Hanoi, the southern insurgents, the Viet Cong, launched a major, multi-target offensive including a highly mediagenic, suicidal attack on the US embassy in Saigon.

The American ego (oops! should have said "eagle") was kicked flat off his perch.

What happened?

Had the Great Westmoreland Victory Song been a lie?

No. General Wesmoreland hadn't lied. He hadn't sold out his personal integrity to help Johnson (a Democrat, in case you've forgotten) in the 1968 campaign. Neither had he lied to protect his command position.

No, the simple answer--that the General lied--is and was wrong.

What had gone wrong was more complex. Westmoreland, like all commanders, like all presidents, had a wide selection of intelligence reports from which to choose. For a half-century now, the US intelligence community, particularly during wartime, has been a cafeteria.

Commander Guys, both civilian and military, can choose the intel they like and leave the skinny they don't like on the shelf. Not surprisingly, ice cream and cake is more likely to be selected than broccoli and liver.

The purveyors of intelligence have come to realise that their offerings will be shoved aside unless they are carefully crafted to meet the consumer's taste. Over time, intelligence comes to be more and more, shall we say, "slanted."

General Westmoreland, in common with President Johnson, did not like the intelligence estimates provided by CIA. Both men had a real problem with CIA's view of progress in Vietnam.

CIA didn't seem to think that we were winning. True, the estimates, evaluations, and reports did indicate that over the previous few years our efforts had been sufficient to conclude that we and the South Vietnamese government were no longer losing. Projected forward in time, the estimates indicated that some sort of more-or-less (un)acceptable stalemate would be achieved.

In short, at least as the Geek reads the scores of declassified CIA studies, if the US kept on with its effort without any great expansion in manpower, there might be setbacks, but, within a somewhat reasonable time (roughly three to five years), a stalemate would result. The Viet Cong would be weakened enough to no longer represent a military threat. The North Vietnamese would be forced to give up their ambitions for forcible unification under Hanoi's domination.

Now, the heart of the problem which both Johnson and Westmoreland faced:

Neither man like the idea of a stalemate bought by American blood. Johnson also must have realised that Congress didn't cotton to the idea anymore than he did. And, neither did We the People.

We had already been down the stalemate road before. Just fifteen years earlier,, the Korean War had ended in a draw. It finished with an armistice. Not with a victory parade.

The political consequences still reverberated in the public, Congress and the military as Westmoreland readied himself forty years ago to come home and report.

As a result, the General selected ice cream and cake intelligence upon which to form his views and the resultant report. Just as did his Commander-in-Chief, Westmoreland reached for the assessments, analyses, and studies performed by military intelligence units, most importantly the "Two Shop" (G-2, the intelligence component of his staff) headed by General Davidson.

Two Shop proprietors tend to very sensitive to the taste preferrences of their customers. Davidson knew just what his boss, William Westmoreland, wanted. He delivered.

Leaving out the excruciating details, suffice it to say that Davidson's conclusions, speedily reinforced by those of the Air Force, gave a good solid basis for Westmoreland's rosy view of progress in the Vietnam War.

It is almost without point to state that the military intelligence stance was quite different from that of CIA. The military believed that peace with victory was both possible and imminent. CIA concluded that stalemate was the best possible outcome.

Why bring up this ancient history? Who cares what happened forty years ago?

Get a grip on this, bucko.

What happened back in late 1967 and the first three months of 1968 is in the back of all the minds in Congress, in the mainstream media, and in much of the blogosphere. It is in the back of the minds of all of We the People who were at all aware back then.

Westmoreland's report to Congress and the American public taken together with the shock of the Tet Offensive only weeks later is the context for the posturing and headshaking, the accusations and mudslinging already in progress over the upcoming report of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

When Senator Feinstein questions the integrity of Petraeus or MoveOn.org accuses the general of betraying us, the reason is not simple, unreasoning political hatred alone. It is the memory of Westmoreland, Tet, and the next four years of Nixon and war.

When the current administration attempts to put daylight between itself and the general after having fervently embraced him not that many months ago, it is the shadow of Westmoreland and Tet not the sun that we see.

Will Petraeus go down the same route as Westmoreland before him?

That's the real question. Unfortunately, it is not one that can be answered immediately and accurately. Not until all the intelligence documents become available decades hence can a definitive assessment be given.

Point a gun at the Geek's head and he'll take a position. His position is, "Yes. General Petraeus will walk along Westmoreland Road. Not since General Vinegar Joe Stillwell in 1942 has an American commander admitted, "We took a hell of a beating." American commanders have consistently allowed as how, "Everything is perfect--and getting better."

Statistics are slimy. They are slippery. They are untrustworthy. Like a a person who confesses eagerly to crimes never committed, statistics will say anything and everything the questioner may wish.

Statistics can prove the stability situation in Iraq is improving.

Statistics can prove the stability situation in Iraq is worsening.

They can prove the Iraqi army is getting better. Or that it is getting worse.

They can show the refugee flood is lessening. Or increasing.

It all depends on who is generating the numbers. And, what their true agenda is.

Pace, Senator Feinstein but there are no, repeat, no objective, credible observers of the war in Iraq. Not General Petraeus. Not the General Accounting Office. Not the White House. And, most assuredly, not Congress.

So, get a grip on this.

When Petraeus has said all he has to say, when Crocker has ended his remarks, when the congresswallahs have finished bloviating and when all the president's men and women have finished spinning and explaining, We the People will just have to pay our money and take our choice.

Our stance will be dictated not by the "facts" presented, dissected, and asserted, but on our personal context, our sense of what is most probably true.

If we are possessed by the ghosts of Westmoreland, Tet, and the years of Vietnam, we will probably decide that once more the general has lied, once again the president has lied for years, and the US had better haul ass out of Iraq.

If we are not haunted, but rather guided by the past, we will remember that winning isn't all that important. We will remember the ultimate lesson of the Korean War.

During the Korean War General Douglas McArthur, the short shelf-life darling of the red-meat Republicans, said, "There is no substitute for victory."

He was wrong. There is.

The substitute for victory, the option that is available in Iraq as it was in Korea is simply this: Not losing.

Get a grip on it. Not losing is what we should be about in Iraq. Whatever Petraeus and the others say, not losing is what it's all about.