Yes, The Dead Really Do Vote

There is a ground truth in war which is both universal and, lamentably, rarely recognised by either historians or policy makers. In war, in all wars of whatsoever nature, there comes a time when the dead propel policy.

In a real way the dead vote. They vote through the living. The dead exercise a profound and often highly unpredictable pressure upon the political will of combatant populations and on the choices made by governments.

During World War I the peace initiative offered by Woodrow Wilson could not but fail even though neither the Entente Powers nor the Central Powers had any realistic hope of victory. The reason for that conclusion is both simple and stark. Had the French, the English, the German or even the Austrian government sought to make a "peace without victors" as the American president proposed, it would have been overthrown in a matter of days.

There was a single sentiment upon which the civilian populations of all the major belligerents could agree. Our dead shall not have died in vain. The populations of France, England, Germany, Austria, Belgium and even Italy were unwilling to see an end to the war without a benefit more than equivalent to the level of sacrifice.

During World War II the British and then the Americans sought to kill enough civilians through the "round the clock bombing campaign" that German civilian political will would collapse with fatal effects to the Nazi government and military. The "death from above" campaign was highly successful in breaking things and killing people, but it was totally counterproductive with regard to its goal of shattering morale. As the bombs fell and the civilian body count grew so also did German military production levels and overall popular commitment to the war.

Both World Wars were total wars of national survival for the primary combatants. They were existential in nature from the perspective of the Germans, the French, the British and the Russians. (Keep that in mind, we'll be coming back to the concept later.)

When a war is not existential for one of the belligerents, the impact of the "Dead Vote" is quite different. Take, for example, the American War in Vietnam. While the conflict was existential for the three Vietnamese belligerents, the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese and South Vietnam, it was not such for the United States. For the US and We the People, the war was a limited one in support of policy. It was not a matter of national life and death.

Through the long years of escalating fighting, the political will of the North Vietnamese grew substantially under the pressure of American bombs. The Viet Cong also experienced a growth of commitment even as their butcher's bill grew. Even the tenacity and will to fight among the supporters of the varied South Vietnamese governments increased--substantially in the closing years of the war following the American withdrawal.

In the United States the "dead vote" was cast differently by the living. Here the lengthening list of the dead resulted in a progressive decline of support for and commitment to the war. Here, We the Living concluded that we must not allow any more to die without useful purpose and in absence of a real, compelling goal.

In short, there are two antipodal "votes of the dead." One is expressed in the context of existential conflict. The other comes about in the lesser, limited wars: the police actions, the foreign interventions, the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions.

The first demands a victory complete, comprehensive and beneficial enough to justify the lives lost. The second demands that no more lives be sacrificed for some hazy and debatable purpose.

Let's pull it down to slogan level. "Our sacred dead shall not have died in vain." Or. "No more wasted lives!"

Interpreting or forecasting the "dead vote" requires considering cultural and religious factors. The Japanese religious and cultural context assured the continuation of commitment regardless of the number of lives lost or the degree of physical destruction and deprivation experienced.

The seven and a half year War of Algerian Independence is a perfect case study of the dichotomy of effect between those whose dead have died in an existential cause and those whose dead have perished in pursuit of a policy goal. It is also a perfect example of the impact of religious and cultural factors on the way in which the living cast the votes of the dead.

In some ways the Algerian War was complex. It involved several distinct communities. It involved vastly different cultures and religions. Yet it can be simplified without doing harm to reality.,

There were two belligerent communities living in Algeria. One was the pieds noirs, the European minority population which had lived in the country for as many as five generations when the war commenced in 1954. The other was the mixed Arab and Berber Muslim majority whose ancestors had been present in some cases from the time of Carthage.

For both of these communities the war was existential. If the Europeans came out on top, then the Muslims would remain strangers in their own land. If the Arab-Berber majority won, then the Europeans would be refugees in the making.

Of course each of these two groups viewed the other through the prism of prejudice and hatred.

The outsider in the war was France. Despite the legalities which proclaimed Algeria to be part of Metropolitan France and ignoring the complications of the French national ego and delusions of continued imperial glory, the war in Algeria was one which was not existential but rather an exercise in support of often ill-defined policy. France could live as well or, as events proved, even better without Algeria as it could carrying the colonial burden.

The dead started voting from the first day of the war. Pied noir dead voted consistently to continue and intensify the war by all means. As the death toll among the Muslim population mounted to its final total of some three hundred thousand, Arab and Berber political will both strengthened in support of total independence and reduced the potential of a moderate "third force" emerging. (It must be mentioned that the nationalist insurgents, the NLF, engaged in ruthless killings to preclude a moderate force from raising its collective head.)

For the outsider, the French, the dead finally voted in the opposite way. War weariness, or what French commentators called "boredom" with the war, was the basis for the DeGaulle government's peace agreement with the NLF. DeGaulle wanted to liquidate the war before it destroyed both the French Army and economy. But, in so doing, he read the mood of the French public perfectly. The war was ended not so much with joy as with an massive sigh of resigned relief.

As some observers mentioned at the time, the Algerian insurgents had a potent advantage. That advantage was defined as the nature of Islam with its emphasis upon martyrdom and a concomitant focus on death--particularly a kind of death which would avoid the perils of hell.

It was also noted at the time that Islam sanctioned, even required, the ghastly ways in which the insurgents butchered their opponents as well as those co-religionists who were suspected of supporting or even not resolutely opposing the French. The throat slittings, the decapitations, the genital mutilations, the torturing of captives, the burnings alive which were features of the war were not incorrectly identified by the French and other observers as being features of Islamic religion and not simply mindless barbarisms.

These features as well as the use of indiscriminate techniques of terror such as bombs planted in cafeterias, lamp posts, beachside dancehalls gave rise to the French and pied noir employment of terror and torture in return. The dead died more savagely. And, their votes counted for more in the minds of all three belligerents.

Islam being death oriented, violently intolerant and afflicted with a propensity for rigid authoritarianism is a powerful force multiplier. The dead of Islam always vote for more war, more death in order that the (literally) sacred Muslim dead will not have died in vain.

This combination of religion and the Vote of the Dead limits fatally the potential for the moderate third force so often sought without success not only in Algeria but over the past decades in the Mideast. Likewise, it limits the potential for any sort of meaningful long-term success for American policy in Afghanistan.

Even if the Son of Surge concept works to assure that the US and its allies achieve the minimum goal of "not losing" in Afghanistan, there is no real potential of a "free democratic, secular" nation-state emerging from the corpses and rubble. The corpses will assure that.

In the Mideast, in the Gaza Strip, the dead vote for more death and the living respond accordingly. This is a very good reason to agree with former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

Eagleburger, who is a realpoliker to the core, recently opined that the Israeli-Palestinian contretemps is "virtually insoluble." His reasoning focused on the inevitability of any proponent of a moderate settlement ending up dead--sooner rather than later.

If Eagleburger is right, and history is on his side, then there is perhaps only one viable option open for the Israelis (and the world.) That option is unpalatable on the surface, but so also is the endless continuation of the blow-counter blow way of war which has typified recent years.

The unmentionable option might be termed the "Sherman Doctrine." To paraphrase a comment by old William T.: The hand of war must rest so heavily upon those who started and continue the fighting that their descendants will both fear and renounce war forevermore.

After enough dying, even those whose religion sanctifies the fine art of dying, will grow tired of the fear, grow tired of asking themselves and each other, "Where will the next bomb, the next missile, the next shell land?"

Even those who purport to love death, to seek the cold embrace of the grave, will shudder with the endless thought, "Will I be next?"

After enough death, those still alive may well decide that they hear the voices from the grave whispering, "Vote for life. Vote for peace."

Well, one can hope. Sometimes even the dead can come to their senses.

Cuba--It's Way Past Time For A Change

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban Revolution will be upon us in a couple of days. In the spirit of New Year's Resolutions and the inevitable accompaniment of nostalgia, the Geek wants to take a retrospective view of US-Cuban relations and argue that the Cold War is over, the Cuban Revolution is a fact on the ground, and it's time for a change.

The Geek is ancient enough to remember the victorious entrance of Fidel Castro and the rest of his bearded crew into Havana on New Year's Day 1959. Like many of his age he had watched the progress of the rebels with supportive interest over the previous years.

Indeed many Americans cheered Castro and the 26th of July Movement as they fought rather romantically through the hills of the Sierra Madre against the inept forces of the corrupt and brutal dictator, Batista. The Eisenhower Administration had done much during 1958 to assure the success of Castro and Company. For example, the administration stopped the flow of military supplies and instructed our ambassador to suggest strongly that Batista and his cronies seek retirement somewhere (other than the United States.).

The Eisenhower Administration acknowledged both publicly and privately that there were good reasons to see Castro replace the kleptocracy of Batista and his buddies from the American organised crime syndicates. The Administration hoped but was never really sure that other, non-criminal investments and property in Cuba would be safe from expropriation. There were hints of an emerging consensus within the second tier of administration officials.

The consensus focused on the idea that should expropriation occur it would be accompanied by appropriate, fair compensation. Balancing this was the fear that the nature of the compensation, while actually fair, would be seen by interested parties as not being fair. The parallel was with events in Guatemala following the Arbenz government's seizure of United Fruit company property. The Guatemalan government had offered compensation based on the declarations of value made by United Fruit for tax purposes. Not surprisingly these artificially low evaluations were unacceptable to UF and the race was on to oust Arbenz as a "Communist Menace."

Virtually all Eisenhower hands who had bothered to scan the intelligence assessments of the 26th of July Movement leadership acknowledged that the Castro brothers, Che and others were Marxist. Some of the administration officials, again mainly those on the second and third tier, saw this as no barrier to normal relations. After all it could (and was) argued that the US had reasonably normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Tito's Yugoslavia.

In the opposing corner were memories of the "Who Lost China" attacks which had performed yeoman service to Republican Party political fortunes in the 1952 elections. How much worse it would be if the Democrats could in 1960 demand to know just who had let the commies into the Western Hemisphere.

The result was the Eisenhower administration's decision not to decide but rather to engage in a combination of watchful waiting and "correct" relations with the new Cuban government. The administration and the American public didn't have to wait and watch for long.

The Cuban Revolutionaries were a young, highly emotional bunch. But much more than mere boyish enthusiasm was at work as the firing squads plied their dreadful trade in the dry moat of Morro Castle as crowds yelled, "Parado! Parado! at informal open air trials of alleged Batista goon squad members The American public including many who had been pro-Castro were nauseated to say the least.

Firing squads were followed by the paper work of expropriation (with compensation in the form of Cuban government bonds) and waves of Cuban refugees. As the US found out in recent years from its experience in Iraq, refugees and expats, particularly those of the former elite, are piss poor providers of accurate and useful intelligence.

Goaded by the expropriations--or, to err on the side of accuracy, the mighty moans of those corporate and private entities whose financial bull had been gored by the Cubans and annoyed by the seemingly irresponsible actions of Castro during a visit to the United Nations, the Eisenhower Administration made a major error.

While the Ike boo-boo might not have been in the same league with that of George W. Bush and the neocon ninnies in 2003, it was nonetheless both large and long lasting in effect. The root cause of the blunder was the Administration's acceptance of Cuban refugee protestations to the effect that Castro was hated by the Cuban people and could be deposed. Easily deposed.

To make a long and very sad story short, the Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition, ended economic aid, and used its diplomatic muscle to isolate the revolutionary government. This masterstroke produced an easily predictable result. Cuba and Castro turned in the direction of the Kremlin. In turn the Russian bear hugged the island and its bearded, fatigue wearing leader to its warm and furry breast.

The 26th of July Movement and its Marxist leaders had not been some sort of syphilitic chancre on the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The American attempt at strangling the revolution in its crib made it one.

The first Eisenhower blunder had been bad enough. But, it got worse. Much worse. And, fast.

In a classic case of how not to run covert operations, the Administration ginned up a bloated CIA operated series of hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. This was followed by the planning for the landing of a guerrilla force recruited from the refugee stream with the goal of fostering an anti-Castro general uprising.

Lest one get the impression that only Republican Administrations are capable of committing world-class acts of stupidity consider the next tragic chapter. The Administration of JFK proved itself both more persistently idiotic than its predecessor and more robust in its ill-considered actions.

Instead of cancelling the planned insertion of exile "freedom fighters: before they were landed in the Bay of Pigs, the New Frontiersmen beefed the exercise up to the level of a minor amphibious forcible entry. Compounding the chaos of error, President Kennedy tried to abort the operation as it was underway, thus assuring that it failed in a highly visible and humiliating way.

Neither JFK nor his younger, even more testosterone driven brother, Robert were inclined to allow humiliation to pass unpunished. The Brothers Kennedy went after Castro hammer and tongs with (c)overt operations, assassination attempts and finally the plan for a full-bore, all-out US invasion of the island which was ended by the killing of JFK in Dallas only months before the scheduled D-day.

It should not be forgotten that the overly muscular and completely unjustified exercises in removing Castro nearly brought about a nuclear exchange between the US and USSR in October 1962. The Russians stood "eye ball to eye ball" with us and "blinked first." This sort of thing is not a tribute to rational statesmanship.

The Republicans played the Cuban card as part of the successful Nixon era "Southern strategy" in 1968, thus giving the Cuban exile communities of Florida and New Jersey a political power which they neither deserved nor earned. As a result Cuba became one more "third rail" in US politics so that no reevaluation of the failed US policy of isolation and confrontation was possible.

Cuba soldiered on. Dependant upon subsidies from the Soviet Union it became a less than totally reliable Soviet proxy but nonetheless proved itself capable of causing much mischief in both the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Kremlin's dole, but Cuba and Castro continued on. The accomplishments of the Revolution were both real and secure enough to survive the years of economic deprivation which ensued. In the past decade Cuba has recovered economically to a sizable extent thanks to the rest of the world not being so politically fossilized as the US.

Fidel lingers on still making the occasional pronouncement. The Cuban people survive, even begin to prosper at least in some part. The Revolution has created, as the Israelis like to say, "facts on the ground." The time has come at long, long last for the US to get a grip on the facts.

It is time for a change. Without any preconditions or apologies, the next administration should enter into discussions with a view to normalising relations with Cuba quickly and completely.

Yes, the aging expat community as well as some of the children and grandchildren of the refugees will whine and moan. Yes, some of the Right will howl that the Obama Administration is "soft on Communism" or that it tolerates "human rights abusers" or some such irrelevant zaniness.

There are sizable benefits which might accrue to the US and its national interests by dropping the half century of lunacy regarding Cuba. Normalising relations would have the potential of impairing the new neo-Castroite regimes of Venezuela, and Bolivia. It would rock the born again Sandinistas of Nicaragua. It might even show the countries to our south that the US is capable of acknowledging and rectifying mistaken policy--a first.

Oh, for all those capitalists out there, Cuban waters cover sizable deposits of that much maligned but still quite necessary commodity--oil. And, there is one heck of a potential used car market down there. All those Fifties vintage pieces of good American iron are getting in real need of replacement.

Carlos Marighela Meets Hamas (And Iran)

Carlos Marighela lived and died as a theorist of urban insurgency. Forty years later his work soldiers on far from his native Brazil.

Marighela advocated terror as the principle weapon of the insurgent. His view was not the same as Lenin, who famously quipped, "The purpose of terror is to terrorise." No. Carlos Marighela had a far more focused understanding of terror. In his theory the utility of terror was found in its capacity to provoke the status quo power--the government in the case of the standard issue insurgency--or the occupying power in other situations. The goal was to force the status quo power into ill-advised and robust action.

Marighela held that under sufficient pressure from terrorist acts, the government would respond with harsh, repressive, even brutal and lethal actions. As a consequence of this the uncommitted majority of the target population would unite against the status quo.

Terror, Carlos argued, therefore must have two results. The first, more direct and short term was that of undercutting confidence in the government's capacity to protect lives and property. The second, less direct but ultimately more lasting and powerful, was the trajectory of government repression leading to radicalization of the population generally.

The leadership of Hamas may never have read Marighela's book, Mini-manual For The Urban Guerrilla, but that terrorist group turned de facto government of the Gaza Strip sure has been acting as though Marighela ranked with Mohammad as the prophet with the most honor. Since shooting their way to power in the Gaza some eighteen months ago, Hamas has been the active employer of terror against Israel.

In the eyes of Hamas (and other similarly inclined groups) Israel is the occupying power. This foreign presence must be eliminated. Since this often announced goal cannot be accomplished by military means, the alternative of terror must be employed.

The endless barrage of crude (but continuously improving) unguided, short-range rockets and mortar shells aimed at the quarter million Israelis living within range of the Gaza Strip is meant to terrorise. It is intended, as are the IED's and suicide bombers, to force the Government of Israel (GOI) into taking robust repressive measures against Hamas and, inevitably, the population of the Gaza Strip.

The calculation made by Hamas is both simple and predictable by anyone who has read the Mini-manual. The Israeli response would produce significant numbers of photogenic and emotional scenes of death, destruction, grief and suffering. More than the rockets which goaded or the IDF missiles and bombs, the images of death and grief, suffering and anger served as Hamas' weapons of choice.

Why is the calculus so simple, so obvious?

Because the West has changed sides in the long running Israeli-Arab war. After forty years of public opinion support for Israel, the elites and opinion moulders of the US, the UK, the EU switched during and in the aftermath of the First Intifada. While the Israel Lobby may remain virtually all-powerful in the US, Israel has lost the sympathy and support of the elites generally in the West.

What Israel lost as a result of emotionally powerful images which reflected neither credit nor glory on the GOI and the IDF as well as the apparently uncompromising nature of many of Israel's major political figures has been picked up by the Palestinians. It is not that the leaders of the several Palestinian groups are great at public relations. Certainly Hamas is a crude and blustering collection of highly motivated and terrifically lethal thugs, not a crew which would be at home on Madison Avenue.

But Hamas and other similar groups are quite willing to let their people die on camera. They are ever so willing to put their fellow Palestinians through the wringer of wretchedness as long as it gains attention and sympathy. Carlos would be proud.

Hamas hopes to leverage its way to the goal of destroying the "Zionist Entity," by using the long lever of world opinion. The fulcrum point is found on the pile of Palestian bodies. This mound of cadavers is the result, not of GOI/IDF action, but of Hamas employment of terror as a goad.

Hamas had an alternative. It could have allowed the "Lull" to continue. Hamas was warned by Egypt, by the Palestinian National Authority, by Israel that ending the "Lull" would be a fatal mistake. Hamas chose, repeat, chose not to heed the warnings.

Why?

One can only speculate given that Hamas is not a bunch noted for either candor or honesty. Two salient points deserve notation. The first is that Hamas is an Iranian proxy. The second is that the US is in a period of interregnum.

If Israel had any intention of unilateral action against Iranian nuclear sites, now would be an apposite time to exercise the option. George W. Bush is carrying his short-timer's stick. President-elect Obama is nearly a month from taking office and has a host of other matters on his (collective) mind.

A prudential move for the Iranian mullahocracy to make would be one of assuring that GOI and the IDF were preoccupied with matters closer to home than the nuclear weapons development plants in Iran. Hamas and (if necessary or desirable) Hezbollah were ready, willing and even eager to have another go at provoking Israel and garnering support from the High Minded of the world.

Another very real benefit from the perspective of Tehran is the potential of the conflict escalating at least horizontally. One immediate impact of such a horizontal escalation including terror attacks against Israeli and US targets throughout the world would be an abrupt hike in the price of oil. Not to put too fine a point on the matter--Iran needs money. Badly. Right now.

So, all the way around, cranking up Hamas is a low risk, high-payoff proposition for the Iranian regime. They protect themselves and have a shot at the money as well.

The only losers in the game are Israel and the civilians of the Gaza Strip. And, why are they losers? Because Hamas acts like Carlos Marighela on steroids.

But that wouldn't matter except for one other reality upon which we must get a grip.

The public opinion molding elites of the West are on the wrong side this time but there is no indication that they either recognise it or are ready to recant. The death, the destruction, the wretchedness and the grief are not being manufactured by the Israelis this time. This time these are all the intentional products of Hamas.

Hamas is guilty. Not Israel. Only if we in the US and the rest of the West get a grip on this fact will the death, destruction and grief come to an end. Only then will the theories of Carlos and the plans of Hamas and the ambitions of Iran be ended Only then will the terror stop. Only then will the dead of Gaza not have died for nothing.

Mexico, Dope and Us

Ninety years ago Mexico was in the final phase of a decade of multi-party internal war. As the wars wound down into a fair semblance of peace, the final bloody year saw approximately 5,000 people die, including a small number of Americans.

As 2008 enters its final days, Mexico is concluding a year in which over 5,300 have died in the fighting between government and drug cartels as well as the inter-cartel violence. It is the worst year for Mexico since the end of the wars of succession.

Now, as ninety years ago, the damage to the Mexican commonweal extends far beyond the deaths, far beyond the wounds, even far beyond the fear of death. Now, perhaps even more than in the wake of the round of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and banditry in the guise of revolution, Mexico faces problems not of its own making as well as those most definitely hecho in Mexico.

Faith in the government was non-existent in 1918. It is almost non-existence today. The ability of the government to keep the peace is in doubt. The capacity of the government to assure both economic and political justice is also a debatable proposition. Indeed, as revelations of drug cartel penetration of judicial, police, army, and central governmental offices generally follow with machine gun rapidity, more and more Mexicans doubt the very integrity of the government.

The rampant corruption which is being exposed day after day in the Mexican press is a legacy of the decade of internal bloodshed with which the Twentieth Century opened. So also is the comparative inefficiency of the federal government. Even the violence of the "drug war" is derived from the killing fields of the Wars of Succession.

Not quite a century ago, residents of El Paso had ringside seats for the fighting across the muddy ditch called the Rio Grande. Bullets and the occasional artillery shell went over the heads of the American observers. (And, periodically were stopped by an unlucky American body.)

In the US Senate one of New Mexico's senators, Albert Fall, kept up an incessant rhetorical fusillade demanding that our government take action to halt the violence, protect American lives, and bring Mexicans the peace they deserved. I

In the White House President Wilson did take action, direct action, robust action. The US launched two invasions of Mexico. One was intended to, in Wilson's words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The other had the aim of bringing a terrorist who had launched an attack on American soil to justice;

Both failed. Arguably, both were counterproductive.

No one would counsel invasion today. Still, the US cannot sit by and watch Mexico slide any closer to collapse. Indeed, the US must recognise that it is in part, even a large part, responsible for what is occurring in Mexico.

The American recession has caused a large down tick in money remitted by illegal workers. This money has been a major cushion for the deeply flawed Mexican economy. (Another legacy of the Wars of Succession and the dictatorial aftermath embodied in the Institutional Revolutionary Party.) The return of illegal workers from the US is placing ever increasing demands upon the Mexican government and economy--demands which if not effectively met will enhance the tumult in the country.

Then there is the matter of drugs. The drugs coming out of Mexico, the drugs which fuel so much of the killing and corruption, are not destined for Canada, they are not on their way to Europe. No. The drugs are headed for the Estados Unidos.

The American market for coke, smack, and pot is the largest, richest in the world. Just as we are the most desired market for other commodities and goods, we are the drug destination of choice, the land of golden opportunity.

Unless and until the US can stop the demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason that Mexico will become less violent, less corrupt. Unless and until the US can stop its demand for illegal drugs, there is no reason to believe that Mexico can focus sufficient attention on such urgent problems as infrastructure improvement, educational improvement, industrialisation, and demographic stresses.

There is only one way in which the US can end the demand for illegal drugs, end the immense profits which drive the corruption and violence, halt the slide to collapse. The time has come for a change.

We have to get a grip on a fact of life that many find unpleasant. Doing the same old same old of more cops, more prisons is a continued march on the treadmill of failure. Searching for psychological, sociological, economic causes and cures may make some do-gooders, agenda writers and academics happy (and employed,) but it won't solve the problem.

There is only one avenue which will help both Mexico and us. Make the drugs legal. Take away the risks and profits of an illegal trade. That is the only answer.

That is the change we must make--like it or not. It is the change reality demands.

Here They Go Again!

History doesn't repeat itself--but it can sure seem that way. Last week Hamas went for yet another round of rocket induced coercion with the goal of forcing Israel to back down from its closure of the landlines of communication. Big shock! The action was counterproductive. Despite Hamas' fond hope that the upcoming elections would paralyse Israel's capacity to react with force, the IDF has proven otherwise.

All the usual actors--the UN, the EU, the Arab League, the Pope--have performed the expectable stereotyped roles. Violence has been deplored. Humanitarian crisis has been declared.

Of course the majority of condemnation has fallen on Israel. That's the line that has been routinely taken ever since the First Intifada started nearly twenty years ago. Israel went from champ to chump as cameras caught footage of tanks rolling through houses and grunts shooting at rock tossing kids.

The reflexive reprobation of Israel ignores several fundamental realities resident in the present situation. The first, most glaring, is that Hamas is the effective government in the Gaza Strip. As the government the Hamas terrorists have the duty of protecting the civilian population.

Far from meeting even the basic requirements of this duty Hamas has deliberately and repeatedly put the civilian population at great risk. Not only the risk of becoming collateral damage from IDF reposts to Hamas terror attacks, but also assuring that civilians would lack the basics of life including food, medical supplies, and potable water.

Yes, there is violence to be deplored. But the violence was begun and continued by Hamas--as a matter of deliberate and continually enunciated policy.

Yes, there is a humanitarian crisis. But the crisis is the deliberate product of Hamas' actions and policies. It is a creation of Hamas. Period.

What this means in practice is simply that Israel is not under a specific duty to assure that no civilians die in the Gaza. It is not Israel's duty to assure that each and every civilian in Gaza has adequate supplies of the necessities of life. It is not Israel's duty to assure that Gaza has a functioning economy.

These are no more Israel's obligation than they were the duty of the US and other Allied nations to assure an absence of civilian casualties or suffering in Germany or Japan during World War II. The protection and maintenance of civilian life is the responsibility--the sole responsibility of the government having power over the civilian population. In Gaza that is Hamas.

The hand wringing High Minded of the EU, the UN, and the Vatican had best get a grip on that reality. So should those of We the People who have joined the chorus of criticism.

There is a second, more basic reality in play. It involves dissecting the motivation behind the policies and actions of Hamas. One superficial reason is self-evident. Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

That is not the only nor even the most basic motive. Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist who outlined the "Clash of Civilizations" over a decade ago, got it right. Wherever and whenever Islam meets a culture based on another religion, it does so with intolerant violence.

The authoritarian and death oriented nature of Islam, particularly Islam of the Islamist/jihadist sort, is no more concerned about the suffering and death of its own population than it is the misery and fatalities of the opponent's civilians. The record of Islam's conquests and defeats is marked with blood of its own as well as that of the "infidel."

In recent years the lack of Islamist/jihadist concern for the well being of Muslims is seen not only by the Hamas policy of seeing the non-combatants of Gaza live in misery, fear and under the threat of death. It is seen as well in the vast number of Muslims killed by suicide bombers and IED's in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.

Hamas is following the normal course of Islamist affairs and Muslim history when it willingly, even eagerly, uses the bodies of the people under its rule as pavement on the road of policy. As long as the High Minded, Lofty Thinkers of the West fail to see what precisely Hamas is doing, it will continue to do everything possible to show the world pictures of bleeding and dying Gazans. This hardened, cynical, religously mandated practice will continue until and unless the governments and opinion molders of the US, of the West get a grip on the realities extant not only today but over the span of centuries.

Failure to get a grip on these unpleasant but easily seen realities makes the US, the EU, the UN facilitators, enablers of the atrocities committed against the people of Gaza. Atrocities which are inflicted not by Israel but by the government called Hamas.

Hezbollah Defines The Latest Threat--Or Not

Two and a half years ago Hezbollah opened a can of Whupass on the IDF. The Israelis entered Lebanon in an ill-considered operation which may have been intended to serve as a re-heated version of the less-than-spectacularly-successful Operation Peace for Galilee a quarter century earlier.

The IDF was in for a big surprise, perhaps because the Government of Israel and the military high command had a very bad case of overconfidence. In any event, the much despised, so-called "terrorist" gang, Hezbollah, fought the Israelis to a stop, inflicting high casualties in the process.

Apologists for the GOI and IDF have argued that Hezbollah did not fight fair. That the Party of God trigger pullers and mortar humpers concealed themselves in the midst of civilian populations so the Israelis had to pull their punch. Many of the same commentators aver that the international media so wrongly portrayed the IDF that Hezbollah had a public relations victory even though the IDF had defeated the terrorists in the field.

There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought very well. For the first time since Jordan's Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha has an Arab force fought so well in conventional combat. The Party of God fighters inflicted more casualties for the losses sustained than any of the conventional Arab armies in any of the many wars they have waged against Israel.

In their use of terrain, use of supporting and indirect fires as well as their willingness to stand, fight, and hold territory Hezbollah troops showed themselves to be better than the Iraqis in either 1991 or 2003. Overall, except in a few areas such as maneuvering separate forces over distance, the much maligned terrorists of Allah performed at least as well as the conventional Arab armies over the past half century.

Comes now a pair of Deep Thinkers at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute with a lengthy paper dissecting the 2006 IDF debacle with a particular focus on the skills, strengths, and weaknesses of Hezbollah. The study contains no surprises for anyone who followed the exercise two plus years ago with a close and critical eye.

The intention of the authors seems to be that of giving comfort to those in the American defense community who oppose proposals to reconfigure US ground combat forces for maximum effectiveness in asymmetrical conflicts, those of interventionary operations including counter insurgency and peace keeping. The writers of this analysis seem to be of the view that the Army and Marine Corps have taken the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan too much to heart and as a result they will not be able to fight opponents of greater conventional warfare abilities including non-state actors such as Hezbollah.

There is no argument concerning the initial poor performance of our ground combat forces following the misleadingly successful invasion of Iraq. The same might be said of Afghanistan except for the reality that failure following seeming victory was assured by the "mission leap" and insufficient manpower dictated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his superiors in the neocon ninnie riddled administration.

The Army in particular, but the Marine Corps as well, had been drinking too long of the mythic waters of conventional war. Wide sweeping armored maneuvers and amphibious operations such as those undertaken or planned in the 1991 Gulf War were the standard not simply the Ideal. Even without the Crimson Tide pawing the ground eager to race through the Fulda Gap, the wet dreams of senior American commanders were those of conventional firepower, movement, and logistics heavy war.

The unspoken mantra of most in senior billets was, "No More Vietnams!"

This is the height of irony since the ground combat forces of the United States demonstrated very high competence in fighting the "mixed state" war which developed in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1967. While the American doctrine of "shoot, move, communicate" so as "to find, fix, and destroy the enemy" was not sufficient to assure victory in the overall conflict of political wills, it was necessary to defeat the enemy in the field.

Defeating the enemy in the field was precisely what the US forces did. Time after bloody time. If the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) or Viet Cong main force units stood and fought in place, the Americans won. That this was irrelevant ultimately is not important in the present context.

What is relevant is that the PAVN and VC main force units were better in conventional and semi-conventional operations than Hezbollah during the 2006 operation. In all respects PAVN and VC main force formations were very, very good. However, the firepower, movement, and logistics heavy US forces were better--much, much better. At the conventional end of the mixed state spectrum in Vietnam, the US was the ass kicker of the century.

It was at the other end of the mixed state spectrum, the end where psyops, civil affairs, presence oriented patrolling, stability enhancement operations, and assorted not-very-nice special operations rule, that the US forces were not as good. It was at this end of the spectrum, the end where politics, psychology, and constrained lethality military operations come together that the most and the greatest deficiencies of American doctrine, tactics, and operational skill can be found.

The authors of this Strategic Studies Institute study, like senior American commanders over the past several years, chose to ignore the body of experience, successful experience racked up by the US Army and Marine Corps in order to make the case that Hezbollah's competence in semi-conventional war means the US should not bias itself to the low end of asymmetrical conflict. While it is interesting to see how good Hezbollah has become at conventional operations, there is nothing new or very instructive to be gained by the exercise.

No one has proposed that US interests will be best served by turning the Army and Marine Corps into a collection of barely armed social workers and door-to-door salesmen of democracy. Rather, the suggestion has been made that wars of the next decade or two will be either totally asymmetrical or of the mixed state variety combining conventional, semi-conventional, and unconventional aspects.

The US defense establishment is already very good at breaking things and killing people. If the enemy chooses to stand and fight, they will be killed. If the enemy concentrates, it will be obliterated.

What we and our forces have only recently begun to master are the arts of unconventional war. Only recently have we relearned the lessons relevant to what must be done when the opponent does not stand and fight or concentrate in order to fight. Only recently has our doctrine rediscovered lessons learned and re-learned during our less-than-war wars of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries--including Vietnam.

While our forces have been re-mastering the requirements of successful asymmetrical warfare, the American people and government have not yet learned the single most important lesson of all asymmetrical conflicts no matter by what name they are fought. It is the same lesson which was ignored or never learned by the people and government of Israel in 2006.

The lesson?

Simple to state and hard to get a lasting grip on. All asymmetrical wars, those of peace keeping, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, humanitarian intervention, are at their root contests of political will. The political will of the two peoples involved is tested and re-tested until one or the other cracks, breaks, and evaporates.

Killing and being killed is only the means by which political will is tested. In this area the US has come up short time and time again over the past fifty plus years. It was in this area as well that the Israeli public and government came up short in 2006.

Unless and until the American people and government take a firm grip on the nature of asymmetrical warfare, the capacity of our military to fight is of little relevance.

Human Rights And Government Duties

The other day a coalition of nations led by those of the EU but including a number of Latin American and Asian countries as well introduced a non-binding resolution in the UN General Assembly. The measure called for the decriminalising of homosexual conduct and the securing of basic human rights regardless of gender identification or sexual orientation.

The resolution was opposed by the United States on the grounds that the national government could not take a position on a matter which, under the federal system, resided solely with the several states. This argument was disingenuous at best.

The initiative was also opposed by the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as being contrary to the feudal dogmas of Islam. (It might be noted that the seven countries which impose the death penalty for homosexual conduct are all members of the OIC.) A speaker denounced the proposed measure as leading to pedophilia. This was an interesting stance considering the legitimacy of pedophilic marriage in Islam and its practice in many of the OIC's member countries.

The raising of the "human rights for gays" matter is one more example of a long standing tendency not only in the UN but throughout the world generally which is inherently both wrongheaded and ultimately not very productive. The primary consequence of the decades long emphasis on "rights" has done little beyond the promotion of a pervasive culture of "victimhood."

The problem with calling for "rights" particularly in resolutions or conventions intended to have international applicability resides in two paramount characteristics inherent to the concept. The first is that any and all "rights" can be defined only in hazy, ambiguous fashion. This means that the extent and nature of any particular "right" is subject to manifold interpretations and endless wrangling.

"Rights," it appears from the historical record are slippery critters. A "right" changes its shape and form with the passage of time and shifting of political winds or social currents.

The second problem with "rights" is their inevitable erosion by government. The government invariably adduces some "for-the-good-of-all" reason. Typically the government abridges a "right" with the tacit support of the citizenry--or at least the politically dominant portion of that society.

The historical record as well as contemporary reality shows that not only are "rights" shape shifters but that they are very fragile beasties as well. A soap bubble in a hurricane has a better chance of longevity than a "right" in the face of government ambition.

Governments, like all practitioners of politics are after power. Governments seek to acquire or at least maintain a level of direct, material and substantial control over the perceptions, beliefs and, therefore, actions of those living under their jurisdiction. Governments, regardless of their nature, are all about power. Power and coercion. "Rights" are the frailest of opponents. A "right" can be crushed easily under a jackboot. Or, a "right" can be modified unto death by a lawyer's pen.

It would be far better--and far more cynically realistic--if institutions, particularly those which aspire to a global sweep spoke of "duties." If they addressed the duties of a government, any government, all governments to their citizens.

The concept "duty" places a specific, well defined obligation for an affirmative action upon an individual or entity. That includes governments. The notion "duty" imposes a definite responsibility on an entity--including a government--to take a necessary action or to refrain from a specific action.

The concept "duty" gains even more salience when it is recalled that the sole justification for the existence of any government is its responsibility to protect and advance the interests and well-being of those individuals which live within the scope of its writ. The only way in which a government can meet the test of legitimacy is through its willingness and ability to shoulder specific responsibilities for the overall commonweal.

Because of their definable nature it is easier to demonstrate that a government has failed in its duty to the citizens under its authority. This implies that it is easier for a multi-national organization to both allege and prove that a particular government has violated international norms of "duty" than it is to do the same with respect to "rights."

To say that there is an inherent "human right" to freedom of speech or conscience is to say nothing. It is a High Minded, Lofty Thinking mouthing of feel-good ambiguity.

If an international convention instead were to impose a duty upon all governments to act affirmatively so as to assure that all citizens were free to write, to speak on any subject without punishment or interference, official or otherwise, is a different matter. It is a requirement, the breech of which can be easily observed and negatively sanctioned. To require that a government must take no action to impede its citizens from following the dictates of conscience and further must take action to assure that no impediments, legal or otherwise be placed in the way of such exercise is to assure that any violation is observable and open to collective expressions of international disapproval.

The same paradigm exists with respect to all the many "rights" enshrined in the sixty year old Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead of hazy sentiments such as those expressing the "rights" to adequate housing, proper nutrition, education and remunerative employment would it not have been better had "duties" been placed upon the signatory states to take all necessary actions to provide these fundamentals of life?

International norms which are expressed in terms of governmental "duties" rather than "human rights" would make it far easier to gain popular support for collective action against those regimes which fail in their "duties." It would be far easier to gain political support and maintain political will in the US and other nations for action against the regimes of kleptocrats, dictators and theocrats who pursue personal power or the dictates of some ideology or theological dogma to the disadvantage of their citizens.

"Rights" are wonderful. We're all for them. They make for a whole lot of feeling good. They are, unfortunately, impossible to define with precision or permanence. They are, unfortunately, impossible to enforce with effectiveness and consistency. Particularly on the international level.

"Duties" are made of sterner stuff. They can be listed with specificity. They are less subject to differing interpretation. Their violation is observable. And, they can be enforced. Even on the global level.

It's time for a change. It's time to replace "human rights" with "governmental duties." It's time for the UN and other international bodies to really work to make life better for the peoples of the world instead of simply doing things that make a few High Minded folks feel better for a day or two.

Time For South Africa To Play Up!

Zimbabwe's Kleptocrat-in-Chief, Robert Mugabe, is at it again! He is now on record saying that "Zimbabwe is mine."

Hey! At least the dude is honest. Not since Louis the Whatever who famously declared of France, "I am the state," has a boss of all the bosses been so up front and blunt.

Of course, who in their right mind would want Zimbabwe? Not only is the economy beyond mere disaster, the place has become Cholera Central. Malnutrition is standard (unless a person is in the army or one of the Kleptocrat's Thug Squads.)

Mugabe appended a challenge to his Declaration of Sole Ownership. He averred that no African country had courage enough to topple him.

His estimate of the situation seems bang on. With the exception of Botswana, which is a military Pygmy, none of the South African Development Conference states has made peep one about the necessity of ridding the world of Mugabe.

In part, Mugabe is depending upon his long tarnished reputation as the premier "Freedom Fighter" in southern Africa. He is willing to bet that no other African leader will risk the consequences of seeking his overthrow by force of arms.

There is another, more realistic, explanation for the unwillingness of South Africa and other countries to enter the cockpit of Zimbabwe. The place is such a mess that an involvement (read occupation) would be a very lengthy and expensive effort. The probability of failure would be high. So would the possibility of blowback.

The reluctance of South Africa (and the African Union) to rise to the challenge of imposing stability on Zimbabwe may be overtaken by events. Cholera is not noted for respecting international borders. The stream of refugees from pestilence, poverty, and murder is going to grow in the days and weeks to come.

The combination of a folk migration and disease against the backdrop of a global economic crisis will give neighboring countries few choices. Self-interest will compel intervention regardless of longer term risks.

It is not improbable that Mugabe and the SADC countries are playing a game of chicken. Each is betting that external actors either will or will not take on the burden of intervention under the color of "humanitarian crisis." The humanitarian crisis is real.

That reality does not imply that external entities such as the UN, the EU, or the US are or will be willing to send (in the words of Warren Zevon) "lawyers, guns, and money." The proof of reluctance is found in the Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.

The UN "peacekeeping" effort in Congo is less than noteworthy in its effectiveness. The EU has jawed about sending troops but has taken no action. Nor is it likely to. The US is overstretched militarily, and the public appears to be disinclined to take on more "nation building" missionary efforts. Current global economic realities also serve as a strong disincentive for adventures in healing the sick, feeding the hungry, and planting democracy in foreign, hostile soil.

What this all means is simple. South Africa has to take the lead. It has to, in cricket terms, "play up."

The alternative is for that country to accept the refugees, the spread of disease, and other unfortunate consequences of the further collapse of Zimbabwe. The leaders of that country (and the rest of Zimbabwe's neighbors) have to get a grip on a basic fact.

Zimbabwe is not the "White Man's Burden." This time around, the load has to be carried by the Africans themselves, even if they carry it alone, uncompensated, and unappreciated.

It's time for South Africa and other countries to call Mugabe's bluff. They, and only they, can save the people of Zimbabwe.

The UN (And The US) Blow It Again

The other day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1851. The measure was introduced and strongly supported by the United States.

In its content Resolution 1851 is laudable. It authorises hot pursuit of those engaged in piracy and armed robbery on the high seas into the territory of Somalia--with the permission of the Transitional Government.

Secretary of State Rice hailed the Security Council's action. She averred that the measure would send a "strong signal" of international resolve to end the rash of maritime hijackings that has severely impeded trade in the Gulf of Aden.

There is only one fault with Secretary Rice's comment. It is out of touch with reality. To end piracy one does not send signals downrange. No. One sends bullets.

There is only one fault with Resolution 1851. The authority will not be used. The US Naval commander in the region has already strongly implied that the American assets detailed to the vast and growing "anti-piracy patrol" lack the specifics of intelligence and deployable forces to do more than escort and monitor.

The commander also raised another objection to hot pursuit or any other more robust measure. There is no court of competent authority available to try "alleged" pirates.

Experts in international law rushed to support this position. These worthies take the position that the various international conventions on the law of the sea which have taken effect following World War II nullified all the previous national laws and international customs and usages which provided for adjudication of acts of piracy. They maintain that none of the current conventions provide for a due process approach to trying and punishing pirates--even those caught in the act or with the tools of the pirate's trade.

Ad hoc arrangements have been made with Kenya for both the trial and incarceration of a handful of pirates captured while plying their bloody business. These deals are limited in both scope and effectiveness. Given the tenuous nature of both Kenyan and regional politics, it is highly improbable that they will be expanded.

Pirate boats have been stopped and boarded by several ships of different navies. Weapons and communications equipment were found. This constituted convincing evidence that the men (who have included nationalities other than Somali) were not out for a fun day of fishing.

Despite the evidence the pirates were released. Disarmed to be sure, but let go to try their luck some other day.

The reason?

No court of competent jurisdiction. No country which was willing to take on the burden of offering a semblance of due process and, following conviction, a reasonable imitation of secure confinement.

The UN Resolution does not change this reality. Neither does it change a related consideration. Robust actions whether or not they involve the new hot pursuit authority carry with them the real potential of killing persons who are not pirates. This causes unpleasant complications for the navy and government seen as being irresponsible trigger pullers.

There is another factor which renders the well-intentioned Resolution 1851 nugatory. Stepping ashore in Somalia, even for the brief time that might be required to free a ship, rescue a captive crew, or snatch some pirate band automatically involves the state undertaking the action in the blood soaked chaos called Somalia. An incursion would carry risks ranging from being denounced as an Islamophobic baby-killer to demands that the intervening force stay to bring stability to the country.

Like the oft-seen legend on old maps, "Here there be Tygers."

If Resolution 1851 sits as another dead letter act by the UN, that body will lose even more street cred with the bad actors of the world. This sort of "strong signal" is counterproductive. It weakens not only the UN in the eyes of Islamist outlaws such as the Pirates of Puntland, it does the same to nations such as the US which embraced and announced the hollow words of good intentions.

If the UN really, really wants to do something constructive regarding piracy in the waters off Somalia and (at least by implication) elsewhere, there is something it can do. There is a measure the Security Council can take which is real, germane, and relevant. There is an act of creation which will do more--much more--than simply send a signal'

The UN can ordain another of those special tribunals of which the organisation seems so enamored. It can create a court of competent jurisdiction to try cases of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas. It can give a holding pen for the sea going scum picked up by the vessels of the Great Gulf of Aden Piracy Prevention Patrol.

Sure, such a court may not be as high-vis or sexy as those dealing with war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity. But, an International Piracy Tribunal would be useful. Even effective. It could do something real and beneficial.

That's probably why the UN hasn't done it yet. Signals are better than useful results in the Great House by the Hudson.

Let's Give It Up For The Shoe Tosser!

Muntader al-Zaidi might have been acting out some personal type of rage and frustration as he hurled his shoes and insults at George W. Bush. His action has made him a form of hero to many folks in the Mideast (and probably elsewhere.)

The Geek is of the view that al-Zadi's up front gesture of scorn and anger raises an important question or two. While the 29 year old TV journalist may have been a bit over the edge with his demonstration, it deserves to be considered as something other than a mere juvenile outburst. It also requires an assessment which goes beyond placing politically expedient labels.

Al-Zaidi has been adopted as a poster boy by people on the Left: See, the Iraqis hate us and our imperialistic ways. He has received a similar sort of bogus sanctification by those on the Right: See, it proves Iraq is "free." No person could do the same in Egypt or Saudi Arabia or pre-2003 Iraq.

Arguably both labels have a degree of truth in advertising. More importantly, neither does service to what probably lies behind not only al-Zaidi's pitching arm, the applause he has received, and the reaction to the Zaidi-throws-and-Bush-ducks episode.

To the Geek, the tossing of shoes and hurling of epithets demands an examination of what the US invasion of Iraq has brought about. This requires asking a simple question which is very difficult to answer--or, at the least to formulate a coherent response upon which a consensus can agree free of ideological bias.

The purpose of war is to bring about a better state of peace. All forms of war, aggressive, defensive, insurgent are waged in order to establish a post-war regime which is superior to that which existed prior to the cannon's roar. Not surprisingly, the details of what constitutes a better state of peace differs between aggressor and defender, insurgent and counterinsurgent. That difference is why the war is being fought.

Interventionary wars such as those being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq lay a special burden on the intervenor--that is the country which starts the war--not only to define but to achieve a state of peace which is demonstrably superior for both the intervenor and the target nation. Let's walk through that again. It's important.

The only consideration which raises an intervention above the level of naked and perhaps unprovoked aggression is the outcome. Does the outcome provide a better state of peace for the country being invaded? If the answer is yes, then the war is ethically justified. If the answer is no, then the war is nothing other than naked aggression for the benefit of the invader.

The Administration of George W. Bush and its supporters among We the People argue that removing Saddam Hussein and opening the possibility of democracy to the Iraqi people is, in and of itself, a better state of peace. Those who have opposed the war state that the results to date constitute a worse state of peace.

The proponents of the invasion having resulted in a better state of peace point to the elections in Iraq, its demonstration of effective sovereignty as embodied in the recent Status of Forces Agreement, and the trials of Saddam, Chemical Ali and others for both war crimes and crimes against the Iraqi people as proof that a better state of peace exists today. They point to al-Zaidi's actions as a clear example of the current state of Iraqi freedom.

Opponents of the American adventure in regime change note the several million internal displaced persons as well as the large number of Iraqi refugees in adjacent countries. They also note the ruined infrastructure, the destroyed neighborhoods, towns and villages. And, the tens of thousands of dead Iraqis who would be alive absent the American invasion. To the people holding this view, al-Zaidi was a symbol of the bitter resentment, not to say hatred, resident in the Iraqi victims of American aggression.

From the Geek's historically driven perspective, the American experiences in both the Philippines and Vietnam provide a guide for assessing whether or not the US effort in Iraq has been ethically justified as bringing about a better state of peace. He would like to take a brief look at both guiding cases.

In the Philippines, the US defeated a well developed, broadly supported indigenous independence movement. The cost of this was high in both American and Filipino lives. The military success was predicated not so much on the skill of American soldiers or the quality of their weapons and tactics as it was on distorting the political process which existed within Filipino society.

The same distortions continued during the long years of US occupation. They were exacerbated not only by the Japanese invasion and occupation of the islands but by the years of US backed counterinsurgency efforts against assorted communist insurgent movements during the decades which followed Filipino independence.

The distortions continued even after the communists were defeated and have done much to assure the rise and continuation of an Islamist separatist insurgency, which is both slow motion in pace and bloody in action. A close examination of the forces at work in Filipino society and politics indicates that the same basic trajectory of class based politics and internal divisions would have existed absent the American invasion, conquest, and occupation.

However, the trajectory would have been neither so long in duration nor bloody in its effects had the American government accepted Filipino independence at the end of the Spanish-American War. The American presence was like a heavy weight put on an elastic surface--it made the distortion deeper with the inevitable consequence that it took longer for the elastic to return to normal following the removal of the weight.

The same general pattern can be seen within Vietnam. The conflicts between North and South existed for centuries before the French Indochina War. The attempts by the French to reestablish colonial authority worsened this pre-existing trajectory as did the later American support of the South Vietnamese regime.

Following the defeat of the US, the North gained operational dominance over the entire country. This was as expected. But, as Hanoi has found out, there is a whale of a difference between operational dominance and unquestioned political authority.

As a result of changes both within and outside Vietnam, the county may continue as a one party state with strong authoritarian aspects but has increasingly been acknowledging the necessity of freer enterprise, a more liberal approach to the rights of the citizens, and the strong necessity of something akin to a rule of law--not party or regional connections and prerogatives.

In short, the long resident trajectories of Vietnamese society have continued. Vietnam today is what Vietnam would have been in any event had there been no American war in the country.

Leaving aside minor quibbles such as American public health measures in the Philippines or the necessity of global containment, the results of the American efforts in both venues were failures. Neither brought about a state of peace better than that which would have emerged without the US military involvement.

Rather than bringing about a better state of peace in either country, the US wars and occupations delayed the arrival of the better state. Neither American effort was ethically justifiable.

Looking back it is clear that the "golden moment" for effective and low cost regime change with a meaningful chance of bringing about a better state of peace in Iraq came and went in 1991. The halting of Coalition forces on the approaches to Basra might have been tactically and logistically justified. The standing by with folded arms as the Shiite uprising was bloodily crushed was not.

That suppression coupled with the years of sanctions and "No-Fly Zones" neither constituted a better state of peace nor a meaningful push for internal Iraqi-driven changes. Rather, the long years of deprivation, repression and collapsing economy made the achievement of internal stability now all the harder.

The regime of Saddam Hussein would not have lasted many more years had the US and other troops stayed at home in 2003. Yes, the death of Saddam would have brought internal power struggles, deaths, and the emergence of yet another authoritarian regime.

Such a pattern is not foreign to the Iraqi social and cultural experience. A transition to another, probably slightly less obnoxious regime would have been both accepted by and acceptable to the Iraqi public generally. The strongman, the oligarch, is completely in keeping with the culture, the history of Iraq, and the region generally.

To sum it up: The American invasion of Iraq was not justified. It did not--could not--bring about a better state of peace. All the invasion has done--could have done--is delay the organic emergence of a better state--as defined by the Iraqis.

George W. Bush, and the world, should be grateful that all al-Zaidi had to throw was his shoes. He (and many Iraqis) probably would have preferred a grenade.

Isn't The Campaign Over?

As far as the Geek is aware the election is over. Even the Electoral College ceremony has been concluded. Barack Obama is the one and only President-elect. Except for a few very disgruntled types on the far right wing who continue to question the location of Obama's birth, the country seems to have agreed on the identity of the next president. That's where the Geek thought reality resided.

So, please would someone brighter and more firmly rooted in the here-and-now than the Geek please tell him why the Official Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda as released the other day by the transition wallahs reads like a poorly connected series of campaign blurbs? Please ease the misery of the Geek who believes now that he must have been abducted by ufonauts and dropped off in some alternate reality by letting him know there is a good, sound, well-rooted reason for the blathering of vapid feel good phrases and calling it a foreign policy agenda.

If you haven't read this sophomoric exercise in pandering to the Great Unwashed, it is available on line. The Geek pulled it from Maxim's, but there are probably other sites holding it. http://www.maximsnews.com/news20081215obamaforeignpolicystatement10812150102.htm

The Geek is perfectly well aware that incoming administrations are not given to laying out a real foreign policy agenda. He also is acquainted with the historical record which shows how the best intentions can be rendered nugatory under the compulsion of events.

Ike limited himself to a campaign trail promise "to go to Korea" with the implication that by so doing he would end the unpopular "police action" there. He went and eventually did help bring about an armistice.

LBJ promised that "American boys will not be sent to fight and die for Asian boys." The boys such as the Geek who were already ducking bullets and pulling triggers in Vietnam were not impressed by either the realism or the honesty of the Texan's commitment.

Nixon said as how he "had a plan for Vietnam." He did. More Americans died in that unpleasant place after His Richardness took office than before.

Jimmy Carter promised to work for peace in the Mideast. (What was the alternative? To work for war?) His efforts eventually did lead to the Camp David Accord. A nice agreement brought about by the compulsion of events in the region, but scarcely a milestone on the road to peace.

In short, incoming presidents tend to make few promises in the foreign policy arena. Those which they do make are usually vague and misleading. Most are kept in the breech far more than in the observance.

However, Mr Obama ran on the mantra of "change." In large measure he was elected because a hell of a lot of We the People very much desired a change after eight years of neocon ninnie agenda driven debacles.

Is it too much to expect--no--to demand that the Obama Administration come into office with something different? A change from past pre-presidential performances? Is it somehow out of line to want an outline of foreign policy goals and objectives that transcends campaign rhetoric? That is demonstrably related to the real problems of the real world? Which shows that the new team on the block has a sound grip of current and near-term future challenges to US national and strategic interests?

While one might cling to the thin rope of hope provided by Mr Obama's appointment of Robert Gates and General Jones, that isn't enough. It is offset by his designation of Susan Rice as UN ambassador with cabinet rank. It isn't helped by his tabbing of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Both of these latter appointees are correctly understood as carriers of ideological agendas rather than being realpolikers.

Rather than do a complete disection of the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" as released, the Geek would prefer to take just a couple of salient points. Consider the matter of nuclear proliferation and fissionable materials control.

Nuclear Weapons
A Record of Results: The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes. Obama has taken bipartisan action to secure nuclear weapons and materials:
He joined Senator Dick Lugar (R-In) in passing a law to help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world.
He joined Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Ne) to introduce a bill that seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Secure Loose Nuclear Materials from Terrorists: Obama and Biden will secure all loose nuclear materials in the world within four years. While working to secure existing stockpiles of nuclear material, Obama and Biden will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. This will deny terrorists the ability to steal or buy loose nuclear materials.
Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Obama and Biden will crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions.
Move Toward a Nuclear Free World: Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global

Sounds good, doesn't it? But that's all it does. Looked at closely the statement not only says nothing, it shows a remarkable lack of grip on reality.

We all know that both North Korea and Iran have already been the targets of a wide variety of admittedly inconsistently imposed sanctions. So far the sanction campaign has had nil results. Given the realities of Great Power dynamics today and into the foreseeable future this is unlikely to change. Extremely unlikely.

Unless and until other Great Powers (and a whole passel of the Not-So-Great Powers) see that it is in their own self interest to prevent these states from acquiring more of a nuclear weapons capacity than they already have, no sanction regime will have an effect. Neither will an approach that combines sanctions with inducements.

The self-interest of countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan include components far less easily quantifiable than gross domestic product or other economic factors but which are equally or even more important. These include the concept of national sovereignty, national dignity and pride, the political capital investment of the regime. None of these motivators of conduct are considered by the Obama/Biden Agenda.

Nuclear arms reduction by the US or Russia is both possible and desirable. But, reduction should never be confused with elimination. No country currently in possession of a nuclear force-in-being is going to be ready to renounce this capacity. The world is a very long way from achieving a political order that makes the nuclear option obsolete. The incoming administration recognises this. It has offered the extension of the American "nuclear umbrella" to Israel and other threatened countries should Iran gain a nuclear weapons capacity.

The efforts made to date to secure weapons grade fissionable materials should be continued. But, it must also be realised that there is not now nor is there likely to be a realistic way of tracking down and gaining custody of all the highly enriched uranium or plutonium which has been made or will be made. The nasty stuff is going to continue to float about in the shadows of the globe.

Now take a close look at the "Obama/Biden Agenda" as it regards Israel.

Israel
Ensure a Strong U.S.-Israel Partnership: Barack Obama and Joe Biden strongly support the U.S.-Israel relationship, and believe that our first and incontrovertible commitment in the Middle East must be to the security of Israel, America's strongest ally in the region. They support this closeness, and have stated that the United States will never distance itself from Israel.

Support Israel's Right to Self Defense: During the July 2006 Lebanon war, Barack Obama stood up strongly for Israel's right to defend itself from Hezbollah raids and rocket attacks, cosponsoring a Senate resolution against Iran and Syria's involvement in the war, and insisting that Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire that did not deal with the threat of Hezbollah missiles. He and Joe Biden believe strongly in Israel's right to protect its citizens.

Support Foreign Assistance to Israel: Barack Obama and Joe Biden have consistently supported foreign assistance to Israel. They defend and support the annual foreign aid package that involves both military and economic assistance to Israel and have advocated increased foreign aid budgets to ensure that these funding priorities are met. They have called for continuing U.S. cooperation with Israel in the development of missile defense systems

What about this differs from the position taken by any of the past ten or eleven presidents? With the sole exception of the reference made to the disastrous 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, any incoming administration from Eisenhower on could have (and did) make virtually identical commitments.

Apparently it is not yet time for a change in the area of American policy regarding Israel. We will continue to be held hostage by the political power of the Israel Lobby. Thus the dog of American foreign policy will continue to be wagged by the tail of Israel. This means that the US and others will keep trudging along a treadmill to nowhere in the Mideast.

Not surprisingly the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" is solidly behind the Global Poverty Act and its UN progenitor, the Millennium Development Goals. The Agenda promises a doubling of US foreign aid to achieve all sorts of High Minded things. Unfortunately the Lofty Ideal is presented without acknowledging any of the real world caveats such as the inability of the UN to do more than blather or the supreme skill with which assorted kleptocrats both in and out of recipient governments see foreign aid as being a highly personalised benefit of position.

The New Team, the fountainheads of "change" stand for "tough and direct" diplomacy--whatever that might mean. Do they think that the US has been noted for its "weak and indirect" practice of international politics in the past? The Agenda is also in support of a "new partnership" with Asian countries. That's nice, but what, exactly, has been wrong with the "old" partnership? The Agenda is silent on that point.

The Agenda is silent as well on other matters of salience. The sound of collapsing states in Africa is ignored. So also is the emergence of potential threats to US interests and security in Latin America.

It is inconceivable that the Obama/Biden bunch is unaware of recent developments to our south. That they have not noticed the election of governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay that are not favorably disposed to the US passes belief. Can the new crew possibly be heedless of the current conditions in Mexico?

But, the Agenda makes no reference to any of these.

Also unmentioned in the Agenda is the latest elephant in the living room. The critter isn't a recent arrival. It's been there for years now. It just keeps on eating and growing. As it noshes its way to greater potency, it keeps being ignored by the polite folks.

The elephant is the international trade in illegal drugs. More accurately it is the relation between the drug cartels and the rebirth of hostile insurgent movements. From the Taliban in Afghanistan to FARC in Columbia, drugs and violence directed against US interests are joined hip and shoulder. Now Sendero Luminoso which had been declared dead a decade ago has lurched back from the grave, resurrected by drug money.

But, the polite people of the new kids on the foreign policy block ignored this stark and highly unpleasant reality. A reality which will demand full attention in the months and years to come.

The Geek agrees that it is time for a change. Unfortunately, the Agenda indicates that the Obama Administration doesn't agree.

Time For A Change--Defining America's "Mission"

Recently Oxfam America launched a petition drive with the view of calling upon the incoming Obama Administration to develop (and, presumably, implement) plans to end the sexual violence directed against women in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa. The nature of the petition as well as its wording implies strongly that this act represents a test of the American "mission" in the world.

Oxfam America and others of like mind have, with this petition, joined the chorus of groups and individuals demanding that the US live up to its global "mission" by alleviating global poverty, ending anthropogenic climate change, feeding those who are hungry, protecting the tropical rainforests, halting acoustic pollution of the oceans, and other tasks too numerous too mention. All of these activities are necessary. All are important. All would serve to the greater benefit of humankind.

But, to what extent are they incumbent upon the United States? How can one argue that any or all constitute America's "mission?"

Getting a grip on what, if any, "mission" accrues to the United States is manifestly necessary. It is necessary if the Obama Administration is to formulate a coherent foreign policy and gain the support of We the People--or at least the politically articulate portion which is concerned with foreign affairs.

For a half century there was no debate over the American "mission." It was consensually understood and agreed that the "mission" of the US was to act as Leader of the Free World in the apocalypse freighted Cold War with the Soviet Union and its clients.

With the end of that confrontation, uncertainty replaced the consensus. The records of the Clinton and W. Bush Administrations demonstrate this uncertainty and confusion, albeit each in a different fashion.

As any number of diplomatic historians have argued over the past century, any confusion regarding the "mission" of the US in the world has stemmed from a basic split in how Americans and their governments have balanced the pursuit of ideals with the requirements of realism. The recurrent shifts between realism and idealism in American foreign policy have existed almost from the beginnings of the American experience.

The roots of idealism are to be found in the "mission statement" implicit in the views of the founders of the Puritan colony of Plymouth. To the Puritan mind, they were on an "errand into the wilderness." The nature of that errand was to continue the process of purifying their community so that in the fullness of time and consonant with the will of God, they would be recalled to England. Recalled to save the mother country from the creeping evil of "Popishness."

You don't get more idealistic than that.

Despite a brief flurry of revolutionary zeal which saw the American Patriots attempt to export the beauties of their revolution to Canada by force of arms, the leaders of the Revolutionary and early Constitutional periods were remarkably free of the idealistic fervor which normally propels a nation born of war. As the underlying pragmatism of the Constitution shows clearly, the "decider guys" of the Federal period held ideals well tempered by a healthy regard for the requirements of reality.

The writings of the Founders and their immediate successors indicate that realism trumped the excesses of idealism. In foreign affairs the universal position was commercial friendship with all who reciprocated and a total rejection of any sort of intervention in the affairs of other countries. It was believed and argued that by focusing its efforts upon developing its land, resources, and, most importantly, its domestic institutions of government, the United States could provide an example worthy of emulation.

In short, the Americans of the early Nineteenth Century were in favor of a sort of leadership-by-example approach to foreign policy. By so doing and by the fact of success, the US would encourage the peoples of other countries to embrace our form of government, economy, and social organisation.

Not until the last years of the 19th Century did this general consensus fray. When it did start to ravel, it came apart with speed and ferocity. Expansion across the continent, at first peaceful (unless you were an indigenous American in the way), morphed into the more muscular Manifest Destiny of mid-century. This in turn transmogrified into the euphemistically expressed imperialism of the Internationalist Progressives.

The Internationalist Progressives were activist oriented ideologues. To their eyes, the US had a "mission" which went far beyond filling a large chunk of the North American continent. Far transcended mere success in the development of resources and institutions. Going much further than leadership-by-example and its essentially realistic view of costs and benefits, the Internationalist Progressives were gung-ho for the forcible exportation of American institutions to other peoples regardless of the desires of the recipients.

The Internationalist Progressives were eager to take on the challenge offered by Rudyard Kipling. They rushed to pick up "the White Man's Burden."

Whether Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt or Democrats like Woodrow Wilson, US Administrations with the backing of the majority of We the People mounted interventions and occupations throughout the world. The Internationalist Progressives never argued that pragmatic interests or the requirements of reality demanded these interventions and occupations except in passing.

The real motive was always idealism.

The ideal in play was simple, easily understood, and agreed upon by virtually all Americans.

Here is the ideal, short and sweet

The nature and character of the United States and its institutions were superior to those existing elsewhere. The exportation of these were in the best interests of the recipients. The moral nature of America demanded that we right presumed wrongs by providing better government, better economic structures, better social institutions.

We could do no other. It was our "mission."

President Wilson put it perfectly as he ordered the landing of troops at Vera Cruz during the midst of the bloody and expropriation minded Mexican revolution. "We will teach the Mexicans to elect good men."

The grunts fighting to suppress the Philippine Insurrection put it just as well. They were a bit more cynical, but such is the prerogative of the guys at the bloody tip. They had a jingle which contained the chorus, "Under the wide and starry flag/We'll civilize them with a Krag." (The Krag-Jorganson rifle was the standard issue weapon of the time.)

We the People and our governments stuck with the idealism of the Internationalist Progressives until the awesome let down of the Twenties. Reality slapped us in the face. The "War to End Wars" had not ended wars. The "War to Make the World Safe For Democracy" hadn't performed that miracle.

World War I was a failure from the American perspective. Lives had been expended for nothing. Blood out, zilch in.

The Internationalist impulse was replaced, not by realism, but by another form of idealism. We the People became self-absorbed both during the years of apparent plenty--the Twenties--and during the time of poverty--the Thirties. This was the time of our total disengagement from the affairs and threats of the world. This was the time of Isolationism.

The reality of threat kept knocking on Uncle Sam's door as the Thirties ended. Few were ready to listen. Ultimately reality with a thwacking great boot kicked the door in on 7 December 41.

During the war, We the People, with the full and often knowingly duplicitous encouragement of the Administration of FDR, were filled with the ideal of a world that would be made peaceful by the joint efforts of a war-winning coalition. We were assured (and we assured ourselves) that once the grand combine of the US, the UK, the USSR (as well as the tag-alongs, France and China) had obliterated the aggressors, they would continue to guarantee a world of peace through the United Nations.

That idealistic view was proven to be hallucinatory even before the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco. With the acknowledgement of the Cold War as being real, very dangerous, and long term in nature, realism came out of the shadows for the first time in generations.

The Containment Policy as interpreted by Truman and then Eisenhower was profoundly realistic. It accepted the limitations imposed by reality. It accepted the world as it was and sought to remake the global political order slowly on the margins until the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union caught up with it.

The policy of roll back espoused by most Republicans on the Right and even some Cold War Liberals on the Left was idealistic. When attempted even in limited form, roll back proved that ideals could be quite deadly. (Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis and hold your breath at just how close we came to the very unpleasant reality of a nuclear exchange.)

Whew! We're through a quick background sketch of the zigs and zags of US foreign policy and its companion, the nature of any American "mission."

Without recapitulating the ideologically propelled debacles of the past twenty years, suffice it to say that recent history parallels the history of long ago. Idealism leads to interventions in the affairs of other peoples and countries without due regard as to the human terrain upon which our well-intended efforts are to operate.

Realism, which has been conspicuously absent over the past decade and a half, demands that We the People and our governments take the world as it is.

Realism requires that we properly appreciate what our core national and strategic interests actually are.

Realism insists that we evaluate closely and carefully what the risks and benefits of a particular policy option might be.

Realism is based upon a full understanding of the strengths and limitations resident in our instruments of national power.

Realism also is predicated upon an accurate reading of the human terrain upon which our policy will operate.

Given the nature of the world's political and economic order today, the pure leadership-by-example model that served the nation well during the first century or so of its existence no longer is sufficient to protect, let alone advance, our core national and strategic interests. It was realistic back then. Now it is not.

The realism of the Cold War is no longer realistic. It is not applicable in a multi-polar world. It would only become realistic should the current conflict expressed as the Global War on Terrorism become a seemingly permanent bifurcation between the Islamist oriented states and all other countries. This Huntington "Clash of Civilizations" is unlikely, but not impossible. Not impossible by a long shot.

A new definition of realism must not only take account of global problems in which the US must play a collaborative role in its own national interest, it must acknowledge that not every "human wrong" no matter how despicable can be addressed by the US acting alone or in concert with other like-minded countries. This is why the Oxfam America and similar High Minded efforts are both wrong-headed and, if acted upon, would lead only to failure.

The collapse of states, the plunder and rapine of kleptocracies and kleptocratic movements are filled with nauseating abuses of human rights. They are filled with the most reprehensible of human cruelties.

These miseries and crimes are real. But, that does not mean that it is realistic for the US or the EU or even that central depository of the High Minded, the UN, to intervene, particularly to intervene with military force.

Nations, even Great Powers, must choose their battles carefully and cautiously. Care, caution, proper detailed planning based on accurate understandings of the human terrain to be targeted as well as the goals to be accomplished are all hallmarks of a realistic foreign policy.

An even more central feature of realism in foreign policy is knowing what the nation's core interests are and how the proposed policy will serve to defend or advance these interests.

Idealism, no matter what form, no matter how lofty the aspirations behind it might be, serves only to cloud the eye and befuddle the mind of a nation. Blind and stupefied countries rarely, if ever, have any useful "mission."

Time For A Change--Pirates And Somalia

The US has floated a new proposal at the UN Security Council. Under its provisions foreign forces would be allowed rights of hot pursuit right past the high tide line and onto Somalian territory. Such rights would, of course, be attendant upon the permission of the UN sponsored Transitional National Government. (No mention was made of the fact that the Somalian central regime is highly transient, not at all national and a government only by courtesy.)

The effrontery of the American proposal apparently rankled the African Union, which made any number of unkind comments regarding the "wealthy" nations being ready to use force against a handful of hardscrabble fishermen trying to eek out a living through seizing ships while being "indifferent" to the fate of Somalia and the Somali people. There was a subtext of implication. An implication that the same"wealthy" nations had promoted the collapse of Somalia nearly twenty years ago.

The fine folks at the African Union might want to refresh their acquaintance with history. The history of their own continent. Specifically, the history of Somalia during the last couple of decades. The US undertook to protect the humanitarian operations of the UN in the early Nineties. The mission was well intended but failed as a result of High Minded aspirations of "nation building." The US effort was ably backed and humanitarian aid offered by any number of the so-called "wealthy" nations.

(It might be recalled as well that during the time of the US intervention in Somalia, the African Union as well as the governments and media of several member states including Kenya severely reamed out the US for practicing both "neocolonialism" and "genocide." Say what!)

The ultimate failure of this first effort at nation building was the responsibility of Somalian leaders. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts was also a product marked "Made in Somalia."

The overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts occurred, not because the US wanted it to (although no tears were shed over the corpse of an Islamist/jihadist entity in Washington,) but because exiled Somalis and assorted member states of the African Union wanted this eventuality to occur. They did it through the agency of the Ethiopian Army which, while receiving a certain level of gratuity from the US for the effort, represents a government which is a member in good standing of the African Union.

The subsequent failure of the Transitional National Government is the responsibility of the Somalis and the African Union. The AU has an up close and personal interest in Somalian stability. This is a far more direct interest than the US has with regard to the place. Our anxiety, which is well-rooted, revolves around the viability of Somalia as a terrorist training and basing site.

The states bordering that geographical expression called Somalia should exercise the most direct involvement. Kenya along with Ethiopia have the greatest interest in providing stability in Somalia. Kenya perhaps more than Ethiopia since the majority of refugees find heading south to join the already large Somalian population in Kenya both easier and more attractive than crossing the wastes of the Ogaden to find sanctuary in Ethiopia.

The African Union along with any number of High Minded but evidently gripless groups and individuals seem to think that the pirate problem in the waters off Somalia can not be abated unless and until the simple fisherfolk turned pirate can return to steady jobs at a good income in a peaceful pursuit.

Get a grip!

Some of the pirates early on in the game might have been unemployed fishermen in search of a (dis)honest couple of bucks. But those days, if they ever existed, are long in the past. Piracy is a big money maker for all concerned. The parties include not only the trigger pullers in the skiffs or the crews of the motherships, they include Somali clans and tribes scattered throughout the refugee communities of Europe. The parties include as well terrorist groups. Given the profits from this year alone--in excess of 100 million dollars of ransom, there is money enough for all and then some.

The US and other maritime nations, wealthy or not, have a direct national interest at stake in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy drives up the costs of shipping. Piracy delays cargos. Piracy costs, in short, both time and money. This means countries heavily involved in maritime commerce have national interests in play.

Here is a ground truth which the AU might not find palatable. Right now the US and other maritime nations have no national interests in play in Somalia. Somalia is not worth anyone's effort because no one has a vital national interest at risk there. Nobody that is except Kenya and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.

So far (with the laudable exception of the French and British) the nations represented in the waters off Somalia have been long on speeches, advice, and having pretty boats drive around the blue waters but have been very short on direct action against the pirates. Many fine words have been expended upon the need of an appropriate court in which to try "alleged" pirates. Somber faces have propounded questions regarding international law, its limits and exceptions.

Speeches, advice, and questions of international law are fine--in their place and time. Noble and High Minded expressions of sentiment regarding the need for a stable government in Somalia and well-paying jobs for Somali fishermen are good for filling space in the media both old and new--but massively irrelevant to the needs of the real world.

It is time for a change. The change must have two components.

The first is short, simple, and unpleasant. Start killing pirates. Accept the inevitable errors and the equally predictable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the High Minded over the terrible catastrophe of pirates becoming fish food. Over the vast sweep of history from the expeditions of a young Julius Cesar to the closing days of the Nineteenth Century, the only way in which piracy has been stopped is through the shedding of large quantities of pirate blood.

The second choice is not simple or short. It is unpleasant. The African Union and the UN have two choices. Here they are.

One is to allow the Transitional National Pseudo-government to walk the plank when the Ethiopians withdraw their forces. The most militant of the tripartite Islamist/jihadist movement, the Shahab, constantly state that during the period of the Union of Islamic Courts there was no piracy. OK. Put them to the test. They are going to take over Somalia if and when the Ethiopians leave. No doubt about that. Somalia will become, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warns, a center for jihadist activities. The US will have to do something robust when that happens. It will be in our national interest.

The second choice is to insist that the African Union clean up the mess in Somalia. This will not be easy. It will be expensive in lives, money, and time. Taking military action will carry with it the risk of blow back to those countries with a sizable Islamic population. The outcome may well be ambiguous enough to assure the long-term probability of an Islamist/jihadist threat remaining in Somalia for years and years to come.

The African Union will demand the assistance and support of the UN and the "wealthy" nations of the world. This support and assistance should be forthcoming. It will be in the collective interest of the world.

The problem(s) presented by the failed state of Somalia are difficult to settle and impossible to predict as to final outcome. This is not a reason to resist making the tough choices.

The time for dithering, talking, excusing, justifying, and ignoring the pirates of Somalia or the land which gave them birth and gives them sanctuary is past. It is time for a change.

The incoming Obama Administration has to get a grip on the reality and take a leadership role in at least the matter of killing pirates so the sealanes will be safe. That is the minimum necessary strategic interest of this country.

As the old Nike ad put it, "Just do it!"