The UN Secretary General Is Out To Lunch--Again

Ban ki-Moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has again demonstrated that the size of the UN's ambition is matched only by the breadth of its ineptitude. At a meeting of the UN Security Council called to consider the recent attacks on Mumbai, he bloviated at some length concerning the "ideal" nature of the UN in combating terrorism.

The Geek would like to know who the SecGen's dealer is because the jefe of the Hudson River Follies is clearly taking some truly righteous mind altering substance if he actually believes that the 190 + nation monster can tackle terrorism around the world with any hope of even the slightest success. If Ban ki-Moon ain't on drugs then he is utterly without a grip on reality. That includes the realities of the organisation over which he presides.

The Secretary General might want to reflect on some unpleasant ground truths about the overly ambitious UN. He might, for example, take note that the outfit has not yet been able to devise a definition of "terrorism" which is politically acceptable to a plurality of the members. This despite years of jawing and yammering on the subject by a specially appointed commission.

As a next step, Ban might want to contemplate the reason for the failure to achieve even a small measure of consensus on defining terrorism. He might meditate on a couple of simple facts. The first of these is the nature of the UN. While the High Minded Lofty Thinking proponents of the "death of the nation-state" perspective might wish it otherwise, the UN is comprised of more than 190 sovereign, independent states. Each of these is guided in its foreign policy by its own understanding of national interest and the relation between foreign and domestic politics.

After getting a firm grip on that basement truth, the Secretary General might well profit from considering a key implication. Among the member states there are some which facilitate terrorism out of a sensitive regard for internal politics. There are others which sponsor or facilitate terrorism by non-state actors for purposes of foreign policy. Yet others have state agencies which, directly or indirectly, employ terror as an instrument of national power. Then there are states which cut deals with terrorist groups--leave us alone and we will overlook your plots against other states. Finally, there are those states which are the targets of terror.

If the well-intentioned Secretary General survives this first exercise in examining the actualities governing the UN's stance on terrorism, he can move on to the second round. There is absolutely no agreement among the majority of the UN's membership as to the correct strategy and tactics with which to counter terrorism.

There are those governments--and non-governmental organisations--which argue terrorism is caused by economic and political marginalisation. The proponents of this hypothesis (which is no way born out by the realities of terrorist backgrounds nor the political goals of terrorist groups) maintain that massive development programs will assuage the poverty which drives men to don suicide vests or hijack aircraft. Others argue that enhancing democracy or rendering governments more responsive will achieve the desired effect of ending terrorism by ending the motivations driving people to take desperate, suicidal (and homicidal) acts.

There are governments--and NGOs--which argue that only a severe alteration of American foreign policy will end the terrorist threat. The argument is a version of the hoary and long discredited defense in a rape case--"the victim made me do it." There may be some truth to the contention that an American abandonment of the Mideast (and other sections of the globe) and subsequent withdrawal into some sort of Fortress America would lessen the motivation for terrorism by giving the terrorists a global victory. But, considering the dynamics of world politics to say nothing of American domestic politics, this is scarcely a viable option.

Then there are those governments--and others--which argue that any military confrontation either with non-state terrorist actors or those states which sponsor, facilitate, or harbor them must be through the UN. As for that position it is only necessary to give cursory consideration to the UN's less than stellar record in peace imposition and peace keeping. Only twice in its history has the UN given its "blessing" to multilateral peace imposition efforts. Both of those involved unprovoked cross-border invasions.

A few voices have been raised in support of the utopian notion of the UN having its own armed force. In this way the Security Council would have a force immediately available without having to rely on the contributions of the member-states, most of which are military nullities lacking even the capacity to impose peace at a soccer riot. The question of where the troops and officers might be recruited is never addressed by the Lofty Thinkers espousing this position. Neither are the far from insignificant questions of equipment (including procurement), training, and basing. And, no thought is ever given to such problems as doctrine.

The High Minded who would like to see a UN force in being also overlook the difficulties of command and control. This means not simply the tactical problems associated with this critical area but, more importantly, the vexing questions of political goals, rules of engagement, and, even, how would command be vested considering the size and composition of the Security Council.

When--or, more properly, IF, the Secretary General and those others in the UN who share his view of the UN being "ideal" as the leader in countering terrorism can answer all--or any--of these real, live problems, then the US and others might take a good look at the potential the UN constitutes. But, for now, in the real world of real governments and real terrorists and real dead bodies, Ban ki-Moon must be ruled, Out To Lunch.