What Can We Snatch From The Jaws Of Defeat?

As has been posted before, the US set its feet firmly on the road to defeat in Afghanistan before the first bomb fell there. Driven by the dictates of idiotically irrelevant ideology, the neocon ninnies generally, and Donald Rumsfeld in particular, rejected the realistic option of a punitive expedition. Instead of doing what could be done--going in and killing as many al-Qaeda leaders and trigger pullers as possible along with their Taliban hosts, the (thankfully) outgoing administration sought the impossible dream of creating a modern nation-state complete with muti-party, secular, liberal democracy, an independent judiciary, and free market capitalism.

They might have well have hoisted a white flag as the first troops put their boots on the ground.

The incoming administration has repeatedly vowed to fight the good fight so that "the good war" might be won. To this end a significant escalation of US and (hopefully) other foreign forces is deemed necessary.

In recent weeks the much maligned Iraqi "surge" has been quoted as the prototype of what must be done to accomplish the goals in Afghanistan. Escalation may be necessary. But, the consequences may well not be the same as seen in Iraq.

The differences between Iraq and Afghanistan are often overlooked by those who see a surge equals victory equation. It is the differences which not only preclude any realistic expectation of "victory" but make even achieving the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing" difficult to achieve.

Iraq may have three nations uneasily coexisting within the confines of a single state, but that puts it far ahead of the more populous geographic expression called Afghanistan. The Afghan population has a long, long history of antipathy--usually expressed violently--between several antagonistic ethno-linguistic-cultural groups. Rarely have the mutual hatreds been overwhelmed by anything less than a major external threat.

That's the first major difference. Iraq is, comparatively speaking, far more coherent than Afghanistan--hard as that is to believe.

The second major difference is in the physical terrain. Afghanistan is a much harder place to wage a counterinsurgency than is Iraq. Take a look at a relief map. If you could flatten out Afghanistan it would be just about the largest country outside of Russia in the world. Of course, you can't flatten some of the roughest mountains on Earth, so you have to learn to, if not love them, at least fight in them.

Also related to terrain is the problem of logistic support. Iraq was easily supported by land from Kuwait and by sea to Kuwait. The road network in Iraq was complete and well laid out from a military perspective. The land lines of supply to Afghanistan are primarily through Pakistan. This road is long and easily interdicted. But, Pakistan is the way to go if the regional support is going to be by sea. The other options are worse, coming through the Central Asian republics. This route is very, very long and susceptible to political closure.

Then there is the small matter of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yes, Iraq has a common frontier with Iran and Iran is not a cheerleader for American success in Iraq. But, the problems of curtailing hostile traffic across the Iraqi border with Iran or with Syria were nothing compared with interdicting cross-border movement from the FATA to Afghanistan.

Compared with the FATA-Afghan border, the US had no problem sealing the borders of South Vietnam and its neighbors, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Pakistan may assist in slowing the movement of hostiles between FATA and Afghanistan, but that is a very, very thin reed on which to place our hope and trust for success.

Another key distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan is the nature of the society, economy, and polity which existed prior to the arrival of the Americans. The Iraqis were a complexly organised society with a long standing economic base and a tradition of self-government in living memory. One aspect of this was the existence of a military tradition and capacity into which the US could belatedly but successfully tap. None of these factors exist in Afghanistan.

Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has never been more than a geographic expression sporadically given some semblance of internal political cohesion by the presence of an outside threat and an indigenous strongman. It has no economic reason to exist as a coherent whole. It has no tradition of so doing. Neither does it possess a military tradition and capacity which can be developed quickly and effectively into a combination national army and "school for citizenship."

Of course, as recent events have made clear, the Afghan government and population exceed even the Iraqis in not wanting us there. Of not wanting to be occupied and uplifted.

All of these factors even more than the Taliban's access to oodles and gobs of money courtesy of opium production militate against any repeat of the Iraq experience.

Still, an escalation of US forces is necessary to assure the highest probability of achieving the minimum necessary strategic goal, that of not-losing. More troops can translate into gaining the initiative whereby the war could be carried to the enemy. This would have two important results.

The first is that our effective casualty rate would be lowered while that of the hostiles would be raised without inflicting higher collateral casualties on the civilian population. It is quite important that we kill more bad guys and fewer civilians. Preferably, we should kill no civilians at all. Leave that to the hostiles to do.

The second result of gaining the clear initiative would be to force Taliban et al to commit more attacks on the softest Afghan targets--the civilian population. By hitting the civilians more and by killing more non-combatants, Taliban would have the unintended result of compelling the Afghan people to look increasingly to both its own government (such as it is) and the outsiders for protection.

The escalation will not bring "victory" in Afghanistan any more than it did in Iraq. What escalation can do, if we are willing to take the time and accept the casualties, is to bring about an endgame where the hostiles cannot claim either military or a political success against us.