Failed And Failing States--And Violent Political Islam

There is a pair of diplomatic T. rex sized critters stomping around the room today.  As this nearly conjoined twin blunder about threatening to trash the international furniture, all the polite people in high places carefully avert their eyes and keep their mouths resolutely shut.

Virtually all hands studiously have ignored the reality presented by violent political Islam.  With the notable exception of former British prime minister Tony Blair there has been a veritable conspiracy of silence concerning not only the nature of the enemy of the civilized states but, more importantly, the success which has been enjoyed by the enemy over the past several years.  Instead of confronting the face of the enemy, rather than name the name of the guilty, the tired, hackneyed, long discredited tropes regarding poverty, political marginalization, the Israeli refusal to make a deal acceptable to the Palestinians, or American foreign policy generally are trotted out as if repetition could remake reality.

Even though the recent rumors of back channel talks between the Karzai government and elements of both Taliban and the Haqqani network give some hint that the military pressures are showing on the political will of the insurgents to continue, this straw in a favorable wind is more than offset by the many alarming (and that is not too strong a word) developments in Pakistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and other parts of the North Caucasus to say nothing of Yemen, Sudan, and Nigeria.  The bad outnumbers the faint good by an overwhelming amount.

Pakistan is lurching ever closer to either collapse or a co-option by the indigenous groups advocating violent political Islam.  Even though those Pakistanis who found from personal experience that living in the Islamic paradise promised by Taliban was far closer to hell on Earth than the heavenly reward have had ample time and opportunity to spread the word, the majority of the people are so fed up with the corruption and inefficiency of the government that the Islamist way seems the better one.  Coupled with a virulent anti-Americanism, which has been in no significant way lessened by the outpouring of US aid following the floods, this widespread public mood bodes poorly for the future stability of Pakistan.

Even a perfectly calibrated American policy which demonstrates the ideal mix of pressure and inducement will not change the underlying reality--most Pakistanis have come to see the US as being in demonic alliance with both India and Israel.  This unholy trinity constitutes the stuff of Pakistani nightmares--and has as little substance.  However, the power of the nightmare is great and real.  Thus the US and others in the small and beleaguered community of civilized states had best prepare for the eventuality of Pakistani state failure or the equally probable embrace by Islamabad of some variant of political Islam.  To do less is to court major disaster given the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan's possession.

This aspect of regional political context also demands a very hard look be taken at our current goals and plans in Afghanistan.  Bluntly, there is no hope of accomplishing more than further perturbation of armed political Islam espousing groups before changes in Pakistan render our presence in Afghanistan nugatory.  The best nightfall case we can now expect in Kabul is a regime which includes both Taliban and the Haqqani network.  This implies that the most we can hope for is a regime which will not provide support, sanctuary, or assistance to advocates of armed political Islam contemplating operations outside Afghanistan or the FATA of Pakistan.

The upcoming strategic review of the AfPak campaign will have little realistic alternative to that of reorienting to a goal of a coalition government in Kabul whose components are willing to forswear cooperating with groups such as al-Qaeda.  Ironically, this means we must "settle" for a goal and definition of victory which should have been in place when the first American boots hit the ground all those years, dollars, and dead bodies ago.  Had only we gone for the punitive expedition model in the first place, sigh.

Preparations for the Pakistani implosion should accompany the reframing of goals in Afghanistan.  It will be nearly impossible to assure that Pakistan does not become even more than it currently is the seedbed of plots against the West by violent political Islamists.  The most the US and others can hope to do successfully is pull Pakistan's nuclear fangs.  That along with finally turning off the great spigot of foreign aid will do much to lower the danger presented by Islamists emerging from the hospitable human and geographic terrain of that country.

Shifting from Northwest Asia, the unpleasant facts of failing states must be confronted.  There has been more than a little wringing of hands over the impending collapse of Yemen and what that would mean taken in conjunction with the mess called Somalia.  Yemen seems doomed to fail.  It is running out of its only cash crop--oil.  It is running out of water for its population burgeoning not only from indigenous increase but from the flow of refugees from Africa.  The government is so corrupt, so unbelievably inefficient, so riddled with cronyism, so laden with denial as to make the lads in Islamabad look like recipients of the Nobel Prize in good governance.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is not responsible for the current sorry state of affairs in Yemen.  It is not behind the two separate defensive insurgencies.  Nor is it an outside agitator stirring up discontent within the population.  Those honors belong to the government.  True, they are enhanced by the history and social construction of the Yemeni people.

However, AQAP can and is benefiting from the internal disorder created in largest measure by the government.  To the extent AQAP benefits, the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula as well as the civilized states generally will suffer.  This implies that the US has a dog in the fight.

The problem comes in that there is little, if anything, that the US and other outside powers can do about the root causes of insurgency or political disaffiliation within Yemen.  We can provide aid, military supplies, and training, intelligence support, but none of these will change the fundamental trajectory of Yemen.  Its failure is virtually certain so the most outsiders can hope for is the delay of the final collapse.

Time is a precious commodity since time is what is needed to build a diplomatic consensus about what the "international community" can do, if anything, regarding the challenge of failed states generally and those which harbor violent political Islam in particular.  Perhaps this will mean the nearly impossible task of reinventing the old "trusteeship" concept of the UN.  Perhaps it will mean an open ended international "peace keeping" presence oriented to suppressing advocates of violent political Islam--even though this will seem one more example of a "war on Islam."

The challenge of failed and failing states looms larger, much larger, when the dynamics of Sudan are considered.  The real deal is Sudan is poised on the brink of multi-party internal war.  The North-South divorce will not occur without bloodshed even if the vote goes off as scheduled and is cleaner than clean, attested to by Jimmy Carter.  The North is not going to let the cash cow of Southern oil get milked without Khartoum holding the pail.  And, the South will not twiddle its thumbs if Southerners living in the North are persecuted, which seems as likely as the Pope being against married priests.

Darfur is doomed to crank up again.  There are no alternatives.  The Khartoum regime isn't about to see the huge desert area drift away while it may have to watch the South go its separate way.  The residuum of hate left from the past conflict assures scores still must be settled in the one acceptable currency--dead bodies.

Africa's most populous state must be placed on the list of failing states.  The frontline of political Islam runs through the country.  The dynamics of the upcoming election are framed by the Muslim versus everyone else contest.  Much of the prevailing sentiment is anyone who is not Muslim is the enemy.  Given the record of what can be termed politely as "sectarian" violence, the election  is not going to settle the great divide which pits Nigerian against Nigerian.  The most active and influential group in the Muslim north is avowedly violent political Islam in its agenda and methods.

The last time Nigeria fell apart was over forty years ago.  The secessionist movement was defeated, but the time was long and the cost high.  While Nigeria recovered from that adventure in falling apart before it collapsed as a state, it was a near run thing.  Since then much has changed so that the probability of holding together this side of failure in the likely event of a Muslim generated internal war is low to nonexistent.

That's enough as the Geek is a sensitive sort of guy who can take only limited amounts of bad news.  The takeaway is self-evident though.  The enemy is violent political Islam.  The best friend of the enemy is the failed and failing state.  And, the time to get a grip on both is short.