One More War We Don't Want To Fight--And Won't

Over ten years ago, around the time of the embassy bombings, the Geek identified Yemen as a primary venue of threats directed against the US and the West by the purveyors of violent political Islam.  He went so far as to predict to his audience that Yemen would rival or surpass Pakistan as the Mother of all Islamist Threats.  He was, not surprisingly, pooh-poohed by the field grades and their civilian counterparts in attendance.

Then, and, even more now, Yemen is the perfect petri dish for breeding the bacillus of armed political Islam.  The reason is not simply that the fractured, desolate countryside is the homeland of Osama bin Laden, although that is a signal of the evil potential resident in the wadis, barren mountains, and scorching desert which constitutes the physical geography of Yemen.

Far more important than the physical makeup of Yemen is its human terrain.  In that area, the single most important consideration when assessing or countering threats from jihadist inclined Muslims, Yemen equals or surpasses Afghanistan, the FATA of Pakistan, and most other Muslim majority locations in exhibiting the features central to the flourishing growth of violent political Islam.

The context is the commonalities found when examining the heartlands of the assorted advocates of violent political Islam.  First, the fundamental social organizing locus above the family is the tribe.  Afghanistan, the FATA, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan are all tribal societies in which the concept of central government is elusive, has no claim on primary loyalties, and is held with the same fondness as a Tea Party member would see a tax hike.

In all the heartland areas, the hold of a central government is light at best and absent in the majority of cases.  Any central government presence is not only fragile and transient, it is viewed with great suspicion by the locals.  The most universal explanation for the lack of confidence in the central government given by residents in the several heartland areas is corruption.  This reason has much to recommend it as the several governments involved are corrupt.  Period.

In addition to pervasive corruption, the several governments are brothers in another critical way.  All are inefficient.  The universal inefficiency assures the central government will not have the slightest shred of functional legitimacy in the estimate of the locals.

The combination of corruption and gross inefficiency assures that whatever existential legitimacy the central government might have possessed has long since been eroded by the corrosive impact of repeated and highly frustrating experiences on the part of locals when dealing with representatives of the central regime.  There is no tradition, no history of viewing the central government as worthy of respect, loyalty, or obedience.

In none of the cited countries is there any set of even slightly compelling reasons for individuals to forsake tribal affiliations for one with the central regime.  Other than coercion, the government has no means by which to engage the locals.  Having no carrots, the regimes are left with only the stick.

Since pressure consolidates long before it fractures and the assorted governments have a record of being just as inefficient in repression as in all other aspects of governmental life, the result is a strengthening of anti-governmental attitudes and loyalties.  Insofar as the government attempts to coerce its way to authority, the result is a solidifying of resistance to it and an increase in the perceptions of illegitimacy.

Finally, there is the political incorrect need to underscore the role of religion.  In all of the several states mentioned, Islam of the most severe, austere form is prevalent.  Local clerics emphasize those aspects of the Muslim portmanteau of beliefs which authorize and even demand violent action be taken by believers against apostate rulers and infidels who support the apostates.  Some, but not necessarily all, of the local clerics also preach the need of ongoing, offensive violent operations against the infidels wherever and whenever they are found.

These factors, all of which are present in Yemen, are enhanced significantly when wealth is maldistributed.  This has been the case in-country with respect to the (now diminishing) oil revenues.  The money has gone in the main to those who are well connected, those who haul heavy freight with the government.  Very little has gone to any use visible to the general public--particularly that part which lives in the most remote, most desolate, most hard scrabble of the country's hinterlands.

Way back when the Geek issued his prediction on Yemen as well as today there are several features unique to the place.  All of these exacerbate greatly the impossibility of the central government suppressing the emerging advocates of violent political Islam.

Yemen is a artificial country.  It is not the end product of a long, organic process of social and political evolution.  More important than the period of British "colonial" presence was the overthrow of the ancient Houthi emirate a half century ago.  The instability of this action was in no way lessened by the division of Yemen into two sovereign states.  Nor were matters improved by the war which ensued, a war which was prolonged and made more bloody by the efforts of outside actors, most importantly Egypt.

The formalities of peace treaties and national consolidation were relatively easily accomplished during the Nineties.  But formalities do not reality make.  The reality remained what it had been during the years of division and war.  The North and South did not make an amicable family.  The supporters and descendants of the old Houthi regime were alive, well, and itching for a comeback.

The "international community" (whatever that might mean in this context) apparently decided that its involvement was no longer needed once the photo-op treaty signing and political reunification had come to an end.  The matter of making peace and reconciliation genuine was dropped onto the laps of the locals with the assumed benevolent(?) assistance of the House of Saud.

For a short while the pretense could be continued.  Even after al-Qaeda issued its declaration of war against the US, even (briefly) after the bombing of the USS Cole, the US and other Western states could afford to take a detached, somewhat bemused attitude regarding Yemen.  Later the focus on Afghanistan and Iraq assured Yemen was cast into the outer darkness of policy making concern.

For a long while even Saudi Arabia could afford the luxury of overlooking Yemen even though it was the largest, most inviting target of the armed political Islamists lurking in the bleak mountains on the border.  The government of Yemen was uncooperative in the common task of defeating the jihadists.  Moments of collaboration--the famed Predator strike stands out--were exceeded by years of obstructionism.

The relocation of the New Mexico born, US educated, English speaking cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, to Yemen made an already grave situation downright deadly as demonstrated by the failed "Underwear Bomber" and the tragically successful Fort Hood Shooter.  Al-Awlaki taken in conjunction with the announced formation of Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) changed the game radically.

Now Yemen equals or, perhaps, surpasses the FATA as the most important locus of anti-American, anti-Western violent political Islam.  Given that the government of Yemen has no effective control over the majority of the country and lacks the political base of support to expand its sway, the situation will only get worse.

The worsening of the Yemen Dilemma has been made crystalline with the air cargo bomb effort.  The Saudis proved their worth by giving the warning which allowed the attack to be prevented.  The precision of the heads-up assured that British and UAE security personnel were able to identify and neutralize the very carefully made and concealed bombs before they exploded probably far over the desolate wastes of the North Atlantic.  With this one action the Saudis have earned much of the aid and assistance provided them by the US.

The ground truth remains.  The prevention of one attack does not equal the abating of the threat behind the attack.  AQAP remains alive and well.  So does Anwar al-Awlaki.

The government of Yemen is no stronger, no more possessed of legitimacy in the eyes of most Yemeni now than it was the day before yesterday.  It is no more able or willing to take serious action against AQAP now than it was the day before yesterday.  And, get a grip on it, the US is no more in a position today than it was the day before yesterday to provide the degree and kind of aid which would assure the government of Yemen can and will destroy AQAP.

The long war in Iraq with its less than convincing success as well as the even longer and so far even less successful war in Afghanistan would have sapped American political will to engage in yet another war with a resolute, resilient, and elusive enemy even in the absence of the Great Recession and the economic constraints it has imposed.  The same applies to a greater degree with respect to the West generally.

This implies that even in the highly unlikely event the government of Yemen requested direct on the ground American presence that Washington would provide it.  The unnecessary war in Iraq combined with the unnecessarily protracted one in Afghanistan has left the US without either the will or the means to fight one more war.

Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia will step into the breech.  The House of Saud has more pressing problems ranging from its own homegrown jihadists to the looming nuclear threat of Iran.  The shrewd calculators of the Land of the Two Mosques will do very little in Yemen unless they are directly and very seriously attacked by AQAP.  Even then it is debatable that the Saudis can act decisively enough and over a long enough period of time to deal a mortal blow to AQAP.

The picture is as dismal as the landscape of Yemen itself.  Eventually AQAP will succeed.  We will get creamed one of these days unless the US and its partners have a run of intelligence good fortune never seen before in the real world.  Then we will respond even if the government of Yemen doesn't like the idea.

It would be far, far better if the US bites down on the cliched bullet and introduces itself into the conflict sooner rather than later.  It is still possible to do so in a reasonably low signature way and still have some good effect.  It will be necessary to program more UAVs and more Special Operations forces both civilian and military.

However, the situation is still such that organizational disruption is possible.  Any significant perturbation of AQAP's leadership--to say nothing of removing al-Awlaki from the board--would cripple AQAP severely.  At the least this would buy time for the Saana government to establish some shred of legitimacy among more of the population.  It would allow creative arm twisting on the Saudis to play a larger role in stabilizing the Peninsula.

If any action in the direction of preempting AQAP is to be made it will be up to the new Congress.  President Obama has shown himself far longer on words than effective deeds when facing "credible threats" to the US and its interests.

This implies the ball will come to rest in the Republican court--if current predictions prove out come Wednesday morning.  Then We the People will discover if today's Republican Party is more like Ronald Reagan--or Jimmy Carter.