Red Faces On Red Square

OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the red faces are not in Red Square but right nearby in the Kremlin.  The cause for the embarrassment is easy to discover.  Despite recent declarations of victory, the advocates and practitioners of violent political Islam are not only alive and well in Chechnya but eager to show their vitality.

As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve.  Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.

The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny.  They died, of course.  They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.

The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted.  The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year.  In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.

Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle.  This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated.  He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."

The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year.  But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.

For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties.  Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005.  In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period.  All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.

The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus.  Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency.  The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."

The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate.  While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic.  The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.

Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring.  The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance."  Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies.  While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat.  With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.

If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable.  The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings.  In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus.  Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.

The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics.  Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency.  The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation.  Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.

Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy.  Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets.  Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.

Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies.  Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition.  This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.

Back to the drawing board, Vladimir.  The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism.  The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior.  It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid.  So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.

In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin.  The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan.  The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.

Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley.  The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years.  Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.

The IUU has been around since 1991.  Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well.  Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports.  This make IUU a large and growing threat.

The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone.  The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents.  However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.

Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents.  Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division.  This unit shares responsibility for border security.  Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.

The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water.  Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.

Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region.  Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.

The US has a bull in this herd.  Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses.  The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan.  Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.

The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions.  More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere.  To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.

There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia.  The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran.  In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.

Don't you just love it?