Whether the Obama administration likes the idea or not (or is even aware of it) the US has a number of "special relationships." Three have been called into question recently. In no particular order of importance, or specialness, these are: The Granddaddy of 'em all: the UK--the most solid in terms of approval by We the People: Israel--and, the most quiet of relations: Canada.
The relationship between the US and the UK was no doubt harmed by the cavalier treatment extended to the Brits by Mr Obama. However that damage was low and self-limiting--the two countries need each other too much to stay in a snit over the sheer ineptitude of a president and some of his "team."
More recently the strong, historically rooted special relationship between the "Mother country" and "The Colonies" has been put in a greater degree of very real peril by the upcoming British review of defense requirements. Due to a ukase from the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence is under irresistible pressure to cut its budget somewhere between twenty and forty percent. This means simply that the British must view the threats to their security and global interests over the next ten years in terms of the severely constricted budgetary environment currently extant.
The last time HMG attempted to cut the size of the threats to meet the cloth of the Exchequer was during the Thirties. The Great Depression was real. So also was the looming threat of expansionist Nazism, Fascism, and Imperial Japan. The budget driven weakness of the British was a major, arguably, the major, reason forcing the appeasement of Munich and the later set of defeats for British forces around the world.
At that time the US was available (along with the invaded Soviet Union) to provide the necessary wherewithal to contain and ultimately defeat the three aggressors. That, as they say, is history.
The fallout from the Great Recession has combined with the spendthrift policies of New Labor governments to compel a period of austerity not seen since the grim, grey days following World War II. The need for fiscal prudence is self-evident. Not so self-evident is the need or safety of placing a great burden on the defense establishment.
Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have viewed the potential retrenchment (to be polite) of the British armed services with a fair degree of public alarm. So also have a number of British senior officers, both active duty and retired.
Stripped to its essentials, any British defense program which is predicated on cutting its active duty ground combat forces to something on the order of eighty thousand will have the effect of making the UK a military nullity in any joint operations approaching even pre-surge Afghanistan. That unfortunate realty, a reality which will see British deployable battalions at forty percent authorized strength, is not compensated for by the very high quality of British troops. General Petraeus was not simply being polite and politic when he praised the British operations in Afghanistan; he was being essentially accurate.
Weak battalions remain weak battalions even when the "few" are trigger pullers without equal. In planning operations, US decision makers must look at quantity as well as quality. The same is true for their colleagues in the UK when considering force projection missions even on the small scale of the one undertaken in Sierra Leone a few years back. If a contemplated mission requires X troops backed with Y capacities in artillery, logistics, engineering, air support, and so on, but you only have X- men or Y- capacities, the mission cannot be undertaken with any measure of certainty.
Complicating the situation is the very hard to understand position adopted by the Royal Navy. The Navy has two aircraft carriers authorized with one under construction presently. To assure gaining these two large and evidently competent ships, the Navy's senior command is willing to cut their total fleet of surface combatants to roughly twenty-five (about enough to assure adequate defense against air, missile, and submarine threats.) This would mean the Senior Service would have the same number of warships it did when Henry VIII was chopping off wives' heads. The complete scuttling of any amphibious warfare capacity would make the Royal Marines redundant--and make it deucedly tough to replicate the Sierra Leone operation let alone the successful retaking of the Falkland Islands. (The aging fleet of SSBN Trident carrying subs would be retained but on a scale which might render constant one boat deployment impossible.)
It is ironic that if the Navy gets its carrier, it will have to borrow some other country's aircraft to fly from it. But, the chatter surrounding the forthcoming review hints at a severe shrinking of the RAF. The famed "few" of seventy years ago will actually be constricted to an aircraft inventory not seen since 1913. This state of affairs calls into question the capacity of the RAF to support even a miniature expeditionary force.
Asymmetrical homeland threats might be countered in a cost effective way by creative use of the Territorial Forces, but any projection of force to the centers of threat would be well neigh onto impossible unless as part of a coalition. Of course it is difficult (but not impossible) to envision the British doing a go-it-alone. For the US as the most likely coalition partner, the question is what can the new, downsized British armed forces add to our efforts beyond diplomatic cover and concealment. More bluntly, is it worth the inevitable political complications of coalition warfare to add even a highly proficient but quite pint sized British component?
With that as context, the larger question demands consideration. If the British military capacity is of very limited diplomatic usage and almost nonexistent warfighting utility, what then exists as a basis for a special relationship? History is nice. So also is a legacy of shared values and norms. Ditto a more or less common language. But, when the vibram hits the road, the only thing that counts is the muscle behind the words of diplomacy.
In short, if the Incredible Shrinking British Military comes into existence, the US will have to (in the words of John Foster Dulles) undergo an "agonizing reappraisal" of our relation with the UK. This process will be driven by a primary consideration: The British will need us a lot more than we will need them. This will not be good for either us or them. The special relationship has benefited our global diplomacy in the past far more than a mere comparison of relative military strength might appear to merit. But, there is a point where one party's extreme weakness permanently alters the relation from one of equals to one of patron-client. The US-UK dyad may soon cross that point.
The special relationship between the US and Israel is often seen as one of patron-client where the client is in charge. No doubt it looks that way, particularly when the American president leans on the Israeli prime minister without useful result.
The important consideration when examining this particular special relationship is that its existence and parameters are not determined by the president or secretary of state. Nor are they determined and defined by congress. No indeed. The nature and extent of the relations between Israel and the US have been and are determined and defined by We the People. To an extent not equaled by any other state, We the People have decided that Israel merits unreserved support and assistance. While the precise percentage of support waxes and wanes over time, there has never been a withdrawing of the commitment made generations ago to the existence and flourishing of the Jewish state.
The government of Israel is perfectly well aware of this. After all, it was responsible in significant measure for the public relations efforts which have provided a great impetus for this support within We the People. When Ike blew the whistle on the Anglo-French-Israeli Sinai War in 1956, the reaction of Israel's government was to take action to preclude such an event in the future. There is nothing wrong nor reprehensible in a state pursuing its national interests through intensive and effective public relations, political actions, and lobbying.
The result is simply that Israel has the capacity to shrug off presidential coercion. It can ignore arm twisting and veiled threats with impunity. And has.
Unless and until the Israeli reputation within We the People can be changed or attenuated, the special relation will continue as presidents come and go.
To the north of us is a big country. It contains people who are very nice, very concerned, people who are quite proud that their country has long been an excellent global citizen. Beyond that, Canada has been an ally of the US in quite a few wars including the one in Afghanistan. Because of shared norms, values, and understandings of life, the Canadian government has usually been on the same side of the voting in the UN as the US.
Canada wanted very much to hold a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. It has already occupied one of the rotating seats six times. The government mounted a long and hard fought campaign to gain one of the two seats reserved under the UN's geographical apportionment system for European and other Western countries. It lost.
Despite having 135 written and 15 verbal commitments of support, Canada trailed Germany and Portugal so that, humiliatingly, it dropped out of the contest. Various explanations for the defeat have been advanced up in the Great White North. Among them are: Canada alienated Muslim countries by supporting the US and Israel; the US did not go to bat for the Canadians.
Not surprisingly these explanations have come with demands that Canada rethink its foreign policies with a view to putting more blue sky between it and the Colossus of the South. While the Canadians are nice, very civilized people, they are also dedicated nationalists. There is resentment of the US--its domination of the Canadian economy, the appeal of American television, and other matters of even less consequential but quite irritating sort.
With that as context and considering that the US delegation to the UN did not make any real, evident effort to support Canada's bid, it would not be surprising if the Canadian government did not become more "independent" in its conduct of foreign relations. This will not imply something as radical as the Canadians suddenly supporting the Islamist demands for an ending of free speech on religious matters, but it could indicate a set of subtle and eventually harmful lessening of Canadian understanding on a raft of issues including the growing matter of Arctic sovereignty.
The US and Canada have had more than a few down points in their mutual history--such as our two invasions of the country two and more centuries ago. But, we share more than a common and still unfortified border, so any unnecessary daylight between us in foreign relations would be more than simply regrettable. They would be mutually injurious.
We and the Canadians are joined hip and shoulder. Far more than economics dictates this sometimes uncomfortable truth. While not talked about as such, our relationship with Canada is uniquely special. However, the contemporary dynamic is such that we must not take it for granted. We would be well advised to undertake actions which will reassure the Canadians that we value them greatly. This will require more than honeyed words and soothing mood music. It will demand actions. Perhaps the time is on us to have a more accommodating view of Canadian ambitions in the Arctic or environmental matters.
Special relations exist. But each is different in its dynamics and requirements for nurture. With the UK, we must quietly but firmly insist that the British armed forces remain credible. With Israel it must be acknowledged that presidents do not define the relationship. For the Canadians it is necessary that we listen effectively and treat with respect.
But, the Obama administration is tone deaf. So we shouldn't hold our collective breath.
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