The current administration clearly can't get a grip on the difference between feces and shoe polish. This unpleasant fact is singularly true regarding what countries are allies in the current fight with Islamists/Jihadists.
Yemen is the current poster child for the current administration's lost-in-space view of what constitutes an ally.
Two days ago, the Commander Guy was reported in the Yemen Times to have sent a message via his Special Assistant for Internal Security and Combating Terrorism, Francis Townsend. The message was purported to congratulate the Yemeni government for "it's success in combating terrorism." See, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1097&p=front&a=1.
The message also contained promises to continue US aid for Yemeni projects in economic development, education, security and military assistance, and "fighting against terrorism." This hearty expression of praise and aid came in the context of a meeting between Yemeni and American counter-terrorism wallahs.
At the meeting one Mohammed Salah, who is the capo-in-chief of the Central Security Forces, said Yemen stood ready (and, maybe, perhaps, kind of willing and able) to "provide assistance and expertise" in the area of counter-terrorism.
Yeah. Right. And, just what sort of "expertise?" What kind of "assistance?"
Jamal al-Badawi, the man convicted in a Yemeni court for having been the chief planner of the bombing of the USS Cole, had turned himself in to Yemeni authorities a week before this love fest of mutual assistance. He had apparently become tired and bored with life as a fugitive after his second successful jail break.
There is no doubt but al-Badawi is a genuine, bottled-in-bond, triple x, super-refined, Grade A Jihadist. He is a serious blackhat. Always has been. In all probability, he always will be.
The "expert" Yemenis cut him loose only two days after Special Assistant Townsend delivered the Commander Guy's kissy-kissy communication.
The experienced and expert Yemeni government isn't saying why they cut the man loose from the horrors of life in the slam. They aren't really confirming or denying whether al-Badawi is under some sort of house arrest. The most this trusted ally in the counter-terrorism arena will say is that al-Badawi has renounced terrorism and really, really promised to be a very, very nice guy in the future.
Al-Badawi himself isn't talking in public. He is reported to be entertaining guests in his house in Aden. Probably regaling them with tales of his exciting life in the desert living with the Tribal types who kept him safe until working out a deal with the expert counter-terrorists in the Yemeni government. (Of course, he might be working on his next little bomb-in-the-boat caper.)
If the Yemenis aren't saying much, their silence is more than compensated for by the screeches from the campaign trail and the howls from the Justice Department.
There is a five megabuck price on Jamal al-Badawi's head. He's on the Feeb's Ten Most Wanted List. There is a lengthy indictment waiting for him in the US. With this as a backdrop, Rudi Giuliani demanded a halt to all aid to Yemen until al-Badawi is rearrested.
Wow! That's telling 'em, Rudy.
What is the US going to do if the Yemeni regime does not respond appropriately to either the statement of "extreme displeasure" delivered by our Ambassador or even an aid cut off?
You gotta remember that the Yemenis are great believers in hospitality, just like the Afghans back in 2002. You also have to remember that al-Badawi has reportedly sworn loyalty to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Loyalty can be--and usually is in tribally based Islamic societies--a two way street.
Now, get a grip on this.
Yemen, no more than Saudi Arabia, is an ally of the US in the confrontation between Islamism and the West. That was obvious in the aftermath of the attack on the USS Cole. Yemeni officials, those experienced and expert on regional counter-terrorism, were notably uncooperative with the FBI and other American investigative or intelligence agencies. Nothing substantial has changed since then.
"How come?" You ask.
Yemen, not unlike Afghanistan, is not really a nation-state as that is understood in the West, or most of the world. It is a geographic expression, which came into its present incarnation back in 1990 when the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen stopped its festering multi-decade war with North Yemen. Its current boundary with Saudi Arabia was fixed only seven years ago.
Its population is young (median age is slightly less than seventeen). Its land is mostly barren, short on water. Yemen is one of the poorest, if not the poorest country in the Arab world, with a per person GDP of roughly $1,000 last year. Wahhabism is the predominant brand of Islam practiced.
In short, the government lacks stability. The population can and has turned restive (to put it politely) when its all too easily perturbed emotional balance is tipped in the slightest.
Al-Badawi is a popular hero to many of the young Yemeni dudes without a real hope of a genuine future and a past deeply rooted in tribalism, Wahhabism, and violence.
Making sense now, isn't it?
Even if the Yemeni government wanted for reasons of its own to cooperate fully with the US not only with regard to al-Badawi's future but the whole spectrum of counter-terrorism issues, it could not. Not without slitting its own throat.
The Commander Guy should have known all of the above (and probably did) before sending the unrealistically fulsome message to the Yemeni government. Not unlike the ambiguous message delivered to Saddam Hussein by our new Ambassador in 1990, the recipient probably concluded that it had a free hand in dealing with al-Badawi. With (unseemly) haste, the Yemeni leadership honored its agreement with the tribal elders and cut the convicted terrorist loose.
To repeat the key question: Now what are we Americans going to do if the Saana regime doesn't rearrest al-Badawi and deliver him to our justice system?
The last time the US faced this type of problem we resolved it by invading. More than five years later the object of that combination of SWAT raid and regime change is still free, making audio tapes by the bushel, and we are still slogging up hill trying to create a nation-state in Afghanistan.
Is this an option now? The Commander Guy and his neocon ninny brigade better scratch their heads long and hard.
Saturday, October 27, 2007
Friday, October 26, 2007
Thinking The Unthinkable--Speaking the Unspeakable
The Geek has an admission. Norman Podhoeritz scares the pippin, doublet, and hose off of him. The seventy-seven year old granddad of the neocon ninnies of the current administration as well as the hyper-hawks surrounding Rudy Giuliani is in full chest-beating, testosterone fury over Iran.
According to the UK's Telegraph on-line, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/27/wbomb127.xml, Podhoeritz "thinks the unthinkable and speaks the unspeakable." That's sure nice. And, to some extent useful.
Of course the neocon clan elder is far from the only person to do just that. Years ago, Herman Khan, the founder of the Hudson Institute, wrote and spoke at length about nuclear war. He even titled a book, Thinking the Unthinkable. It gave the few folks who read it the shivers--and reasons to think harder and better about the taboo-in-polite-circles topic of nuclear war and the potential reality of mutually assured destruction.
In a very small way, the Geek has done the same in past years, challenging policy makers and executors alike to realise just how easy it is not to win in counterinsurgencies and akin stability operations. Like the (un)jolly fatman of the Hudson Institute, the Geek's goal was to get people to think deeper and better about the unique nature of a particular type of war.
That goal, it appears to the Geek, is not uppermost in Podhoeritz' mind--if it exists at any level there.
At some point decades ago, Mr Podhoeritz had an epiphany concerning his opposition to the Vietnam War which resulted in a lucidly argued mea culpa that still resides on the Geek's bookshelves. From that moment on, the gentleman under consideration became a neo-conservative. One of the most warlike coloration.
Therein lies the tragedy.
Mr Podhoeritz became one of those whom Eric Hoffer described more than fifty years ago with startling and fear-provoking clarity. The True Believer.
True Believers are very dangerous people. History shows that. So do recent events. Osama bin Laden is a True Believer. So were those who flew the passenger filled cruise missiles into the Pentagon and Twin Towers.
True Believers search for any facts, the slightest hint of a factoid even, which seem to support their belief and its expressions. All else is disregarded as heresy at best, counterfactual at worst.
As a result Mr Podhoeritz places an emphasis, an emphasis beyond all rational calculation, upon the necessity to execute massive air attacks using both manned and unmanned platforms upon Iranian targets. While Mr Podhoeritz might be willing to settle for striking the nuclear facilities, the Geek is convinced that his real desire is the complete obliteration of Iran as a functioning polity, economy, and society.
Mr Podhoeritz blithely assumes that the strikes could be delivered quickly, without any warning, and would be effective. He is probably correct in the first two portions of his assumption.
The further consequences of the action apparently are of no interest to him. Yet it is precisely in these that the dangers for us and the rest of the world exist.
As Iraq, Afghanistan, and a host of previous wars show clearly, Clausewitz was right: No plan survives first contact with the enemy.
In his carefree attitude to the "day after" Mr Podhoeritz is one with the neocon ninnies who gave no realistic thought to what would happen after we deposed Saddam in Iraq or Sheik Omar in Afghanistan. In this fantasyland approach to war planning and fighting, Mr Podhoeritz, Vice-President Cheney, former SecDef Rumsfeld, and the deep thinking crew in the Pentagon almost equal the brain dead Adolph Hitler with his totally unnecessary and utterly counterproductive declaration of war on the US in December 1941.
The True Believer world view of Mr Podhoeritz and his ilk as well as their demonstrated influence in the current administration is what has increasingly alienated, not to say scared the hell out of, the European governments who initially took our part in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. They are what has given rise to the increasingly oppositional posture of Vladimir Putin and the mandarinate in China.
By now even the Israeli government and public ought to be getting nervous over the impact of the Podhoeritz type True Believers. In the (hopefully remote) eventuality that the US gives reality to Mr Podhoeritz's unthinkable thoughts and unspeakable words, Israel will be in the impact zone. There is no way that any conceivable US air campaign will so defang or so demoralize the Iranian regime and those of similar mind that there will be no response.
The response is (quite) likely to make 9/11 and its aftermaths look like a flower power gathering out of the Sixties. The full menu of options available to the survivors in Tehran is extensive.
Mr Podhoeritz has written of Islamofacism and the World War IV between the Islamists and the West. The Geek found some merit in some of the man's arguments.
Call it World War IV or the Second Cold War, it doesn't matter. But, a firm grip must be kept on the fundamental reality that Cold Wars are not won by air strikes. They are won by a firm line, backed by the willingness to use minimal appropriate force for narrowly conceived goals over time. They are won not by bluster and bombs but by political will maintained over generations if need be.
Mr Podhoeritz, try thinking about this unthinkable. Cold Wars are won by outlasting the enemy, by outlasting his political will, by showing over time that the world view he espouses is inferior to yours. We won the last cold war this way. We won by allowing him to lose faith in his god.
That may not be emotionally satisfying to a True Believer. It is however intellectually warming to a realpolitiker.
According to the UK's Telegraph on-line, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/27/wbomb127.xml, Podhoeritz "thinks the unthinkable and speaks the unspeakable." That's sure nice. And, to some extent useful.
Of course the neocon clan elder is far from the only person to do just that. Years ago, Herman Khan, the founder of the Hudson Institute, wrote and spoke at length about nuclear war. He even titled a book, Thinking the Unthinkable. It gave the few folks who read it the shivers--and reasons to think harder and better about the taboo-in-polite-circles topic of nuclear war and the potential reality of mutually assured destruction.
In a very small way, the Geek has done the same in past years, challenging policy makers and executors alike to realise just how easy it is not to win in counterinsurgencies and akin stability operations. Like the (un)jolly fatman of the Hudson Institute, the Geek's goal was to get people to think deeper and better about the unique nature of a particular type of war.
That goal, it appears to the Geek, is not uppermost in Podhoeritz' mind--if it exists at any level there.
At some point decades ago, Mr Podhoeritz had an epiphany concerning his opposition to the Vietnam War which resulted in a lucidly argued mea culpa that still resides on the Geek's bookshelves. From that moment on, the gentleman under consideration became a neo-conservative. One of the most warlike coloration.
Therein lies the tragedy.
Mr Podhoeritz became one of those whom Eric Hoffer described more than fifty years ago with startling and fear-provoking clarity. The True Believer.
True Believers are very dangerous people. History shows that. So do recent events. Osama bin Laden is a True Believer. So were those who flew the passenger filled cruise missiles into the Pentagon and Twin Towers.
True Believers search for any facts, the slightest hint of a factoid even, which seem to support their belief and its expressions. All else is disregarded as heresy at best, counterfactual at worst.
As a result Mr Podhoeritz places an emphasis, an emphasis beyond all rational calculation, upon the necessity to execute massive air attacks using both manned and unmanned platforms upon Iranian targets. While Mr Podhoeritz might be willing to settle for striking the nuclear facilities, the Geek is convinced that his real desire is the complete obliteration of Iran as a functioning polity, economy, and society.
Mr Podhoeritz blithely assumes that the strikes could be delivered quickly, without any warning, and would be effective. He is probably correct in the first two portions of his assumption.
The further consequences of the action apparently are of no interest to him. Yet it is precisely in these that the dangers for us and the rest of the world exist.
As Iraq, Afghanistan, and a host of previous wars show clearly, Clausewitz was right: No plan survives first contact with the enemy.
In his carefree attitude to the "day after" Mr Podhoeritz is one with the neocon ninnies who gave no realistic thought to what would happen after we deposed Saddam in Iraq or Sheik Omar in Afghanistan. In this fantasyland approach to war planning and fighting, Mr Podhoeritz, Vice-President Cheney, former SecDef Rumsfeld, and the deep thinking crew in the Pentagon almost equal the brain dead Adolph Hitler with his totally unnecessary and utterly counterproductive declaration of war on the US in December 1941.
The True Believer world view of Mr Podhoeritz and his ilk as well as their demonstrated influence in the current administration is what has increasingly alienated, not to say scared the hell out of, the European governments who initially took our part in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. They are what has given rise to the increasingly oppositional posture of Vladimir Putin and the mandarinate in China.
By now even the Israeli government and public ought to be getting nervous over the impact of the Podhoeritz type True Believers. In the (hopefully remote) eventuality that the US gives reality to Mr Podhoeritz's unthinkable thoughts and unspeakable words, Israel will be in the impact zone. There is no way that any conceivable US air campaign will so defang or so demoralize the Iranian regime and those of similar mind that there will be no response.
The response is (quite) likely to make 9/11 and its aftermaths look like a flower power gathering out of the Sixties. The full menu of options available to the survivors in Tehran is extensive.
Mr Podhoeritz has written of Islamofacism and the World War IV between the Islamists and the West. The Geek found some merit in some of the man's arguments.
Call it World War IV or the Second Cold War, it doesn't matter. But, a firm grip must be kept on the fundamental reality that Cold Wars are not won by air strikes. They are won by a firm line, backed by the willingness to use minimal appropriate force for narrowly conceived goals over time. They are won not by bluster and bombs but by political will maintained over generations if need be.
Mr Podhoeritz, try thinking about this unthinkable. Cold Wars are won by outlasting the enemy, by outlasting his political will, by showing over time that the world view he espouses is inferior to yours. We won the last cold war this way. We won by allowing him to lose faith in his god.
That may not be emotionally satisfying to a True Believer. It is however intellectually warming to a realpolitiker.
Get Real, Putin!
Vladimir Putin and the Geek share one factor. We were both alive during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which peaked a couple days shy of forty-five years ago.
Mr Putin and the Geek differ in one important factor. The Geek is a historian. Putin distorts history--even worse than does our Commander Guy.
President Putin had the sheer unmitigated gall to compare the proposed basing of US anti-missiles in Poland with supporting target acquisition radars in the Czech Republic with the Soviet action of deploying offensive medium and intermediary missiles in Cuba.
It has been a long while since a supposedly responsible world figure has reversed the reality of an historical event that much. Compared to the brazen effrontery of Putin's wretched warping of the past, the Commander Guy's misinterpretations of the Vietnam War are minor errors.
Let's go to the videotape.
Back in 1962 the Soviet Union without any prior warnings, discussion, or threats attempted the secret basing of offensive, nuclear capable missiles in Cuba along with supporting defensive systems including a reinforced brigade of combat troops. Our intelligence wallahs caught them at it.
The crisis grew rapidly. The US went public early on with overhead imagery displayed at the UN. The Soviets blustered, noting that the US had based intermediate range missiles in Turkey right on the Soviet border.
As matters escalated, the Kennedy Administration finally fixed on a naval blockade (euphemistically called a "quarantine") around Cuba. As the first missile laden Soviet freighters approached the blockade, breaths were held on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
Not to overstate the case, the world came within a hairbreadth of nuclear war. Never before and never since the last week of October 1962 has the unthinkable come so close to happening.
The crisis resolved quickly. The Soviets backed down. The missiles went back home. The US promised not to invade Cuba and went ahead with the already programmed removal of the Jupiter C missiles from Turkey and elsewhere in Europe. The Kremlin quietly kept its combat brigade in Cuba (where it was suddenly "rediscovered" in a blare of hype during the Reagan Administration.)
OK, keep that synopsis in mind as we look at the US ABM initiative in Central Europe.
Quite awhile back, the current administration announced its plan to base a small (ten fire units) anti-ballistic missile force in Poland with supporting radar in the Czech Republic. The purpose of the new installations was to defend Europe against any intermediate range missile threat coming from Northwest Asia, which meant Iran.
The announcement as well as the lengthy negotiations with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia have been in the open and very well publicised. The Russian love affair with the word nyet has been demonstrated all along.
The US has made numerous attempts to assuage Russian anxieties about the installation. In recent weeks the Americans have even taken the necessary step of treating Russia like the Great Power it believes it is regarding the proposed ABM basing. Most recently SecDef Gates has stated that the facilities will not be "activated" until the Iranians demonstrate a credible threat.
A uniformed stooge in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces blew that offer off.
SecDef Gates has also suggested that, subject to Czech approval, Russian experts can be stationed at the radar site to assure that it is not directed against any Russian trajectories of attack. That was dubbed "interesting" by the Kremlin.
So, you tell the Geek something.
Where is the historical analogy Putin thinks exists between the now in Central Europe and the then in the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Or, is the Russian President pursuing some other objective?
That's quite likely. The Russians are unhappy with the Cold War vintage Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. Only the US and Russia (and other successor states of the Soviet Union) are bound by it. Other countries, some of which might present a credible threat at some future date including Israel, India, Iran, Pakistan, Peoples Republic of China, Japan, South Korea are not.
Here's a question for you, Mr Putin.
If that is the real motive behind your preposterous line, why not just put it forward? Why not take the lead in demanding a multi-party negotiation on the subject including not just the US and European countries but all others within 1500 nautical miles range of Russian borders?
Or, Vladimir, were you taking lessons from Tehran's Orator-in-Chief during your recent trip there?
Mr Putin and the Geek differ in one important factor. The Geek is a historian. Putin distorts history--even worse than does our Commander Guy.
President Putin had the sheer unmitigated gall to compare the proposed basing of US anti-missiles in Poland with supporting target acquisition radars in the Czech Republic with the Soviet action of deploying offensive medium and intermediary missiles in Cuba.
It has been a long while since a supposedly responsible world figure has reversed the reality of an historical event that much. Compared to the brazen effrontery of Putin's wretched warping of the past, the Commander Guy's misinterpretations of the Vietnam War are minor errors.
Let's go to the videotape.
Back in 1962 the Soviet Union without any prior warnings, discussion, or threats attempted the secret basing of offensive, nuclear capable missiles in Cuba along with supporting defensive systems including a reinforced brigade of combat troops. Our intelligence wallahs caught them at it.
The crisis grew rapidly. The US went public early on with overhead imagery displayed at the UN. The Soviets blustered, noting that the US had based intermediate range missiles in Turkey right on the Soviet border.
As matters escalated, the Kennedy Administration finally fixed on a naval blockade (euphemistically called a "quarantine") around Cuba. As the first missile laden Soviet freighters approached the blockade, breaths were held on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
Not to overstate the case, the world came within a hairbreadth of nuclear war. Never before and never since the last week of October 1962 has the unthinkable come so close to happening.
The crisis resolved quickly. The Soviets backed down. The missiles went back home. The US promised not to invade Cuba and went ahead with the already programmed removal of the Jupiter C missiles from Turkey and elsewhere in Europe. The Kremlin quietly kept its combat brigade in Cuba (where it was suddenly "rediscovered" in a blare of hype during the Reagan Administration.)
OK, keep that synopsis in mind as we look at the US ABM initiative in Central Europe.
Quite awhile back, the current administration announced its plan to base a small (ten fire units) anti-ballistic missile force in Poland with supporting radar in the Czech Republic. The purpose of the new installations was to defend Europe against any intermediate range missile threat coming from Northwest Asia, which meant Iran.
The announcement as well as the lengthy negotiations with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia have been in the open and very well publicised. The Russian love affair with the word nyet has been demonstrated all along.
The US has made numerous attempts to assuage Russian anxieties about the installation. In recent weeks the Americans have even taken the necessary step of treating Russia like the Great Power it believes it is regarding the proposed ABM basing. Most recently SecDef Gates has stated that the facilities will not be "activated" until the Iranians demonstrate a credible threat.
A uniformed stooge in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces blew that offer off.
SecDef Gates has also suggested that, subject to Czech approval, Russian experts can be stationed at the radar site to assure that it is not directed against any Russian trajectories of attack. That was dubbed "interesting" by the Kremlin.
So, you tell the Geek something.
Where is the historical analogy Putin thinks exists between the now in Central Europe and the then in the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Or, is the Russian President pursuing some other objective?
That's quite likely. The Russians are unhappy with the Cold War vintage Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. Only the US and Russia (and other successor states of the Soviet Union) are bound by it. Other countries, some of which might present a credible threat at some future date including Israel, India, Iran, Pakistan, Peoples Republic of China, Japan, South Korea are not.
Here's a question for you, Mr Putin.
If that is the real motive behind your preposterous line, why not just put it forward? Why not take the lead in demanding a multi-party negotiation on the subject including not just the US and European countries but all others within 1500 nautical miles range of Russian borders?
Or, Vladimir, were you taking lessons from Tehran's Orator-in-Chief during your recent trip there?
Thursday, October 25, 2007
Watch Out For The Gang Of Three
Yesterday India, China, and Russia made a joint announcement. The foreign ministers of all three countries jointly called for a "more just and rational" world order.
Let us all applaud the idea. It does sound so nice. Kind of like the Commander Guy's statement way back when--way back before Adventures in Regime Change and The Global War On Terrorism--that the US would lead with "humility."
Yeah. Right.
The three foreign ministers hurriedly added that the declaration was not "aimed at any country."
Yeah. Right. Sure it's not.
But, you gotta love the platitudes in which the not-so-veiled attack on American "hegemony" was couched. India's Pranab Mukherjee, China's Yang Jiechi, and Sergei Lavrov of Russia "emphasized that they would continue to promote democratization of international relations and evolution of a more just and rational international order."
The joint statement went on to assert that ties between the three nations would be, "beneficial to the process of global multi-polarity."
That doesn't sound nearly so peace, love and flower-power, does it?
Now, let's cut to the chase.
Russia wants the US as a plausible external threat. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is immediate and future oriented. The other is historical and also future oriented.
"Give it over, Geek!" You demand.
OK. The immediate reason first. Russia is after influence over its "near abroad." Casting the US and, by implication, NATO, in the role of villain helps this with the Caspian Sea states including Iran.
The historical reason extends from today back through the Commissars to the Czars. Russia needs the justification of external threat to assure acceptance of an authoritarian regime. Vladimir Putin has shown great skill in acquiring centralised power. His future ambitions in Russian politics is obscure as to details but quite obviously ambitious in form.
(Think Power Behind The Throne if not on the throne.)
The Geek won't use soft words about the Peoples' Republic of China. The PRC is hostile to the US. It has near term goals such as re-acquiring Taiwan which run counter to American policy. It is afraid (with reason) that the US might extend anti-missile technology to Taiwan, perhaps by way of Japan or South Korea.
Longer range, PRC has at least regional hegemonic ambitions. To achieve this, the authority and influence of the US must be reduced. American freedom of action must be limited.
"But," you protest, "the Chinese have worked with us in North Korea."
Sure they have. It was in their national interest to do so. Just as it was in Russia's, Japan's, and South Korea's.
Ask yourself, just who would want a nuclear equipped rogue regime next door?
India has been anti-American almost since Day One. Much of the reason stems from US support for Pakistan. The validity and utility of this tilt to Pakistan is open to debate as is Indian motivation for our tilt.
Still, the fundamental orientation of key segments of the Indian politically articulate population is anti-US. That won't change just because India has been enjoying profound economic success recently in large measure because of sales of Indian products to US markets.
Some Americans might believe that a multi-polar world is almost as good as a unified global government. History shows the contrary. Whenever there has been a multi-polar environment, as in the 1930's, the arrangement has been both inherently unstable and risky.
A bi-polar world such as that which existed during most of the Nineteenth Century and the Cold War period after 1945 may seem risky but is inherently stable. That was particularly true during the Cold War. The potential of nuclear destruction limited the ambitions of both sides. It induced caution (particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when fingers on both the hither and further sides of the Iron Curtain came ever-so-close to the Big Button.)
India's ForMin stated to the press that his country would never participate with the US in a ballistic missile defense system as if that was a guarantee of India's peaceful intentions and inherent security. It may be symbolic of the first although the Pakistanis might be forgiven for not believing so. It is not a symbol of the second.
Arguably, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction worked during the Cold War. We're all still here. This historical reality might not hold true in the multi-polar world, particularly considering that nuclear arms have already spread beyond the first (and second) nuclear club.
Missile defense is as George H.W. Bush used to say, "prudent." A limited system helps deter and defend against either a small scale attack by a country with few delivery systems. It also protects against the straggle strike launched by the recipient of a first strike.
China and India have neighbors with a nuclear capacity. These two countries have had their clashes in the past. Recent past and distant past. These two massively overpopulated countries might find themselves at daggers drawn again--in the not too distant future.
What about the uni-polar alternative?
There is only limited historical experience with a truly unipolar world. The handful of years between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the present time. The experience has been, at best, mixed.
Suffice it to say that had the current administration acted consistently in tune with the word uttered by the Commander Guy, "humility," the Gang of Three might not be so motivated to cut us down to size. The trouble with history is that there is no way to rewind the tape and try again.
The next administration will have a major decision right out of the box. Are the best interests of the US well served by the emergence of a multi-polar world with all of its inherent instabilities and attendant risks? If not, then, how can the best days of a uni-polar world order be retrieved from the trash heap into which the neocon ninnies of the current administration heaved them?
Let us all applaud the idea. It does sound so nice. Kind of like the Commander Guy's statement way back when--way back before Adventures in Regime Change and The Global War On Terrorism--that the US would lead with "humility."
Yeah. Right.
The three foreign ministers hurriedly added that the declaration was not "aimed at any country."
Yeah. Right. Sure it's not.
But, you gotta love the platitudes in which the not-so-veiled attack on American "hegemony" was couched. India's Pranab Mukherjee, China's Yang Jiechi, and Sergei Lavrov of Russia "emphasized that they would continue to promote democratization of international relations and evolution of a more just and rational international order."
The joint statement went on to assert that ties between the three nations would be, "beneficial to the process of global multi-polarity."
That doesn't sound nearly so peace, love and flower-power, does it?
Now, let's cut to the chase.
Russia wants the US as a plausible external threat. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is immediate and future oriented. The other is historical and also future oriented.
"Give it over, Geek!" You demand.
OK. The immediate reason first. Russia is after influence over its "near abroad." Casting the US and, by implication, NATO, in the role of villain helps this with the Caspian Sea states including Iran.
The historical reason extends from today back through the Commissars to the Czars. Russia needs the justification of external threat to assure acceptance of an authoritarian regime. Vladimir Putin has shown great skill in acquiring centralised power. His future ambitions in Russian politics is obscure as to details but quite obviously ambitious in form.
(Think Power Behind The Throne if not on the throne.)
The Geek won't use soft words about the Peoples' Republic of China. The PRC is hostile to the US. It has near term goals such as re-acquiring Taiwan which run counter to American policy. It is afraid (with reason) that the US might extend anti-missile technology to Taiwan, perhaps by way of Japan or South Korea.
Longer range, PRC has at least regional hegemonic ambitions. To achieve this, the authority and influence of the US must be reduced. American freedom of action must be limited.
"But," you protest, "the Chinese have worked with us in North Korea."
Sure they have. It was in their national interest to do so. Just as it was in Russia's, Japan's, and South Korea's.
Ask yourself, just who would want a nuclear equipped rogue regime next door?
India has been anti-American almost since Day One. Much of the reason stems from US support for Pakistan. The validity and utility of this tilt to Pakistan is open to debate as is Indian motivation for our tilt.
Still, the fundamental orientation of key segments of the Indian politically articulate population is anti-US. That won't change just because India has been enjoying profound economic success recently in large measure because of sales of Indian products to US markets.
Some Americans might believe that a multi-polar world is almost as good as a unified global government. History shows the contrary. Whenever there has been a multi-polar environment, as in the 1930's, the arrangement has been both inherently unstable and risky.
A bi-polar world such as that which existed during most of the Nineteenth Century and the Cold War period after 1945 may seem risky but is inherently stable. That was particularly true during the Cold War. The potential of nuclear destruction limited the ambitions of both sides. It induced caution (particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when fingers on both the hither and further sides of the Iron Curtain came ever-so-close to the Big Button.)
India's ForMin stated to the press that his country would never participate with the US in a ballistic missile defense system as if that was a guarantee of India's peaceful intentions and inherent security. It may be symbolic of the first although the Pakistanis might be forgiven for not believing so. It is not a symbol of the second.
Arguably, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction worked during the Cold War. We're all still here. This historical reality might not hold true in the multi-polar world, particularly considering that nuclear arms have already spread beyond the first (and second) nuclear club.
Missile defense is as George H.W. Bush used to say, "prudent." A limited system helps deter and defend against either a small scale attack by a country with few delivery systems. It also protects against the straggle strike launched by the recipient of a first strike.
China and India have neighbors with a nuclear capacity. These two countries have had their clashes in the past. Recent past and distant past. These two massively overpopulated countries might find themselves at daggers drawn again--in the not too distant future.
What about the uni-polar alternative?
There is only limited historical experience with a truly unipolar world. The handful of years between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the present time. The experience has been, at best, mixed.
Suffice it to say that had the current administration acted consistently in tune with the word uttered by the Commander Guy, "humility," the Gang of Three might not be so motivated to cut us down to size. The trouble with history is that there is no way to rewind the tape and try again.
The next administration will have a major decision right out of the box. Are the best interests of the US well served by the emergence of a multi-polar world with all of its inherent instabilities and attendant risks? If not, then, how can the best days of a uni-polar world order be retrieved from the trash heap into which the neocon ninnies of the current administration heaved them?
Administration Makes A Smart Move--At Last.
The imposition of new economic sanctions against the Iranian Ministry of Defense as well as the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Aerospace Industries Organisation is a well-timed, intelligent, and major foreign policy move. In and of itself, the new sanction package shows the analysis of University of Michigan professor Juan Cole misses the point.
Professor Cole writes in today's Salon.com that the current administration's foreign policy is in chaos. See, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/10/24/kurds/index.html?source=newsletter. The professor contends that US policy in the Mideast and Northwest Asia has become a morass of ad hoc gimmicks since the start of our Adventures in Regime Change.
The Geek takes a different perspective. The Geek maintains that six years ago with both the declaration of Global War On Terrorism and the invasions first of Afghanistan and then Iraq, US policy lacked both realistic purpose and achievable goals. Forced in recent months to accept the dictates of reality by events in the two regions, US policy has been changing from its initial formless mass into something that begins to approximate a purpose and goal.
The inchoate Global War On Terrorism is being replaced (at long last!) by a focus on achieving a measure of stability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan while reducing the potential potentency and appeal of Islamism/Jihadism. There seems to have been a small, but critical, shift in the worldview within the current administration.
"What's that?" You ask.
While defensive efforts conducted by FBI, CIA ,and other organs focus on detecting and interdicting terrorist operations aimed at the US at home and US personnel or facilities overseas, offensive American operations have been more narrowly focused on the challenges of bringing stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and defanging Islamist supporting states such as Iran and Syria.
That's not much. But it is a beginning. An important beginning.
Iran is and will continue to be a major troublemaker. The mullahocracy likes ever so much to play the role of, "Let's you and him fight!" The technical term for this sort of foreign policy gambit is proxy war.
The idea is to cause endless difficulty for your actual adversary at little or no risk to yourself. The old Soviet Union played the game. They played it long and almost well in southern and eastern Africa during the Seventies.
The US has played the proxy war game too. We played it long and reasonably well during the Reagan Administration in Afghanistan. Our game fell apart only when we handed operational responsibility over to the Pakistani regime of General al-Huq. The Paks had their own proxies in mind. (Can we say, "Taliban?")
The Iranians and Syrians have been playing proxy war for decades now. These national actors prefer to use stateless groups as their pawns. But, whether a lesser state or a non-state agent, proxy war has numerous benefits for the sponsor and very few risks.
Using the Revolutionary Guard Corps foreign operating division, the al-Quds Force, as agent, the mullahocracy has been able to provide support, training, intelligence, and other services to The Party of God in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, among others. Closer to home and more recent in time, the same Iranian agency has provided the same services to anti-US, anti-regime groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is true that the Iranian footprint has often been light on the ground, but one does not need to be an Australian aboriginal tracker to see it.
(To those ideologues who are in a state of denial about the Iranian proxy war efforts, the Geek would like to point out that the whole purpose of proxy war is to lessen risk through plausible deniability. Just because American covert and clandestine efforts are often as well concealed as a hippopotamus in a phone booth is no reason to think that all countries are equally as inept at keeping secrets.)
While maintaining proxy operations the mullahs in Tehran have been trying to cast the largest possible shadow on the world stage. By so doing they not only divert internal attention from internal problems, they also gain influence with both Islamist entities and potentially threatened states. It is important to remember that the mullahocracy has the goal of a global caliphate--a global Shiite caliphate.
The current torrent of over-the-edge rhetoric flowing from both Tehran and Washington over Iranian nuclear ambitions is a very good way of enlarging the Iranian shadow. It is also riskier than low level proxy war.
In large measure due to Russian protection (extended for reasons to be further laid forth in a future post) as well as Chinese (see previous parenthetical expression) the mullahs have been able to follow their game plan without real pain and with real (internal political) benefit. At the same time the mullahocracy has enjoyed a collateral benefit.
The Geek hears you muttering, "Don't keep me waiting."
As a spin-off of the Iranian intransigence over matters nuclear, the neocon ninnies of the current administration have been eager to introduce unnecessary complications into American foreign policy generally. Among these are two of particular noteworthiness.
The present US-Russian standoff over the basing of a limited anti-missile system in Eastern Europe is one.
The other is the Turkey-PKK affair. As mentioned in a post yesterday, the US has been smiling on one arm of the Kurdish insurgency--the one directed against Iran--while frowning mightily on the other--the one directed against Turkey. As a result, the US has not been able or, (to err on the side of probable accuracy) willing to effectively assist in the reduction of the PKK threat with the result that Ankara is ready, willing, and able to mount destabilizing incursions into Iraq.
The prime beneficiary of these collaterals is, unsurprisingly, Iran.
The Iranian shadow must be reduced. It must be reduced so that the US can afford to pull back from the unnecessary complications. It must be reduced so that modulated diplomatic discourse might prove effective in gaining the desired end of preventing Tehran from acquiring atomic weapons in either the near- or mid-term.
It is equally necessary that Tehran feel real, even exquisite, pain to slow or stop its proxy war operations. The UN imposed sanctions have hurt. But, not enough.
The new sanctions, if imposed on foreign companies or financial institutions or governments who do business with the targeted entities as well as in the US, will add pain, perhaps intolerable amounts.
Think of it as the foreign policy equivalent of what police call a "compliance hold." The goal is to coerce compliance with dictated behavior by imposing increasing amounts of physical discomfort.
These sanctions may not prove to be sufficiently intense to force a modification on the mullah's actions and policies. They may be sufficiently unpleasant in application to force a limited change for a limited time. They may not work at all.
Those are questions that can only be answered in the next few weeks and months. The sanctions are nonetheless a strong indication that the US has today what it did not have six years ago--an actual policy that is more realistic than not as well as one more likely to achieve positive results than not.
If nothing else, these long overdue new sanctions delay the date of our next Adventure in Regime Change. For that, the Geek is grateful. So should all of us be.
Professor Cole writes in today's Salon.com that the current administration's foreign policy is in chaos. See, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/10/24/kurds/index.html?source=newsletter. The professor contends that US policy in the Mideast and Northwest Asia has become a morass of ad hoc gimmicks since the start of our Adventures in Regime Change.
The Geek takes a different perspective. The Geek maintains that six years ago with both the declaration of Global War On Terrorism and the invasions first of Afghanistan and then Iraq, US policy lacked both realistic purpose and achievable goals. Forced in recent months to accept the dictates of reality by events in the two regions, US policy has been changing from its initial formless mass into something that begins to approximate a purpose and goal.
The inchoate Global War On Terrorism is being replaced (at long last!) by a focus on achieving a measure of stability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan while reducing the potential potentency and appeal of Islamism/Jihadism. There seems to have been a small, but critical, shift in the worldview within the current administration.
"What's that?" You ask.
While defensive efforts conducted by FBI, CIA ,and other organs focus on detecting and interdicting terrorist operations aimed at the US at home and US personnel or facilities overseas, offensive American operations have been more narrowly focused on the challenges of bringing stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and defanging Islamist supporting states such as Iran and Syria.
That's not much. But it is a beginning. An important beginning.
Iran is and will continue to be a major troublemaker. The mullahocracy likes ever so much to play the role of, "Let's you and him fight!" The technical term for this sort of foreign policy gambit is proxy war.
The idea is to cause endless difficulty for your actual adversary at little or no risk to yourself. The old Soviet Union played the game. They played it long and almost well in southern and eastern Africa during the Seventies.
The US has played the proxy war game too. We played it long and reasonably well during the Reagan Administration in Afghanistan. Our game fell apart only when we handed operational responsibility over to the Pakistani regime of General al-Huq. The Paks had their own proxies in mind. (Can we say, "Taliban?")
The Iranians and Syrians have been playing proxy war for decades now. These national actors prefer to use stateless groups as their pawns. But, whether a lesser state or a non-state agent, proxy war has numerous benefits for the sponsor and very few risks.
Using the Revolutionary Guard Corps foreign operating division, the al-Quds Force, as agent, the mullahocracy has been able to provide support, training, intelligence, and other services to The Party of God in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, among others. Closer to home and more recent in time, the same Iranian agency has provided the same services to anti-US, anti-regime groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is true that the Iranian footprint has often been light on the ground, but one does not need to be an Australian aboriginal tracker to see it.
(To those ideologues who are in a state of denial about the Iranian proxy war efforts, the Geek would like to point out that the whole purpose of proxy war is to lessen risk through plausible deniability. Just because American covert and clandestine efforts are often as well concealed as a hippopotamus in a phone booth is no reason to think that all countries are equally as inept at keeping secrets.)
While maintaining proxy operations the mullahs in Tehran have been trying to cast the largest possible shadow on the world stage. By so doing they not only divert internal attention from internal problems, they also gain influence with both Islamist entities and potentially threatened states. It is important to remember that the mullahocracy has the goal of a global caliphate--a global Shiite caliphate.
The current torrent of over-the-edge rhetoric flowing from both Tehran and Washington over Iranian nuclear ambitions is a very good way of enlarging the Iranian shadow. It is also riskier than low level proxy war.
In large measure due to Russian protection (extended for reasons to be further laid forth in a future post) as well as Chinese (see previous parenthetical expression) the mullahs have been able to follow their game plan without real pain and with real (internal political) benefit. At the same time the mullahocracy has enjoyed a collateral benefit.
The Geek hears you muttering, "Don't keep me waiting."
As a spin-off of the Iranian intransigence over matters nuclear, the neocon ninnies of the current administration have been eager to introduce unnecessary complications into American foreign policy generally. Among these are two of particular noteworthiness.
The present US-Russian standoff over the basing of a limited anti-missile system in Eastern Europe is one.
The other is the Turkey-PKK affair. As mentioned in a post yesterday, the US has been smiling on one arm of the Kurdish insurgency--the one directed against Iran--while frowning mightily on the other--the one directed against Turkey. As a result, the US has not been able or, (to err on the side of probable accuracy) willing to effectively assist in the reduction of the PKK threat with the result that Ankara is ready, willing, and able to mount destabilizing incursions into Iraq.
The prime beneficiary of these collaterals is, unsurprisingly, Iran.
The Iranian shadow must be reduced. It must be reduced so that the US can afford to pull back from the unnecessary complications. It must be reduced so that modulated diplomatic discourse might prove effective in gaining the desired end of preventing Tehran from acquiring atomic weapons in either the near- or mid-term.
It is equally necessary that Tehran feel real, even exquisite, pain to slow or stop its proxy war operations. The UN imposed sanctions have hurt. But, not enough.
The new sanctions, if imposed on foreign companies or financial institutions or governments who do business with the targeted entities as well as in the US, will add pain, perhaps intolerable amounts.
Think of it as the foreign policy equivalent of what police call a "compliance hold." The goal is to coerce compliance with dictated behavior by imposing increasing amounts of physical discomfort.
These sanctions may not prove to be sufficiently intense to force a modification on the mullah's actions and policies. They may be sufficiently unpleasant in application to force a limited change for a limited time. They may not work at all.
Those are questions that can only be answered in the next few weeks and months. The sanctions are nonetheless a strong indication that the US has today what it did not have six years ago--an actual policy that is more realistic than not as well as one more likely to achieve positive results than not.
If nothing else, these long overdue new sanctions delay the date of our next Adventure in Regime Change. For that, the Geek is grateful. So should all of us be.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Ghost Of Fidel Haunts Current Administration
The Geek has to wonder if the Commander Guy and the neocon ninnies around him have noticed that Cuba--and the Castro boys--have been slogging on despite our ever present disapproval. He also has to scratch his head over the warning issued today by the CG sternly telling Fidel that the US will not continence his turning power over to little brother Raul.
Hasn't anyone mentioned to the encapsulated Decider that effective transfer of power has already occurred? Isn't that what the National Intelligence Czar is supposed to do? Isn't that one of the reasons the US has an enormous intelligence community?
Or, is the Commander and Decider pursuing some arcane political advantage with the aging expatriate Cuban community in Florida? In the alternative, have some of the nagging neocons with their visions of democracy and free enterprise in action yet undimmed by the dust of Iraq once again gained control of the current administration's decision-making loop?
At the moment, the latter seems probable given the invocation of the march of democracy through Latin America.
Ahh, yes! Democracy in action. Gotta love it.
Democracy brought Hugo Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela. It (aided by Chavez' closing of opposition radio and television stations and a host of questionable election practices) gave birth to the changes in the Venezuelan constitution giving authoritarian powers to the neo-Castroite.
Democracy in action has brought about neo-Castroite regimes in Ecuador and Bolivia.
What does the current administration think? Is it convinced that blowing the same ancient warnings and implied threats will bring about democracy in action in Cuba? Is it somehow convinced that by doing this the results of democracy in action in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia will be rolled back?
The evil synergy of ideology and perceived domestic political gain has powered some of the worst foreign policy errors in US history including the "Who-Lost-China?" debacle which shackled US policy in Asia for decades to say nothing of the forty-eight years of stupidity regarding Cuba.
If the US really wants to constructively engage Cuba, and the three neo-Castroite regimes in South America, it has to change its diplomatic and rhetorical course. Continuation of elderly, long proven to be ineffective postures is not only ideologically blind and intellectually bankrupt, it is counterproductive to the max.
There is nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
American national interest in Latin America and the Caribbean basin is furthered by open, authentic dialogue which is free from ideological cant. It requires that the deep thinkers at the policy level have ears as well as mouths.
The governments and peoples of Latin America do not constitute a monolith. Each nation has a different history, varied needs, separate priorities, and, never forget this, a unique, subjectively defined national interest.
Nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
Cuba and the Cubans have been living with the consequences both good and bad of the success of the 26th of July Movement for two generations now. There have been no, repeat, no genuine, large scale indications of dissatisfaction. If the Castro boys were the icky-poo repressors of Cuba, coups would have been attempted, insurgent movements would have populated the hills.
This hasn't happened. Even though the US stood ready, willing, and somewhat able to foster and assist wannabe over throwers of the Evil Island Empire as events of the early 1960s demonstrated.
Yes, the internal security establishment in Cuba is pervasive and effective. But, not that effective.
History has shown that no government can be totally effective at total repression over time. For a few years, yes. For a couple or three decades, probably. Day after day for a half century? Not likely.
This implies strongly that the Castro regime has what we Americans like to call the "consent of the governed." That means that most, if not all, Cubans see their regime as possessing either or both existential and functional legitimacy. To Cubans, or at least a critical mass of them, the current regime of the Castro brothers is their government, indigenous, organic, not imposed from without. Further, to the Cuban people, or at least a critical mass, the current regime delivers a satisfactory enough overall quality of life.
Ironically, the existential legitimacy of the Castro regime has been enhanced over time by the unyielding opposition of the United States. Administration after administration has failed to understand that pressure consolidates the political will and cohesion of the target population long before it shatters it.
The Commander Guy's stern speech would assure the overwhelming election of Raul Castro if elections were to take place tomorrow.
(Hint to the Cubans: Why not try it? Why not put the current administration to the ultimate test? Have an election. Go ahead, elect Raul, if that's who you want. Ask Jimmy Carter to monitor the election. That would put the current administration in the put-up or shut-up whipsaw.)
In the spirit of even-handedness, the Geek has a hint for the current administration. (Well, to err on the side of accuracy, two of them.)
Hint number one: Elections are a nice idea perhaps. But, democracy is not a panacea. It never has been. Elections bring good results. They are equally likely to bring bad ones. Elections can be and often are shams. They have no inherent white magic. So, current administration, quit pandering to a myth. Ask yourselves, what are we going to do if Raul or someone else like him wins an election in Cuba?
Hint number two: (Pay attention now, this is a several step hint.) Great Powers--like the United States--have long term national interests which are best served by a world order which is stable, predictable, and manageable over time.
Long term interests, history shows, are not, repeat, not served by hectoring another country. Neither are they served by attempting to export our systems and the myths that support them by coercive methods.
History also shows (in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines among others) that the long term stability so needed by a Great Power is not served by supporting or fostering tin plated dictators who promise short duration order.
Finally, history shows beyond even the irrational doubts of neocon ninnies that the greatest of Great Powers can have meaningful impact upon another country's social and political institutions only by working with the organic, indigenous trajectories which have developed within that country. The changes within a society or polity have both direction and inertia.
The inertia of human myths, beliefs, institutions is greater than any in the physical world. Get a grip on that.
The trajectories of the Cuban people cannot and will not be changed by stern words out of Washington. Fidel knows that. As a result, he rejected the words even before they were officially uttered.
Unfortunately for us the Commander Guy isn't is smart as the aging, ailing Cuban.
Hasn't anyone mentioned to the encapsulated Decider that effective transfer of power has already occurred? Isn't that what the National Intelligence Czar is supposed to do? Isn't that one of the reasons the US has an enormous intelligence community?
Or, is the Commander and Decider pursuing some arcane political advantage with the aging expatriate Cuban community in Florida? In the alternative, have some of the nagging neocons with their visions of democracy and free enterprise in action yet undimmed by the dust of Iraq once again gained control of the current administration's decision-making loop?
At the moment, the latter seems probable given the invocation of the march of democracy through Latin America.
Ahh, yes! Democracy in action. Gotta love it.
Democracy brought Hugo Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela. It (aided by Chavez' closing of opposition radio and television stations and a host of questionable election practices) gave birth to the changes in the Venezuelan constitution giving authoritarian powers to the neo-Castroite.
Democracy in action has brought about neo-Castroite regimes in Ecuador and Bolivia.
What does the current administration think? Is it convinced that blowing the same ancient warnings and implied threats will bring about democracy in action in Cuba? Is it somehow convinced that by doing this the results of democracy in action in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia will be rolled back?
The evil synergy of ideology and perceived domestic political gain has powered some of the worst foreign policy errors in US history including the "Who-Lost-China?" debacle which shackled US policy in Asia for decades to say nothing of the forty-eight years of stupidity regarding Cuba.
If the US really wants to constructively engage Cuba, and the three neo-Castroite regimes in South America, it has to change its diplomatic and rhetorical course. Continuation of elderly, long proven to be ineffective postures is not only ideologically blind and intellectually bankrupt, it is counterproductive to the max.
There is nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
American national interest in Latin America and the Caribbean basin is furthered by open, authentic dialogue which is free from ideological cant. It requires that the deep thinkers at the policy level have ears as well as mouths.
The governments and peoples of Latin America do not constitute a monolith. Each nation has a different history, varied needs, separate priorities, and, never forget this, a unique, subjectively defined national interest.
Nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
Cuba and the Cubans have been living with the consequences both good and bad of the success of the 26th of July Movement for two generations now. There have been no, repeat, no genuine, large scale indications of dissatisfaction. If the Castro boys were the icky-poo repressors of Cuba, coups would have been attempted, insurgent movements would have populated the hills.
This hasn't happened. Even though the US stood ready, willing, and somewhat able to foster and assist wannabe over throwers of the Evil Island Empire as events of the early 1960s demonstrated.
Yes, the internal security establishment in Cuba is pervasive and effective. But, not that effective.
History has shown that no government can be totally effective at total repression over time. For a few years, yes. For a couple or three decades, probably. Day after day for a half century? Not likely.
This implies strongly that the Castro regime has what we Americans like to call the "consent of the governed." That means that most, if not all, Cubans see their regime as possessing either or both existential and functional legitimacy. To Cubans, or at least a critical mass of them, the current regime of the Castro brothers is their government, indigenous, organic, not imposed from without. Further, to the Cuban people, or at least a critical mass, the current regime delivers a satisfactory enough overall quality of life.
Ironically, the existential legitimacy of the Castro regime has been enhanced over time by the unyielding opposition of the United States. Administration after administration has failed to understand that pressure consolidates the political will and cohesion of the target population long before it shatters it.
The Commander Guy's stern speech would assure the overwhelming election of Raul Castro if elections were to take place tomorrow.
(Hint to the Cubans: Why not try it? Why not put the current administration to the ultimate test? Have an election. Go ahead, elect Raul, if that's who you want. Ask Jimmy Carter to monitor the election. That would put the current administration in the put-up or shut-up whipsaw.)
In the spirit of even-handedness, the Geek has a hint for the current administration. (Well, to err on the side of accuracy, two of them.)
Hint number one: Elections are a nice idea perhaps. But, democracy is not a panacea. It never has been. Elections bring good results. They are equally likely to bring bad ones. Elections can be and often are shams. They have no inherent white magic. So, current administration, quit pandering to a myth. Ask yourselves, what are we going to do if Raul or someone else like him wins an election in Cuba?
Hint number two: (Pay attention now, this is a several step hint.) Great Powers--like the United States--have long term national interests which are best served by a world order which is stable, predictable, and manageable over time.
Long term interests, history shows, are not, repeat, not served by hectoring another country. Neither are they served by attempting to export our systems and the myths that support them by coercive methods.
History also shows (in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines among others) that the long term stability so needed by a Great Power is not served by supporting or fostering tin plated dictators who promise short duration order.
Finally, history shows beyond even the irrational doubts of neocon ninnies that the greatest of Great Powers can have meaningful impact upon another country's social and political institutions only by working with the organic, indigenous trajectories which have developed within that country. The changes within a society or polity have both direction and inertia.
The inertia of human myths, beliefs, institutions is greater than any in the physical world. Get a grip on that.
The trajectories of the Cuban people cannot and will not be changed by stern words out of Washington. Fidel knows that. As a result, he rejected the words even before they were officially uttered.
Unfortunately for us the Commander Guy isn't is smart as the aging, ailing Cuban.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
There Are "Bad" Kurds--And Good Ones
That's where the problem lies for the United States. Worse, it's another one for which we are partially responsible.
We all know who the "bad" Kurds are. They're called the Kurdistan Workers Party, usually called the PKK. They've gotten all the news play in the past few days. They are "bad" because they attack Turkish targets as they have been doing for almost twenty-five years now.
But, who or what are the "good" Kurds?
They call themselves the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). They are "good" because they have been attacking targets in Iran as they have been doing for nearly twenty-five years now. They have gotten no significant news coverage.
The PKK have been declared to be a "terrorist" group. The PJAK has not received this distinction.
The PKK has received no US assistance, not even conversational. The PJAK has not only been talked with by American personnel, there is strong reason to believe they have been the beneficiaries of more than mere polite palaver.
You don't need to have a PhD in Kurdish Studies to see the reason for the difference in treatment. Do you?
From Washington's perspective, Turkey is a good guy (most of the time.) Also from the banks of the Potomac, Iran is a bad guy (all of the time.)
There is, however, one small problem.
"What's that?" You ask.
PKK and PJAK are not separate organisations. They share the goal of an independent Kurdistan carved out of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. More, they share leadership. They share logistics support.
They are not even Siamese twins. PKK and PJAK are different names for the same entity.
Washington knows it. Turkey knows it. The Iraqi regime knows it.
All of the above (and the mullahocracy in Tehran as well) know that (ahem) PJAK has and does receive the distant blessings of Washington. Not just the current administration but its predecessors running back a quarter century. (Don't say a word about it. The whole thing has been covert. You know, deep, deep black.)
Of course, that's how weapons supplied to the Iraqis ended up in the hands of dead PKK guerrillas inside Turkey. The strictures of plausible deniability demand that the US never speak on that matter but rather let the whole affair die with time and benign neglect.
Now, it doesn't take a particularly deep thinker to realise that it is impossible to bless one arm of a group while damning the other. Whatever benefits the one limb will aid the other.
Thus, the current problem further bedeviling the current administration's Iraq policies.
The Kurds aren't going to just stop the show because it would make our life in Iraq a little less unbearable. They've gotten up a reasonably good head of steam in recent months.
The PJAK wing has killed or captured a surprising number of Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. Their pin prick raids have stimulated not only Iranian artillery fire in reply but political difficulties in the northwestern areas of Iran.
During the same time, PKK has raised the noise level in the Turkish countryside to an unacceptable extent. The Turkish Army is good for go.
The Iraqi regime is caught in the middle. There isn't much Baghdad can do, at least in the near-term. Closing the offices of the PKK in Iraq and proclaiming the outfit to be "terrorist" is scarcely a death blow. Neither is the promise that the Iraqi government will do something about the PKK one of these days.
That leaves the US.
In principle the US could collaborate more closely and effectively with the Turkish armed forces and government. We could provide more hard, actionable intelligence in a more timely fashion. We could provide surveillance and reconnaissance equipment to support Turkish interdiction efforts. We could, at least hypothetically, spare a brigade or two to move against PKK facilities in the mountains on the Turkish border.
We could do any or all of these if it were not for the fact that hurting the "bad" Kurds also hurts the "good" Kurds. We could do any or all of these things if it were not for the fact that providing comfort for Turkey does the same for Iran.
Ahh! What a delightful policy bind!
A realpolitiker might focus on the more immediate horn of the dilemma. That would be Iraq. The realpolitiker would agree to work with the Turks in abating the PKK nuisance without regard to the collateral damage inflicted on the PJAK. Help the necessary ally without worrying about the attendant assistance given to the adversary, Iran.
The current administration has not been noted for its grip on the requirements of realpolitik. Given the recent rhetorical blasts leveled by the Decider Guy and the Veep at Tehran, as well as the counterblasts from the mullahocracy, discomfiting the Iranians may well out weigh placating the Turks.
Short-term, the Turks (with US support, and Iraqi understanding) should be able to lower the capacity of PKK to mount attacks. They've done that much before.
Longer term, military operations are not the solution. The Kurds are not going to lose political will in the foreseeable future.
The longer term answer will have to reside in some sort of semi-autonomous Kurdistan.
The Kurds face a harsh reality.
They have to come to terms with geography, just as the Turks, Iraqis, Iranians, and Syrians have to accept the dictates of ethnic and historic identity.
The Kurds may have material resources (read oil) but without the collaboration of their neighbors, it might as well stay in the ground. Kurdistan of whatsoever size is landlocked.
Another reality on the ground is water. The Turks have spent much time, effort, and oodles of Lira on their hydro projects on the upper rivers. No matter what works out finally with respect to Kurdistan, Ankara is not going to include the dams in the deal. Neither would the downstream nations, Iraq and Iran, allow the Kurds to take over control of the faucet. It's bad enough that the Turks have it now.
There will be a fair amount of killing in the future. There will have to be a lot of tough talking between countries as well as with the Kurds--even those of the bifurcate semi-Marxist guerrillas.
How much killing as well as how and when the talking will start is in some measure up the US. Ironically the situation parallels that in Palestine. (Or the West Bank and Gaza, if you prefer.)
We all know how well American efforts at brokerage have worked there.
We all know who the "bad" Kurds are. They're called the Kurdistan Workers Party, usually called the PKK. They've gotten all the news play in the past few days. They are "bad" because they attack Turkish targets as they have been doing for almost twenty-five years now.
But, who or what are the "good" Kurds?
They call themselves the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). They are "good" because they have been attacking targets in Iran as they have been doing for nearly twenty-five years now. They have gotten no significant news coverage.
The PKK have been declared to be a "terrorist" group. The PJAK has not received this distinction.
The PKK has received no US assistance, not even conversational. The PJAK has not only been talked with by American personnel, there is strong reason to believe they have been the beneficiaries of more than mere polite palaver.
You don't need to have a PhD in Kurdish Studies to see the reason for the difference in treatment. Do you?
From Washington's perspective, Turkey is a good guy (most of the time.) Also from the banks of the Potomac, Iran is a bad guy (all of the time.)
There is, however, one small problem.
"What's that?" You ask.
PKK and PJAK are not separate organisations. They share the goal of an independent Kurdistan carved out of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. More, they share leadership. They share logistics support.
They are not even Siamese twins. PKK and PJAK are different names for the same entity.
Washington knows it. Turkey knows it. The Iraqi regime knows it.
All of the above (and the mullahocracy in Tehran as well) know that (ahem) PJAK has and does receive the distant blessings of Washington. Not just the current administration but its predecessors running back a quarter century. (Don't say a word about it. The whole thing has been covert. You know, deep, deep black.)
Of course, that's how weapons supplied to the Iraqis ended up in the hands of dead PKK guerrillas inside Turkey. The strictures of plausible deniability demand that the US never speak on that matter but rather let the whole affair die with time and benign neglect.
Now, it doesn't take a particularly deep thinker to realise that it is impossible to bless one arm of a group while damning the other. Whatever benefits the one limb will aid the other.
Thus, the current problem further bedeviling the current administration's Iraq policies.
The Kurds aren't going to just stop the show because it would make our life in Iraq a little less unbearable. They've gotten up a reasonably good head of steam in recent months.
The PJAK wing has killed or captured a surprising number of Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. Their pin prick raids have stimulated not only Iranian artillery fire in reply but political difficulties in the northwestern areas of Iran.
During the same time, PKK has raised the noise level in the Turkish countryside to an unacceptable extent. The Turkish Army is good for go.
The Iraqi regime is caught in the middle. There isn't much Baghdad can do, at least in the near-term. Closing the offices of the PKK in Iraq and proclaiming the outfit to be "terrorist" is scarcely a death blow. Neither is the promise that the Iraqi government will do something about the PKK one of these days.
That leaves the US.
In principle the US could collaborate more closely and effectively with the Turkish armed forces and government. We could provide more hard, actionable intelligence in a more timely fashion. We could provide surveillance and reconnaissance equipment to support Turkish interdiction efforts. We could, at least hypothetically, spare a brigade or two to move against PKK facilities in the mountains on the Turkish border.
We could do any or all of these if it were not for the fact that hurting the "bad" Kurds also hurts the "good" Kurds. We could do any or all of these things if it were not for the fact that providing comfort for Turkey does the same for Iran.
Ahh! What a delightful policy bind!
A realpolitiker might focus on the more immediate horn of the dilemma. That would be Iraq. The realpolitiker would agree to work with the Turks in abating the PKK nuisance without regard to the collateral damage inflicted on the PJAK. Help the necessary ally without worrying about the attendant assistance given to the adversary, Iran.
The current administration has not been noted for its grip on the requirements of realpolitik. Given the recent rhetorical blasts leveled by the Decider Guy and the Veep at Tehran, as well as the counterblasts from the mullahocracy, discomfiting the Iranians may well out weigh placating the Turks.
Short-term, the Turks (with US support, and Iraqi understanding) should be able to lower the capacity of PKK to mount attacks. They've done that much before.
Longer term, military operations are not the solution. The Kurds are not going to lose political will in the foreseeable future.
The longer term answer will have to reside in some sort of semi-autonomous Kurdistan.
The Kurds face a harsh reality.
They have to come to terms with geography, just as the Turks, Iraqis, Iranians, and Syrians have to accept the dictates of ethnic and historic identity.
The Kurds may have material resources (read oil) but without the collaboration of their neighbors, it might as well stay in the ground. Kurdistan of whatsoever size is landlocked.
Another reality on the ground is water. The Turks have spent much time, effort, and oodles of Lira on their hydro projects on the upper rivers. No matter what works out finally with respect to Kurdistan, Ankara is not going to include the dams in the deal. Neither would the downstream nations, Iraq and Iran, allow the Kurds to take over control of the faucet. It's bad enough that the Turks have it now.
There will be a fair amount of killing in the future. There will have to be a lot of tough talking between countries as well as with the Kurds--even those of the bifurcate semi-Marxist guerrillas.
How much killing as well as how and when the talking will start is in some measure up the US. Ironically the situation parallels that in Palestine. (Or the West Bank and Gaza, if you prefer.)
We all know how well American efforts at brokerage have worked there.
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