Of late it seems as if every "foreign policy expert" has come out either for or against opening some sort of dialogue with Iran. Even former Agency analysts and fieldhands have come out of the shadows with a view on the necessary next step in the dance between Washington and Tehran.
Looking at the problem through the lens of history, the Geek is persuaded that the time for talks has come. The Geek has come to this conclusion by considering the effects of the self-donned chastity belt of "non-recognition." The US demonstrated a marked preference for ignoring the reality of political changes of which it did not approve over the course of the Twentieth Century.
For a few years we pretended that revolutionary Mexico did not exist. Then for more than a decade we turned a Nelsonian eye to the Soviet Union. After World War II we went to the absurd length of ignoring unpleasant facts of political reality in China. Every Administration from Ike to W. Bush averted their eyes from the island of Cuba.
Of course we cocked our collective snoot at Iran since 1979.
In every one of these cases except the last two, the US finally had to get a grip on reality and engage in normal diplomatic relations. In every case the policy of non-recognition had no useful effect. The illusion of some sort of moral purity never matches the cold, hard reality of dealing with a government--no matter how unpleasant it may be--as one more nation-state with interests.
The mullahocracy of Tehran and its puppet sham parliament and president are obnoxious. The Tehran regime is unpleasant in the extreme. Nonetheless it exists. We have to deal with it. We have to get over its insults, its threats, its internal repression, its sponsorship of lethal groups.
We have to talk with the mullahs, or at least their frontmen. We have to talk directly, face to face.
Opening direct, public, high profile relations is not necessary. Nor is such desirable. It is not in our better interests.
The process followed by the Nixon administration with respect to China provides a useful template. The coinciding interests of the US and Iran regarding Iraq and Afghanistan provide the necessary context.
Neither the mullahs nor ourselves wish to see a close approximation of civil war in Iraq. Neither ourselves nor the mullahs want to see Taliban back in power in Afghanistan. (In a related matter, neither Tehran nor Washington hopes to see a Taliban in control of Pakistan.)
While the sporadic low level conversations between US and Iranian personnel in Iraq have been without real useful result, they provide the opening wedge. Using backchannel means of communication we should arrange for a suitable mid- to high-level member of the Obama Administration to make an unannounced trip to Tehran.
(The same level of secrecy which attended Kissinger's first trip to China is no longer possible. The media are no longer so cooperative as to sit on a story as they once were.)
If the mullahs refuse the offer or prove disastrously uncooperative in maintaining the low profile nature of the trip and conversations, fine. The Lads in Tehran will have made their choice. We--and the world--will know where the mullahs stand. There will be neither reason nor demand that we try again or try harder or offer more concessions.
If, however, the visit proves productive, the basis will have been laid for a path toward normal diplomatic relations. There will be ground on which to build regarding the vexing issues of nuclear material production, sponsorship of terrorist groups, and so forth.
Most importantly, the attempt at low-visibility diplomacy will help to answer a vital question. It will help provide an understanding of the most important single question confronting the world regarding the nature and character of the Iranian government.
The question?
Is the source of Iranian conduct eschatological or not? Is the government and the mullahs in the back room oriented toward international affairs with the perspective of a real world oriented nation-state or is it seeking the end times, the coming of the Mahdi through the mechanism of apocalypse?
The answer to this question is fundamental to all other considerations of policy toward Iran. We have to get the answer ourselves. Only the conduct of the Iranians from the very first contact will provide a basis for an accurate answer.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Time For A Change--Pakistan
The US has coddled the hell out of the military and intelligence service of Pakistan for the past eight years. The billions of dollars spent there have bought no noticeable improvement in the counter-terrorist or counterinsurgency capacities of the military. The effort has been without success.
The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to be a fortress of Islamism/jihadism. The military is not much better. These two unpleasant ground truths are the reason that most, if not all, terrorist roads end in Pakistan.
The time has come to get a grip on this reality. It is really long past time to drop the pretense that Pakistan is an ally in the effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar e-Taiba.
It is time to publicly acknowledge that Pakistan provides ready sanctuary, easy cover, and competent training and support to the people fighting the US, killing Americans, and seeking the goal of ejecting the US and the West from the sub-continent.
Unless and until Pakistan ceases being the recruiting, training, financing, and general purpose rest and recreation center for the jihadists of the world, the world has no hope of being rid of their noxious presence. The instruments of American national power, along with those of other countries which have a realistic appraisal of the threat presented by jihadism and the critical role played by Pakistan in facilitating jihadism, must be employed to alter Pakistan's behavior--radically.
This does not mean another great adventure in regime change. There is no need (and even less possibility of success) for a Iraq type invasion.
What is needed is the application of economic and diplomatic pressure on the government of Pakistan to take two specific actions. Get a grip on them. It isn't hard even though the current administration couldn't (or wouldn't) do it.
The ISI must be disbanded. Period. Reform of the ISI so as to remove the Islamists/jihadists is as impossible as reforming the Mafia to remove the Tony Soprano types.
The Pakistani military has to be reoriented from wishing for yet another losing war with India. The job for the armed forces of Pakistan is twofold. Secure the borders between Pakistan and India as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mount a sustained counterinsurgency and pacification campaign not only in the FATA but Swat and other jihadist heartlands.
In short, the armed forces of Pakistan should take on the greatest challenge and perform the most important mission any military can--insure the structural integrity of the government. Make sure the government of Pakistan and only the government of Pakistan has authority over the population of Pakistan.
Given the parlous economic conditions of Pakistan, conditions that can only be worsened by the current global recession, the US and its partners (we assume the US will have partners globally after next January 20th.) can put the squeeze on Pakistan with a high probability of success. Yes, the government of Pakistan will squawk like the cliched stuck pig about foreign dictates and the beauties of national sovereignty. That is only to be expected. Let them scream all they want--as long as they also do what is required.
Cut off all military and economic assistance until the required twin efforts have been undertaken, at least to the extent that results are visible. Then and only then reprogram the aid. This time emplace sufficient oversight that the money is spent only for purposes consistent with stamping out the terrorist groups and their supporters.
"But, wait a minute, Geek! The Paks have nukes. They have plutonium. We can't take the risk."
The Pakistani bomb is one of the reasons we have to go the "tough love" route. Their assembled, deliverable nuclear arsenal represents a threat to India and--potentially--Iran. One of these countries already has a nuclear deterrent and the other one seems hellbent to do the same. In any event, the Government of Pakistan is well aware of what might (will) happen if some of its nuclear material ends up as a mushroom cloud somewhere. The bomb is not a reason to cease pressure on Islamabad. It is a reason to increase it.
The administration of George W. Bush swived the pooch with respect to Pakistan. The reasons for this severe failure are still unclear. In so far as the past is prologue, in this case it is the cause of a very dark future. Coddling Pakistan, its military, its ISI, has not only brought the Taliban resurgence, it has brought the world Mumbai.
To have a better chance of a future without more Mumbais there must be a change. To have a better chance of a future without one, two, many Talibans, there must be a change.
The change must happen in Pakistan. The change must be started in Washington.
The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to be a fortress of Islamism/jihadism. The military is not much better. These two unpleasant ground truths are the reason that most, if not all, terrorist roads end in Pakistan.
The time has come to get a grip on this reality. It is really long past time to drop the pretense that Pakistan is an ally in the effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar e-Taiba.
It is time to publicly acknowledge that Pakistan provides ready sanctuary, easy cover, and competent training and support to the people fighting the US, killing Americans, and seeking the goal of ejecting the US and the West from the sub-continent.
Unless and until Pakistan ceases being the recruiting, training, financing, and general purpose rest and recreation center for the jihadists of the world, the world has no hope of being rid of their noxious presence. The instruments of American national power, along with those of other countries which have a realistic appraisal of the threat presented by jihadism and the critical role played by Pakistan in facilitating jihadism, must be employed to alter Pakistan's behavior--radically.
This does not mean another great adventure in regime change. There is no need (and even less possibility of success) for a Iraq type invasion.
What is needed is the application of economic and diplomatic pressure on the government of Pakistan to take two specific actions. Get a grip on them. It isn't hard even though the current administration couldn't (or wouldn't) do it.
The ISI must be disbanded. Period. Reform of the ISI so as to remove the Islamists/jihadists is as impossible as reforming the Mafia to remove the Tony Soprano types.
The Pakistani military has to be reoriented from wishing for yet another losing war with India. The job for the armed forces of Pakistan is twofold. Secure the borders between Pakistan and India as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mount a sustained counterinsurgency and pacification campaign not only in the FATA but Swat and other jihadist heartlands.
In short, the armed forces of Pakistan should take on the greatest challenge and perform the most important mission any military can--insure the structural integrity of the government. Make sure the government of Pakistan and only the government of Pakistan has authority over the population of Pakistan.
Given the parlous economic conditions of Pakistan, conditions that can only be worsened by the current global recession, the US and its partners (we assume the US will have partners globally after next January 20th.) can put the squeeze on Pakistan with a high probability of success. Yes, the government of Pakistan will squawk like the cliched stuck pig about foreign dictates and the beauties of national sovereignty. That is only to be expected. Let them scream all they want--as long as they also do what is required.
Cut off all military and economic assistance until the required twin efforts have been undertaken, at least to the extent that results are visible. Then and only then reprogram the aid. This time emplace sufficient oversight that the money is spent only for purposes consistent with stamping out the terrorist groups and their supporters.
"But, wait a minute, Geek! The Paks have nukes. They have plutonium. We can't take the risk."
The Pakistani bomb is one of the reasons we have to go the "tough love" route. Their assembled, deliverable nuclear arsenal represents a threat to India and--potentially--Iran. One of these countries already has a nuclear deterrent and the other one seems hellbent to do the same. In any event, the Government of Pakistan is well aware of what might (will) happen if some of its nuclear material ends up as a mushroom cloud somewhere. The bomb is not a reason to cease pressure on Islamabad. It is a reason to increase it.
The administration of George W. Bush swived the pooch with respect to Pakistan. The reasons for this severe failure are still unclear. In so far as the past is prologue, in this case it is the cause of a very dark future. Coddling Pakistan, its military, its ISI, has not only brought the Taliban resurgence, it has brought the world Mumbai.
To have a better chance of a future without more Mumbais there must be a change. To have a better chance of a future without one, two, many Talibans, there must be a change.
The change must happen in Pakistan. The change must be started in Washington.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Human Rights And National Interest
Last Monday a group headed by two Clintonites, William Cohen, the one time Secretary of Defense and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, released a report timed to coincide with the Sixtieth Anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. This report took the position that "genocide" and "mass atrocities" threatened American national security and interests.
The report urged the incoming Obama Administration to reorganise the National Security Council and other components of the national security establishment to reflect this conclusion. While cheerfully acknowledging that the Cohen-Albright report is filled with High Minded, Lofty Thinking, the Geek is unconvinced that enforcement of "human rights," however narrowly they may be defined, is necessarily in the national or strategic interests of the United States.
Even the matter of genocide is not necessarily one that the US should, let alone, must, respond to even in the context of multilateral action. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (ratified by the US in 1988) like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the product of its time.
Specifically, the Genocide Convention was the product of revulsion throughout the Western world over the state sponsored slaughter of discrete ethno/linguistic/religious communities by the Nazi government of Germany. (It is doubtful that Joe Stalin was all that perturbed by the tales of extermination considering his extensive personal experience with liquidating undesirable populations.)
In 1948 the definition of genocide was easy. The example was right in front of the world's leaders and peoples. In more recent years, the edges of definition have become ever more fuzzy, ever more blurred by propagandists and ideologues alike. The political goals and ideological imperatives override any objective definition and consensual understanding of the actions which genuinely constitute genocide.
The charge of "genocide" is hurled at the Israelis by partisans of the Palestinians. It is heaved by the Kremlin to justify the Russian invasion of Georgia. Taliban chieftains accuse the US of pursuing genocide in Afghanistan. The central regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charges the government of Rwanda of genocide by proxy.
You get the point.
The highly undistinguished former Secretary of Defense and his equally-at-sea counterpart from State want the military to incorporate genocide prevention (and, presumably, punishment) in its official doctrine. (Hint to Mr Perry: It's already there in all the doctrinal corpus that covers interventionary operations.) The report also demands that the intelligence community add genocide and related human rights violations to its already overstocked plate of missions and tasks. (Hint to Mr Perry and Ms Albright: Such reporting is already present even if it is not labeled as such.)
The Geek does not contemplate genocide with total detachment and equanimity although he is willing to admit that life as a historian hardens one to the extent and brutality of calculating governmental brutality. He is not willing to buy into the proposition that genocide per se let alone violations of human rights constitutes a threat to American national interests and security which compels response beyond the rhetorical.
There are several historically rooted reasons buttressing the contention that massive violations of human rights including the starkest expression of violation, genocide, does not constitute a threat to national interests and security. Some of these should be self-evident to Mr Perry and Ms Albright as they witnessed them during the Clinton years.
The first of these historical experiences is a negative lesson from a generally positive outcome. The venue was the ruins of Yugoslavia. The time frame was the 1990s. The cause was "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. The outcome was a seeming success with the atrocities ended and at least some of the major perpetrators arrested.
The important lesson is not that the intervention by NATO worked. While that is true, it is also less important than the negative lesson which must be taken away from the experience. The operation, including the low risk, high payoff bombing campaign worked simply because of the unique nature of the Bosnian context.
The venue was small, easily isolated. The ethnic rivals were easily identified. The support among the larger population for the atrocities committed by the ethnic cleansers was weak and easily eroded. The participants on all sides came to be revolted by their own excesses. Beyond that, there was a growing fear that if the chaos was not ended quickly, it would become an unendable monster as the dead increasingly dictated a policy of revenge and counter-revenge.
There was an almost palpable sense of relief in the disintegrating remnants of Yugoslavia when NATO and the US provided a way out. Promised a chance to end the mutual dance of slaughter without any particular group losing either face or internal cohesion.
In short, Mr Perry, Ms Albright, et al should take a firm grip on the ground truth of Bosnia. It constitutes a success which is nearly non-replicable.
There are other realities which the group headed by the ex-SecDef and ex-SecState should get a grip on. It is even more important that Susan Rice and others in the incoming Obama Administration get a grip on the limitations inherent to any attempt to prevent or punish genocide or other crimes against the purported rights of all humans.
Mr Perry and Ms Albright were around during the debacle of the US intervention in Somalia. They were witnesses if not architects of the disastrous adventure in mission creep which saw the US start out with the High Minded but achievable goal of protecting UN humanitarian relief convoys and distribution centers. Over the span of only a few months, the mission shifted from one of defending convoys and centers to one of suppressing warlords and building a nation.
Insufficient force combined with deficient planning and an excess of ignoring basic intelligence concerning the Somalis and an exuberance of ideology to assure an American defeat. Make no mistake about it. We were defeated in Somalia. Defeated in the field in the course of one botched commando style raid. Defeated in our political will by the televised imagery of American corpses dragged through the dust of Mogadishu.
The defeat of the US in Somalia had long term consequences. Consequences with which we are still dealing. The American defeat convinced Osama bin Ladin and others that the US lacked the stomach for killing and being killed. It convinced these prototypical jihadists that they could achieve their policy goal of forcing the US out of the Mideast if only they could inflict enough casualties in a high profile way on our citizens and troops.
The rest is, as they say, history. More properly, it is the Law of Unintended Consequences at work.
Another argument against taking action whenever and wherever violations of human rights occurs is the nature of international politics. Countries such as China and Russia have a sensitive regard for protecting "internal affairs" from the actions or even the inspection of outsiders. It is necessary to balance our national interests which may well require the understanding cooperation of major actors such as these two permanent members of the Security Council with emotional or ethical repugnance at the acts of governments such as that of Sudan.
In short, we must carefully assess where our genuine interests reside and not be driven by ideological considerations or the emotional gales of people outraged by gory media depictions of atrocities. Every Great Power from Great Britain in the Sudan over a hundred years ago to us in the past decade has suffered the negative consequences of emotional and ideologically driven policy decisions.
A final cautionary note for all of those eager to embrace the propositions of the Perry-Albright report (that means you, Ms Rice,) Well intended humanitarian actions may well have the result of freeing obnoxious governments from the necessity of basic reform. The efforts of High Minded, Lofty Thinking outsiders to alleviate human suffering in the short-term may well result in the paradoxical effect of assuring the suffering continues in the long run.
The paradoxical effects of well-intended efforts at humanitarian relief can be seen time after (literally) bloody time in Africa. Sometimes and under some conditions the best love is tough love, the best humanitarian gesture is doing nothing. There are times and places such as Zimbabwe today where only the absence of aid and the concomitant increase of human suffering will serve to cure the greater ill: The government of Kleptocrat in Chief Robert Mugabe.
It is neither pleasurable nor instructive to stand by with folded arms as people suffer and die. Neither is it pleasurable or instructive to watch as foreign troops fight, kill, and die in order to end atrocities or punish their perpetrators.
That's why foreign policy is usually a matter of choosing the least-worst option. That is why only cool assessment of genuine national interests and not feel good emotions or ideology must be the basis for foreign policy.
The report urged the incoming Obama Administration to reorganise the National Security Council and other components of the national security establishment to reflect this conclusion. While cheerfully acknowledging that the Cohen-Albright report is filled with High Minded, Lofty Thinking, the Geek is unconvinced that enforcement of "human rights," however narrowly they may be defined, is necessarily in the national or strategic interests of the United States.
Even the matter of genocide is not necessarily one that the US should, let alone, must, respond to even in the context of multilateral action. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (ratified by the US in 1988) like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the product of its time.
Specifically, the Genocide Convention was the product of revulsion throughout the Western world over the state sponsored slaughter of discrete ethno/linguistic/religious communities by the Nazi government of Germany. (It is doubtful that Joe Stalin was all that perturbed by the tales of extermination considering his extensive personal experience with liquidating undesirable populations.)
In 1948 the definition of genocide was easy. The example was right in front of the world's leaders and peoples. In more recent years, the edges of definition have become ever more fuzzy, ever more blurred by propagandists and ideologues alike. The political goals and ideological imperatives override any objective definition and consensual understanding of the actions which genuinely constitute genocide.
The charge of "genocide" is hurled at the Israelis by partisans of the Palestinians. It is heaved by the Kremlin to justify the Russian invasion of Georgia. Taliban chieftains accuse the US of pursuing genocide in Afghanistan. The central regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charges the government of Rwanda of genocide by proxy.
You get the point.
The highly undistinguished former Secretary of Defense and his equally-at-sea counterpart from State want the military to incorporate genocide prevention (and, presumably, punishment) in its official doctrine. (Hint to Mr Perry: It's already there in all the doctrinal corpus that covers interventionary operations.) The report also demands that the intelligence community add genocide and related human rights violations to its already overstocked plate of missions and tasks. (Hint to Mr Perry and Ms Albright: Such reporting is already present even if it is not labeled as such.)
The Geek does not contemplate genocide with total detachment and equanimity although he is willing to admit that life as a historian hardens one to the extent and brutality of calculating governmental brutality. He is not willing to buy into the proposition that genocide per se let alone violations of human rights constitutes a threat to American national interests and security which compels response beyond the rhetorical.
There are several historically rooted reasons buttressing the contention that massive violations of human rights including the starkest expression of violation, genocide, does not constitute a threat to national interests and security. Some of these should be self-evident to Mr Perry and Ms Albright as they witnessed them during the Clinton years.
The first of these historical experiences is a negative lesson from a generally positive outcome. The venue was the ruins of Yugoslavia. The time frame was the 1990s. The cause was "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. The outcome was a seeming success with the atrocities ended and at least some of the major perpetrators arrested.
The important lesson is not that the intervention by NATO worked. While that is true, it is also less important than the negative lesson which must be taken away from the experience. The operation, including the low risk, high payoff bombing campaign worked simply because of the unique nature of the Bosnian context.
The venue was small, easily isolated. The ethnic rivals were easily identified. The support among the larger population for the atrocities committed by the ethnic cleansers was weak and easily eroded. The participants on all sides came to be revolted by their own excesses. Beyond that, there was a growing fear that if the chaos was not ended quickly, it would become an unendable monster as the dead increasingly dictated a policy of revenge and counter-revenge.
There was an almost palpable sense of relief in the disintegrating remnants of Yugoslavia when NATO and the US provided a way out. Promised a chance to end the mutual dance of slaughter without any particular group losing either face or internal cohesion.
In short, Mr Perry, Ms Albright, et al should take a firm grip on the ground truth of Bosnia. It constitutes a success which is nearly non-replicable.
There are other realities which the group headed by the ex-SecDef and ex-SecState should get a grip on. It is even more important that Susan Rice and others in the incoming Obama Administration get a grip on the limitations inherent to any attempt to prevent or punish genocide or other crimes against the purported rights of all humans.
Mr Perry and Ms Albright were around during the debacle of the US intervention in Somalia. They were witnesses if not architects of the disastrous adventure in mission creep which saw the US start out with the High Minded but achievable goal of protecting UN humanitarian relief convoys and distribution centers. Over the span of only a few months, the mission shifted from one of defending convoys and centers to one of suppressing warlords and building a nation.
Insufficient force combined with deficient planning and an excess of ignoring basic intelligence concerning the Somalis and an exuberance of ideology to assure an American defeat. Make no mistake about it. We were defeated in Somalia. Defeated in the field in the course of one botched commando style raid. Defeated in our political will by the televised imagery of American corpses dragged through the dust of Mogadishu.
The defeat of the US in Somalia had long term consequences. Consequences with which we are still dealing. The American defeat convinced Osama bin Ladin and others that the US lacked the stomach for killing and being killed. It convinced these prototypical jihadists that they could achieve their policy goal of forcing the US out of the Mideast if only they could inflict enough casualties in a high profile way on our citizens and troops.
The rest is, as they say, history. More properly, it is the Law of Unintended Consequences at work.
Another argument against taking action whenever and wherever violations of human rights occurs is the nature of international politics. Countries such as China and Russia have a sensitive regard for protecting "internal affairs" from the actions or even the inspection of outsiders. It is necessary to balance our national interests which may well require the understanding cooperation of major actors such as these two permanent members of the Security Council with emotional or ethical repugnance at the acts of governments such as that of Sudan.
In short, we must carefully assess where our genuine interests reside and not be driven by ideological considerations or the emotional gales of people outraged by gory media depictions of atrocities. Every Great Power from Great Britain in the Sudan over a hundred years ago to us in the past decade has suffered the negative consequences of emotional and ideologically driven policy decisions.
A final cautionary note for all of those eager to embrace the propositions of the Perry-Albright report (that means you, Ms Rice,) Well intended humanitarian actions may well have the result of freeing obnoxious governments from the necessity of basic reform. The efforts of High Minded, Lofty Thinking outsiders to alleviate human suffering in the short-term may well result in the paradoxical effect of assuring the suffering continues in the long run.
The paradoxical effects of well-intended efforts at humanitarian relief can be seen time after (literally) bloody time in Africa. Sometimes and under some conditions the best love is tough love, the best humanitarian gesture is doing nothing. There are times and places such as Zimbabwe today where only the absence of aid and the concomitant increase of human suffering will serve to cure the greater ill: The government of Kleptocrat in Chief Robert Mugabe.
It is neither pleasurable nor instructive to stand by with folded arms as people suffer and die. Neither is it pleasurable or instructive to watch as foreign troops fight, kill, and die in order to end atrocities or punish their perpetrators.
That's why foreign policy is usually a matter of choosing the least-worst option. That is why only cool assessment of genuine national interests and not feel good emotions or ideology must be the basis for foreign policy.
How Close Is Mexico To Collapse?
The Mideast continues to exercise black hole level appeal to the US mainstream media and the attention of those few politicians who can tear their eyes (and calculations) away from failing banks, collapsing auto makers, and an imploding economy. Everyone has gotten into the act of offering advice to Barack Obama on what he should/must/can do to assure Mideast peace in our time.
From former Iranian presidents to the current Nobel Peace Prize recipient come torrents of well-intended suggestions for peace. When not gazing like a spotlighted deer at the Israel-Palestinian morass, attention is given to the swamp called Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan and, most recently, the attacks in Mumbai. Except for an occasional glance tossed in the direction of the Merry Pirates of Puntland or the "humanitarian crises" in Darfur, Zimbabwe, and the Congo, the foreign policy and national security focus of the US stays firmly on the Mideast and Northwest Asia.
This is in keeping with the sweep of American foreign policy over the past century or so. Things falling apart far from our shores and even only tangential to our interests get the attention. Grave matters right next door are met with yawning indifference.
It's true that a few people looked askance at the rise of Hugo Chavez and his stridently anti-American agenda backed by improving relations with Iran and Russia. But hardly a soul noted the advent of equally anti-American regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador. Even fewer seemed to notice that Paraguay is lurching into the anti-US, pro-Hezbollah constellation.
Now to the nitty-gritty. Mexico. A place more deadly than Iraq. More lethal than Afghanistan.
The government of Felix Calderon inaugurated a full scale war on narcotrafficking in 2007. The use of the term "war" is appropriate as the Mexican army has been employed on a massive scale and the body count is impressive to say the least. The term "war" is also appropriate as the drug industry has grown to a level of power and has so penetrated the government and police forces that it poses an existential threat to the central regime.
This year the violence of the war has increased greatly--no--monumentally. Through the end of November some 5,376 people have been killed in the fighting between the government and the drug smugglers or in the inter-gang violence. In comparison only 2,477 died during the same period of 2007. (A further comparison of interest: The body count for 2008 alone is greater than the aggregate total of Americans killed in both Iraq and Afghanistan from day one through today.)
The killings have not only escalated in numbers, they have escalated in sheer barbarism as well. The drug gangsters have adopted the jihadist notion of decapitation with an exuberance which boggles the mind. They have even added some wrinkles which have eluded the jihadists such as rolling cut off heads like bowling balls into restaurants and bars.
The drug related massacre has been accompanied by a grotesque increase in the number of kidnappings for ransom. No longer are the victims of this practice (which often ends with the victim's body being found in an abandoned car) confined to members of the Mexican rico class. Now even the children of street market booth proprietors are at risk. Since the overwhelming majority of kidnappings are never reported to the police (often from fear that the police are themselves involved in the crime), the exact number of snatches will never be known with precision. Estimates range from a low of not quite one per day to a conservative high of three each and every day.
The apprehension felt by many Mexicans that the police are involved in crime has been borne out in recent weeks by the high profile arrests of individuals ranging from file clerks to department heads on charges of corruption--of being bought and paid for employees of the smugglers.
While low level corruption has been endemic among the poorly paid and badly trained Mexican police for decades, the recent revelations of corruption in the highest levels of law enforcement have rocked confidence not only in the criminal justice system but in the capacity of the central government to provide even the most fundamental service of government: protection of the citizen from violence.
There are other very disturbing indicators of a state in distress, a state on the verge of collapse. Over the past eight years more than 150,000 men have deserted from the Mexican armed forces. That's right 150,000! Of these, some fifteen hundred have been members of various "elite" formations. These are the units most often called upon for the most dangerous operations against the drug cartels.
It might also be mentioned that at least some of these deserters, including those from the elite units which have received training by Americans or in the United States, now provide the most effective "muscle" for the cartels. Los Zetas has gained the highest notoriety in this area of endeavor but is not the only such group.
There is yet another consideration. Mexican stability like the well-being of many Mexican families depends upon the flow of cash from the US. In 2007 the Bank of Mexico reported that a record amount of dollars--23 billion, 979 million--flowed to the country from "migrants" primarily those resident in the US. This year the total is expected to reach 23.5 billion.
That's only a slight decrease. But it is a sign of things to come. Remittances are falling along with the US economy. They may drop to less than 20 billion next year. They may drop more.
While the total loss of remittances from "migrants" in the US can not be predicted with certainty, we can get a grip on one inevitable consequence. Social instability will increase. Another consequence is almost as inevitable. Reliance upon drug smuggling will grow. Along with that, violence will escalate.
Mexico's neighbor to the south, Guatemala, is suffering partial collapse as the result of the operations of drug cartels. Last week, cartel violence along the Mexico-Guatemala border reached a level that the redeployment of Mexican national army units was necessary to contain it. Much of Guatemala is outside the control of the central government. This government is fragile in the extreme. It must be remembered that the country underwent some thirty-six years of insurgency which ended only in 1996 after costing more than 100,000 lives.
The drug cartels move into governmental vacuums and such has been the case both in Guatemala and the southern states of Mexico. (You might remember the uprising in Chiapas state which garnered an inordinate amount of transient media attention some fifteen years ago.)
The vacuum is spreading in Mexico as the economy goes south and the drugs flow north. Thus, it is to be expected that violence--including an increase in attacks on the less than robust infrastructure of the southern Mexican oil fields--will reach the level that so far has been experienced only in the northern states along the US border.
Columbia almost went down the abyss of collapse. It was almost destroyed by a combination of drugs and insurgency. It still isn't a model of stability although it no longer teeters on the ragged edge of failure. But, Columbia survived due in large measure to an unprecedented amount of American attention and assistance The direct US aid to the Colombian military and police forces exceeded the four hundred million dollars promised Mexico under current plans by more than an order of magnitude.
So there it is. Violence which touches the lives of many, many Mexicans. Fear in the middle class that has resulted even in migration. Loss of confidence in the government and the instruments of national security. The prospect of even more of the same in the foreseeable future.
It is long past time that the situation in Mexico can be ignored by the US government and media. There is a collapsing state on our southern border. The implications of this are not at all good from an American perspective. The US government and We the People have several options available to us. None are completely palatable. But, one must be discussed, chosen, and implemented.
It is time for a change. One can only hope that the President-elect and his policy crew are aware of this. One can only hope that they get a firm grip on the reality to the south and move quickly to help Mexico solve the existential threat it faces.
From former Iranian presidents to the current Nobel Peace Prize recipient come torrents of well-intended suggestions for peace. When not gazing like a spotlighted deer at the Israel-Palestinian morass, attention is given to the swamp called Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan and, most recently, the attacks in Mumbai. Except for an occasional glance tossed in the direction of the Merry Pirates of Puntland or the "humanitarian crises" in Darfur, Zimbabwe, and the Congo, the foreign policy and national security focus of the US stays firmly on the Mideast and Northwest Asia.
This is in keeping with the sweep of American foreign policy over the past century or so. Things falling apart far from our shores and even only tangential to our interests get the attention. Grave matters right next door are met with yawning indifference.
It's true that a few people looked askance at the rise of Hugo Chavez and his stridently anti-American agenda backed by improving relations with Iran and Russia. But hardly a soul noted the advent of equally anti-American regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador. Even fewer seemed to notice that Paraguay is lurching into the anti-US, pro-Hezbollah constellation.
Now to the nitty-gritty. Mexico. A place more deadly than Iraq. More lethal than Afghanistan.
The government of Felix Calderon inaugurated a full scale war on narcotrafficking in 2007. The use of the term "war" is appropriate as the Mexican army has been employed on a massive scale and the body count is impressive to say the least. The term "war" is also appropriate as the drug industry has grown to a level of power and has so penetrated the government and police forces that it poses an existential threat to the central regime.
This year the violence of the war has increased greatly--no--monumentally. Through the end of November some 5,376 people have been killed in the fighting between the government and the drug smugglers or in the inter-gang violence. In comparison only 2,477 died during the same period of 2007. (A further comparison of interest: The body count for 2008 alone is greater than the aggregate total of Americans killed in both Iraq and Afghanistan from day one through today.)
The killings have not only escalated in numbers, they have escalated in sheer barbarism as well. The drug gangsters have adopted the jihadist notion of decapitation with an exuberance which boggles the mind. They have even added some wrinkles which have eluded the jihadists such as rolling cut off heads like bowling balls into restaurants and bars.
The drug related massacre has been accompanied by a grotesque increase in the number of kidnappings for ransom. No longer are the victims of this practice (which often ends with the victim's body being found in an abandoned car) confined to members of the Mexican rico class. Now even the children of street market booth proprietors are at risk. Since the overwhelming majority of kidnappings are never reported to the police (often from fear that the police are themselves involved in the crime), the exact number of snatches will never be known with precision. Estimates range from a low of not quite one per day to a conservative high of three each and every day.
The apprehension felt by many Mexicans that the police are involved in crime has been borne out in recent weeks by the high profile arrests of individuals ranging from file clerks to department heads on charges of corruption--of being bought and paid for employees of the smugglers.
While low level corruption has been endemic among the poorly paid and badly trained Mexican police for decades, the recent revelations of corruption in the highest levels of law enforcement have rocked confidence not only in the criminal justice system but in the capacity of the central government to provide even the most fundamental service of government: protection of the citizen from violence.
There are other very disturbing indicators of a state in distress, a state on the verge of collapse. Over the past eight years more than 150,000 men have deserted from the Mexican armed forces. That's right 150,000! Of these, some fifteen hundred have been members of various "elite" formations. These are the units most often called upon for the most dangerous operations against the drug cartels.
It might also be mentioned that at least some of these deserters, including those from the elite units which have received training by Americans or in the United States, now provide the most effective "muscle" for the cartels. Los Zetas has gained the highest notoriety in this area of endeavor but is not the only such group.
There is yet another consideration. Mexican stability like the well-being of many Mexican families depends upon the flow of cash from the US. In 2007 the Bank of Mexico reported that a record amount of dollars--23 billion, 979 million--flowed to the country from "migrants" primarily those resident in the US. This year the total is expected to reach 23.5 billion.
That's only a slight decrease. But it is a sign of things to come. Remittances are falling along with the US economy. They may drop to less than 20 billion next year. They may drop more.
While the total loss of remittances from "migrants" in the US can not be predicted with certainty, we can get a grip on one inevitable consequence. Social instability will increase. Another consequence is almost as inevitable. Reliance upon drug smuggling will grow. Along with that, violence will escalate.
Mexico's neighbor to the south, Guatemala, is suffering partial collapse as the result of the operations of drug cartels. Last week, cartel violence along the Mexico-Guatemala border reached a level that the redeployment of Mexican national army units was necessary to contain it. Much of Guatemala is outside the control of the central government. This government is fragile in the extreme. It must be remembered that the country underwent some thirty-six years of insurgency which ended only in 1996 after costing more than 100,000 lives.
The drug cartels move into governmental vacuums and such has been the case both in Guatemala and the southern states of Mexico. (You might remember the uprising in Chiapas state which garnered an inordinate amount of transient media attention some fifteen years ago.)
The vacuum is spreading in Mexico as the economy goes south and the drugs flow north. Thus, it is to be expected that violence--including an increase in attacks on the less than robust infrastructure of the southern Mexican oil fields--will reach the level that so far has been experienced only in the northern states along the US border.
Columbia almost went down the abyss of collapse. It was almost destroyed by a combination of drugs and insurgency. It still isn't a model of stability although it no longer teeters on the ragged edge of failure. But, Columbia survived due in large measure to an unprecedented amount of American attention and assistance The direct US aid to the Colombian military and police forces exceeded the four hundred million dollars promised Mexico under current plans by more than an order of magnitude.
So there it is. Violence which touches the lives of many, many Mexicans. Fear in the middle class that has resulted even in migration. Loss of confidence in the government and the instruments of national security. The prospect of even more of the same in the foreseeable future.
It is long past time that the situation in Mexico can be ignored by the US government and media. There is a collapsing state on our southern border. The implications of this are not at all good from an American perspective. The US government and We the People have several options available to us. None are completely palatable. But, one must be discussed, chosen, and implemented.
It is time for a change. One can only hope that the President-elect and his policy crew are aware of this. One can only hope that they get a firm grip on the reality to the south and move quickly to help Mexico solve the existential threat it faces.
Tuesday, December 9, 2008
The UN Secretary General Is Out To Lunch--Again
Ban ki-Moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has again demonstrated that the size of the UN's ambition is matched only by the breadth of its ineptitude. At a meeting of the UN Security Council called to consider the recent attacks on Mumbai, he bloviated at some length concerning the "ideal" nature of the UN in combating terrorism.
The Geek would like to know who the SecGen's dealer is because the jefe of the Hudson River Follies is clearly taking some truly righteous mind altering substance if he actually believes that the 190 + nation monster can tackle terrorism around the world with any hope of even the slightest success. If Ban ki-Moon ain't on drugs then he is utterly without a grip on reality. That includes the realities of the organisation over which he presides.
The Secretary General might want to reflect on some unpleasant ground truths about the overly ambitious UN. He might, for example, take note that the outfit has not yet been able to devise a definition of "terrorism" which is politically acceptable to a plurality of the members. This despite years of jawing and yammering on the subject by a specially appointed commission.
As a next step, Ban might want to contemplate the reason for the failure to achieve even a small measure of consensus on defining terrorism. He might meditate on a couple of simple facts. The first of these is the nature of the UN. While the High Minded Lofty Thinking proponents of the "death of the nation-state" perspective might wish it otherwise, the UN is comprised of more than 190 sovereign, independent states. Each of these is guided in its foreign policy by its own understanding of national interest and the relation between foreign and domestic politics.
After getting a firm grip on that basement truth, the Secretary General might well profit from considering a key implication. Among the member states there are some which facilitate terrorism out of a sensitive regard for internal politics. There are others which sponsor or facilitate terrorism by non-state actors for purposes of foreign policy. Yet others have state agencies which, directly or indirectly, employ terror as an instrument of national power. Then there are states which cut deals with terrorist groups--leave us alone and we will overlook your plots against other states. Finally, there are those states which are the targets of terror.
If the well-intentioned Secretary General survives this first exercise in examining the actualities governing the UN's stance on terrorism, he can move on to the second round. There is absolutely no agreement among the majority of the UN's membership as to the correct strategy and tactics with which to counter terrorism.
There are those governments--and non-governmental organisations--which argue terrorism is caused by economic and political marginalisation. The proponents of this hypothesis (which is no way born out by the realities of terrorist backgrounds nor the political goals of terrorist groups) maintain that massive development programs will assuage the poverty which drives men to don suicide vests or hijack aircraft. Others argue that enhancing democracy or rendering governments more responsive will achieve the desired effect of ending terrorism by ending the motivations driving people to take desperate, suicidal (and homicidal) acts.
There are governments--and NGOs--which argue that only a severe alteration of American foreign policy will end the terrorist threat. The argument is a version of the hoary and long discredited defense in a rape case--"the victim made me do it." There may be some truth to the contention that an American abandonment of the Mideast (and other sections of the globe) and subsequent withdrawal into some sort of Fortress America would lessen the motivation for terrorism by giving the terrorists a global victory. But, considering the dynamics of world politics to say nothing of American domestic politics, this is scarcely a viable option.
Then there are those governments--and others--which argue that any military confrontation either with non-state terrorist actors or those states which sponsor, facilitate, or harbor them must be through the UN. As for that position it is only necessary to give cursory consideration to the UN's less than stellar record in peace imposition and peace keeping. Only twice in its history has the UN given its "blessing" to multilateral peace imposition efforts. Both of those involved unprovoked cross-border invasions.
A few voices have been raised in support of the utopian notion of the UN having its own armed force. In this way the Security Council would have a force immediately available without having to rely on the contributions of the member-states, most of which are military nullities lacking even the capacity to impose peace at a soccer riot. The question of where the troops and officers might be recruited is never addressed by the Lofty Thinkers espousing this position. Neither are the far from insignificant questions of equipment (including procurement), training, and basing. And, no thought is ever given to such problems as doctrine.
The High Minded who would like to see a UN force in being also overlook the difficulties of command and control. This means not simply the tactical problems associated with this critical area but, more importantly, the vexing questions of political goals, rules of engagement, and, even, how would command be vested considering the size and composition of the Security Council.
When--or, more properly, IF, the Secretary General and those others in the UN who share his view of the UN being "ideal" as the leader in countering terrorism can answer all--or any--of these real, live problems, then the US and others might take a good look at the potential the UN constitutes. But, for now, in the real world of real governments and real terrorists and real dead bodies, Ban ki-Moon must be ruled, Out To Lunch.
The Geek would like to know who the SecGen's dealer is because the jefe of the Hudson River Follies is clearly taking some truly righteous mind altering substance if he actually believes that the 190 + nation monster can tackle terrorism around the world with any hope of even the slightest success. If Ban ki-Moon ain't on drugs then he is utterly without a grip on reality. That includes the realities of the organisation over which he presides.
The Secretary General might want to reflect on some unpleasant ground truths about the overly ambitious UN. He might, for example, take note that the outfit has not yet been able to devise a definition of "terrorism" which is politically acceptable to a plurality of the members. This despite years of jawing and yammering on the subject by a specially appointed commission.
As a next step, Ban might want to contemplate the reason for the failure to achieve even a small measure of consensus on defining terrorism. He might meditate on a couple of simple facts. The first of these is the nature of the UN. While the High Minded Lofty Thinking proponents of the "death of the nation-state" perspective might wish it otherwise, the UN is comprised of more than 190 sovereign, independent states. Each of these is guided in its foreign policy by its own understanding of national interest and the relation between foreign and domestic politics.
After getting a firm grip on that basement truth, the Secretary General might well profit from considering a key implication. Among the member states there are some which facilitate terrorism out of a sensitive regard for internal politics. There are others which sponsor or facilitate terrorism by non-state actors for purposes of foreign policy. Yet others have state agencies which, directly or indirectly, employ terror as an instrument of national power. Then there are states which cut deals with terrorist groups--leave us alone and we will overlook your plots against other states. Finally, there are those states which are the targets of terror.
If the well-intentioned Secretary General survives this first exercise in examining the actualities governing the UN's stance on terrorism, he can move on to the second round. There is absolutely no agreement among the majority of the UN's membership as to the correct strategy and tactics with which to counter terrorism.
There are those governments--and non-governmental organisations--which argue terrorism is caused by economic and political marginalisation. The proponents of this hypothesis (which is no way born out by the realities of terrorist backgrounds nor the political goals of terrorist groups) maintain that massive development programs will assuage the poverty which drives men to don suicide vests or hijack aircraft. Others argue that enhancing democracy or rendering governments more responsive will achieve the desired effect of ending terrorism by ending the motivations driving people to take desperate, suicidal (and homicidal) acts.
There are governments--and NGOs--which argue that only a severe alteration of American foreign policy will end the terrorist threat. The argument is a version of the hoary and long discredited defense in a rape case--"the victim made me do it." There may be some truth to the contention that an American abandonment of the Mideast (and other sections of the globe) and subsequent withdrawal into some sort of Fortress America would lessen the motivation for terrorism by giving the terrorists a global victory. But, considering the dynamics of world politics to say nothing of American domestic politics, this is scarcely a viable option.
Then there are those governments--and others--which argue that any military confrontation either with non-state terrorist actors or those states which sponsor, facilitate, or harbor them must be through the UN. As for that position it is only necessary to give cursory consideration to the UN's less than stellar record in peace imposition and peace keeping. Only twice in its history has the UN given its "blessing" to multilateral peace imposition efforts. Both of those involved unprovoked cross-border invasions.
A few voices have been raised in support of the utopian notion of the UN having its own armed force. In this way the Security Council would have a force immediately available without having to rely on the contributions of the member-states, most of which are military nullities lacking even the capacity to impose peace at a soccer riot. The question of where the troops and officers might be recruited is never addressed by the Lofty Thinkers espousing this position. Neither are the far from insignificant questions of equipment (including procurement), training, and basing. And, no thought is ever given to such problems as doctrine.
The High Minded who would like to see a UN force in being also overlook the difficulties of command and control. This means not simply the tactical problems associated with this critical area but, more importantly, the vexing questions of political goals, rules of engagement, and, even, how would command be vested considering the size and composition of the Security Council.
When--or, more properly, IF, the Secretary General and those others in the UN who share his view of the UN being "ideal" as the leader in countering terrorism can answer all--or any--of these real, live problems, then the US and others might take a good look at the potential the UN constitutes. But, for now, in the real world of real governments and real terrorists and real dead bodies, Ban ki-Moon must be ruled, Out To Lunch.
Sunday, December 7, 2008
Obama Better Not Quit Smoking Quite Yet
Reputedly cigarettes are an effective anodyne when a person is tense--stressed. The way things are going in Afghanistan (and elsewhere around the world) the incoming administration will be facing a very high uptightness factor.
To put it bluntly, the US is further away from the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing" in Afghanistan today than it was even a few months ago. While the downhill trajectory of US fortunes in that miserable geographic expression was apparent early this year, only recently have the Deep Thinkers inside the Beltway gone public on it.
The most salient indicator of declining American fortunes comes with the announcement that US troops must be deployed in Logar and Wardak provinces south of Kabul. This is the first time that US combat units have been sent to these provinces. The first time that the US had to establish what amounts to a close-in perimeter defense of Kabul.
This development means that the roughly four thousand members of the 10th Mountain Division will not be going to the critical area on the Pakistan border. Rather than carrying the war to the bad guys on their transit routes to and from base camps in Pakistan, the 10th Mountain's Third Brigade will be guarding the Afghan capital. Protecting the rear so to speak.
Logar and Wardak have never been noted as centers of strong support for the Karzai regime. In recent months the reinvigorated Taliban has thoroughly penetrated the provinces, gaining significant (and growing) support from the folks who live there. It is clear that Taliban has made propaganda capital not only out of every US/NATO airstrike which produced civilian fatalities but also from their own "successes" such as the killing of three US troops and their Afghan interpreter last June in Wardak.
The level of popular support as well as the number of Taliban initiated incidents shows no sign of leveling off. Additionally, US and NATO intelligence in the two provinces is extremely limited to say the least. (Perhaps we should airdrop some satellite telephones or at least a few hundred cell phones so COMINT can have something to catch.)
Wardak and Logar have the potential to become the functional equivalent of the Parrot's Beak and War Zone D during the Vietnam War. Like these two infamous areas near Saigon, the two provinces have the real possibility of becoming black holes whose gravity wells have the power to suck in an endless number of American troops on missions which have importance only to the extent that they prevent or limit enemy offensives directed at the capital.
Wars are not won (or even "not lost") by defensive orientations or by granting the initiative to the enemy. They are not won (or even "not-lost") by protecting a capital, guarding a government, or preventing mediagenic enemy launched spectaculars of the Tet Offensive sort.
Wars are won (or "not-lost") by taking the initiative and holding it. They are won or "not-lost" by eroding the enemy's material capacity and political will to continue. In Afghanistan that means the critical physical terrain is along the border--not adjacent to the capital.
A second very strong indication of just how badly affairs are going in Afghanistan is the expectation that there will be no winter stand-down this year. Each of the past winters Taliban has invoked that hoary old notion of going into winter quarters when the weather turned from the merely miserable to the utterly execrable. Our side reciprocated in kind.
This year life will be a lot different and a lot worse for the grunts in-country. Taliban shows no sign of losing its momentum by retiring to warmer climes for the winter. Our technology gives us certain advantages even as the winds hit gale force, the snow gives new meaning to the term "blizzard conditions," and the ceiling drops to zero (along with the thermometer.) Taliban is taking a risk by keeping the war going but its leadership evidently believes that maintaining its psychological and political momentum is worth it.
A third indicator of the parlous state in which the US finds itself is the attack on the logistics support facilities in Peshawar. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the targets were two parking lots filled with US vehicles.) While the twin attacks might not have impaired US combat capacity, they do serve as another warning about the tenuous lines of supply on which our augmented forces will be dependent.
About three quarters of the supplies needed by our and allied forces in Afghanistan flows out of Peshawar up through the Khyber Pass. As any number of historical examples show, the Khyber is an easily blocked choke point. Before getting to the Khyber Pass the supplies must be trucked from the port of Karachi to Peshawar. Think of the highway as a long, long ambush site.
The Pakistani armed forces have not shown a convincing capacity to secure the land lines of communication. Heck, the Pakistani army couldn't even respond to the attacks in Peshawar despite having a large number of troops in the city. Given the prickly sensitivities of the Pakistanis regarding sovereignty, there is nothing the US can do directly to assure the proper securing of the critical lines of supply.
The President-elect opined this weekend that the economic conditions in the US were going to get worse before they get better. The same may be said concerning our efforts in Afghanistan. With one critical difference.
The difference?
We can be reasonably certain on several bases that the economy will improve ultimately. The same assurance does not exist regarding Afghanistan.
Our situation in Afghanistan will get worse. Of that we can be sure. There is no certainty that it will then, perforce, get better.
Best not quite smoking quite yet, Mr President-elect. The real high pucker time is yet to come.
To put it bluntly, the US is further away from the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing" in Afghanistan today than it was even a few months ago. While the downhill trajectory of US fortunes in that miserable geographic expression was apparent early this year, only recently have the Deep Thinkers inside the Beltway gone public on it.
The most salient indicator of declining American fortunes comes with the announcement that US troops must be deployed in Logar and Wardak provinces south of Kabul. This is the first time that US combat units have been sent to these provinces. The first time that the US had to establish what amounts to a close-in perimeter defense of Kabul.
This development means that the roughly four thousand members of the 10th Mountain Division will not be going to the critical area on the Pakistan border. Rather than carrying the war to the bad guys on their transit routes to and from base camps in Pakistan, the 10th Mountain's Third Brigade will be guarding the Afghan capital. Protecting the rear so to speak.
Logar and Wardak have never been noted as centers of strong support for the Karzai regime. In recent months the reinvigorated Taliban has thoroughly penetrated the provinces, gaining significant (and growing) support from the folks who live there. It is clear that Taliban has made propaganda capital not only out of every US/NATO airstrike which produced civilian fatalities but also from their own "successes" such as the killing of three US troops and their Afghan interpreter last June in Wardak.
The level of popular support as well as the number of Taliban initiated incidents shows no sign of leveling off. Additionally, US and NATO intelligence in the two provinces is extremely limited to say the least. (Perhaps we should airdrop some satellite telephones or at least a few hundred cell phones so COMINT can have something to catch.)
Wardak and Logar have the potential to become the functional equivalent of the Parrot's Beak and War Zone D during the Vietnam War. Like these two infamous areas near Saigon, the two provinces have the real possibility of becoming black holes whose gravity wells have the power to suck in an endless number of American troops on missions which have importance only to the extent that they prevent or limit enemy offensives directed at the capital.
Wars are not won (or even "not lost") by defensive orientations or by granting the initiative to the enemy. They are not won (or even "not-lost") by protecting a capital, guarding a government, or preventing mediagenic enemy launched spectaculars of the Tet Offensive sort.
Wars are won (or "not-lost") by taking the initiative and holding it. They are won or "not-lost" by eroding the enemy's material capacity and political will to continue. In Afghanistan that means the critical physical terrain is along the border--not adjacent to the capital.
A second very strong indication of just how badly affairs are going in Afghanistan is the expectation that there will be no winter stand-down this year. Each of the past winters Taliban has invoked that hoary old notion of going into winter quarters when the weather turned from the merely miserable to the utterly execrable. Our side reciprocated in kind.
This year life will be a lot different and a lot worse for the grunts in-country. Taliban shows no sign of losing its momentum by retiring to warmer climes for the winter. Our technology gives us certain advantages even as the winds hit gale force, the snow gives new meaning to the term "blizzard conditions," and the ceiling drops to zero (along with the thermometer.) Taliban is taking a risk by keeping the war going but its leadership evidently believes that maintaining its psychological and political momentum is worth it.
A third indicator of the parlous state in which the US finds itself is the attack on the logistics support facilities in Peshawar. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the targets were two parking lots filled with US vehicles.) While the twin attacks might not have impaired US combat capacity, they do serve as another warning about the tenuous lines of supply on which our augmented forces will be dependent.
About three quarters of the supplies needed by our and allied forces in Afghanistan flows out of Peshawar up through the Khyber Pass. As any number of historical examples show, the Khyber is an easily blocked choke point. Before getting to the Khyber Pass the supplies must be trucked from the port of Karachi to Peshawar. Think of the highway as a long, long ambush site.
The Pakistani armed forces have not shown a convincing capacity to secure the land lines of communication. Heck, the Pakistani army couldn't even respond to the attacks in Peshawar despite having a large number of troops in the city. Given the prickly sensitivities of the Pakistanis regarding sovereignty, there is nothing the US can do directly to assure the proper securing of the critical lines of supply.
The President-elect opined this weekend that the economic conditions in the US were going to get worse before they get better. The same may be said concerning our efforts in Afghanistan. With one critical difference.
The difference?
We can be reasonably certain on several bases that the economy will improve ultimately. The same assurance does not exist regarding Afghanistan.
Our situation in Afghanistan will get worse. Of that we can be sure. There is no certainty that it will then, perforce, get better.
Best not quite smoking quite yet, Mr President-elect. The real high pucker time is yet to come.
Saturday, December 6, 2008
Susan Rice Scares The Geek
"Say what, Geek! You sure get a case of the knocking knees right easy."
Yeah, it is easy to say that. Very few people get an anxiety attack over a UN Ambassador--particularly before the person takes office.
To err on the side of candor this is a first for the Geek. He has been able to yawn his way through every previous naming ceremony--even that of John Bolton.
Not this time. This time is different. Come along with the Geek as he lays out his case.
President-elect Obama often promised (before the appropriate audiences only) that he would put a new emphasis on the United Nations and assure that the US played a constructive role in that institution. He has made good on that particular campaign promise--at least symbolically--by restoring the UN Ambassador to cabinet rank.
Without passing on the merits of Obama's decision, suffice it to say that the PR will have a greater, more direct influence upon critical foreign policy decisions than would have been the case had the office been left at its sub-cabinet position. The enhanced influence of the PR on the making and execution of foreign policy undoubtedly will cheer those who seek a greater harmonization of US and UN policy.
The High Minded advocates of greater global cooperation under the blue UN flag will be quite happy with the restoration of the PR's "lost" status. They would be even more gratified if the reality of the next months and years is the PR being not only the American ambassador to the international organization but the UN's ambassador to the Oval Office.
These considerations in and of themselves do not cause the Geek undue apprehension. However, the elevation of the PR to cabinet rank is a necessary part of the context producing the Geek's current anxiety attack. Another contextual factor is the presence of the High Minded, who would be ecstatic should the UN gain greater leverage on American foreign policy,
Another key component of context is the radical shift in the orientation of the UN at both the Security Council and General Assembly levels in recent years. The "mission creep" exhibited by the ever-more-ambitious UN has changed much in the way the outfit operate. It has also served to alter the way in which the organisation views itself and its role in world affairs.
It must be recalled that the primary reason invoked for the creation and maintenance of the UN was the preservation of international peace. The UN was presumed to be both the deterrer of aggression and the punisher of aggressive war when it occurred.
Although often prevented from executing its primary function by the dynamics of the Cold War and the use of the veto by one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the UN did punish aggression at least twice, once in 1950 and again forty years later. The potential, let alone the actuality, of the UN operating to promote effective collective action against an international aggressor gave the organisation legitimate claim upon the support of the American government and people.
The UN provided other useful services to the global welfare over the years. Its attempts to maintain international peace through monitoring and "peacekeeping" forces were meritorious even if rarely effective. Similarly, its efforts at ameliorating the human misery attendant upon both war and natural disasters have been commendable, if, again, less than spectacularly successful.
Starting in the waning days of the Cold War and proceeding at an ever escalating rate, the UN has sought to carve out a new role for itself which is only tangentially related to its original functions. That role can be best described as intervening in the affairs of distressed or collapsing states.
The UN Charter was carefully crafted to prohibit the organisation from interfering in the internal affairs of member states. This principle of non-interference has two champions on the Security Council: China and Russia.
Despite both the strictures imposed by the Charter and the self-interest of at least two Great Powers, the UN has involved itself in more and more internal operations. The involvement has normally been covered by either the declaration of a "humanitarian" crisis or the invocation of a compelling consideration such as "genocide."
From Somalia fifteen years ago to Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo today, the UN has sought an interventionary role. It has gained strong support for this species of mission distorting creep from those in the European Union and the US who see national boundaries and national sovereignty as obsolete or at least obsolescent barriers to the full protection and expansion of human rights.
What this means is both simple and alarming. Should a US administration become convinced for whatsoever reason that the situation in a distressed or collapsing state had progressed to an unacceptable level of bloodshed, it would find a ready and willing collaborator in the dispatch of armed force to protect lives, restore stability, and insure the exercise of human rights
Who could object to such fine, noble, and altruistic sentiments and objectives?
Certainly not Susan Rice. And, here comes the reason for the Geek's trembling.
Ms Rice when she was a staffer on the Clinton National Security Council experienced an epiphany. She saw the aftermath of the bloodletting in Rwanda. She was on the killing fields. She smelled the stench. She saw the death.
And, apparently, she vowed, "Never again." Or, at the least, she has maintained publicly, repeatedly, that she "would go down in flames" in the effort to stop mass killing in the future.
Mass killing is not stopped by simply asking the killers to cease and desist. Wholesale murderers are not famed for their readiness to stop. It takes force to stop force.
It takes killing--and dying--to stop the killing.
Before the peace can be kept, it must exist. It must be imposed. Imposed impartially by an outside military force of high competence, high firepower, high levels of training, high levels of command and control, high levels of discipline. The record of the past several decades demonstrates that such force is possessed by few countries, most of which are located in Europe and North America.
It takes a significant number of troops and a fair risk that some of these will be killed to provide the sort of stability oriented peace imposition mission for which Ms Rice would be willing to go down in flames. Back during the Clinton Administration the US showed both an unwillingness to send enough force or to take casualties when our military was tasked with the "humanitarian" mission in Somalia.
Apparently, Ms Rice missed that. Or, the memory of what happened after a poorly planned and executed Special Forces operation ended in both American deaths and the televised desecration of American bodies. Or, the memory was wiped away by the tears shed for the dead of Rwanda.
Then there is another set of problems which may have eluded Ms Rice in her passionate commitment to assuring more Rwandas do not happen. Sufficient force, sufficient killing and dying can assure that internal violence is halted, domestic peace restored. It can even serve to arrest those suspected of crimes against humanity.
But that is all the outsiders can do. Their guns cannot do more than silence the guns of the killers within. Guns can arrest putative evil doers. Those are the limits of force.
What happens next? What will be done once the killing stops? What other than feeding and housing and caring for the wounded, the fugitives, the fearful?
Will the UN and its member states build a new nation-state in the wreckage of the old? Who decides what type of nation, what variety of state, what form of government, what sort of economy will be erected on the rubble?
How long will it take? How much will it cost? Most importantly, will it work? Is there any realistic chance that a viable entity can be created for the benefit of the residents by the well intentioned High Minded outsiders?
Ms Rice would be very well advised to take a good, cold look at the consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan. Before eagerly sending American and other troops off to Darfur or the Congo or Zimbabwe or Somalia or any of the other states which are or shortly will be distressed, Ms Rice should smell the air of Afghanistan, walk the streets of Afghanistan, smell the dead of Afghanistan.
Ms Rice would be well advised to ask herself if there was any realistic probability that the well intentioned efforts of progressive High Minded folks would result in any better state of peace for the locals than the adventures of the neocon ninnies of recent memory.
Will Ms Rice do any of these things? The Geek is willing to bet hair that she will not. And, that is why her appointment scares him. Ideology, whether of the Right or the Left, does not serve the interests of the US. It doesn't even serve the UN well.
Yeah, it is easy to say that. Very few people get an anxiety attack over a UN Ambassador--particularly before the person takes office.
To err on the side of candor this is a first for the Geek. He has been able to yawn his way through every previous naming ceremony--even that of John Bolton.
Not this time. This time is different. Come along with the Geek as he lays out his case.
President-elect Obama often promised (before the appropriate audiences only) that he would put a new emphasis on the United Nations and assure that the US played a constructive role in that institution. He has made good on that particular campaign promise--at least symbolically--by restoring the UN Ambassador to cabinet rank.
Without passing on the merits of Obama's decision, suffice it to say that the PR will have a greater, more direct influence upon critical foreign policy decisions than would have been the case had the office been left at its sub-cabinet position. The enhanced influence of the PR on the making and execution of foreign policy undoubtedly will cheer those who seek a greater harmonization of US and UN policy.
The High Minded advocates of greater global cooperation under the blue UN flag will be quite happy with the restoration of the PR's "lost" status. They would be even more gratified if the reality of the next months and years is the PR being not only the American ambassador to the international organization but the UN's ambassador to the Oval Office.
These considerations in and of themselves do not cause the Geek undue apprehension. However, the elevation of the PR to cabinet rank is a necessary part of the context producing the Geek's current anxiety attack. Another contextual factor is the presence of the High Minded, who would be ecstatic should the UN gain greater leverage on American foreign policy,
Another key component of context is the radical shift in the orientation of the UN at both the Security Council and General Assembly levels in recent years. The "mission creep" exhibited by the ever-more-ambitious UN has changed much in the way the outfit operate. It has also served to alter the way in which the organisation views itself and its role in world affairs.
It must be recalled that the primary reason invoked for the creation and maintenance of the UN was the preservation of international peace. The UN was presumed to be both the deterrer of aggression and the punisher of aggressive war when it occurred.
Although often prevented from executing its primary function by the dynamics of the Cold War and the use of the veto by one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the UN did punish aggression at least twice, once in 1950 and again forty years later. The potential, let alone the actuality, of the UN operating to promote effective collective action against an international aggressor gave the organisation legitimate claim upon the support of the American government and people.
The UN provided other useful services to the global welfare over the years. Its attempts to maintain international peace through monitoring and "peacekeeping" forces were meritorious even if rarely effective. Similarly, its efforts at ameliorating the human misery attendant upon both war and natural disasters have been commendable, if, again, less than spectacularly successful.
Starting in the waning days of the Cold War and proceeding at an ever escalating rate, the UN has sought to carve out a new role for itself which is only tangentially related to its original functions. That role can be best described as intervening in the affairs of distressed or collapsing states.
The UN Charter was carefully crafted to prohibit the organisation from interfering in the internal affairs of member states. This principle of non-interference has two champions on the Security Council: China and Russia.
Despite both the strictures imposed by the Charter and the self-interest of at least two Great Powers, the UN has involved itself in more and more internal operations. The involvement has normally been covered by either the declaration of a "humanitarian" crisis or the invocation of a compelling consideration such as "genocide."
From Somalia fifteen years ago to Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo today, the UN has sought an interventionary role. It has gained strong support for this species of mission distorting creep from those in the European Union and the US who see national boundaries and national sovereignty as obsolete or at least obsolescent barriers to the full protection and expansion of human rights.
What this means is both simple and alarming. Should a US administration become convinced for whatsoever reason that the situation in a distressed or collapsing state had progressed to an unacceptable level of bloodshed, it would find a ready and willing collaborator in the dispatch of armed force to protect lives, restore stability, and insure the exercise of human rights
Who could object to such fine, noble, and altruistic sentiments and objectives?
Certainly not Susan Rice. And, here comes the reason for the Geek's trembling.
Ms Rice when she was a staffer on the Clinton National Security Council experienced an epiphany. She saw the aftermath of the bloodletting in Rwanda. She was on the killing fields. She smelled the stench. She saw the death.
And, apparently, she vowed, "Never again." Or, at the least, she has maintained publicly, repeatedly, that she "would go down in flames" in the effort to stop mass killing in the future.
Mass killing is not stopped by simply asking the killers to cease and desist. Wholesale murderers are not famed for their readiness to stop. It takes force to stop force.
It takes killing--and dying--to stop the killing.
Before the peace can be kept, it must exist. It must be imposed. Imposed impartially by an outside military force of high competence, high firepower, high levels of training, high levels of command and control, high levels of discipline. The record of the past several decades demonstrates that such force is possessed by few countries, most of which are located in Europe and North America.
It takes a significant number of troops and a fair risk that some of these will be killed to provide the sort of stability oriented peace imposition mission for which Ms Rice would be willing to go down in flames. Back during the Clinton Administration the US showed both an unwillingness to send enough force or to take casualties when our military was tasked with the "humanitarian" mission in Somalia.
Apparently, Ms Rice missed that. Or, the memory of what happened after a poorly planned and executed Special Forces operation ended in both American deaths and the televised desecration of American bodies. Or, the memory was wiped away by the tears shed for the dead of Rwanda.
Then there is another set of problems which may have eluded Ms Rice in her passionate commitment to assuring more Rwandas do not happen. Sufficient force, sufficient killing and dying can assure that internal violence is halted, domestic peace restored. It can even serve to arrest those suspected of crimes against humanity.
But that is all the outsiders can do. Their guns cannot do more than silence the guns of the killers within. Guns can arrest putative evil doers. Those are the limits of force.
What happens next? What will be done once the killing stops? What other than feeding and housing and caring for the wounded, the fugitives, the fearful?
Will the UN and its member states build a new nation-state in the wreckage of the old? Who decides what type of nation, what variety of state, what form of government, what sort of economy will be erected on the rubble?
How long will it take? How much will it cost? Most importantly, will it work? Is there any realistic chance that a viable entity can be created for the benefit of the residents by the well intentioned High Minded outsiders?
Ms Rice would be very well advised to take a good, cold look at the consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan. Before eagerly sending American and other troops off to Darfur or the Congo or Zimbabwe or Somalia or any of the other states which are or shortly will be distressed, Ms Rice should smell the air of Afghanistan, walk the streets of Afghanistan, smell the dead of Afghanistan.
Ms Rice would be well advised to ask herself if there was any realistic probability that the well intentioned efforts of progressive High Minded folks would result in any better state of peace for the locals than the adventures of the neocon ninnies of recent memory.
Will Ms Rice do any of these things? The Geek is willing to bet hair that she will not. And, that is why her appointment scares him. Ideology, whether of the Right or the Left, does not serve the interests of the US. It doesn't even serve the UN well.
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