It is clear that the general well understands the basics of the complex dynamics in Afghanistan. He sees correctly that the war is not one of body counts or phase lines on a map. He understands that the major "terrain" of the war is the collective mind of the Afghan population. He properly underscores the need for US and other foreign troops to stand between the uncommitted majority of the civilian population and harm's way.
A nuance resident in the centrality of using foreign troops as the wall of protection for the civilians of Afghanistan is that by so doing the insurgents, the assorted Islamist jihadists, are forced to come to us. Unless the Black Turbans are willing to risk themselves against the wall of foreign defenders, there is no way that they can seek victory on the human terrain of the Afghan civilian population.
By forcing the Taliban and its ilk to come to us, the initiative is gained by us. It is, as General McChrystal notes at several places in his assessment, imperative that the US and its allies including the Afghan National Forces gain the initiative, the momentum from Taliban. This is done in two ways: carrying the war to the traditional safe havens of Taliban as the British Army and US Marines did this past summer in Helmand or by forcing the enemy to come to us in the contest over the loyalties of the uncommitted majority.
General McChrystal makes a specific and repeated reference to key facts regarding the Afghan population. Most are not positive from the perspective of future success against Taliban. But, some are.
The negative first. The people of Afghanistan are spectacularly weary of the war. It has been eight more years of instability and fear since the Americans and their proxy, the Northern Alliance, ended the Taliban government. That is eight years on top of the preceding decades of war, first against the Soviets and their local stooges and later the internal fighting that brought Taliban to power.
The failure of the US led adventure in regime change to bring either peace or a general improvement in the living conditions of the Afghan population generally has brought in its train a deep disenchantment with both the foreigners and the indigenous government. General McChrystal focuses on the latter factor with a fine precision. He notes in an understated but unmistakable manner that the combination of illegitimacy, corruption, and abusive treatment have undercut the ability of the central regime in Kabul to mobilize support within the uncommitted majority.
If there is a fault in McChrystal's view of the problems faced by the central government, it comes in his overemphasis upon the cruciality of of the central government. He clearly knows that the nature of Afghan society and polity is decentralized, based on face-to-face relations and tribal loyalties, with the result that Afghanistan as a national polity is very much an emergent system with all the untidiness that entails and implies. Being a good Man of the West, he tends to discount the self-organizing capacities of the Afghan polity and society as well as the resilience that brings to the table.
As a result, he focuses too much on the need (which is real, but arguably irrelevant) for thorough governmental reform so as to lower if not eliminate both corruption and abuse of power. It would be both far better and far more likely to bring success against the jihadists if the US and its foreign partners were to stand aside in the game of government and allow the self-organizing capacities of the locals deal with the lacks in Kabul. It would be both far better and far more productive if the US and its foreign allies were to respond to locally generated definitions of required and desired assistance both physical and in the realm of ideas.
On the positive side, McChrystal properly credits the Afghan governmental and military leaders with a will-to-win and a faith in their ability to persevere. As he comments, it is the Afghans who must ultimately win or lose the war. That is true in so far as they have to live there long after we and the rest of the foreign crew have departed. What this implies is the final, political solution must arise from the Afghans. This marks the outer limit of whatever nation building the General might be considering as a part of the overall strategy.
Zeroing in on the Afghan National Forces, McChrystal hits a very important point, one that marks a very important lesson unlearned during the war in Vietnam. The Afghan forces must be included at the spear's tip from right now on into the future. The Afghan forces must bear an ever greater part of the purely military battle against the jihadists, and the US must resist the temptation to do any more heavy lifting than is absolutely necessary.
This is a key point in the assessment. During the Vietnam War the attitude of the US commanders (at all levels down to squad leader) toward the South Vietnamese forces was, "Get out of the way, little puke. We'll win this war for you." Quite unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese were quite willing to allow the big nosed round-eyes to go out and get themselves killed on behalf of the Vietnamese. Also unsurprisingly, the South Vietnamese were not fully combat competent when the US started pulling out. War requires on-the-job training if it is to be waged successfully.
General McChrystal apparently is sensitive to this reality. He writes as if he were quite unwilling to push the Afghans to one side while we win their war for them--and die on their behalf. At the same time he is realist enough to understand that the Afghan national forces are not up to the task yet. They need time to ready themselves, time to take the strain a bit at a time. That is why we and our allies must continue to bear the burden of war fighting and casualty taking for some time to come. That is why more men on the ground, trigger pullers and trainers alike, are necessary.
The McChrystal assessment is not going to make him too many friends in some of the NATO capitals. He correctly dings the majority of the national contingents as being too risk averse to have either any contact with the Afghan population or true military effectiveness against the insurgents. The General writes with a honest pen. The contribution of many of the national contingents to either the peace of mind of the Afghans in their TAOR or the disquiet of the Taliban has been minimal at best.
The national governments of many NATO and other "allies" have been so risk averse that their troops might have done more for the cause of success in Afghanistan if they had stayed at home. When the "whoop-and-a-hollar" rush to join with the US in eliminating al-Qaeda and Taliban decayed under Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld from a quick, certain punitive expedition with a few nation building flourishes into the long slog to nowhere, more than a few governments decided that discretion was the best part of valor and that their publics could not accept fatalities.
Still, despite the discretion which bordered on flying a yellow flag, the casualties mounted over time, all the more so as Taliban spread into previously peaceful portions of Afghanistan, particularly in the north. Killing and dieing were too much for some of the more sensitive souls in assorted NATO and other nations--including our own.
This is why McChrystal emphasizes that time is of the essence. Recognizing as he does that an insurgency is "won" by the side possessing the greater political will and that the political will of the US and its partners is evaporating faster than an ice cube at high noon on a desert rock, he puts a priority on time. Saving time means putting more men at risk.
That is the bitter and brutal equation which pervades the assessment. More men means more risk. More men means more casualties. More men means saving time. Saving time conserves the rapidly depleting store of political will here and abroad.
This distills to the right operational and tactical mix of men and time, of potential casualties, and that relation to political will. This is not an easy problem to solve. Nor will the right answer come from instincts, from gut reactions.
The Obama administration is correct to take some time reflecting on the strategy which resides both explicitly and implicitly in McChrystal's assessment. They must take time--but not too much. Time is not on our side. Time is the best ally Taliban and the other Islamist jihadists possess. That fact coupled with their ability to accept casualties is what makes them a particularly formidable adversary.
To offset this advantage President Obama and his people must take two actions. The first is to respond favorably to the need for more trigger pullers on the ground in Afghanistan in the short to mid-term. The second is to take the case for success, the crying need for success, to the American and world's people. To honestly and accurately lay out what is at stake in the harsh mountains and skeptical minds of Afghanistan.
The president and his people need to purchase both time and political will by telling the truth about Afghanistan and its people. They need to convince We the People and the "progressives" of the Democratic Party most of all that anything other than a convincing military defeat of the Islamist jihadists in Afghanistan means we will be living in fear for decades, perhaps generations to come.
A tough job? Sure. But no tougher than yomping the mountains of Afghanistan wondering where the next IED might be or the next sniper might be hiding.
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