Leaving aside such diversions as the possibility that the "organs of state security" pulled off the 1999 Moscow apartment bombing which was used successfully by Vladimir Putin in his rise to power, the Islamists along with the nationalist oriented insurgents have been a thorn in the bear's flesh for more than a decade now. The single reason for the continued presence of the insurgents as well as their increased pollution by Islamist jihadists is Russia's ineptitude at counterinsurgency.
One of the reasons, perhaps the most important one, for the Kremlin's continued running of diplomatic interference for Iran in the dispute over the mullahocracy's pursuit of nuclear weapons is the misplaced hope that Islamists both at home and abroad can be controlled. The apparent mechanism of choice in seeking control of Islamist jihadist groups is Iran. The quid pro quo is obvious: The Kremlin will protect Iran including the furnishing of air defense systems in return for which Iran will use its influence on Islamist jihadists including those in the North Caucasus.
In the good old days of the Soviet Union the Kremlin had a fair degree of success with the use of indigenous communist groups to control and guide anti-Western groups including insurgent entities fighting the good fight of "anti-colonialism." Proxy wars dotted many regions of the world especially Africa and Latin America. While some surrogates and tools (including Cuba) proved difficult, even impossible to control, the Kremlin was successful in "guiding" the chosen instruments in many of these conflicts.
The Boys In The Kremlin learned a wrong, terribly wrong, lesson from the Soviet successes in proxy conflict. They failed to see that while the "historical inevitability" doctrine of Marxism had a real appeal to the disaffected intelligentsia which commanded the majority of "liberation" movements, there was no inherent appeal resident in any feature of post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, they failed to understand that Russia per se held no fascination for the Islamist jihadists of the world. They even managed to overlook that the first target and the purported first victory of Islamist jihadism was over the Red Army in Afghanistan.
In short, the Kremlin leadership misjudged completely their capacity to control or even influence Islamist jihadist entities either within Russia or elsewhere. This misappreciation of reality extended to Iran. The mullahs are as indifferent to the needs or desires of Russia as they are to those of the US.
To date the Russians have shoveled bushels of carrots in the direction of Tehran. This has been good for business in that the Iranians can pay for nuclear reactors and assorted weapons systems. But, it has done no useful service for the Kremlin in the area of controlling Islamist jihadists--even those pesky ones in the North Caucasus.
The first hint that the Kremlin may be willing to wave a (small) stick has come with the acknowledgement by Dmitry Medvedev that additional sanctions are not out of the question. This is the first time that the Russian command echelon has admitted the slightest willingness to put another round of sanctions in place should the mullahs not prove a bit forthcoming in the context of the upcoming talks in Turkey between the P5+1 and Iran. While the Russian president (correctly) believes that sanctions are not very effective, they are "sometimes necessary."
This position can be seen as a very mild low caliber warning shot across the Iranian bow. If that is the Russian intent, if the Boys In The Kremlin really believe that Tehran can modify the actions of the Islamist jihadists in the North Caucasus, they are making one more mistake.
Russia has been making a firm bid for both regional and global power status over the past year or so. The Russian leadership has good reason for this gambit. The poor treatment given to the proud bear by the Bush/Cheney administration would have been motivation in and of itself. But, even more impetus is provided by the internal needs of Russian politics. The Russians need to believe that they are citizens of a powerful, respected (even feared) state. In and of itself the sense of belonging to a potent entity makes up for lacks and even sacrifices in daily life.
It is hard to pretend that Russia is actually a Great Power when it cannot effectively counter the insurgencies in the North Caucasus. Even if the insurgents do not engage in any spectaculars, the chronic unrest constitutes a running sore on the credibility of the government and its assertion of regional or global status. It is a galling problem and the Kremlin is looking for a quick solution.
It will not be found in Tehran. Neither carrots nor sticks can produce any effective Iranian intervention in the North Caucasus. The limits of Iranian influence and authority may run to the Gaza Strip but they do not include the North Caucasus.
Nor will favorable policies toward Iran give the Kremlin the potential to "guide" Islamist jihadist movements elsewhere in the world in a manner akin to the Soviet Union's use of communist doctrine to motivate and control the "liberation" movements of thirty or forty years ago. Islamism is onto itself as an ideology--and it does not speak nor read Russian.
In the still unlikely event that Russia signs on to another round of sanctions against Iran, it is quite improbable that these will have the desired, favorable effect. Iran is quite impervious to sanctions now. It is too close to its goal of acquiring near-term break out on the nuclear weapons front.
Whatever the Kremlin may think or wish, the prospect of a nuclear capable Iran is both real and soon in nature. Their hint of a stick in the offing is too late in the proceedings to have any impact. The Kremlin (and Washington) will have to face the fact that the mullahs will soon have the "Mahdi Bomb" in their possession.
The Kremlin Crew will also have to face the brutal reality that its claims of regional and global status will continue to ring hollow. The continuation of the North Caucasus insurgency and its potential for horizontal escalation undercuts all pretense to Great Power status. (The analogy would be the US claiming Great Power status with an ongoing insurgency by Mexican nationalists in the American Southwest.)
Unfortunately the Russians have to look to themselves for success in the North Caucasus. The avenue to success there is easy to see, easy to outline in principle as the Geek has shown in previous posts on the subject--but very hard to execute in practice given the extreme inertia resident in Russian institutions both military and civilian.
As the Americans demonstrated in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the ultimate cause of defeat is self-inflicted wounds. Unless the Kremlin can get a grip on that reality they are going to do the same in the North Caucasus--and potentially elsewhere in Russia.
That would be bad for the US. Bad for the world. A crumbling, internally unstable nuclear power the size of Russia is a nightmare no one wants to face.
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