Let's Gang Up On Israel--One More Time

The Parade Marshal was Iran. The Drum and Bugle Corps included all the Arab states. Marching in line were a number of the so-called "lesser developed" countries. Joining in for the fun were China and "listen-more-closely-to-US-concerns" Russia.

The festivities were conducted by the 150 members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the annual meeting of this august (and questionably neutral) body. The guest of honor was Israel.

Israel along with India and Pakistan has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and this has exercised the collective outrage of the "international community"--or, to err on the side of accuracy, forty-nine components of that alleged "community." Forty-five other states including the US refused to join in the collective display of displeasure and sixteen apparently could not decide whether or not they were incensed by Israel's non-participation in the NPT.

To nobody's surprise the Iranian delegate to the IAEA crowed about what a great day this was for the Palestinian people and what "a glorious moment" the vote was. Presumably it was a good day for the Man From Mullahland as it took the spotlight for a brief instant off the Iranian pursuit of the "Mahdi Bomb" and focused it on the "Zionist Entity."

The Israeli possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal is the world's worst kept secret although the government of the country never has confirmed nor denied its existence. Instead the government of Israel has repeatedly and coyly maintained it would never be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons to the Mideast. Whatever that might mean.

It is a debatable point as to whether or not the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons has increased or decreased Israeli security. When the decision to embark upon a nuclear procurement program was made back in the days when Ike was in the White House and Israel was both outnumbered and outgunned by the assorted Arab states, it was (correctly) seen as a necessary and prudential precaution.

The US turned a semi-Nelsonian eye to the Israeli developments during the days of Camelot and its successor, the LBJ administration. The Israeli nuclear program developed quickly and successfully using means both fair and foul--including the "theft" of yellowcake shipments. By the time of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israelis had a significant nuclear capability.

One result of this capacity was its threatened use of the "Sampson Option," which caused the Nixon administration to strip US stockpiles of needed conventional arms and supply critical intelligence to the Israelis. The rapid American re-supply effort was responsible in part for the breathtakingly rapid reversal of Israeli fortunes on the ground in Sinai and, even more importantly, on the Golan Heights.

The US and the Soviet Union both feared the consequences of the Israelis employing the "Samson Option" more than they did even the potential of a direct confrontation, so Moscow backed down from its rhetorical threats as its own sources confirmed the Israeli threat was both real and imminent. From the Israeli perspective, having nukes paid off even when not used.

Israel has nothing to gain and everything to lose by joining the NPT. There is no inducement the US or any other country can provide which would cause Israel to rethink its position on nuclear weapons. Jews learned the very hard way seventy years ago that when push comes to shove, they are on their own. And, no one should forget that a prime reason for the establishment of Israel was to provide a sure and certain final redoubt for Jews of the world.

The Iranian quest for nuclear weapons makes it far more impossible for Israel to set aside a policy which has served it well for decades. The Iranian bomb may or may not be an existential threat to Israel--no less an authority than Defense Minister Barak asserted it was not just the other day. However, given the display of vitriol on the part of Ahemdinejad at the al-Quds Day celebrations in Tehran, it would be foolhearty in the extreme to bet the life of the country on the goodwill or good sense of the mullahs.

The majority was predicated on a pair of false assumptions. One was simply the old theme of "Muslim solidarity." The other was the bogus belief on the part of many nuclear have-not nations that the US and other nuclear powers sought to control access to nuclear technology for their own economic benefit. It might be noted in passing that the US--with the exception of the recent agreement between it and India--is and has not been a major exporter of nuclear equipment and technology. Both the French and the Russians have been far, far more active in this area.

The US and other Western countries may be cautious in who buys equipment and knowledge from them. This is for good reason. These countries are the most likely to become the targets of weapons either nuclear or radiological which may derive from these sales. Russia is less worried. The Kremlin may be wrong in its view, only time will tell.

In any event, countries with a presumed need for access to nuclear technology which possess the means to pay and membership in the NPT have and will continue to have no real problem in acquiring the equipment and knowledge they desire. It is, after all, a profit deal for the vendors.

A related question is simply that of the effectiveness and impartiality of the IAEA. Recent disclosures, particularly that of the "secret annex" to the last IAEA report on Iran, show a startling lack of impartiality or even attention to duty on the part of the IAEA senior leadership. Given the record of Dr ElBaredi on the Iranian question, there is little if any reason to trust the IAEA in the discharge of its responsibility to detect and prevent violations of the NPT.

Only time can tell if the new regime at IAEA will be any more efficient and less partisan than the outgoing one. But the reality continues: If the IAEA cannot be fully trusted, if the IAEA cannot resist the siren song of ideology or ethnic loyalities, the NPT is a dead letter.

It was the perceived partisanship or blatant ineffectiveness of the IAEA which prompted Israel to abate potential nuclear nuisances in Iraq nearly thirty years ago and Syria last year. It may also eventually necessitate a similar but far more risky and costly operation directed against Iran.

Nuclear proliferation is a reality. It is one which grows with each failure of IAEA to do its task fully and effectively. It grows with every successful evasion of the NPT by states such as North Korea.

While some countries such as South Africa, Brazil, and even Libya have publicly abandoned their quest for nukes, there are others who seek to acquire the Big Bomb. Arguably, there are more of the latter than the former.

Instead of meaningless grandstanding, the members of the IAEA should be investing their efforts into protecting themselves from future planting of nuclear mushrooms by making the NPT and the IAEA more effective. Israel is a done deal. Deal with those yet to come. Deal with the threats yet to emerge--now before it is too late to do so.